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Foreword

The

International

Naval

War

Law Studies

(the "Blue

Book")

series

was inaugurated by the

College in 1901 as a forum for essays, treatises, and articles that

promote a broader understanding of international law. The eighty-second volume of
The Law of War

this historic series,

Force,

in the 21st Century:

a compilation of scholarly papers derived

is

2005 colloquium hosted by the Naval

Weaponry and

the Use of

from the proceedings of a June

War College.

The purpose of this colloquium was

to

examine international

applicable to the use of force, as well as the development

legal standards

and employment of

Newport from more
than 20 countries and included government officials, military commanders, repre-

weapons systems

came

in the 21st century. Participants

to

sentatives of nongovernmental organizations, esteemed international law scholars,

and military and

civilian lawyers.

During the course of events, attendees grappled

with vexing issues such as the suitability of principles developed for inter-State
conflict to a global threat

environment increasingly influenced by non-State actors.

Undoubtedly, the ideas generated during the summer colloquium and revisited in
this

the

Book volume will contribute substantially to the ongoing examination of
major legal challenges accompanying 21 -century armed conflict.
Blue

st

On behalf of the
Commandant

Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the

of the Marine Corps,

I

extend a

warm thank you

to Professor

Charles Garraway, the 2004-2005 Stockton Professor of International Law, and

Major Richard Jaques,
nized.

tions

I

also

and

USMC, under whose leadership this colloquium was

orga-

wish to thank the authors and editors for their invaluable contribu-

for engendering a greater understanding of international law.

also to the Lieber Society of the

Thanks

American Society of International Law and Roger

Williams University's Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, gracious cosponsors of this
colloquium. And,

finally, a

very special note of gratitude goes to the Naval

College Foundation and Israel Yearbook on

support

made this

Human

Rights,

whose tremendous

conference and, particularly, this "Blue Book" possible.

JACOB

L.

SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval

War

War College

Introduction

The

Naval

War College hosts an annual conference to examine international

law issues and developments that
time and during armed
cal Lessons of NATO's
1 1,

we looked

conflict.

affect military operations,

both in peace-

The 2001 conference examined the Legal and Ethi-

Kosovo Campaign. In 2002, following the tragic events of 9/

at International

trum of issues were analyzed

Law and

the

War on

Terror. In 2003, a

in Current Issues in International

broad spec-

Law and

Military

Operations, including, of course, a discussion of the initial events of Operation
Iraqi

Freedom, which had begun on March 20th of that

year. In

the 2002 conference was continued in Homeland Security

2004 the work of

& Combating Terrorism.

By 2005, we determined that it was time to examine the manner in which rapid
advances in the types and capabilities of weapons and the methods of warfare were
changing how warfare will be conducted in the future, and the implications of that
change for the law of armed conflict. The conference began with a discussion of the
International Committee of the Red Cross's then just published Customary International Humanitarian

enough

Law

study (hereinafter the Study).

to have Jean-Marie Henckaerts,

We

were fortunate

one of the authors, present an overview of

the Study, which purports to be a "restatement of contemporary customary inter-

national law."

A panel of equally distinguished scholars and government and mili-

tary lawyers questioned both the

conclusions, while acknowledging
articles

methodology of the Study and
it

certain of

its

was an indispensable resource. The scholarly

contributed to this volume by Mr. Henckaerts and the panelists provide

valuable insight into the Study.

Another important development
ture conflicts

is

likely to

be as one

is

that participation

by the United States

member of a coalition of nations,

in Operations Allied Force, Desert Storm,

Enduring Freedom, and

as

in fu-

was the case

Iraqi

Freedom.

The panel on coalition warfare addressed the implications and challenges of bringing together warfighters whose nations may have differing views on the content of
customary law and are parties to different treaties.
Immediately following the conclusion of the conference, a Conference Sum-

mary was prepared and

distributed to the participants. This excellent review

marized the remarks of the speakers and the discussion that followed.
incorporated into the Preface.

I

encourage you to read

It

sum-

has been

it.

The conference was cosponsored by the Lieber Society on the Law of Armed Conflict

of the American Society of International

Law and was organized under

the

leadership of Professor Charles Garraway, the Naval

War

College's Charles H.

US Marine

Stockton Professor of International Law, and Major Richard Jaques,
Corps, of the International

of the Naval

War

Law Department.

It

was made possible with the support

College Foundation and the Israel Yearbook

on

Human

Rights.

Without the dedicated efforts and support and assistance of these individuals and organizations, neither the conference nor this
I

would

particularly like to recognize

volume would have been

possible.

my appreciation to Rear Ad-

and express

miral Joseph Strasser, Executive Director of the Naval War College Foundation, for
the continuing contributions of the Foundation to our annual conferences and the

publication of the "Blue Book" series that reflect the proceedings of those conferences.

On

the eve of Admiral Strasser's retirement as Executive Director of the

Foundation,

we extend

contributions and his
I

also

would

to

him our profound

own personal support of the International Law Department.

like to

extend

my sincere

dinaire, Captains Jack Grunawalt

for the "nuts

thanks, both for the Foundation's

thanks and gratitude to editors extraor-

and Ralph Thomas, USN JAGC

(Ret.).

Responsible

and bolts" editing of these outstanding papers, Jack and Ralph devoted

myriad hours to

this project, assuring painstakingly

Law

and

skillfully that this

work

Tony Helm,
JAGC, US Army, Deputy Chairman, International Law Department, served as man-

would be the best-ever

International

Studies volume. Colonel

aging editor of this volume. His dedication and perseverance in communicating with
contributing authors throughout the world, marshaling authors' papers, packaging
the volume,

and overseeing the complex publishing and distribution process

deserving of special thanks. In short, this Department
professionals

who worked so

is

also are

truly indebted to these three

diligently to bring this Blue

Book to

its

readers.

For over one hundred years the United States Naval War College has committed
itself to

combining a scholarly understanding of the laws of war with an apprecia-

—

and insight into the perspective of the warfighter the one who must apply
those laws in the crucible of conflict on land, at sea and in the air. This conference
tion for

and

this

"Blue Book" continue that tradition.

MANDSAGER
Professor of Law & Chairman
DENNIS

L.

International

xn

Law Department

Preface

While planning

this

volume of the International Law Studies

series,

we

concluded that an excellent conference summary prepared painstak-

Timothy Flynn and Stephen Sarnoski, both reserve officers in the
Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps, would be a fitting preface for this book.
Major Richard Jaques, USMC, who was the 2005 conference coordinator for the
ingly by Captains

International

Law Department,

also played a

key role in

this compilation.

we offer the following edited summary as both a snapshot of the 2005 International Law Conference and an appropriate retrospective context from which
the works in this volume flow. Of course, at the first mention of editing, it is fitting
Professor Emeritus
to thank and praise those who breathed life into this volume
and Captain Jack Grunawalt and Captain Ralph Thomas, both retired Navy Judge
Advocates and long-time supporters of the International Law Department. Indeed,
they made tidying up the text and scouring the footnotes of the authors' papers
look easy, and it was plain to us from the start that they love their work just as much
as we truly enjoy and love having them work side-by-side with us in the Department. I can think of no one else I'd rather entrust my own writings to than Jack and
Ralph. They know the law, understand the dynamics of the annual conference, and
have internalized the protocols and nuances of the legal writer's bible we refer to
respectfully as "the other Bluebook." Indeed, but for their genuine sense of modThus,

—

names unquestionably should grace the spine of this volume of the International Law Studies series. Gentlemen
Bravo Zulu well done. A hearty thankyou is also in order for several key members of the Naval War College Desktop
Publishing Office. As Jack and Ralph brought this volume to life, Ms. Susan Meyer
was personally responsible for its care and feeding formatting, providing "camera-ready" copy, and otherwise completely packaging the volume for publication.
It would be hard to find a more responsive, thorough, and dedicated professional
esty, their

.

.

—

.

—

than Ms. Meyer. Likewise, Ms. Meyer's boss, Mr. Jeremiah Lenihan, was instru-

mental in resolving

ticklish

formatting matters, and two superb proofreaders, Ms.

Susan Farley and Ms. Angela Daughtry, whose eagle eyes caught every figurative
uncrossed "t" and undotted
Again, thanks to
to

all

at

"i," also

were indispensable Blue Book contributors.

Desktop Publishing for helping deliver such a quality project

our distinguished readers.

Preface

Introduction

As alluded
lieved

it

to above, as time passed

and the dust of conference past

would be useful to recount salient themes and highlights

toric value

settled,

—not

we be-

just for his-

but as a basis for understanding and appreciating the fine works of this

volume's contributors. For example, during the 2005 Conference, The Law of War
in the 21st Century: Weaponry and the Use of Force, participants debated energetically the

measure of importance and authority to be accorded the recently pub-

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Customary International
Humanitarian Law study. Attendees and panelists also pointed out the need for
careful and timely legal review of weapons development programs to ensure their
by-products ultimately would pass legal muster under international law. Another
recurring general theme
undoubtedly a truism was that the realities of today's
lished International

—

—

substantially asymmetrical conflicts raise

mand serious examination.
tions

and

Participants also emphasized the importance of coali-

need for a

stressed the

unique international law issues that de-

common methodology for conducting combined

operations, particularly with regard to rules of engagement

(ROE) and detainee

treatment. Finally, the colloquium wrestled with an array of challenges emanating

from technological advances

that will affect future navies

and require

careful dis-

cussion and analysis today.

Keynote Address

Kennedy observed initially that the aspirahumanitarian law proponents and the goals of those who

In his keynote address, Professor David
tions of international

practice the military arts are inextricably intertwined.

He

observed that evolving

principles of the law of armed conflict have engendered an alliance
tary and civilian practitioners
that conflict presents

sor

and between warriors and their lawyers. Recognizing

more than a set of easily recognizable legal problems,

Kennedy addressed

the future of international humanitarian law

ing the colloquium to answer several incisive questions.
differ

depending upon the nature of a

of a nation

mandate

is

at stake

between mili-

conflict?

or a coalition of nations

is

Do

Profes-

by challeng-

law of war principles

Does it matter whether the

survival

simply enforcing a United Nations

to preserve or restore peace following a low- intensity conflict? If conflict

more than a complex set of legal problems resolved by applicaset of principles and procedures, does application of the modern

presents something
tion of a discrete

law of armed conflict also require moral judgments using a broader interpretive

framework? Professor Kennedy concluded by inviting the conference attendees to

xiv
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answer these and other questions, recognizing that "[l]aw doesn't provide the answers

.

.

.

we

do."

Conference Panel I

—Defining Customary International Humanitarian Law

Following Dr. Kennedy's presentation, Conference Panel I opened with a stimulat-

ICRC Customary International Humanitarian
Henckaerts, ICRC legal adviser and co-author of the

ing debate about the efficacy of the

Law

study.

Mr. Jean-Marie

study, explained that the study

was commissioned

in 1995

by the 26th Interna-

Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent in Geneva, Switzerland.

tional

During the course of the study, members consulted extensively with 35 law of

armed

conflict experts, reviewed the practices of

47

States,

and delved

into

ICRC

more than 40 international and non-international armed conflicts. Study members adopted an inductive reasoning process, reviewing State
practices and producing 161 rules, most of which address both international and
archives covering

non-international conflicts. Mr. Henckaerts also explained the principal reasons

embarking on a study aimed

for

at defining principles reflective

of customary in-

ternational law: international humanitarian law treaties bind only those States that
ratify

them, and parties to the same conflict

may be bound by different treaty obli-

gations; treaties governing non-international

developed; and characterizing a conflict
ties

or protocols apply. In

fact,

is

armed

conflict are not always well

required before determining which trea-

Mr. Henckaerts emphasized that while certain

pects of international humanitarian law exist in treaties, not

States are parties to

and not all elements of international humanitarian law are codified in

such

treaties

such

treaties. Likewise,

a

all

as-

according to Mr. Henckaerts, not

normative framework for non-international

all

current treaties reflect

conflicts.

Professor Tim

McCormack, the Australian Red Cross Professor of International
Humanitarian Law at Melbourne University and the Director of the Asia-Pacific
Centre for Military Law in Australia, characterized the ICRC study as an invaluable
primary source of information on the practice of States in international humanitarian law.

He asserted, however, that criticism of the study was inevitable because

any attempt to identify the content of customary international law
controversial

ments which
as

and because the authors of the study have
in

some

cases

relied

on

is

invariably

official

docu-

were drafted and tabled with no thought to their status

examples of State practice.

Mr. Joshua Dorosin, Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs
U.S. State

Department Office of the Legal Adviser, noted the ICRC study

is

in the

an

in-

dispensable resource, but he also expressed concern over the methodology of for-

mulating the rules in the study. In his view, the rules are not adequately analyzed

xv
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and do not

reflect a separate

consideration of State practice versus opinio juris. In-

some parts of the study, there are very few references to State practice.
Former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, Professor Yoram

deed, in

Dinstein from Tel Aviv University expressed grave concern over the

ICRC study's

no bearing on the practice of States,
which is the bedrock of customary international law. As examples, he referred to
various reports submitted by rapporteurs to United Nations bodies and to comments made by persons not representing States. Professor Dinstein also observed
that, although military Manuals are indeed a primary source of customary international law, at least two of the so-called manuals referred to in the study are not real
manuals. He also highlighted a number of inconsistencies and errors in both the
black-letter rules and commentary of the study.
In an afternoon session, Mr. Henckaerts noted that the ICRC study was not inreliance

on numerous statements

that have

word on customary international humanitarian

law. Instead,

the study is where enlightened discussion about further development

and clarifica-

tended to be the

last

tion of the subject

must

begin.

tendees emphasized that there

During ensuing general discussion, conference

is

a clear distinction between State practice, as such,

and customary international law. Likewise, Professor Dinstein
distinguish between State practice

and opinio juris,

was not made adequately in the study. He
to

customary law and emphasized

the evidence

must be found

Others also noted that the

at-

that,

stressed the

need

to

a distinction that, in his view,

also challenged the leap

although treaties

may

from

treaty law

stimulate custom,

in the practice of or vis-a-vis non-contracting Parties.

ICRC study cannot be viewed

as evidence

of a substan-

body of customary international law merely because States have signed Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In this regard, it was widely
tive

agreed that evidence of any State practice in support of the existence of customary
international law

must be formulated independently of the voluntarily assumed

treaty obligations of signatory States.

—Disseminating International Humanitarian Law

Conference Panel II
Conference Panel

II

focused on the public awareness of and appreciation for inter-

Commentators emphasized that the Red Cross and
(RCRC) were founded and operate on the fundamental

national humanitarian law.

Red Crescent

Societies

and impartiality. In particular, Dr. Mohammed
Al-Hadid, President, Jordanian National Red Crescent Society, emphasized that
there is no religious connotation associated with either the Red Cross or the Red
principles of humanity, neutrality,

Crescent emblems. Both are meant to be purely humanitarian symbols. Dr. Hadid
also voiced his support for the creation of a third additional protocol to the 1949

xvi
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—

—

would adopt a new emblem the Red Crystal to enhance the protection of victims and the status of humanitarian assistance, especially during armed conflict, where in recent years respect for protective emblems
has eroded. This third protocol also would promote the universality of the ICRC
movement and help overcome the objection of certain States to the use of the two
Geneva Conventions

that

traditional symbols.

Ms. Lucy Brown, Senior Adviser, International Humanitarian Law, American
National Red Cross Society, emphasized the need to increase public awareness of

and support

for the principles of international humanitarian law, particularly

among school age

children and youth. Ms.

Brown introduced the "Exploring Hu-

manitarian Law" curriculum to the conference and noted that

it is

being piloted or

implemented in the United States and 94 other countries. Ms. Brown observed that
a necessary by-product of dissemination
ful coexistence

is

the reinforcement of principles of peace-

and facilitation of a return to peace in the event of an armed conflict.

Mr. David Lloyd Roberts, MBE, and formerly of the ICRC addressed the

efforts

ICRC to bring international humanitarian law training to the armed forces.
He cited the importance of the supporting role played by the ICRC and urged conof the

ference participants to ensure training

"[o]nce the fighting has started,
tial

it's

too

is

completed during peacetime because

late."

Mr. Roberts outlined certain poten-

obstacles to successful implementation of international humanitarian law

training
ples

and noted the lack of support

among some

ness of training,

for international humanitarian law princi-

senior military personnel, skepticism concerning the effective-

and the

difficulty

of adapting such training to the

realities

and

pressures of combat.

Conference Panel III

—Modern Weaponry and Warfare

On a completely different tack and heading, Conference Panel III addressed issues
modern weaponry and warfare. Mr. Ed Cummings, Assistant Legal
Adviser for Arms Control, Office of the Legal Adviser, US State Department, began
associated with

by recounting the

substantial

development of conventional weapons principles

over the past 100 years. Reminding the audience that weapons treaty negotiations
necessarily occur in a political context, he reinforced the fact that the United States

always seeks treaty consensus with an overriding goal of reducing

during armed

conflict.

the effect of weapons
fects

on

civilians.

technical

make

when

Mr. Cummings noted that the

on combatants but

Mr. Cummings

human suffering

rules focused originally

that rules tend

now to concentrate on ef-

also explained that States are reluctant to

be too

negotiating agreements because rapid technological advances

definitions

and descriptions of weapons obsolete shortly

xvi 1

on

after

may

agreements

Preface

are executed.

prove the

On the other hand, he observed that advances in technology can im-

reliability

of weapons and reduce casualty

rates.

Indeed, the

US Depart-

ment of Defense has directed that at least 99 percent of its submunitions produced
detonate properly and has proposed an amendment to the treaty covering antivehicle mines that calls for inclusion of detection devices for such weapons.

Doctor Marie Jacobsson, Principal Legal Adviser on International Law to the
Swedish Ministry for Foreign
36 of Additional Protocol
State party determine

by Protocol

I

I

Affairs, discussed

to the

Sweden's compliance with Article

Geneva Conventions. This

article requires that a

whether employment of a new weapon would be prohibited

or any other rule of international law applicable to that State party.

She averred that very few States complete weapons studies and that ICRC representatives have

1974,

it

been discussing what the parameters for such studies should be. In

established a delegation to review conventional weapons,

which

factors

human rights, and disarmament laws into its Article 36 studies.
The delegation may set conditions on the development of weapons relating to prihumanitarian,

mary, secondary, and indiscriminate
tive designs or limits the use

applications. In 2003,

effects,

Sweden pledged

commented

it

proposes alterna-

of a weapon in military or law enforcement

tarian law also should be considered

Jacobsson

and occasionally

further that

to review

when

whether international humani-

evaluating weapons for export. Dr.

weapons reviews occasionally

the absence of a clear distinction between interstate

are stymied

by

armed conflict and operations

such as peacekeeping.
Colonel Ken Watkin, Canadian Defense Forces Deputy Judge Advocate General/
Operations, offered his views on whether certain legal principles developed for international
States

mind

armed

conflict

should apply equally to asymmetric warfare between

and non-State actors. Colonel Watkin framed the

—chemical agents and expanding

treaty

bullets.

A

issue with

large

law bars the use of chemical weapons in armed

in

body of well-developed

conflict,

forcement purposes. Colonel Watkin, however, argues that

mane to

two weapons

but not for law en-

it

may be more

hu-

use prohibited riot control agents to clear a cave in combat than to use a

flame thrower or grenade for the same purpose. Certain chemical agents, such as

malodorants, calmatives, and darts, though prohibited by treaty law,

may

offer

armed conflict. Colonel Watkin observed
were banned by the 1899 Hague Declaration. He queried,

non-lethal alternatives to deadly force in
that expanding bullets

however, whether their use should be prohibited in

all

aspects of non-interna-

armed conflict particularly where the military forces are executing a law enforcement function. If use by police in a domestic law enforcement context is
considered humane, how is it inhumane to use such bullets for similar purposes in
armed conflict?

tional

xvin
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Mike Schmitt from the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany, opined that law and conflict are in a mutually
affective relationship and mused how future military technology may affect the existence, application, and interpretation of the law of armed conflict. Professor
Schmitt noted further that while a substantial number of treaties govern specific
means and methods of warfare, future agreements may cover depleted uranium
shells, computer network attacks, and space-based offensive operations. Indeed, in
February 2005, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
published a report listing likely future developments in US military technology and
means, including detection and destruction of elusive surface targets, robust tactical networks, networked manned and unmanned systems, detection of underground structures, assured use of space, cognitive computing, and the bioProfessor

revolution. According to Professor Schmitt, developments of this nature will in-

weapon

crease

more

precision,

transparent,

enhance

control, render the battlespace

and promote use of autonomous unmanned attack platforms.

In the context of the law of
the

command and

armed

conflict, these

developments also

will increase

asymmetry between technologically advantaged and disadvantaged combat-

ants. Professor

Schmitt commented further that asymmetry disrupts the balance

between military necessity and humanitarian concerns because the law does not
operate equally for both sides. Thus, the disadvantaged combatant
tactics

prohibited under the law of armed conflict as a

way to

battle,

because legally permissible tactics likely will be

futile.

may

resort to

survive or prevail in

Such

tactics

may

in-

clude fighting in civilian clothes, use of human shields and protected places, perfidy,

marking mustering points with protected symbols of the ICRC, and

suicide bombers.

regard the law of

Even

if

armed

a technologically disadvantaged
conflict, the

resort to

combatant does not

combatant may instead compensate

dis-

for

its

disadvantage by defining military objectives broadly while undervaluing collateral

damage.

A technologically advantaged combatant may engage in effects-based op-

erations rather than a serial destruction of the enemy's military force.

question and answer session, Professor Schmitt asserted that

During the

many critics are "cap-

tured by technology" and have proposed that a State should reduce the asymmetry
in

armed

conflict

by foregoing use of advanced weapons.
Conference Panel IV

—Coalition Warfare

Conference Panel IV tackled the timely and highly relevant topic of coalition warfare.

Discussion began with

USAF,

comments by

Brigadier General Charles Dunlap,

Combat Command, Langley Air
General Dunlap noted that 21st century warfare has become

Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, Air

Force Base, Virginia.

Jr.,

xix
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increasingly legalistic
identified a

and complex, and that

number of challenges

is

no exception. He

facing coalition partners, including differences

between and among coalition partners, disagreement over

in treaty obligations

what constitutes customary international
menting

coalition warfare

law,

and

differences in domestic imple-

General Dunlap emphasized the importance of developing

legislation.

ROE for all coalition forces, but noted the obvious difficulty in achieving this goal,
particularly with regard to the definition of self-defense
intent.

He also cautioned that legal hurdles facing coalition forces, e.g., the inability

of US forces to provide logistic support to
tional

and the meaning of hostile

its

coalition partners absent

an interna-

agreement concerning reimbursement for costs, have important operational

effects that

cannot be ignored by military commanders. General Dunlap com-

mented that creating a formal judge advocate general corps among coalition partners would be a positive initiative. He observed that when coalition partners
deploy JAGs with their operational forces, coordination is facilitated and synergies
result. The General emphasized, however, that military commanders must understand and internalize the proper role of their military legal advisers, instructing
that "JAGs provide advice; commanders make decisions." General Dunlap concluded by warning conferees about the development of the
"lawfare,"

which he described

to the law of

armed

as the use of legal principles

conflict to mischaracterize

phenomenon of

such as those applicable

and undermine a

State's actions.

The General emphasized the importance of recognizing the practice of "lawfare,"
and encouraged the US and its coalition partners to meet lawfare activity head-on
by actively and publicly providing their own legal analysis and justification for
their actions.

Commander (CMDR)

Dale Stephens of the Royal Australian Navy and liaison

Law Department, US Naval War College, echoed GenDunlap's comments concerning the importance of harmonizing ROE among

officer to the International
eral

coalition partners,

and

might be developed.

briefly

CMDR

summarized the process through which such

ROE

Stephens warned against a purely formalistic ap-

proach to the development of coalition ROE, however, emphasizing that a more
realistic

approach

is

necessary.

Among

considerations pertinent to the develop-

ment of coalition ROE, CMDR Stephens mentioned the importance of exercising
"calibrated discretion on key operational law concepts," the value of the socializing
experience achieved by participation in international coalition operations, and the

need to globalize the training of military officers.
tified a

number of challenges

to the effective

Commander Stephens also iden-

development of common coalition

ROE, including difficulties associated with translating the principles of the law of
armed conflict into a State's domestic law and the pressing need to reinforce a
commonality of language between international military lawyers and
xx
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government agencies. He capped his presentation with a quote from renowned author and Professor Louis Henkin, who once stated, "Almost all nations observe al-

most all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all
of the time."
Professor Charles Garraway, the 2004-2005 Charles H. Stockton Professor of
International Law,

US

War

Naval

College, observed that in order for a multi-na-

coming together
Professor Garraway

tional coalition to work, the principles underlying the reason for

must be

in the first place

internally

wisely commented that " [i] f there

is

and externally consistent.

no

coalescing, there

is

no coalition." Professor

Garraway instructed that the distinctiveness of each coalition partner need not be
sacrificed in order achieve the goals of a successful coalition. Rather,

secret

work around those

to

is

distinctions. Professor

cern about the apparent uncertainty regarding the

Garraway

reflect

that the only existing

The United

also voiced con-

US position on which principles

of the law of armed conflict codified in Additional Protocol

United States to

he noted, the

I

are considered

by the

customary international law. Professor Garraway noted

US viewpoint, articulated in

States Position

1987 by Michael

J.

Matheson

on the Relation of Customary International

to the

authoritative. Professor

Garraway concluded

his

to the

no longer considered
presentation by questioning

1949 Geneva Conventions,

1977 Protocols Additional

Law

in

is

whether the principles of human rights law, codified, for example, in the Interna-

Covenant of Civil and

tional

armed

conflict principles

Political Rights, coexist

during times of armed

with or are replaced by law of

conflict.

He asserted that the lan-

guage of the various human rights conventions made it clear that the two

legal re-

gimes were intended to co-exist, despite the former being considered lexgeneralis

and the

US

latter lex specialis. Professor

stance

more

on

this

Garraway again noted

a lack of clarity in the

matter and called for the United States to articulate

its

position

clearly.

Leslie

Green, Professor Emeritus, University of Alberta, Canada, and former

Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, picked up where Professor

He opined that the law of armed conflict prevails in situations of
armed conflict where its principles deviate from those embraced by human rights
Garraway left

off.

law. Professor

Green agreed with previous commentators, however,

the development of common
tions. Professor

the current

Green

also

treaty

ROE and a mutual understanding of detainee opera-

commented that

it

was time

for a

new treaty to

replace

NATO treaty. In his view, NATO has become an international organi-

zation that has transcended

new

in calling for

would

reflect

its

more

original mandate. Professor

accurately

NATO's

Green argued that

current goals and aspirations

and would be more representative of its current membership.
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Conference Panel

V—Future Navies

The penultimate conference panel generally considered the shape, methods, and
means of future navies. RADM Robert Cox, Associate Director, Assessment Division, Office of the

Chief of Naval Operations, tracked the progression of opera-

tional concepts in the

ongoing transformation of the

US

Navy. In short, the Navy

has evolved from the 1950s task group with specific missions, to the platform
centric motif of the 1970s sporting multi-mission battle groups, to today's

network

on defeating anti-access capabilities. According to RADM
Cox, the future Navy must be joint, distributed, netted, persistent, surge-based,
and surge-ready at home. Planning now occurs in minutes and hours rather than
in days. Naval forces must be fully netted with required kinetic and non-kinetic capability, employable when directed by the Combatant Commander. In this context, sea basing does not consist only of technology. Sound doctrine is required to
support the best use offerees in an effects-based environment. A move from a platform centric to a network centric environment has spawned legal challenges concerning employment of unmanned aerial vehicles, civilian mariners, frequency
spectrum management, and the maritime commons while the United States strives
to maintain a global naval presence through doctrinal and technological
centric force focused

transformation.

Rear Admiral Raydon Gates of the Royal Australian Navy spoke of a future navy

from the perspective of an operator in a mid-sized sea service. The trend for the
ture

is

projection of naval

power at home and offshore, wherever Australia's

ests are at stake. Australia's participation in coalition

national interests in the endeavor rather than

operations

may

fu-

inter-

reflect its

common interests with other partici-

pants. Different national objectives reflect different national priorities,

and

mili-

commanders must manage and harmonize these varied interests. Joint
application of power is another trend. According to Admiral Gates, national military forces must not only operate jointly, but must work with other instruments of
national power to assure a concerted defense effort. There will be a maritime element to future security undertakings, particularly in the littoral environment and
tary

primarily involving

ROE development and targeting principles. Technological de-

velopments in weapons systems also

employment of missiles with
sponding ROE. Australian forces

will

breed legal issues related, in particular, to

and development of correalso will be required to balance the implementation of network centric warfare with existing technology and fiscal considerations.
The Royal Australian Navy of the future will be smaller with no corresponding dethe

artificial intelligence

crease in operational tempo, while

its

operating budget likely will not increase.

the other hand, future ships will feature

On

more automation and be staffed with fewer
xxn
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sailors.

Greater use of contractors to support naval forces also will raise questions

about whether to characterize contractor employees as combatants and appropriate

methods of command and

discipline.

Captain Jane Dalton, Assistant Judge Advocate General (Civil Law) and

Com-

manding Officer, Naval Civil Law Support Activity, identified several aspects of future navies that require timely consideration by military lawyers. For example,
employment of civilian mariners aboard naval ships in billets historically held by
military members grows out of the Chief of Naval Operations' effort to move sailors from non-war fighting jobs to positions in direct support of fleet and combat
operations. Likewise, the proposed Maritime Prepositioning Force cargo ship

is

a

key part of the sea basing concept and will serve as a floating logistics center. Use of
this ship in

an "assault echelon" with combat forces and

and deck functions. Under international

a crew which

and

calls into

is

under regular armed forces

aboard

raises the

may manage

engineering, naviga-

law, a warship

must be "manned by

question of whether civilian mariners lawfully
tion,

aircraft

discipline." Yet this phrase

is

undefined

question whether the civilian crew must be subject to the same sys-

tem of discipline as the military members. Whether civilian mariners could be considered unlawful combatants depends upon whether they take a direct or active
part in hostilities. Would manning a weapons system or navigating a ship constitute direct activity? The Navy has developed a legislative proposal that includes
Navy Reserve affiliation as a requirement for detailing civilian mariners to a warship. Unmanned airborne and undersea vehicles are already engaged in combat
operations. Should they be treated like their

manned

counterparts?

Is

an un-

manned undersea vehicle a "vessel" under international rules to prevent collisions
at sea

and

are they required to

gimes under the

comply with the innocent and

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea?

transit passages re-

Captain Dalton also noted

unanswered questions related to hospital ships, which, while protected by law from
capture or intentional attack,

may not utilize encrypted communications. Changes

in technology, domestic laws

on

privacy,

however, have prompted the Navy to

and national communications

insist that its

policy,

two hospital ships deploy with

secure communications systems in order to complete their humanitarian missions

and comply with domestic law. Captain Dalton

also observed that the

Law of the

Sea Convention supports Sea Power 21 and the Proliferation Security Initiative,

and does not

affect

US

that reference in the

intelligence-gathering activity. She

would contend further

Convention to use of the high seas for other internationally

lawful uses permits the United States to stage forward-deployed sea bases in the exclusive

economic zones of coastal

States. In

any event,

US sea basing will comport

with the law, whether the operation involves humanitarian
forcement, or international armed conflict.

xxin

relief,

UN sanctions en-

Preface

Professor Doctor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg of the University of Frankfurt-

Oder and University of Augsburg, Germany,
Professor of International
state

Law at the US Naval War

of the law of naval warfare and

Heinegg noted

first

also a

its

former Charles H. Stockton
College, reviewed the current

future challenges. Professor Heintschel

that current provisions regarding signal encryption

ing of hospital ships have been questioned and

may be somewhat

von

and arm-

anachronistic.

He noted further that deception rules and principles must be adjusted to reflect developments in the electronic environment. Similarly, according to Professor
Heintschel von Heinegg, the concept of blockade remains settled, but must be distinguished from other methods of naval warfare, such as maritime interception,
zones,

and control of enemy commerce and operations under

Council resolution. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg asserted,

a

UN

Security

as well, that

mari-

time zones must be analyzed carefully to determine whether they are intended to

be unlawful

free fire

zones or legal ruses of war. In short, a zone must have a

mate purpose and must

limit the area of naval warfare, protect neutral

legiti-

and inno-

cent shipping, and subject neutral shipping and aviation to extensive control

measures. In Professor Heintschel von Heinegg's view, future challenges to the law

of naval warfare include excessive maritime claims to well-defined geographical areas, different interpretations

and

legal targets,

of basic legal concepts, confusion about political aims

and the impact of human

rights law. Additionally, challenges re-

garding asymmetric actors are based on the increasing multitude of terrorists and
non-State actors and other difficult questions have arisen as well from the indefatigable trend toward civilianizing positions within the

armed forces. The technology

gap in naval warfare also has raised the technological inferiority argument which
has engendered a decreasing willingness to accept legal regulation of armed conflict.

So, too, has the illusion of "clean warfare"

been fostered by today's precision

weaponry generated by advances in technology. According to Professor Heintschel
von Heinegg, however, these various challenges to the law of naval warfare do not
justify the various

demands

for

new rules.
Conclusion

The

foregoing, in a nutshell,

was an overview of the 2005 International Law De-

partment conference and a glimpse of the

scintillating views, discussion,

and opin-

by the pages of this the 82d volume of the International Law Studies
series. And if this conference and volume have taught us anything, it is that, as this
world entered the Age of Aquarius, it changed in ways only the most forward
thinkers could have imagined
speed-of-light communication available to the
ions cloaked

—

masses; transnational enemies

who

rely

on
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means

to

flit

about the globe with

relative ease;

enemies

who have waged with im-

punity a type of asymmetrical conflict that endures without regard for even the

most

basic tenets of international humanitarian law; the "lawfare"

that thrives

phenomenon

on the Internet and other mass media and is used by our enemies

daily

to contest the legitimacy of well-intentioned acts or highlight isolated failings; prolific

sea

use of unmanned vehicles and precision weaponry; basing a fighting force at

where

coastal access

is

rectly?) specific principles

curtailed;

and attempts

to over-define ("codify" indi-

of customary international humanitarian law; and the

growing practice of employing civilians in positions traditionally held by members

name

wake of these changes, those entrusted with
the defense of their nations have struggled to adapt both technologically and operationally. It is perhaps for these reasons and in the face of other such challenges that
Professor Kennedy recognized so poignantly that a firm and durable alliance has
been struck between warriors and their lawyers.
In closing, then, it is our sincere desire that the following works of the preeminent authors who contributed so graciously to this volume will assist those seeking
answers to today's hard questions and propagate thoughts and action that shape
of the military, to

a few. In the

the future.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

I

War and International Law:
Distinguishing Military and Humanitarian
Professions

David Kennedy*
Introduction: a

Common Profession

would like to begin by thanking Admiral Shuford, Professor Dennis
Mandsager and Professor Charles Garraway, as well as Major Richard Jaques
and Commander Dale Stephens, who have given me and my students a warm
welcome at the Naval War College. I appreciate their generous hospitality and
good counsel.
For civilian students and academics like me, who have never served in uniform,
the military profession can seem to be a different universe. But how different are
we, professionals within and outside the armed services? How different are the professions of war and peace?
When I was a young man, they could not have seemed more different. I regis-

I

—

—

bombings of Hanoi in 1972,
I hoped I would find work promot-

tered as a conscientious objector after the Christmas

and eventually became an international lawyer.

ing peace, economic development, humanitarian
global stage.

*

Nothing seemed

and progressive values on the

as different as the

humanitarian and military

Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. The viewpoints expressed

article are the author's alone.

in this

Distinguishing Military

professions

—

the one

made

and Humanitarian

Professions

war, the other sought to limit war's incidence and

moderate war's violence.
Indeed, the military seemed to

me

then

all

that international law

violence and aggression in contradiction to our reason and restraint.
later that

I

learned

how many international

was not
It

was only

lawyers serve with the military

how readily humanitarians have rushed to legitimate the use of force.
War and peace. I studied history and political science. War, we learned,

—and

"broke

when "disputes" could not be resolved peacefully, when cosmopolitan reason
gave way to nationalist passion, when the normal "balance of power" was upset by
abnormal statesmen. These bad guy statesmen pursued outmoded projects of agout"

grandizement, domination, aggression or imperialism. They were in cahoots with

what we

called "the military industrial complex"; not

knowing we were quoting

Eisenhower.
Realpolitik

was the

tional relations

disease; the softer

wisdom of international law and

interna-

was the cure. The key to peace was wise statecraft and conflict man-

We put our faith in negotiations among the disputing parties—which we
hoped to facilitate. We were sure that reasonable aspirations for peaceful change
agement.

should

—and would—be accommodated by wise

serve as advisors. Leaders
itarian

and cosmopolitan

leaders, for

whom we

would

who would act for the common good, in a global humanspirit.

Leaders like that would address the roots of war in

poverty, cultural backwardness, nationalist isolation, or ideological fervor.

—

would need and want
tional community.

More than anything
good

practices,

—help from the

management

machinery of the interna-

would require procedures
a steady and imaginative institutional framework and a

else,

good offices,

institutional

They

for peace

cadre of dedicated humanitarian policy experts
the world's general interest in peace.

organizations (NGOs), and

civil

who

could express and implement

The United Nations,

society, the

the non-governmental

peacemakers and peacekeepers,

needed to succeed so that the military would never again be needed.

How

did

we imagine

the military?

Our knowledge was

vague. All that ceremony and hierarchy, training to

we were
rial. I

cooler heads prevailing.

think

we imagined war

troops mass at the border, a
skelter,

as

it is

not

it is

They were

our imagery

hot, passionate;

dry, focused, pragmatic

and manage-

depicted in films of the ancient world. The

command is given and everyone rushes forward helter-

applying lethal force as

But of course

We were

kill.

limited,

fast

like this at

and furiously as
all.

possible.

Scoundrels do rule

—often

there simply

is

no wise and benevolent ruler waiting for our advice about the general good.
More importantly, military and civilian professionals, although certainly different,
are no longer oil and water. War must also be managed by experts. The more I have

David Kennedy

known

military officers

and military lawyers, the more obvious the

tween our professions have become. The more

And

the

more

seen that

I've

when we

differ,

I've
it is

come to

see us

all

parallels be-

as

managers.

often the military that are the

cooler heads.

Some years ago, before the current war in Iraq, I spent some days on board the
USS Independence in the Persian Gulf. Nothing was as striking about the military
culture

I

encountered there as

its

intensely regulated

feel.

Five thousand sailors,

thousands of miles from base, managing complex technologies and weaponry,
constant turnover and flux.

It

was absolutely clear that even

if you

could afford to

buy an aircraft carrier, you couldn't operate it. The carrier, like the military, is a social system, requiring a complex and entrenched culture of standard practices and
shared experiences, rules and discipline.
The carrier is also a small town. I remember the eager salesman in a crowded
mess hall selling Chevrolets for delivery when the crew next hit shore. I came
away completely ready to believe that, at least in principle, no ship moves, no
weapon is fired, no target selected without review for compliance with regulation,
not because the military has gone soft, but because there was simply no other way
to make modern warfare work. Warfare has become rule and regulation.

—humanitarian law—

In a way, of course, the routinization of law
tary professions

is

a terrific achievement. Military professionalism affirms civilian

and humanitarian professions have merged, yield-

control. But more, our military

ing a humanitarian military and a

But I worry.

pragmatic humanitarianism.

realistic,

Was there nothing valuable in the separation of military and human-

itarian professions?

As our professions merge, what happens

standing outside, speaking humanist truth to military power?
the real political necessity for the military to break

some

to the virtues of

And what happens to

eggs

when

the going gets

tough? What, moreover, happens to the legal "principle of distinction?"
ciple that military

My project this
best

I

can, the

in the mili-

and

civilian professions

morning

is

must be

—

the prin-

distinguished.

to retrace the laws about warfare to illuminate, as

ways in which the military and

legal professions

have marked and

unmarked the boundary between war and peace, and some of the virtues and vices
of strengthening and weakening our sense that humanitarian and military professionals march to different drummers.
Looking back, the legal mind has sometimes sharply distinguished war and
peace, and sometimes blurred them together. The modern laws of war inherit both
traditions
and now offer us a confusing mix of distinctions that can melt into air
when we press on them too firmly. A law of firm rules and loose exceptions, of

—

foundational principles

—and counter

principles. This

guage can certainly limit our vision. For the

complex professional

legal professional

—whether

lan-

serving in

Distinguishing Military

and Humanitarian Professions

the military or the humanitarian world

—the challenge

is

to engage this slippery

body of material strategically as a partner in, rather than a substitute for, political
leadership and command responsibility.
The narrative line in this very complex historical story is actually quite simple
the rise and fall of a distinction between war and peace. For the early 19 th -century
jurist, war and peace were far less distinct than they came to seem in the half century before the First World War. After that war, 20 th -century international lawyers
sought to bridge the gap that had opened between war and peace, to routinize humanitarianism in the military profession and pragmatism among humanitarians.
Although they were quite successful our professions have merged the

—

—

potential to distinguish has not been eliminated. Instead, the relationship between

war and peace has become,
itself something to

be managed.

make and unmake the
in

for the

humanitarian lawyer and military professional,

We now have the rhetorical and doctrinal tools to

distinction

between war and peace.

And we do so as a tactic

both war and peace. The result is less a difference between the outside of human-

itarian virtue

and the

practitioners

manage

language;

all

common profession whose
war and peace within a common

inside of military violence than a

the relationship between

the while working in the

shadow of a new outside, the world we think

of as "politics."

Historical Backdrop: the Rise of "Modern

War"

Our laws of war were forged in the shadow of a new "modern" conception of warfare.

In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, what had been an aristocratic en-

deavor of the old regime became the general project of a nation

—an extension of

public policy, an act of the whole.

This

is

the development crystallized by Clausewitz as a continuity between

and peace.

war

We have come to treat his formulation as classic:

We know, certainly, that War is only called forth through the political intercourse of
Governments and Nations; but in general it is supposed that such intercourse is broken
War, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its
own. We maintain, on the contrary, that War is nothing but a continuation of political
off by

1
intercourse, with a mixture of other means.

The new

attitude Clausewitz proposes

had been building

the revolutionary break with the ancien regime

lowed
tic

—drove

and

it

—and the Napoleonic wars

home. The transformation of war from the

religious struggles of

for a generation.

But

that fol-

interpersonal, dynas-

an aristocracy to the public struggles of a nation

—
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citizens'

army, the levee en masse, the army "of the republic"

an extension of national policy, as a project of the whole

—made war

visible as

society.

War became continuous with the political intercourse of peacetime as it became
the public affair of a nation

—an instrument of national

policy,

an expression of

The ancient marks of military distinctiveness, the uniform, the profession, the codes of honor, became synonymous
not with aristocratic status, but with public life and often with submission to
national sovereignty, a sign of national honor.

—

civilian leadership.

Latent in the merger of war and public policy lay a distinction between the old

—wars of

war and the new
culation
It

and

honor and passion, versus wars of reason,

chivalry,

cal-

policy.

took some time for

this

new

vision to take hold. In 1838, a few years after

Clausewitz wrote, and long before he would became a wartime president, Abra-

ham Lincoln spoke of the abolitionist cause in these terms:
but can do so no more.

It will

in future be

unimpassioned reason, must furnish
defense."

all

"Passion has helped us,

our enemy. Reason, cold, calculating,

the materials for our future support and

2

—

In saying this, Lincoln was understood to set himself against war

the just cause

would need the calm determination of cooler peacetime heads. Two and a half decades later, however, Lincoln would be embroiled in a war that would confound
this easy

opposition of passionate war and reasoned peace.

—

Our Civil War

—
—

much of the law in war

remembered
as the first "modern" war. In part, this is winner's history
a war of the modern
North against the antebellum South, a war of industrial power and the Federal Nation, against the old military order of chivalry and the old sectarianism of region. A
culture of commerce defeating a culture of honor, cold Northern reason slowly
birthplace for so

quenching the hot passions of the South
But the
sides, this

ined

Civil

was

a

war

pitting the full

as total war,

sanctification

ground"

3

split

—would

More than

economic and

spiritual

victory.

forestall war;

it

For both

powers of their imag-

war of the whole, war for the whole. In this

from
—"we cannot

remain

it

of a National Whole.

against another in a struggle for national identity.

unimpassioned reason would not

would

name

often

War's modernity lay not only in the Northern

community

conducted

in the

is

Modern war

sense, Lincoln's

would become war. But neither

passion, as Lincoln's inspired vocabulary of sacrifice,
dedicate,

we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this

attest.

anything, the modernity of the Civil

War lay in

the strange

brew of

reason and passion through which the struggle was understood by both sides. The

Northern cause was also a crusade, the Southern military also a redoubt of professional

skill,

thought, and

art,

against an often brutal Northern campaign.

The

Distinguishing Military and Humanitarian Professions

rhetorical tools for distinguishing

war and peace, new wars and old wars, were

there, but they were redirected to define the relations

This

mix of passion, reason and national expression on both sides conjured up

war of singular

ferocity. In a sense, the Clausewitzian vision

war had become continuous,
gles

between the warring parties.

in reason

and passion, with the

had been

a

realized

great political strug-

of the nation.

Legal War:

On the one hand,
sion of warfare.

Modern War Encounters Modern Law

19 th -century legal developments contributed to this emerging vi-

The

private

modes of warfare

associated with the old regime,

thought incompatible with a unitary public sovereign monopoly of
progressively eliminated.
"privateering," a

complex

The 1856

Paris Declaration,

legal institution

were

"letters

of marque" au-

Henceforth there would be

military.

At the same time, however,
transformed what

acts.

force,

for example, eliminated

through which

thorized private vessels to carry out belligerent

one sovereign, one

4

now

it

meant

for

late

19th century changes in legal consciousness

war

to be the exclusive act of a public sovereign.

Most crucially, by the end of the 19th century, it no longer meant that war was continuous with peace, or a project of the whole more the opposite.
The emergence of a sharp distinction between public and private brought with it

—

the image of a transnational commercial space that should be kept free

from con-

tamination by public force. Private armies, mercenaries, privateers;

these were

outmoded, not only because they were part of an
did not

fit

aristocratic past,

all

but because they

with the new, exclusively public nature of sovereign war powers.

The public realm had become one sphere of power among many, marked off
from the private realm of the market and the family. Public warfare that had
seemed general, continuous with the whole society, now seemed, in legal terms,
specific

—the

project of the government, not the society.

Law's Allies: Humanitarians Speaking Virtue

Humanitarian voices supported the
peace.

legal separation

to Violence

of war from the domain of

Broad pacifist campaigns arose from diverse sources: church leaders, propo-

nents of woman's suffrage, heirs to the abolition movement, as well as political activists

of all types

—

anarchists, socialists, populists, progressives, Catholics.

These diverse voices marked the distinction between war and peace in various

ways

—

as ethics against politics, as faith against the cruel logic

of commerce, as

calm reason against fanaticism, modern logic against the primitive culture of

8
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marked the line from peace to war parallel those by which both sides distinguished North and South.
All these voices spoke to war, to the statesmen and military who made war, from
in the name of an alternative ethical vision, sometimes national, more ofoutside
Clausewitz was now the problem. We
ten universal. War and peace were separate
might now say they pled for peace by speaking truth to power. The point was to
shrink the domain of war through moral suasion, agitation, shaming, and proselytizing. In their view, blurring war with peace was both dangerous and immoral.
honor. In

fact,

the terms with which they

—

—

This conviction lent an ethical urgency to the emergence of a sharp legal distinction between
tion.

war and peace. Each was now

Combatants and noncombatants, neutrals and

bundles of legal rights and privileges. The

was

a legal status, separated

legally

by

a declara-

belligerents have different

battlefield, the territory

of belligerency,

demarcated. The legal treatises of the period began to place the law of

peace and the law of war in separate volumes. In part, these distinctions aimed to
limit the carnage of

war by expanding the

military privilege to

kill.

privileges of civilians

and limiting the

These distinctions were also part of a broader reorganization of legal thought,
sharpening the distinction between the public and the private sphere, hardening
private rights

For

all,

and limiting public powers

to their respective spheres.

peace and war were to be legally separated, for example, private rights

we

were increasingly thought to be continuous across the boundary.

It is

began to see the logic of thinking that when the dust

war claiming the

lives

settles after a

here that

of millions, destroying empires, and remaking the political and economic

landscape of the planet, people might reasonably

feel

they are

still

entitled to get

their property back.

In short, the late 19th century developed an alliance between two rather different sets of ideas.

manding

A moral conviction that the forces of peace stand outside war, de-

that swords be beaten into ploughshares,

the distinction between public powers

and private

and

a legal project to sharpen

rights.

The result was a legal conception of war as a public project limited to its sphere.
The legal distinctiveness of war reinforced the idea that war was itself a discrete and
limited phenomenon
over there, the domain of combat. It seemed reasonable to
expect that warriors stay over there
and that protected persons, even women soldiers, stay outside the domain of combat.
This alliance of ethics and legal form has continued across the 20th century and
is with us still. We see it in the effort to restrain war by emphasizing its moral and
legal distinctiveness
by walling it off from peace and shrinking its domain. We

—

—

—

see

its

echo in the

many varieties of 20 th -century pacifism,

in efforts to revive "just

war" theory as an exogenous truth that can limit military power, and

in the struggle

Distinguishing Military and Humanitarian Professions

to bring the language of human rights to bear

to treat

combat and

armed

"police action" as fundamentally

domain of human

the one the

—

rights, the other the

and

professional

ethical

this outsider

view which, because

we even have
is

it

—

different;

proper domain of the law of

where

my own

To think war and peace con-

between war and peace,

how can

a conversation about limiting war's violence? In this view, our only

to bring

an external reason to bear on the violence of war

The Dark Sides of Outsider

come back to

tinct as all that.

this,

—and an

war might sometimes make

external

sense.

Virtue: Limits to the Alliance

Nevertheless, the dark sides of this outsider's perspective are
will

It is

could think war, would also find itself making war, was simi-

ethical passion to the cold calculation that

the uneasy feeling that

now familiar. There is,

war simply is no longer

Even assuming war might be conducted "over there,"

in

its

as dis-

own do-

has always been difficult to keep one's ethical distance from warfare in

it

modern

discussions of international affairs.

There

is

the nagging problem that force also has humanitarian uses in a wicked

We know

world. Moreover, war can strengthen our moral determination.

moral claims often become stronger when

great

in efforts

And to embrace a cynical, realpolitik point of

larly unthinkable. If you can't tell the difference

main,

it

journey began; in a moral world for which the

tinuous was to think the unthinkable.

I

to judge the

ethically, legally

approach.

Clausewitzian perspective was precisely the problem.

and

is,

conflict.

have a great deal of sympathy for

hope

military, that

of war by a different and higher ethical standard. But we also see

effects

I

on the

men and women

kill

and

that

die in

some kind of feedback loop between our ethical convictions
and our use of force. Moreover, we know how easily moral clarity calls forth vio-

their

name. There

lence

and justifies warfare.

for

is

It is

a rare military

campaign today that

is

not launched

some humanitarian purpose.
Looking back,

this

was a great lesson of the Civil War

their project

and excoriated

Both battled

in the

power

as they

went

—

opponents

at

both cool reason and hot crusade.

one another tooth and

we have

learned

how

speaking truth to

nail.

easily ethical

denunciation and out-

triggering intervention in Kosovo, Afghanistan, even Iraq

circumstances where

we

are not able to follow through

humanitarian promises which war cannot
rights

as

parties experienced

name of the National Whole. Everyone was

In the years since,
rage

their

—both

deliver.

The

—can

get us into

and cause the making of

universal claims of human

can seem to promise the existence of an "international community" which

simply not available to back them up.
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Indeed, the discourse of ethical denunciation often has a tip of the iceberg problem. Take Abu Ghraib. Sexually humiliating, even torturing and killing prisoners

is

probably not, ethically speaking, the worst or most shocking thing our Coalition
has done in Iraq.

We should worry that our outrage at the photos may also be a way

of not thinking about other injuries, deaths and mutilations our government has

wrought.

Outrage can
Ghraib a

legal violation

—or

dignity

from the hard questions. Was the problem

distract us

tactics?

—or

a failure of leadership?

The whole episode was

with the nagging question.

If it

Was the

Abu
failure one of human

clearly a military defeat.

could be kept

secret, if it

We

and combatants

—can become

its

own

on balance, reduce

idolatry. Is

ethical precepts in
it

is

Absolute rules lead us to imagine we know what violence

people, struggled for,
leadership

—on the

and redefined,

battlefield

and

is

not

wartime

—

as

sensible to clear the cave with a

firebomb because pepper spray, lawful when policing,
always and for everyone. But justice

left

alike.

know, moreover, that following absolute

any other time

But we are

could be done pursuant to a

warrant, perhaps sexual humiliation can help win the war; might,
the suffering of civilians

in

like that,

it

is

unlawful in "combat"?

and what is

just

must be imagined,

in each conflict in

new ways.

unjust,

built

by

Justice requires

off.

Of course, for all these difficulties, much can sometimes be achieved by bringing
humanitarian reason to bear on cultures of violence and by opposing the cruel
culations of cynical statesmen with ethical

cal-

commitment.

may not be able to stay all that external. Often,
the trouble begins when it hits the problem of exceptions. What if it were Hitler,
what if there were genocide, what if they were raping your mother? What about
self-defense? What about deterrence? These classic questions take us straight to the
Still,

an external moral discourse

doctrinal world of flexible standards, balancing conflicting considerations, assess-

ing proportionality that
gains.

To

figure out

is

familiar to the professional weighing costs to achieve

when and how much

self-defense

is

"just,"

we need

technical,

professional military expertise.

Some commentators reacted to the 1996 International Court of Justice opinion

—

on the Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons 5 a fabric of legal equivocations
by shaming the Court for speaking with nuance about an apocalypse; for

—

parsing the "slaughter of the innocents" into the
for worrying

more about

The horrors of

awkward

categories of Article 38;

the validity of norms than the future of humanity.

warfare, the dead

and mangled bodies, the

lives

and

families

ripped apart, the intense anxiety and suffering on and off the battlefield, the pain of
a single

wounded

child crying out,

language but that of moral

it

seems obscene to speak of these things

clarity, regret

and outrage.
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there, in fact,

an alternative
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mode

of discussion on which to ground this

Once we set out to speak of nuclear war as "slaughtering the innocents,"
we would soon enough need a definition for innocent. We would need to account
sensibility?

not merely for the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also for their singularity.

How can the

dangers of nuclear proliferation, nuclear error, nuclear

best be prevented? Serious, difficult questions.

What about

work? When? And, of course, what about torture?

first

use

deterrence, does

it

When does it work?

Moreover, presuming we speak about the slaughter of the innocents in order to

—

reduce the likelihood of nuclear war

need to

assess ethical

denunciation

benefits of denunciation?

we

will

are the costs

and

rather than merely to bear witness,

itself in tactical

What

terms.

When should we trim our sails a bit, hold back, even flat-

name of an effective pacifism? Of
course, if we hold our rhetorical fire this time people may die. People whose death
we might have prevented, in whose torture we acquiesce, whom we sacrifice for the
larger ethical objective of a stronger law in war, or a more legitimate International
ter those

whose

fingers are

on the button,

in the

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Humanitarian Pragmatism and Antiformalism

Strategy Switching:

Over the

last

century, these difficulties

the outsider strategy; an erosion sped

which

this strategy

had been

allied.

and ambiguities have eroded confidence
by the

The

first

fate

in

of the legal consciousness with

half of the 20th century

saw

a wide-

spread loss of faith in the formal distinctions of classical legal thought; in the wisdom,
as well as the plausibility,

of separating law sharply from

politics,

or private right

sharply from public power.

This loss of faith has had consequences for efforts to limit the violence of warfare

through law; both undermining
tral,

for example,

itary

classic distinctions,

and opening new strategies

for

between belligerent and neu-

moving more fluidly between mil-

and humanitarian professional vocabularies.

As a

result, the strategy

of external denunciation

never had the grip in the law of force that
rights.

Indeed, the

it

—naming and shaming—has

has had, say, in the field of

human

modern law of force represents a triumph for grasping the nettle

of costs and benefits and infiltrating the background decision- making of those

whom it would bend to humanitarian ends.
The result was a new, modern law in war. This is the law known to the ICRC and
much of the European international law establishment as "humanitarian law," and
to the US military as the "law of armed conflict." They are speaking about the same
thing.

I

prefer the classic term "laws in war" or jus in bello.
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As

early as the Civil

War, the humanitarian project sought

less to distinguish

war from peace, or just war from unjust war, or good guys from bad guys, than to
through an insider strategy of professionalization.

limit the violence of all sides

It is

not surprisingly that Francis Lieber, author of an early code of conduct for battle 6

had

on both

relatives

sides in

our

Civil

War. The law

in

war we have inherited

elo-

quently illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of this professionalization strategy.

The "law

in

mittee of the

war"

—

associated

Red Cross

—has always prided

with military professionals.

ICRC

most prominently with the International Com-

It is

on

itself

its

pragmatic relationship

not unusual to hear military lawyers speak of the

lawyers as their "partners" in codification

—and compliance—and

vice

They attend the same conferences, and speak the same language, even when
they differ on this or that detail.

versa.

Developing a

meant

common

insider vocabulary did not

mean

jettisoning rules;

it

of all placing the rules on a firmer footing in the militarily plausible.

first

Rules are not external expressions of virtue, but internal expressions of professional discipline.

Already in the 19th century,

many humanitarians thought the best way to

ceed was to work with the military to codify detailed rules they can respect

pro-

—no

ex-

To
among

ploding bullets, respect for ambulances and medical personnel, and so forth.
this day, the

most

have indeed been negotiated

significant codifications

diplomatic and military authorities.
In this, the codified 19 th -century law in

war was something of an exception

the prevailing spirit of classical legal thought

—and

a precursor for

low in the 20th century. Rather than elaborating private
ers, it

to

what would fol-

rights against public

pow-

harnessed the authority of public sovereignty to the articulation of limits;

foreshadowing an international

legal positivism that

would be theorized only

in

th

the early decades of the 20th century as a repudiation of 19 -century efforts to

ground law outside sovereign consent.

Of

course, this reliance

achieved
feel will

—

on

military acquiescence limited

military leaders outlaw weapons

what could be

which they no longer need, which they

be potent tools only for their adversaries, or against which defense would

be too expensive or difficult. Narrowly drawn rules permit a great deal

mate what

is

—and

legiti-

permitted.

Recognition of these costs

is

one reason the pragmatism of the law in war has

al-

ways meant more than positivism; more than deference to sovereign consent;

more than

legal clarity;

matism has
As you

power of nation States. Pragprinciples and standards replacing rules.
a vocabulary of principles has grown up

realism about the

—

meant antiformalism
know, since at least 1945,

also

all

more than

alongside tough-minded military bargains over weaponry.
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—

The Hague or Geneva law have morphed into standards simple ideas which can
be printed on a wallet-sized card and taught easily to soldiers in the field. "The
means of war are not unlimited," "each use of force must be necessary" and "proportional." These have become ethical baselines for a universal modern
civilization.

Humanitarians have sought to turn rules into principles to render the narrow
achievements of negotiation in more general terms; transforming narrow
into

broad custom. Military professionals have done the same

sons

—

to ease training

judgment by

soldiers

treaties

for different rea-

through simplification, to emphasize the importance of

and commanders operating under the

rules,

or simply to

cover situations not included under the formal rules with a consistent practice. Apparently, for example, a standard

Canadian military manual

and principles" 7 of the international law of armed

"spirit

international conflicts not covered
It is

Military lawyers turn broad principles
line rules of

engagement

conflict apply to

by the terms of the agreed

not just that rules have become principles

—we

instructs that the

non-

rules.

as often find the reverse.

and nuanced judgments into simple bright

for soldiers in combat.

Humanitarians comb military

handbooks and government statements of principle promulgated

for

sorts of

all

The ICRC's recent three
volume restatement of the customary law of armed conflict is a monumental work
purposes, to

"rules" of customary international law.

distill

of advocacy of just
In the

this type.

modern law

in war,

both rules and standards are simultaneously under-

stood in the quite different registers of "validity" and "persuasion." In the world of
validity, the
field acts

stop.

law

is

do not

—you should follow

the law

fall

it

because

it is

valid. If your battle-

under a valid prohibition, you remain privileged to

kill.

Full

On the other hand, however, as a tool of persuasion, the law in war overflows

these banks.

many

It

will

be hard to argue

—

particularly to persistent opposers

of the purportedly customary rules in the

speaking, "valid." But there

contexts and to

is

no gainsaying

ICRC

restatement are,

—

that

strictly

their likely persuasiveness in

many

many audiences.

We are used to working with the law of armed conflict in the key of validity. We
make rules by careful negotiation. We influence customary rules by intentioned
and public behavior. We send ships through straits or close to shorelines both to
assert

and

But we

to strengthen rights.
will

need to become more adept

at

operations in the law of persuasion.

The domain in which the image of a single dead civilian can make a persuasive case
for a law of armed conflict violation trumps the most ponderous technical legal
defense.
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The law

in

war of persuasion

tarian outsiders, of course.

The

is

not only the product of overreaching humani-

military also interprets, advocates, seeks to per-

suade. This reinterpretation of rules

and principles has brought humanitarian law

inside the vocabulary of the military profession

and brought complex considerAs a framework for debate and

ations of strategy to the humanitarian professions.

judgment,

this

new law

in

war embraced the unavoidability of trade-offs, of bal-

—an experience common

ancing harms, of accepting costs to achieve benefit

both military

Take

to

and humanitarians.

strategists

Of course, civilians will be killed in war. Limiting civilpragmatic commitment no unnecessary damage, not

civilian casualties.

ian death

had become

one more

civilian

—

a

than necessary. In the vernacular of humanitarian law,

this be-

comes no "superfluous injury" and no "unnecessary suffering." The range of complex strategic calculations opened up by this idea, for those inside and outside the
military,

We
been
tary

broad indeed.

might say that the old distinction between combatants and

relativized.

and

there

is

is

What,

civilian to

in

have

any event, can

it is

mean

for the distinction

itself become a principle?

something oxymoronic here

Of course,

it

—

either

it is

The

civilians has

between mili-

"principle of distinction"

a distinction, or

it is

a principle.

but a short step from here to "effects-based targeting," and the

elimination of the doctrinal firewall between civilian and military, belligerent and
neutral. But, thinking in

humanitarian terms,

why

shouldn't military operations

be judged by their effects, rather than by their adherence to narrow rules that might

manner of perverse and unpredictable outcomes?
I was struck during the NATO bombardment of Belgrade
justified by the international community's humanitarian objectives in Kosovo
by the public dis-

well have

all

—
—

cussions

among military strategists and humanitarian

appropriateness of targeting the civilian

elites

international lawyers of the

most strongly supporting the

Milosevic regime. If bombing the bourgeoisie would have been
a long
sary,

march inland toward the

capital,

it

have been proportional, neces-

indeed humanitarian to place the war's burden on young draftees in the

rather than

upon

the civilian population

targeting civilians supporting an outlaw,

the

would

more effective than

Nuremberg

who
if

sent

them

there?

Some argued

field

that

democratic, regime would also extend

principle of individual responsibility. Others disagreed, of course.

But the terms of their disagreement were provided by shared principles.

The law in war today offers the basis for both external denunciation of military
action and internal calculation of its necessity or proportionality. Although they
do not lie easily with one another, our thinking fades easily from one to the other.
Take the Abu Ghraib photos. The law
laries for reacting to the

in

war

offers us

two quite

photographs, neither of which
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satisfactory. First,

moral
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it

said that the administration, like so

was "shocked by the photos." They may have been

others,

Rumsfeld was indeed shocked, might he not be just
with taking the country to war?

He was shocked

—but

I

many

wonder.

If

a bit too naive to be entrusted

in part, as

we

all

were, because

the violence was gratuitous, unnecessary, not instrumentally justified, and, of
course, because

it

was photographed. But was

it

really

not necessary?

How does

compare to humiliation, or to chills, or to intense
more humane? Which more effective? Can we still distinguish the

sleep or sensory deprivation
fear?

Which

is

two questions?

Asymmetry
There

is

something

—Severing the Laws of Validity and Persuasion

else

about

this

new vocabulary that

is

disturbing.

You may re-

member Major General James Mattis, poised to invade Falluja, concluding his demand that the insurgents stand down with these words: "We will always be
humanitarian in all our efforts. We will fight the enemy on our terms. May God
help them when we're done with them." 8 1 know I shivered at his juxtaposition of
humanitarian claims and blunt
It is

threats.

troubling, of course, that this so often has been a vocabulary for judgment of

the center against the periphery.

New

page of the

When

the Iraqi insurgent quoted

on the same

York Times as Mattis threatened to decapitate civilian hostages

if

the coalition forces did not withdraw, he was also threatening innocent civilian

death

—

made me
It is

of

less

it

actually

—but without the humanitarian promise. And he

shiver.

no

secret that technological advances

warfare. In the

this

assumption is coming undone. When the poor deviate from

the best military practices of the rich,
illegitimate.

have heightened the asymmetry of

framework of validity, it is clear that all are bound by the same rules.

But as persuasion,

it is

tempting to

treat their entire

But before we jump to the legitimacy of their cause,

campaign as

how

should we

evaluate the strategic use of perfidy by every outgunned insurgency battling a

ern occupation army?

mod-

From an effects-based perspective, perfidious attacks on our

or using human
—from mosques, by insurgents dressing
—may have more humanitarian consequences than any number of

military
shields

also

as civilians

alterna-

tive tactics.

And they are very likely to be interpreted by many as reasonable,

"fair"

responses by an outgunned, but legitimate force.

no question that technological asymmetry erodes the persuasiveness of
the "all bound by the same rules" idea. It should not be surprising that forces with
vastly superior arms and intelligence capacity are held to a higher standard in the
There

is
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court of world public opinion than their adversaries. As persuasion, the law in
force has indeed

become

a sliding scale.

Persuasion and the

In 1996,

1

CNN Effect

traveled to Senegal as a civilian instructor with the Naval Justice School

from here

in

Newport

to train

members of the

Senegalese military in the laws of

war and human rights. At the time, the training program was operating in 53 countries,

from Albania to Zimbabwe. As

manitarian law

is

recall

I

it,

our training message was

not a way of being nice. By internalizing

human

clear:

rights

hu-

and

humanitarian law, you will make your force interoperable with international coalitions, suitable for international

peacekeeping missions. To use our sophisticated

weapons, your military culture must have parallel rules of operation and engage-

ment to our own. Most importantly, we insisted, humanitarian law will make your
military more effective
will make your use of force something you can sustain

—

and proudly stand behind.
I

was struck when we broke into small groups

gional

commander who

guerrillas, isn't

it

for simulated exercises,

kept asking the hard questions

better to place a guy's

by a

re-

—when you capture some

head on a stake for deterrence? Well, no, we

would patiently explain, this will strengthen the hostility of villagers to your troops,
and imagine what would happen
course,

if

CNN were

and respond "we must be sure the press

Ah, but

this

tional stage,

is

no longer

we

you need to be ready to have

place an imaginary

shoulder.

possible,

CNN

Not because

act of violence

one can

want

to play

laugh, of

on

the interna-

helmet, or, better, just over your

must be limited and not because

disclose

all

CNN constantly by your side. You must

up, but because only force which can imagine

An

They would

stays away."

said, if you

webcam on your

force

nearby.

itself

CNN

might show

being seen can be enduring.

and be proud of is ultimately stronger, more

legitimate.

Our

lesson

was written completely

in the

key of persuasion, not

validity. It

was

on those who considered the interrogation of "high value
our own war on terror. Nevertheless, the Senegalese had learned, as

a lesson apparently lost
targets" in

Secretary Rumsfeld

now seems

to be learning,

what was required

violence to be something one could proudly stand behind.

word, for warfare to be

more

it

made me

civilized.

The more

shiver as well.
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however, the
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Comparative Law: the International Law of Armed Conflict and
Military Discipline

I

have been speaking about the law in war as

if

we could

rather easily identify

its

terms. But what law governs the battlefield? If you ask an international commercial

what law governs the transaction, the answer will be anything but

lawyer,

on

—even

straight-

World Trade Organization agreements would only be the beginning. There would be international private law, of
course. But far more importantly, national regulation with transnational effects,
forward. Treaty law

the subject

—

and the national private law

the

built into the transaction

through private ordering.

Assessing the significance of these various bodies of law requires not only inquiry
into their formal jurisdictional validity, but also their sociological effect.

want to regulate the transaction?

Who will

Who will be able to do so? What rules will influ-

ence the transaction even absent enforcement?

The answer for warfare is no simpler, particularly for coalition operations, or for
campaigns that stretch the "battlespace" across numerous jurisdictions. Who will
try to apply what rules, who will succeed? When the Italians decide to prosecute

CIA

operatives for their alleged participation in a black operation of kidnapping

The practice of military law topredictions of fact and law. Whose interpreta-

and rendition, the law of the battlefield has
day requires complex and shifting
tion will prevail

shifted.

and before what audience?

This kind of analysis will require sophisticated comparative law, for there are

more than one laws of armed conflict. The rules simply look different if you anticipate battle against a technologically superior foe, or live in a Palestinian refugee

camp

in Gaza.

Moreover, although a national military

the international law of armed conflict directly into
terpretation

the

same

its

may translate

operations manual, the in-

and intent may well be different. More often,

coalition, will

different nations, even in

have implemented and interpreted the shared rules and

principles quite differently. Humanitarians looking at the

toward

the words of

restrictive interpretations,

same

rules

might lean

adopting the perspective of the potential "vic-

tim," while the military might lean towards greater freedom of maneuver. Al-

though we might disagree with one another's interpretation, we must recognize
that our professional materials are elastic
tations. Military

law

is

enough

to enable quite diverse interpre-

comparative law.

As humanitarians, when we compare international
rules of

engagement, we might well be surprised: the military rules might well be

the stricter.

can be

rules with the military's

The strength and significance of the military's own culture of discipline

difficult for civilians to grasp.

by saying it is bureaucratic necessity,

I

have tried to explain

it

to civilian audiences

central to the effectiveness of the mission
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to the safety of colleagues. But

my sense is that military discipline is as much pas-

sion as reason; instrumentalism

from

civilian life

As

—

wrapped in honor and integrity in

a culture set off

a higher calling.

a social production, military discipline

is

also of course,

and perhaps more

The United States Army runs recruitment commercials which implore "see your recruiter, become an Army of One." The promself-discipline. If you join, you will be
ise is power, to be sure. But also discipline
transformed inside you will become an army, coordinated, disciplined, your
own commanding officer, your own platoon, embodying within yourself the force
of hundreds because of the work you will do, and we will do, on you.
Of course, there is opportunity for individual judgment and error. Soldiers
who run amok. We remember the pilots who flew beneath the Italian ski lift slicing
the cables. And the precision guided missile fired in Kosovo with the tail fins put on
backwards, spinning ever further from its programmed target until it exploded in a
crowded civilian marketplace. We remember the American pilots who bombed
importantly, a

work on

the

self.

—

—

—

their

Canadian

dad, and
It

all

allies.

Or, for that matter,

My Lai, the abuse of prisoners in Bagh-

the other tales of atrocity in war.

can be particularly hard for civilians to grasp that

breach of military discipline, their defense

is

when

soldiers are tried for

often stronger under the vague stan-

dards of international humanitarian law than under national criminal or military
law.

Or that international law provides the framework less for disciplining the force

than for unleashing the spear

at its tip.

Indeed, the international legal standards of self-defense, proportionality and
necessity are so

broad that they are routinely invoked to

tion rather than limitation.

I

guage of international

and "defend

commanding

—
law

officer

"just don't

in the

do anything you don't

The

leash of rules, assembled in a package coordinated

describe
mili-

empowering
feel is

lan-

necessary"

fighter pilot heads out

on a

by a complex transnational

Only at the last moment,

in contact with the

he released to the discretion framed by the law of armed

and

who

and military law. After the

summarizes

yourself; don't get killed out there."

ray of operating procedures.

zone of discre-

have spoken to numerous Navy pilots

briefings filled with technical rules of engagement

tary lawyer leaves, the

refer to the

conflict, that

is,

ar-

enemy,

is

necessity,

self-defense.

What are we to make of the widespread sense that military professionals are the
most disturbed by the current administration's
tarian standards in their

war on

JAG Corps

has been

Has the military gone soft? Become less
condone harsh tactics? Or is the scandal that

more courageous

those civilian humanists

who

humani-

terror?

willing than their civilian masters to

the

efforts to shrink or skirt

in their opposition to harsh tactics

than

stand outside, wringing their hands, but uncertain
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whether they are in

and Humanitarian

fact qualified to judge?

torture or not to torture has

Professions

Perhaps the scandal

our sense that to

is

become a professional judgment in the

first

place,

avoidably linked to the question of whether harsh treatment will work. Again,
effective, in fact, is sexual humiliation,

After the Gulf War,
the electrical grid

by

how

or isolation, or torture?

was widely acknowledged

it

un-

that the decision to take

down

power out for far longer than
unsanitary water supply and the unnecessary death of

striking the generators

necessary, contributing to

had

left

many thousands from cholera. Military planners involved have admitted this was a
mistake, and they have reportedly revised their procedures accordingly. In

and

Iraq,

such a devastating blow to the

electrical grid

But in reviewing the Gulf War experience, they

will

generators lacked proportionality or necessity, or that

was not

Kosovo

struck.

not say that taking out the
it

was excessive given what

they knew then and what they were trying to achieve. These legal standards remain
the solid ground

on which their acts, and, ultimately the deaths of many thousands,

can remain legitimated

— What Exactly?

Weighing and Balancing

The transformation of the law in war into a vocabulary of persuasion about legitimacy is not the end of the matter. We still need to figure out, for a given purpose, a
given argument, just what

is,

in fact, necessary or proportional.

in this spirit that targets in the recent Iraq conflict

And of course, it is

were pored over by lawyers. But

even in the best of times, the promise of weighing and balancing
I

have learned that

if

you ask

is

a military professional precisely

rarely met.

how many civil-

you kill to offset how much risk to one of your own men, you won't receive
a straight answer. When the Senegalese asked us, we'd say "it's a judgment call." Inians can

deed, at least so far as

change

moves

have been able to ascertain, there

is

no background

ex-

What you find instead are rules kicking the decision up
command as the number of civilians increases, until the decision

rate for civilian

the chain of

I

offstage

life.

from military professionals

to politicians.

In the early days of the Iraq war, coalition forces were certainly frustrated by
Iraqi soldiers

who advanced

in the

company of

civilians.

Mcintosh reported that he and a colleague had declined
diers in fear of harming civilians. "It's a

judgment

weigh the losses, then you don't take the shot."

one

Iraqi soldier,

and 25

women and

A

Corporal Mikael

several times to shoot sol-

call,"

he

said, "if the risks out-

He offered an example:

children,

I

"There was

didn't take the shot." His col-

Schrumpf chipped in to describe facing one soldier among
two or three civilians, opening fire, and killing civilians: "We dropped a few civil9
ians, but what do you do. I'm sorry, but the chick was in the way."

league, Sergeant Eric
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There

no avoidance of decisions of this type

is

when humanitarian law transforms

When it encourages
human

decisions about

is

are clear cases both

significant in the great

mean to pretend these
ate the irreducibly

—destroying
—but we know

from the ab-

the village to save

also

decisions

its

was struck that Iraq war reporting was
at

or

that the principles

fall

in between.

imaginary quality of the promise that costs and benefits

overcome by remorse

it,

What does it
are principled judgments? How should we evalu-

run of situations that

weighed, that warfare will be proportional,

duty by their

responsible, but rather

ways

minor accidental damage en route to victory

I

whom to kill into judgments.

of professional principles.

We know there
most

difficulty arises

us to think the chick's death resulted not from an exercise of

freedom, for which a moral being

stract operation

are

The

in warfare.

having slaughtered

officers, their chaplains,

and

will

be

violence necessary?

filled

with anecdotes about soldiers

civilians,

and being counseled back to

mental health professionals,

their

who

explained that what they had done was necessary, proportional, and therefore just.

Of course,
can

kill

if

you ask leading humanitarian law experts how many civilians you

for this or that,

judgment
civilians,"

call,"

you

will also

not get an answer. Rather than saying

however, they are likely to say something

like

"it's

a

"you just can't target

thereby refusing to engage in the pragmatic assessments necessary to

make that rule

applicable in combat; defaulting,

if

you will,

to the external strategy

of denunciation abandoned a century ago by humanitarian law.
In psychological terms,

it is

hard to avoid interpreting

this

pragmatism-promised-

but-not-delivered as a form of denial; a collaborative denial

and military lawyers

—of

their participation in the

In the military vernacular,

avoidance of

command

it

—by humanitarians

machinery of war.

might be more accurate to sense a collaborative

responsibility

and

leadership; a willingness to

push

re-

up to the domain of politics or down to the domain of rules. The tendency to blame the civilian leadership or the lawyers is well known. But we also
sponsibility

—

—

know lawyers, whether
tending the law

is

more

inside or outside the military,
decisive

—or more open—than

The Law

war

is

in

War Comes

that easy

In part this

Unstuck

I

is

traditional law

—new technologies and new
world imagined
wake of wars
The language has
war,
—

a matter of blurring boundaries

modes of warfare pressing a doctrinal
seemed "modern" in the 1860s.
hostilities,

by pre-

it is.

do not need to emphasize the extent to which the
becoming unstuck; questioned from every angle.

In this audience,
in

who make

in the

proliferated

that

self-defense,

the use of force, resort to arms, police action, peace enforcement,
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peacemaking, peacekeeping.

Who can align them confidently, like "chop," "whip,"

"blend" on the Cuisinart? They are
doctrine, but also in ethical

month

and Humanitarian Professions

and

all

technical terms in military parlance

and legal

political discourse.

on Foron
eign Relations
"post-conflict" reconstruction. All agreed we were far from 19thcentury warfare. Who was the enemy and where was the battlefield? The old days of
Earlier this

I

participated in a lengthy discussion at the Council

industrial warfare are over; you're not trying to
til

the political leadership surrenders.

It's

blow stuff up on the battlefield un-

asymmetric,

it's

chaotic,

it's

not

linear.

The battlespace is at once global and intensely local; there are no front lines. Here at
home, we hardly seem at war the enemy, the conflict, the political goal, all have
become slippery.
For the military, everything important and difficult seems to happen in a kind of
grey area between war and peace. The idea of a boundary between law enforcement, limited by human rights law, and military action, limited by the laws of
armed conflict, seems ever less tenable. In the same city troops are at once engaging
in conflict, stabilizing a neighborhood after conflict, and performing humanitar-

—

ian,
I

nation-building tasks.

heard military

men with

continuities of the transition

was

a

misnomer. In

experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq

from war to peace; they insisted the term

principle, planning

should begin before the

conflict,

even

"spare" troops in the preparation phase

and training
if it

all stress

the

"post-conflict"

for the post-conflict phase

seems hard to imagine identifying

who might be

saved for later tasks. In any

event, restoring water or eliminating sewage after the conflict are part of winning

To paraphrase Clausewitz, post-conflict action is the continuation of conflict by other means. Anyway, they wondered, when did the war start
on 9/1 1? In
the war.

—

1991? In 2003?

The boundaries

are blurry. Everywhere

outsourcing, insurgents

we

find public/private partnerships,

who melt into the mosque, armed soldiers who turn out to

work for private contractors. There are civilians all over the battlefield, not only insurgents dressed as refugees, but special forces operatives dressing like natives, private contractors dressing like Arnold Schwarzenegger,

and

the complex technology and logistical chains "behind"

The

rules of

the civilians running

modern

warfare.

engagement are no longer just those of humanitarian law or

tary discipline, there

is

also private law, contract,

parently at one point the Swiss
private

all

mili-

environmental regulation. Ap-

company backing up

life

insurance contracts for

convoy drivers in Iraq imposed a requirement of additional armed guards if

they were to pay on any claim, slowing the whole operation.

no question that all this generates enormously difficult doctrinal problems; we will deal with many of them over the next days. Why should weapons
There

is
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permissible in domestic riot control and policing

—not be

—non-penetrating

bullets, cer-

on the battlefield if combat blurs easily with stabilization and law enforcement? In close quarters on board a ship interdicted during a
blockade should seamen be issued weaponry appropriate for combat or law entain gases

available

To what extent does law shape or limit this decision?
In this new environment, we hear that humanitarian law will have to be rethought. But this is more than simply a more complex legal situation requiring
more sophisticated analysis. Adjusting the law in war to post-modern warfare will
require more than doctrinal ingenuity. It will require a new way of thinking about
forcement?

the role of law

Indeed,
clear rules

it

—and

warfare.

might be more accurate to say that the

and sharp

distinctions,

fluid

broad principles and vague calculations of pro-

portionality and necessity was designed precisely for this.

ulary for making distinctions

modern vocabulary of

It is

a professional vocab-

and eroding them, for applying principles and simply

What will be required is a new understanding of the work of law
responsibilities of command.

invoking them.

and of the

Sophisticated analyses of necessity and proportionality,

no less than the external

vocabulary of distinction and denunciation, seem ever less convincing. Each has, in
its

own

way, become a vocabulary of warfare.

More

importantly,

we

are increas-

ingly likely to interpret whatever military or humanitarian professionals say about

the use of force in strategic terms, that
tactical advantage.

and unmake

—

As

is

as things said for a reason, things said for

professionals, civilian or military,

the distinctions between

we know how to make

war and peace, between

civilian

and

combatant.
Brigadier General Charles

Dunlap gave

me

the arresting term "lawfare," using

law as a weapon, offensively and defensively, to
Partly this

is

legally condition the battlefield.

public relations; shaping expectations about what will happen and

what will be legitimate. Getting the word out that we will

—and we may—

kill

some

civilians.

Take the difficult question, when does war end? The answer is not to be found in
law or

fact,

but in strategy. Declaring the end of

election theater or military assessment. Just like

long

way to

go," or that the "insurgency

tual or legal assessments,

is

in

hostilities

might be a matter of

announcing that there remains "a

its final

throes." These appear as fac-

but we should understand them as arguments

but also weapons. Communicating the war

is

—messages

fighting the war.

The old distinctions have not disappeared. Indeed, we sometimes want to insist
upon a bright line. For the military, after all, defining the battlefield defines the
privilege to kill in the

be

seen

as

same way that

humanitarians,

not

aid agencies

want the guys digging the

post-conflict
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opens a "space" for humanitarian action. For both professions,

not-battlefield

tinguishing, like balancing, has

Ending conflict,
then opening

and Humanitarian Professions

calling

it

become at once a mode of warfare and of pacifism.

occupation; ending occupation, calling

hostilities, calling

ments of policing, declaring a

dis-

it

it

sovereignty;

a police action; suspending the judicial require-

state

of emergence, a zone of insurgency. All these

things are also tactics in the conflict.

We are occupying, but Falluja, for a few weeks,

is

again a combat zone, and so on. Defining the battlefield

ployed force and a rhetorical claim. This
lice action, this is

legal issues are there
its

a war, this

is

both a matter of de-

an occupation,

this

is

a po-

a security zone. These are insurgents, those are criminals, these

are illegal combatants,

stand

is

is

and so on. And these are

—the claim must have

all

claims with audiences.

a plausible validity;

The old

we must under-

persuasive potential.

Guantanamo the "war" may never
end. What war, which war? The war on terror? The war on poverty? Al Qaida? In
Iraq? The Taliban? Afghanistan? The war for security, for oil, for ... ? What is, preAudience reaction matters. For detainees

cisely,

the objective that once achieved will

at

end their war? What limits our ability to

—doctrines of the law of armed

extend the war for which they are held indefinitely
conflict? Hardly, the

to

impede our

war

CNN effect gets closer to the mark. When publics with power

ability to achieve

our strategic objectives find our argument that the

for those prisoners has not

ended so unpersuasive that they

exercise that

power, we will need to change course.

We have heard that police and combat operations now go side-by-side; the zone
of combat abuts, overlaps the zones of occupation and military action. Must
therefore conclude that

human

rights

we

law and the law of armed conflict operate

The assertion that human rights
some audiences in some situations;

concurrently, across the battlespace? Yes and no.
limits action in

combat will seem persuasive to

as will the assertion that the activities are distinct, the laws separate.

managing law and war together
and both responses, and an

—

Lawfare

requires a strategic assessment of both claims

active strategy

by military and humanitarian

actors to

frame the situation in one or the other.
In these strategic assessments, the legal questions

become

these:

who, under-

standing the law in what way, will be able to do what to affect our ongoing efforts?

How,

using what mix of behavior and assertion, can

uation to our advantage? This

is

we transform the strategic sit-

not a question of validity, not even of persuasion.

This requires a social analysis of the dynamic interaction between ideas about the

law and strategic objectives.

As humanitarian and military professionals work with the law of armed conflict,
they change

it.

Of course

the law that pre-exists a conflict constrains

its

course

conditioning expectations, establishing habits of mind and standard procedures of
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and military professionals

operation. Humanitarians

are used to thinking about

influencing the law in peacetime through careful negotiations, through codification,

through advocacy, and through assertions of right.

to see that the
seize

on

law is,

if anything,

It

can be hard, in combat,

more open to change. When humanitarian voices

vivid images of civilian casualties to raise expectations about the required

accuracy of military targeting, they are changing the legal fabric.

damage often noted that coalition pilots could have improved their technical accuracy by flying lower, although this would have exposed their planes and pilots to more risk. The law of
armed conflict does not require you to fly low or take more risk to avoid collateral
damage; it requires you to avoid superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. But
flying high to reduce risk seemed
these news reports changed the legal context
"unfair." Humanitarians seized the moment, developing various theories to demand "feasible compliance" that would hold the military to technically achievable
In the Kosovo campaign, news reports of collateral

—

levels

of care. In conference after conference, negotiation after negotiation, repre-

sentatives of the

US military have argued that this is simply not "the law." Perhaps

not, but the effect of the legal claim

is

hard to deny.

Of course, the military also seeks to affect the legal context through its public affairs activity

and through

given objective

may

its

action

induce defenders to

whether you intend to attack
as

much

on the

a message, as a tactic

Military action has

it

battlefield. Asserting a right to attack a

tie

up

assets in its defense, regardless

or not. Attacking

—or not

attacking

—

a

mosque

of
is

on the ground.

become legal action, just as legal acts have become weapons.

When the United States uses the United Nations Security Council to certify lists of
of their assets abroad,

terrorists to force seizure

we might

say that they have

weaponized the law since they could, presumably, have immobilized those
using other technologies. Similarly

commercially available

satellite

when

assets

they use contracts to buy up access to

images of the

they could presumably

battlefield,

have denied their adversary access to those images using other weapons. The

legal

and military professions have indeed merged.

None

of this would have surprised Clausewitz.

He

continued his famous para-

graph on war as a continuation of policy with a striking turn to language:
[T]he chief lines on which the events of the

War

attached, are only the general features of policy

And how

peace takes place.
diplomatic

notes

Governments?
thoughts?

It

Is

stop

not

can we conceive

the

War

has certainly a

political

it

and to which they

progress,

which run

all

through the

to be otherwise?

relations

between

War

Does the cessation of
Nations and

different

merely another kind of writing and language for

grammar of its own, but

25

its

logic

are

until

is

political

not peculiar to

itself.
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Clausewitz might well be surprised, however, by the extent to which the turn to

language has revitalized the distinction between warfare and the
experience, military

somewhere

share a sense that

somebody
and

else

if

else,

makes decisions

discretion. This

untroubling;

and humanitarian professionals operating

the

is

why the

number

is

political. In

in this

my

vocabulary

outside or beyond their careful calculations,

in a different

—

way

exercises political

judgment

absence of a clear exchange rate for civilian

high enough,

it

will

become

lives is

a political decision.

—Do Politicians Think Differently?

The Law of War

This takes us directly to the law of war. Normally, of course, for military profes-

law of war

sionals, the

is

tions about the legitimacy of the conflict

place

—

to a different, the political,

But, as the law in

means leaving quesgo to war in the first

far less present. Civilian leadership

war has begun

—

the decision to

domain.
to

come unstuck, professionals find themselves

turning increasingly to the law of war; find themselves unable to assess the

macy of wartime

violence without assessing the legitimacy of the war

might say that the law of war has become the law in war's destiny.

—more

If the

legiti-

itself.

We

use offeree

—

more important objectives it seems reasonable to think there would be a sliding scale for more and less important wars.
Wars for national survival, wars to stop genocide shouldn't they legitimate more
is

to be proportional

force for

—

than run of the mill efforts to enforce

UN resolutions?

There can be something perverse here

—harsher

tactics

more legitimate in more

"humanitarian" campaigns? But once the law of armed conflict becomes

relative, a

we must ask whether the vocabulary we use to
make the "political" decision to go to war differs in kind from that we use to fight
function of the conflict's legitimacy,

and

restrain

—the

conflict

once underway. Are

"political" decisions, in fact, differ-

ent from decisions of commanding officers and humanitarian advocates?

As

it

turns out, while the law in war has infiltrated the military profession, the

law of war has been engaged in a
infiltrate the

and

—and equally

successful

—campaign

to

vocabulary of politics. The law about going to war has a history quite

parallel to that

sional

collateral

of humanitarian law. As a

political

judgments

is

result, the distinction

far less clear

than

between profes-

we might wish.

This story, which can be told in shorter compass, begins with a period of rather
fluid justifications expressed in a
is

not

clear, that 17 th -century

tary force.

mixed vocabulary of justice and sovereign right.

It

"unjust" war ideas ever really limited the use of mili-

They may well have done more

the cause.

26

to de-legitimate the

enemy and justify
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In any event, by the late 19th century, international law had very

little

to say

about the decision to go to war, a silence rooted in the assumption that war was an

The modern law of war

unrestrained prerogative of sovereign power.

is

a century

long pragmatic reaction against this 19 th - century legal silence.

The

right

and capacity to make war was so

central to the late 19 th -century legal

definition of sovereignty that even in the 1920s,

we still find jurists assessing the in-

ternational legal personality of the League of Nations

by asking whether

it

has the

make war. But the League's purpose was another.
The diplomats who made the League sought to replace legal doctrines with a po-

"right" to

institution that could sanction

litical

framework
brave

for peaceful

new world

and deter aggression, while providing

a

change and the peaceful settlement of "disputes." The

of institutional management was born.

name of pragmatism, this scheme matured into a comprehensive constitutional system. As we all know, the UN Charter
aimed to establish an international monopoly of force, placing responsibility for
After the Second World War, again in the

maintaining the peace with the Security Council.
authorized by the

War was

prohibited

—except

as

UN Charter. Not as authorized by the United Nations, but as au-

thorized by the Charter.
Like a constitution, the Charter was drafted in broad strokes and

be interpreted. Over the years, what began as an

come

effort to

would need to

monopolize force has be-

a constitutional regime of legitimate justifications for war.

This

modern vocabulary of force has a jurisprudence

lationship between law
policies,

and power.

It is

—an

attitude about the re-

the flexible jurisprudence of principles

of balancing conflicting considerations, familiar from

and

many domestic

constitutional systems.

Legal scholar Oscar Schachter gave perhaps the best description in his eulogy for

Dag Hammarskjold, who epitomized

the

new jurisprudential

spirit:

Hammarskjold made no sharp distinction between law and policy; in this he departed
clearly from the prevailing positivist approach. He viewed the body of law not merely
as a technical set of rules and procedures, but as the authoritative expression of
principles that determine the goals and directions of collective action. ... It is also of
significance

in

evaluating

Hammarskjold's

flexibility

that

he characteristically

expressed basic principles in terms of opposing tendencies (applying, one might say,
the philosophic concept of polarity or dialectical opposition).
fact that a principle,

such as that of observance of human

He never lost sight of the

rights,

was balanced by the

concept of non-intervention, or that the notion of equality of States had to be
considered in a context which included the special responsibilities of the great Powers.

The

fact that

such precepts had contradictory implications meant that they could not

provide automatic answers to particular problems, but rather that they served as
criteria

which had

to be

weighed and balanced
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He did not, therefore, attempt to set law against power. He

the particular problem

sought rather to find within the limits of power the elements of common interest on
the basis of which joint action

There

is

no doubt

warfare. Indeed,
these terms.
is

It is

it is

established. 11

and agreed standards could be

that this system of principles has legitimated a great deal of

hard to think of a use of force that could not be legitimated in

a rare statesman

almost always something

else to

have been violated; our enemy

were about to attack

us;

who launches a war simply to be aggressive. There

we

is

are

be said

—the province

not, in fact, a State;

is

actually ours; our rights

we were

invited to help; they

promoting the purposes and principles of the

United Nations. Something.

As the law in war became

a matter of standards, balancing,

lation, the difficult, discretionary decisions

and pragmatic

calcu-

were exported to the political realm. As

the political vocabulary has itself become a matter of constitutional interpretation,

our understanding of the

political process

has also been transformed.

This convergence of humanitarianism and militarism has transformed our un-

derstanding of international
ternal to the ebbs

politics.

Idealism no longer provides a standpoint ex-

and flows of the policy conversation. Action

legitimates norms,

norms legitimate action. Humanitarians and statesmen, idealists and realists are in
the same game, and are increasingly difficult to distinguish from one another.
International Politics: a Conversation about Legitimacy

In the international world,

we imagine

this

shared vocabulary of principles and

policy judgment to operate through conversation. States, private actors,

and national courts are participants

in

NGOs,

an ongoing conversation about the

—legitimacy judged by

macy of State behavior

their compatibility with

legiti-

UN Charter

principles.

Conversing before the court of world public opinion, statesmen not only
their prerogatives, they also test
Political assertions

and

come armed with

assertions carry a small

establish those prerogatives
little

assert

through action.

packets of legal legitimacy, just as legal

backpack of political corroboration. As lawyers must har-

ness enforcement to their norms, States

must defend

their prerogatives to

keep

them

—must back up

great

many military campaigns have been undertaken for just this kind of credibility

missiles
It

become

was, after

announce

their assertions with action to

credibility.

A

missives.

all,

in this spirit that President

Bush went

to the United Nations to

would enforce the Charter; and if he succeeded and the Iraq rechange and democracy and freedom released, the legitimacy deposit

that he

gime were to

maintain their
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in his

account would be a direct transfer from the United Nations.

a risk; but the

When

United Nations was also daring, and risking in

resisting.

the United Nations withholds approval or refuses to participate,

de-legitimate the military campaign. Let us suppose

mined

Of course, it was

coalition pushes ahead in the

name

it

does not stop

is

may

a deter-

of Charter principles. In the easy cases,

Or the campaign

the campaign succeeds; the United Nations has missed out.
the United Nations

it;

it

fails;

vindicated.

The difficult case is now ours. The occupation is more difficult than anticipated,
the post-conflict/post-war/peace-building/nation-building phase holds hostage

the ultimate success or failure of the campaign.

Op-ed writers urge all parties to

ig-

on the future. Surely, they argue, we all have a stake in a
successful outcome, and it makes sense for the United States and the international
community to cooperate.
Perhaps, but sunk costs cannot be ignored so readily. Seen dynamically, it makes
sense for Bush to resist relying on the United Nations to make good his original
wager as precedent for the next case; just as it makes sense for the United Nations to
resist engagement. It is no accident that we sometimes feel the Europeans want the
project to fail, and sometimes they do, for in this game of meaning and precedent,
to ignore sunk costs and get with the program is to take a legitimacy hit.
Either way, Iraqi citizens are paying the price, not in the "great game" of 19 th nore sunk

costs, to focus

century diplomacy, but in the "great conversation" of 20 th -century legitimacy.
If,

interpreting the law in war, humanitarians were loath to speak about the

civilians

who might

legitimately be killed

also resist the suggestion in the

—"you

just can't target civilians"

law of war that they,

like military planners,

—they
decide

when to draw down and when to pay into their legitimacy stockpile, and, therefore,
when to accept civilian casualties as necessary for longer term objectives.
Although humanitarians talk about the long-run benefits of building up the UN
system or promoting the law of force, they do not make such long-run calculations.

Current costs are discounted, future benefits promised as

if

weigh against expansion of humanitarian institutions and

there were nothing to

ideas;

no

civilians

needed to be allowed to die for the legitimacy of the United Nations. But in
depart from pragmatic calculation altogether and
lute virtue.

When

I

move

into the

who

this,

we

domain of abso-

We are back speaking truth to power.
speak to civilian audiences, there

is

something scandalous about pre-

senting an aircraft carrier sailing off to war as the realization of international hu-

manitarianism. Aircraft carriers are the instruments of statesmen. Civilians prefer
to think of humanitarians as gentle civilizers, lawyers whispering in the admiral's
ear, protesters

marching

in the streets for peace, scholars
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law, teachers instructing soldiers in the limits to

warfare. Humanitarian rulership

is

often rulership denied.

The transformation of the law of war into a set of constitutional standards at
once defined and enforced through an ex-post assessment of legitimacy earned and
spent offers an open-ended vocabulary for diplomatic and military conversation.
Any and all criteria that turn out to affect the legitimacy of the action in the eyes of
those with the power to affect its success will, retrospectively, turn out to have been
persuasive requirements of the law of war. Like the "preferences"

we

think stand

behind market behavior, standards of legitimacy are inevitably subjective when we

when we look

look forward, objective
taken us as far as

it

can

—

back. Professionalism has, in this sense,

occupying the

fully

field.

own limits, blind spots, biases. Not all voices are
equally heard, not all concerns equally calculated by the group of elites we call "the
Yet this

new vocabulary has

international

Those

its

community."

in the loop are likely to focus too

much on

the United Nations as proxy

world public opinion. Were opponents of the Iraq war serious when they

for

claimed their objection to the war was the lack of
ally
I

UN approval? Would the war re-

have made more sense to them had France had a different government?

worry when great debates about war and peace, staged

One

in the vocabulary of the

become routine to
say that international law had little effect on the Iraq war. Arguments made by a few
Charter, capture our attention.

international lawyers that the

war was

result:

illegal failed to

it

has

stop the American adminis-

and its allies, who were determined to go ahead, and who had,

tration

own

unfortunate

after

all,

their

international lawyers.

But

this lets international

law off the hook too

easily. If we

expand the aperture

from the decision to invade, war looks ever more to be a product of law: the laws in
war

that legitimated targeting, the laws of war that provided the vocabulary for as-

sessing

its

legitimacy, the laws of sovereignty that defined

and limited Saddam's

and have structured the occupation, not

mention commercial

prerogatives

rules, financial rules,

and

private law regimes through

tions system

and through which the

makes

background

these

rules

coalition built

its

to

which Iraq gamed the sanc-

response.

The UN law offeree

seem matters of fact, rather than points of choice.

The Charter scheme encourages us to think of global policy as a combination of
short multilateral police actions and humanitarian assistance. It distracts our attention from the economic side of the story and from the development policy
that comes with an invasion. It shortens our sense of how long and how difficult
war to build nations or change regimes is likely to be.
In the Iraq case, international law and the UN Charter focused our attention on

—

weapons, which when not forthcoming, de-legitimated the entire enterprise.
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making it all too easy to
began with the invasion and ended with the

International law urges us to respect Iraqi sovereignty,

think our intervention in Iraqi affairs

handover of the bundle of rights we have decided to

call

"sovereignty."

The vocabulary of the Charter can make it more difficult to address the motives
for war and devise alternative policies. Let us say the administration's hawks were
right; suppose that after 9/11 it was necessary to "change regimes" from eastern
Turkey to western Pakistan. In the months before the war, the international community found

it

regime change straightforwardly. Ideas about

difficult to discuss

sovereignty, the limits of the Charter, core humanitarian

nunciation of empire;

all

commitments

to the re-

placed regime change outside legitimate debate.

Yet supposedly sovereign regimes are already entangled with one another. They
struggle every day to change

ways.
is

one another's regimes

in

all

manner of

legitimate

Why should this all become taboo when force is added to the mix, unless war

no longer,

in fact, in Clausewitz's terms, "a continuation of political intercourse,

with a mixture of other means." 12

When it comes to force, the Charter vocabulary offered an easy and irresponsible

way out. We never needed to ask how should the regimes

our regimes

way

to

do

military

—be changed?

it?

Is

Iraq the place to start?

How do we compare various ways

Is

in the

Middle East

military intervention the

of combining military and non-

"means" to the end of regime change?

Had the Europeans

not had the United Nations to shield them, not

felt

the ge-

ography of the European Union (EU) marked a legitimate boundary to their
global responsibilities, they might well have

drawn on

"regime change" in Spain, Portugal and Greece in the

many in the

and now with the ten new member

Why not EU

Europe.

Egypt

'90s,

membership

—regime change through

for Turkey,

the promise

their
'80s,

own

experiences with

with the old East Ger-

States in central

Morocco, Jordan,

and

eastern

Palestine, Israel,

and example of social and economic

inclusion rather than military force.

Had our debates not been framed by the laws

of war,

other solutions and escaped the limited choices of

and war

—

in short,

began

this

UN sanctions, humanitarian aid

thought outside the box.

Decisionism:

I

we might well have found

Command Responsibility, Leadership and Politics

morning with

a

worry about the relationship between the military and

humanitarian professions. Should we celebrate their merger in a new pragmatism
or should

we

reinvigorate the pacifist impulse to stand outside

and denounce?

The choice turns out to be a false one. The military and humanitarian professions have merged in a shared practice of making and unmaking the distinctions of
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war and peace
has

become

that once

marked the line between

a culture of violence,

humanitarian hands.

and Humanitarian Professions

it is

their respective

domains.

If ours

a shared culture, a product of military

If ours is history's

most humane empire,

laborative achievement of humanitarian

that also

is

and

the col-

and military professionals.

The laws of force increasingly provide the vocabulary not only for restraining
the violence and incidence of war, but also for waging war and deciding to go to
war.

We should be clear; this bold new vocabulary beats ploughshares into swords

as often as the reverse. It forecloses

our attention to other causes, consequences and

alternatives to warfare.

The problem

no longer an unwillingness to be tough; humanitarians have advocated all manner of tough and forceful action in the name of
humanitarian pragmatism, and their words have legitimated still more. The problem is an unwillingness to do so responsibly facing squarely the dark sides, risks
and costs of what they propose.
The problem for military professionals is no longer a lack of humanitarian commitment. The military has built humanitarianism into its professional routines.
The problem is loss of the human experience of responsible freedom, of discretion
to kill, and a loss of the political experience of free decision.
The worry I find most unsettling is the difficulty of locating a moment of refor humanitarians

is

—

sponsible political discretion in the broader process.
ians, military professionals

We are all experts, humanitar-

and statesmen, speaking a

common

military

and

humanitarian vocabulary.

The way out will not be to tinker with doctrines of the laws offeree. The way forward will require a new posture and professional sensibility among those who
work in this common language. When speaking to civilian audiences, I use the vocabulary of decisionism to evoke what I have in mind. Rather than fleeing from the
exercise of responsible decision to the comfortable interpretive routines of their

professional discourse, humanitarians should,
cise

I

argue, learn to

embrace the exer-

of power, acknowledge their participation in governance, and cultivate the ex-

perience of professional discretion and the posture of ethically responsible

personal freedom. International humanitarians,
military,

I

argue, inside

and outside the

have sought power, but have not accepted responsibility. They have advo-

cated and denounced, mobilized and killed, while remaining content that others

governed and others decided.

The

military vocabulary of

command

responsibility

and leadership evokes

many of the same ideas. The new law of armed conflict requires a different collaboration between the legal

the briefcase of rules
strategy for

and military professions. The lawyer is brought along to carry

and

restrictions rather

which he or she would share

than as a participant in discussions of

ethical, if not
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But military and humanitarian professionals
ship,

nal

however flexible,

judgment

in fact,

an

—by

fluid

alike,

however

and strategic their approach

political leaders or others

—

that

close their partner-

to law, yearn for

what they have gotten up

offloads responsibility for warfare to the civilian leadership

who

cites failures

is

no

to

is,

commander who

ethically responsible national politics. In a sense, the

foot soldier

an exter-

different

from the

of leadership, or the lawyer who faults limitations in

the rules.

The posture of professionalism
is

against decision, or in contrast to responsibility,

only plausible so long as the ethicists and politicians are speaking another lan-

guage. But they

no longer do. Our language has become the language of politics

and the language of ethics. The challenge
and the

for

all

responsibility, of discretion. Clausewitz

When we make

of political intercourse.

of us

was

is

to recapture the freedom,

right;

war

is

the continuation

war, humanitarian and military profes-

sionals together, let us experience politics as

our vocation.
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Study on Customary International

Humanitarian Law:

A Contribution to the Understanding and
Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict

Jean-Marie Henckaerts*
Abstract

This

article explains the rationale

behind a study on customary international

humanitarian law recently undertaken by the International Committee of

Red Cross (ICRC) at the request of the International Conference of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent. It describes the methodology used and how the study was
organized and summarizes some major findings. It does not, however, purport to

the

provide a complete overview or analysis of these findings.

Introduction

In the 50 years or so since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,

man-

kind has experienced an alarming number of armed conflicts affecting almost every
continent. During this time, the four
* Legal Adviser, Legal Division, International

Geneva Conventions and

their Additional

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The views in
this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the ICRC. This article
was first published in the International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 87, Number 857, March
2005, at page 175 and is reprinted with permission. © 2006 by Jean-Marie Henckaerts.
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Protocols of 1977 have provided legal protection to persons not or
ticipating directly in hostilities (the

wounded,

prived of their liberty for reasons related to
so, there

no longer

par-

and shipwrecked, persons dean armed conflict, and civilians). Even
sick

have been numerous violations of these

treaties, resulting in suffering

and

death which might have been avoided had international humanitarian law been
better respected.

The general opinion
due

is

to the inadequacy of

spect the rules,

from

their application in

that violations of international humanitarian law are not
its

rules. Rather,

insufficient

means

they stem from an unwillingness to re-

to enforce them,

some circumstances and from

from uncertainty

as to

a lack of awareness of them

on

the part of political leaders, commanders, combatants and the general public.

The International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, convened in
Geneva in August-September 1993, discussed in particular ways to address violations of international humanitarian law but did not propose the adoption of new
treaty provisions. Instead, in

its

Final Declaration adopted

ference reaffirmed "the necessity to

by consensus, the Con-

make the implementation of humanitarian law

more effective" and called upon the Swiss government "to convene an open-ended
intergovernmental group of experts to study practical means of promoting full respect for

and compliance with

the States

and

that law,

and

to prepare a report for submission to

to the next session of the International Conference of the

and Red Crescent."

Red Cross

1

The Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection of War Victims met
in Geneva in January 1995 and adopted a series of recommendations aimed at enhancing respect for international humanitarian law, in particular by means of preventive measures that would ensure better knowledge and more effective
implementation of the law. Recommendation II of the Intergovernmental Group
of Experts proposed

The ICRC be

that:

invited to prepare, with the assistance of experts in

IHL

[international

humanitarian law] representing various geographical regions and different

legal

from governments and international
organizations, a report on customary rules of IHL applicable in international and noninternational armed conflicts, and to circulate the report to States and competent
systems,

and

in consultation with experts

international bodies. 2

In

December

Red Cross and
mandated the ICRC

1995, the 26th International Conference of the

Red Crescent endorsed this recommendation and officially
to prepare a report on customary rules of international humanitarian law applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts. 3 Nearly ten years
later, in 2005, after extensive research and widespread consultation of experts,
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now referred

this report,

to as the study

ian law, has been published.

on customary

international humanitar-

4

Purpose

The purpose of the study on customary
overcome some of the problems related
manitarian treaty law. Treaty law

is

international humanitarian law

to

to the application of international hu-

well developed

and covers many aspects of

warfare, affording protection to a range of persons during wartime

permissible

was

and limiting

means and methods of warfare. The Geneva Conventions and

their

Additional Protocols provide an extensive regime for the protection of persons

not or no longer participating directly in

methods of warfare

in treaty law goes

hostilities.

The regulation of means and

back to the 1868

Petersburg Declaration,

St.

Hague Regulations and the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, and has
most recently been addressed in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the
1977 Additional Protocols, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons and its five Protocols, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the
1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines. The protection of cultural properly in the event of armed conflict is regulated in detail in
the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols. The 1998 Statute of the Interthe 1899 and 1907

national Criminal Court contains, inter alia a
y

list

of war crimes subject to the ju-

risdiction of the Court.

There are, however, two serious impediments to the application of these treaties
in current

armed

conflicts

tional humanitarian law
States that

have

ratified

is

and which explain why
necessary and useful.

a study

on customary

apply only to the

First, treaties

them. This means that different

interna-

of international

treaties

humanitarian law apply in different armed conflicts depending on which
the States involved have ratified. While the four

been universally
law, for

been

ratified,

the

same

Geneva Conventions of 1949 have

not true for other

treaties

of humanitarian

example the Additional Protocols. Even though Additional Protocol

ratified

States that

by more than 160

States, its efficacy

today

is

I

has

limited because several

have been involved in international armed conflicts are not party to

Similarly, while nearly 160 States
in

is

treaties

have

which non-international armed

these non-international

armed

ratified

Additional Protocol

conflicts are taking place

conflicts,

common

II,

it.

several States

have not done

Article 3 of the four

so. In

Geneva

Conventions often remains the only applicable humanitarian treaty provision. The
first

purpose of the study was therefore to determine which rules of international

humanitarian law are part of customary international law and therefore applicable
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to

all

parties to a conflict, regardless of whether or not they have ratified the treaties

containing the same or similar rules.

Second, humanitarian treaty law does not regulate in sufficient detail a large

proportion of today's armed

conflicts, that is non-international

because these conflicts are subject to

far

armed

conflicts,

fewer treaty rules than are international

Only a limited number of treaties apply to non-international armed connamely the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons as amended, the

conflicts.
flicts,

Statute of the International Criminal Court, the

Ottawa Convention on the Prohi-

bition of Anti-personnel Mines, the Chemical

Weapons Convention,

the

Hague

Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property and its Second Protocol and, as
already mentioned, Additional Protocol

common

Geneva Conventions. While

II

and

Article 3

Article 3

is

common

to the four

of fundamental importance,

it

only provides a rudimentary framework of minimum standards. Additional Protocol

II

usefully supplements

common Article 3, but it is still less detailed than the

rules governing international

Additional Protocol

I

has

conflicts in the

Geneva Conventions and

I.

Additional Protocol
tional Protocol

armed

II

contains a mere 15 substantive

more than

80.

articles,

While numbers alone do not

whereas Addi-

tell

the full story,

they are an indication of a significant disparity in regulation by treaty law between
conflicts, particularly when

international

and non-international armed

detailed rules

and definitions. The second purpose of the study was therefore to de-

it

comes to

termine whether customary international law regulates non-international armed
conflict in

more

detail

than does treaty law and

if so,

to

what

extent.

Methodology

The Statute of the International Court of Justice describes customary international
law

as "a general practice accepted as law." 5 It

a rule of

namely

State practice {usus)

necessitatis).
is

widely agreed that the existence of

customary international law requires the presence of two elements,

or allowed, depending

case: "It

is

and

a belief that such practice

on the nature of the

rule, as a

As the International Court of Justice

is

required, prohibited

matter of law (opinio juris sive

stated in the Continental Shelf

of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to

be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States." 6 The exact

meaning and content of these two elements have been the

subject of much academic

The approach taken in the study to determine whether a rule of general customary international law exists was a classic one, set out by the International Court

writing.

of Justice, in particular in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 7
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State Practice
State practice

must be looked

at

from two

what practice contributes

angles:

creation of customary international law (selection of State practice)
this practice establishes a rule

to the

and whether

of customary international law (assessment of State

practice).

Selection of State Practice

Both physical and verbal

acts

of States constitute practice that contributes to the

creation of customary international law. Physical acts include, for example, battlefield

behavior, the use of certain

weapons and the treatment afforded

to different

categories of persons. Verbal acts include military manuals, national legislation,

national

case

law,

instructions

to

armed

and

security

forces,

military

communiques during war, diplomatic protests, opinions of official legal advisers,
comments by governments on draft treaties, executive decisions and regulations,
pleadings before international tribunals, statements in international fora, and gov-

ernment positions on resolutions adopted by international organizations. This

list

shows that the practice of the executive, legislative and judicial organs of a State can
contribute to the formation of customary international law.

The negotiation and adoption of resolutions by

international organizations or

conferences, together with the explanations of vote, are acts of the States involved.
It is

recognized that, with a few exceptions, resolutions are normally not binding

in themselves

and therefore the value accorded

to

any particular resolution

in the

assessment of the formation of a rule of customary international law depends on
its

content,

The

its

degree of acceptance and the consistency of related State practice. 8

greater the support for the resolution, the

more importance

it

is

to be

accorded.

Although decisions of international courts are subsidiary sources of international law, 9 they

do not constitute

State practice. This

courts, international courts are not State organs.

The

is

because, unlike national

decisions of international

courts were nevertheless included in the study because a finding by an international court that a rule of customary international law exists constitutes persuasive

evidence to that

effect.

In addition, because of the precedential value of their deci-

sions, international courts

can also contribute to the emergence of a rule of cus-

tomary international law by influencing the subsequent practice of

States

and

international organizations.

The

practice of

armed opposition groups, such

ments made to observe certain

as

rules of international

codes of conduct, commit-

humanitarian law and other

statements, does not constitute State practice as such. While such practice

contain evidence of the acceptance of certain rules in non-international
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conflicts, its legal significance is unclear and, as a result,

was not

upon

relied

to

prove the existence of customary international law. Examples of such practice were
listed

under "other practice"

Volume

in

of the study.

II

Assessment of State Practice

weighed to

State practice has to be

assess

a rule of customary international law.

10

whether

To

it is

sufficiently "dense" to create

establish a rule of

customary interna-

tional law, State practice has to be virtually uniform, extensive
tive.

11

Let us look

more

closely at

what

this

First, for State practice to create a rule

virtually uniform. Different States

and representa-

means.

of customary international law,

must not have engaged in

it

must be

substantially different

conduct. The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice shows that contrary practice which, at

appears to undermine the uniformity of the

first sight,

practice concerned, does not prevent the formation of a rule of customary international

law as long as

by the government
tion

is

this contrary practice

itself.

is

is

denial, the rule in ques-

12

particularly relevant for a

law for which there

condemned by other States or denied

Through such condemnation or

actually confirmed.

This

is

number of rules of international humanitarian

overwhelming evidence of verbal

State practice in support of

a rule, alongside repeated evidence of violations of that rule.

been accompanied by excuses or

condemnation by other

justifications

Where violations have

by the party concerned and/or

they are not of a nature to challenge the existence

States,

of the rule in question. States wishing to change an existing rule of customary international law have to

do so through

and claim

their official practice

to be acting

as of right.

Second, for a rule of general customary international law to
the State practice concerned

must be both

extensive

however, need to be universal; a "general" practice
percentage of States

is

required.

One

reason

on the extent of participation required
rather than quantitative. That

is

States participate in the practice,

is

to say,

it is

and

representative. It

suffices. 13

No precise number or

is

in a sense qualitative

not simply a question of

but also which

does not,

impossible to put an exact figure

that the criterion
it is

come into existence,

States.

14

how many

In the words of the Inter-

national Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the practice

"include that of States whose interests are specially affected."

This consideration has two implications: (1)
represented,

it is

at least

acquiesced in the practice of "specially affected States";

do not accept the practice, it cannot mature
of customary international law, even though unanimity is not required

(2) if "specially affected States"

into a rule

"specially affected States" are

not essential for a majority of States to have actively participated,

but they must have

and

if all

must

15
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16
as explained.

Who

is

may vary according to

"specially affected"

under international humanitarian law

circumstances. Concerning the legality of the use of blind-

ing laser weapons, for example, "specially affected States" include those identified
as

having been in the process of developing such weapons, even though other

States could potentially

population

is

in

become

need of humanitarian aid are "specially affected"

which frequently provide such

whose

the objects of their use. Similarly, States

aid.

With

just as are States

respect to any rule of international hu-

manitarian law, countries that participated in an armed conflict are "specially

when their practice examined for a certain
conflict. Although there may be specially affected
fected"

national humanitarian law,

was relevant to that armed

rule

States in certain areas of inter-

also true that all States

it is

have a legal interest in

quiring respect for international humanitarian law by other States, even
are not a party to the conflict.

17

In addition,

methods of warfare deployed by other

States.

must be considered, whether or not they are

af-

if

re-

they

from means or

all

States can suffer

As

a result, the practice of all States

"specially affected" in the strict sense

of that term.

The study took no view on whether it is legally possible to be a "persistent objector" in relation to customary rules of international humanitarian law. While many
commentators believe that it is not possible to be a persistent objector in the case of

who doubt the continued validity of the persis-

rules of jus cogens^ there are others

tent objector concept altogether.
persistent objector, the State

18

If

one accepts that

it is

legally possible to

be a

concerned must have objected to the emergence of a

new norm during its formation and continue to object persistently afterwards;
not possible to be a "subsequent objector."

While some time
law emerges, there

will

is

no

normally elapse before a rule of customary international
specified timeframe. Rather,

it is

practice of sufficient density, in terms of uniformity, extent

which

is

it is

19

the determining factor.

the accumulation of a

and representativeness,

20

Opinio Juris

The requirement of opinio juris in

establishing the existence of a rule of customary

international law refers to the legal conviction that a particular practice

is

carried

out "as of right." The form in which the practice and the legal conviction are expressed
bition,

may well differ depending on whether the rule concerned contains a prohi-

an obligation or merely a right to behave in a certain manner.

During work on the study,
strictly
flects

it

proved very

separate elements of practice

both practice and

and

difficult

and

largely theoretical to

legal conviction. Often, the

legal conviction.

same

As the International Law Association

pointed out, the International Court of Justice "has not in fact said in so
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words that just because there are

(allegedly) distinct elements in

customary law the

same conduct cannot manifest both. It is in fact often difficult or even impossible
to disentangle the two elements." 21 This is particularly so because verbal acts, such
as military

manuals, count as State practice and often

same

the State involved at the

When

there

is

sufficiently

conviction of

time.

dense practice, an opinio juris

within that practice and, as a result,
rately the existence of

reflect the legal

it is

is

generally contained

not usually necessary to demonstrate sepa-

an opinio juris. In situations where practice

is

ambiguous,

however, opinio juris plays an important role in determining whether or not that
practice counts towards the formation of custom. This
sions,

when

States

do not

act or react but

it is

both the International Court of Justice and

is

often the case with omis-

not clear why.

its

in

It is

such cases that

predecessor, the Permanent Court

of International Justice, have sought to establish the separate existence of an opinio
juris in order to

determine whether instances of ambiguous practice counted to-

wards the establishment of customary international law. 22
In the area of international humanitarian law, where
tion

from

certain conduct, omissions pose a particular

of opinio juris because

many rules require abstenproblem

has to be proved that the abstention

it

but based on a legitimate expectation.

When

is

in the assessment

not a coincidence

such a requirement of abstention

indicated in international instruments and official statements, the existence of a
gal

le-

requirement to abstain from the conduct in question can usually be proved. In

addition, such abstentions
tain controversy,
tal,

is

although

it is

which

may occur after the behavior in

also helps to

show that

question created a cer-

the abstention was not coinciden-

not always easy to prove that the abstention occurred out of a

sense of legal obligation.

Impact of Treaty Law
Treaties are also relevant in determining the existence of customary international

law because they help shed

light

on how

States

law. Hence, the ratification, interpretation

ing reservations

view certain rules of international

and implementation of a treaty, includ-

and statements of interpretation made upon

ratification,

were

in-

cluded in the study. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the International

Court of Justice

clearly considered the degree

of ratification of a treaty to be relevant

to the assessment of customary international law. In that case, the

"the

number of ratifications and accessions so far secured

[39]

is,

Court stated that

though respectable,

hardly sufficient", especially in a context where practice outside the treaty was contradictory. 23 Conversely, in the

weight,

when

fact that the

assessing the

Nicaragua

customary

case, the

Court placed a great deal of

status of the non-intervention rule,

Charter of the United Nations was almost universally
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It
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even be the case that a treaty provision
treaty

is

reflects

not yet in force, provided that there

is

customary law, even though the

sufficiently similar practice, includ-

ing by specially affected States, so that there remains

little

likelihood of significant

opposition to the rule in question. 25
In practice, the drafting of treaty

norms

helps to focus world legal opinion and

has an undeniable influence on the subsequent behavior and legal conviction of
States.

The

International Court of Justice recognized this in

Continental Shelf case in which

it

judgment

its

stated that "multilateral conventions

in the

may have an

important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or in-

deed in developing them." 26 The Court thus confirmed that
pre-existing customary international law but

may also

far as to state that "it

and representative participation
it

might be that

in [a] convention

may

codify

lay the foundation for the

development of new customs based on the norms contained
Court has even gone so

treaties

might

in those treaties.

... a very

suffice

The

widespread

of itself, provided

included that of States whose interests were specially affected." 27

The study took the cautious approach that widespread ratification is only an indication and has to be assessed in relation to other elements of practice, in particular the practice

of States not party to the treaty in question. Consistent practice of

States not party

was considered

as

important positive evidence. Contrary practice

of States not party, however, was considered as important negative evidence. The
practice of States party to a treaty vis-a-vis States not party

also particularly

is

relevant.

Thus, the study did not limit

itself to

the practice of States not party to the rele-

vant treaties of international humanitarian law.

To

limit the study to a consider-

ation of the practice of only the 30-odd States that have not ratified the Additional

would not comply with the requirement that customary
law be based on widespread and representative practice. Therefore,

Protocols, for example,

international

the assessment of the existence of customary law took into account that, at the time
the study was published, Additional Protocol

Additional Protocol
It

II

by 157

I

had been

ratified

by 162

States

and

States.

should be stressed that the study did not seek to determine the customary na-

ture of each treaty rule of international humanitarian law and, as a result, did not
necessarily follow the structure of existing treaties. Rather,

sues in order to establish

inductively

what

rules of

it

sought to analyse

is-

customary international law can be found

on the basis of State practice in

relation to these issues.

As the approach

chosen does not analyse each treaty provision with a view to establishing whether
or not

it is

customary,

it

cannot be concluded that any particular treaty rule

customary merely because

it

does not appear as such in the study.
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Organization of the Study

To determine the best way of fulfilling the mandate entrusted to the ICRC, the authors consulted a group of academic experts in international humanitarian law,

who formed

Committee of the study. 28 The Steering Committee
adopted a plan of action in June 1996, and research started the following October.
Research was conducted using both national and international sources reflecting
State practice and focused on the six parts of the study identified in the plan of
the Steering

action:
•

Principle of distinction

•

Specifically protected persons

•

Specific

•

Weapons

•

Treatment of civilians and persons hors de combat

•

Implementation

and objects

methods of warfare

Research in National Sources
Since national sources are

more

easily accessible

from within a country,

cided to seek the cooperation of national researchers.

group of researchers was identified in nearly 50
cas, 15 in Asia,

1

in Australasia

and

their respective State's practice.

29

1 1

in

To

it

was de-

this end, a researcher or

States (9 in Africa,

1 1

in the

Ameri-

Europe) and asked to produce a report on

Countries were selected on the basis of geo-

graphic representation, as well as recent experience of different kinds of armed
conflict in

The

which a variety of methods of warfare had been used.

military

manuals and national

legislation of countries

not covered by the

on State practice were also researched and collected. This work was facilitated by the network of ICRC delegations around the world and the extensive collection of national legislation gathered by the ICRC Advisory Service on
reports

International Humanitarian Law.

Research in International Sources
State practice gleaned

from international sources was

collected

by six teams, each

of which concentrated on one part of the study. 30 These teams researched practice
in the

framework of the United Nations and other international organizations,

cluding the African

Union (formerly

in-

the Organization of African Unity), the

Council of Europe, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the European Union, the

League of Arab

States, the

Organization of American

46

States, the

Organization of

Jean-Marie Henckaerts

the Islamic Conference

and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-

rope. International case law

was

also collected to the extent that

it

provides evi-

dence of the existence of rules of customary international law.

Research in

ICRC Archives

To complement the research carried out in

ICRC looked

into

its

own

national

archives relating to nearly 40 recent

in Africa, 2 in the Americas, 8 in Asia

and 8

were selected so that countries and

conflicts

practice

would

also

and international

in Europe).

31

armed

sources, the

conflicts (21

In general, these conflicts

not dealt with by a report on State

be covered.

—

The result of this three-pronged approach research in national, international
and ICRC sources is that practice from all parts of the world is cited. In the
nature of things, however, this research cannot purport to be complete. The study
focused in particular on practice from the last 30 years to ensure that the result
would be a restatement of contemporary customary international law, but, where
still relevant, older practice was also cited.

—

Expert Consultations
In a
to

first

round of consultations, the ICRC invited the international research teams

produce an executive summary containing a preliminary assessment of custom-

on the basis of the practice collected. These executive summaries were discussed within the Steering Committee at three
meetings in Geneva in 1998. The executive summaries were duly revised and, durary international humanitarian law

ing a second round of consultations, submitted to a group of academic and govern-

mental experts from

all

regions of the world. These experts were invited in their

personal capacity by the

ICRC to attend two meetings with the Steering Committee

in

Geneva in 1999, during which they helped to evaluate the practice

indicated particular practice that

had been missed.

collected

and

32

Writing of the Report

The assessment by the Steering Committee, as reviewed by the group of academic
and governmental experts, served as a basis for the writing of the final report. The
authors of the study re-examined the practice, reassessed the existence of custom,

reviewed the formulation and the order of the rules and drafted the commentaries.

These draft texts were submitted to the Steering Committee, the group of academic

and governmental experts and the ICRC Legal Division
further updated

and

finalized, taking into

47

comment. The text was
account the comments received.
for
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Summary of Findings
The

Geneva Conventions, including comconsidered to be part of customary international law. 33 Further-

great majority of the provisions of the

mon Article 3, are

more, given that there are
binding on nearly

all

now

192 parties to the Geneva Conventions, they are

States as a matter of treaty law. Therefore, the

ture of the provisions of the Conventions

Rather, the study focused

on

was not the subject

issues regulated

sally ratified, in particular the

as

customary na-

such of the study.

by treaties that have not been univer-

Additional Protocols, the Hague Convention for the

Protection of Cultural Property and a

number of specific conventions

regulating

the use of weapons.

The description below of rules of customary international law does not seek to
explain why these rules are customary, nor does it present the practice on the basis
of which this conclusion was reached. The explanation of why a rule is considered
customary can be found in Volume I of the study, while the corresponding practice
can be found in

International

Volume

II.

Armed Conflicts

Additional Protocol

I

codified pre-existing rules of customary international law

but also laid the foundation for the formation of new customary rules. The practice
collected in the

framework of the study bears witness

to the

profound impact of

on the practice of States, not only in international but also in
non-international armed conflicts (see below). In particular, the study found that
the basic principles of Additional Protocol I have been very widely accepted, more
widely than the ratification record of Additional Protocol I would suggest.
Even though the study did not seek to determine the customary nature of specific treaty provisions, in the end it became clear that there are many customary
rules which are identical or similar to those found in treaty law. Examples of rules
found to be customary and which have corresponding provisions in Additional
Protocol I include: the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives; 34 the prohibition of indisAdditional Protocol

I

criminate attacks; 35 the principle of proportionality in attack; 36 the obligation to
take feasible precautions in attack
to respect
ports, 38

and against the

and protect medical and

humanitarian

effects

of attack; 37 the obligation

religious personnel, medical units

relief personnel

and

objects, 39

and

and

trans-

civilian journalists;

40

the

obligation to protect medical duties; 41 the prohibition of attacks
localities

and demilitarized zones;

42

the obligation to

on non-defended
provide quarter and to safe-

guard an enemy hors de combat^ the prohibition of starvation; 44 the prohibition
of attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population; 45 the

48
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emblems and perfidy; 46 the obligation to respect
the fundamental guarantees of civilians and persons hors de combat; 47 the obligation to account for missing persons; 48 and the specific protections afforded to
women and children. 49
prohibition of improper use of

Non-international

Over the

last

Armed Conflicts

few decades, there has been a considerable amount of practice

insist-

on the protection of international humanitarian law in this type of conflicts.
This body of practice has had a significant influence on the formation of customary
law applicable in non-international armed conflicts. Like Additional Protocol I,
Additional Protocol II has had a far-reaching effect on this practice and, as a result,
ing

many
law.

of

its

provisions are

now

considered to be part of customary international

Examples of rules found to be customary and which have corresponding pro-

visions in Additional Protocol

II

include: the prohibition of attacks

on

civilians; 50

the obligation to respect and protect medical and religious personnel, medical
units

and transports; 51 the obligation to protect medical duties; 52 the prohibition of

starvation; 53 the prohibition of attacks

on

objects indispensable to the survival of

the civilian population; 54 the obligation to respect the fundamental guarantees of
civilians

and persons hors de combat; 55 the obligation

protect the

wounded,

tect the dead;

57

sick

and shipwrecked;

56

to search for

and respect and

the obligation to search for and pro-

the obligation to protect persons deprived of their liberty; 58 the pro-

hibition of forced

movement of civilians; 59 and the specific protections afforded to

women and children. 60
However, the most significant contribution of customary international humanitarian

law to the regulation of internal armed conflicts

provisions of Additional Protocol

II.

is

that

it

goes beyond the

Indeed, practice has created a substantial

number of customary rules that are more detailed than the often rudimentary provisions in Additional Protocol

II

and has thus

filled

important gaps in the regula-

tion of internal conflicts.

For example, Additional Protocol

II

contains only a rudimentary regulation of

the conduct of hostilities. Article 13 provides that "the civilian population as such,
as well as individual civilians, shall

time as they take a direct part in
tional Protocol

II

hostilities."

.

.

.

unless

and for such

Unlike Additional Protocol

I,

Addi-

does not contain specific rules and definitions with respect to the

principles of distinction

The gaps

not be the object of attack

and proportionality.

in the regulation

of the conduct of hostilities in Additional Protocol

II

have, however, largely been filled through State practice, which has led to the creation of rules parallel to those in Additional Protocol

law to non-international armed

conflicts.

49

I,

but applicable as customary

This covers the basic principles on the
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conduct of hostilities and includes rules on
jects

and

specific

methods of warfare.

Similarly, Additional Protocol

manitarian
civilian

relief for civilian

population

is

sential for its survival

.

.

exclusively humanitarian

any adverse distinction
tional Protocol

persons and ob-

on hu-

contains only a very general provision

populations in need. Article 18(2) provides that "if the

undue hardship owing

to a lack of the supplies es-

relief actions for the civilian

population which are of an

suffering
.

II

specifically protected

61

and impartial nature and which are conducted without

shall

be undertaken." Unlike Additional Protocol

I,

Addi-

does not contain specific provisions requiring respect for and

II

protection of humanitarian relief personnel and objects and obliging parties to the
conflict to allow

for civilians in

and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian

relief

need and to ensure the freedom of movement of authorized human-

itarian relief personnel, although
plicit in Article

it

can be argued that such requirements are im-

18(2) of the Protocol. These requirements have crystallized,

however, into customary international law applicable in both international and
non-international
tually

armed conflicts as a result of widespread, representative and vir-

uniform practice to that

In this respect

it

effect.

should be noted that while both Additional Protocols

I

require the consent of the parties concerned for relief actions to take place,

of the practice collected does not mention this requirement.

It is

and

62

II

most

nonetheless

self-

evident that a humanitarian organization cannot operate without the consent of
the party concerned. However, such consent

grounds.

If it is established that a civilian

must not be refused on

population

and a humanitarian organization which provides
discriminatory basis
sent.

63

is

able to

remedy the

is

arbitrary

threatened with starvation

relief

on an impartial and non-

situation, a party

is

obliged to give con-

While consent may not be withheld

for arbitrary reasons, practice recog-

may exercise

control over the relief action and that

nizes that the party concerned

humanitarian

relief personnel

must respect domestic law on access to territory and

security requirements in force.

Issues Requiring Further Clarification

The study also revealed

a

number of areas where practice is not clear. For example,

while the terms "combatants" and "civilians" are clearly defined in international

armed conflicts, 64 in non-international armed conflicts practice is ambiguous as to
whether, for purposes of the conduct of hostilities, members of armed opposition
groups are considered members of armed forces or civilians. In particular, it is not
clear whether members of armed opposition groups are civilians who lose their
protection from attack when directly participating in hostilities or whether members of such groups are liable to attack as such. This lack of clarity is also reflected in

50
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treaty law. Additional Protocol
vilians or

for example, does not contain a definition of ci-

II,

of the civilian population even though these terms are used in several

provisions. 65 Subsequent treaties, applicable in non-international
similarly use the terms civilians

and

civilian

armed

conflicts,

population without defining them. 66

A related area of uncertainty affecting the regulation of both international and
non-international

armed conflicts

is

the absence of a precise definition of the term

"direct participation in hostilities." Loss of protection against attack

is

clear

and

uncontested

when

lence against

human or material enemy forces. But there is also considerable prac-

which

tice

gives

weapons or other means

a civilian uses

or no guidance

little

on

participation," stating, for example, that

to

commit

acts

of vio-

the interpretation of the term "direct

an assessment has to be made on a case-

by-case basis or simply repeating the general rule that direct participation in hostilities

causes civilians to lose protection against attack. Related to this issue

is

the

question of how to qualify a person in case of doubt. Because of these uncertainties,
the

ICRC is seeking to clarify the notion of direct participation by means of a series

of expert meetings that began in 2003. 67

Another

issue

open to question

still

is

principle of proportionality in attack.

support for this principle,
tained in treaty law as to

it

the exact scope

and application of the

While the study revealed widespread

does not provide more clarification than con-

how to

balance military advantage against incidental

civilian losses.

Selected Issues

on the Conduct of Hostilities

Additional Protocols

and

I

and

installations containing

tary objectives,

if such

quent severe losses

attack

among

these specific rules have

introduced a

II

dangerous

new rule

forces,

prohibiting attacks

even where these objects are mili-

may cause the release of dangerous forces and conse-

the civilian population. 68

become

While

tives.

works and

it is

not clear whether

part of customary law, practice shows that States

are conscious of the high risk of severe incidental losses
attacks against such

on works

installations

which can

when they constitute

result

from

military objec-

Consequently, they recognize that in any armed conflict particular care

must be taken in case of attack in order to avoid the release of dangerous forces
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population, and this requirement was found to be part of customary international law applicable in any
armed conflict.
Another new rule introduced

in Additional Protocol

I is

the prohibition of the

means of warfare that are intended, or maybe expected, to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. Since the
use of methods or

adoption of Additional Protocol

I,

this prohibition has received

51

such extensive
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support in State practice that

it

has crystallized into customary law, even though

some States have persistently maintained that the rule does not apply to nuclear
weapons and that they may, therefore, not be bound by it in respect of nuclear
weapons. 69 Beyond this specific rule, the study found that the natural environment
is considered to be a civilian object and as such it is protected by the same principles

and

tinction

rules that protect other civilian objects, in particular the principles of dis-

and proportionality and the requirement

to take precautions in attack.

This means that no part of the natural environment
tack, unless

it is

a military objective,

which may be expected

may be made the object of at-

and that an attack against

a military objective

damage to the environment which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited. In its advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, for example, the International Court of Justice stated that "States must take environmental
considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in
to cause incidental

the pursuit of legitimate military objectives." 70 In addition, parties to a conflict are

required to take

all

feasible precautions in the

conduct of hostilities to avoid, and in

any event to minimize, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific
certainty as to the effects

on

the environment of certain military operations does

not absolve a party to the conflict from taking such precautions. 71

There are also

issues that are not as

such addressed in the Additional Protocols.

For example, the Additional Protocols do not contain any specific provision concerning the protection of personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission. In practice,

however, such personnel and objects were given protection

against attack equivalent to that of civilians
result, a rule

and

civilian objects respectively.

As

a

prohibiting attacks against personnel and objects involved in a peace-

keeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as
they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under international humanitarian law, developed in State practice
Statute of the International Criminal Court.
tional law applicable in

A number
Hague

any type of armed

It is

and was included

now part

conflict.

of issues related to the conduct of

in the

of customary interna-

72

hostilities are regulated

by the

Regulations. These regulations have long been considered customary in in-

armed conflict. 73 Some of their rules, however, are now also accepted as
customary in non-international armed conflict. For example, the long-standing

ternational

rules of customary international

law that prohibit

(1) destruction or seizure

of the

property of an adversary, unless required by imperative military necessity, and (2)
pillage apply equally in non-international

armed

conflicts. Pillage is the forcible

taking of private property from the enemy's subjects for private or personal use. 74
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Both prohibitions do not affect the customary practice of seizing as war booty military

equipment belonging to an adverse

party.

Under customary international law, commanders may enter into non-hostile
contact through any means of communication, but such contact must be based on
good faith. Practice indicates that communication may be carried out via intermediaries known as parlementaires but also by various other means, such as telephone
and radio. A parlementaire is a person belonging to a party to the conflict who has
been authorized to enter into communication with another party to the conflict
and who is, as a result, inviolable. The traditional method of making oneself known
as parlementaire by advancing bearing a white flag has been found to be still valid.
a.

In addition,
facilitate
tral

also

it is

recognized practice that the parties

may appeal to

a third party to

communication, for example a protecting power or an impartial and neu-

humanitarian organization acting as a substitute, in particular the ICRC, but

an international organization or a peacekeeping

shows that various

institutions

force. Collected practice

and organizations have acted

negotiations in both international

as intermediaries in

and non-international armed conflicts, and that

The rules governing parlementaires go back to the Hague
Regulations and have long been considered customary in international armed conflict. On the basis of practice in the last 50 years or so, they have become customary
in non-international armed conflicts as well. 75
Practice reveals two strains of law that protect cultural property. A first strain
dates back to the Hague Regulations and requires that special care be taken in military operations to avoid damage to buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, education or charitable purposes and historic monuments, unless they are military
objectives. It also prohibits seizure of or destruction or willful damage to such
buildings and monuments. While these rules have long been considered customary
in international armed conflicts, they are now also accepted as customary in noninternational armed conflicts.
A second strain is based on the specific provisions of the 1954 Hague Conventhis is generally accepted.

tion for the Protection of Cultural Property,

which protects "property of great im-

portance to the cultural heritage of every people" and introduces a specific distinctive sign to identify

such property. Customary law today requires that such objects

not be attacked nor used for purposes which are likely to expose them to destruction
or damage, unless imperatively required by military necessity.

form of

theft, pillage

or misappropriation

against, such property.

the

on

of,

and any

acts

It

also prohibits

of vandalism directed

These prohibitions correspond to provisions

Hague Convention and

are evidence of the influence the

set forth in

Convention has had

State practice concerning the protection of important cultural property.
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Weapons
The general

principles prohibiting the use of weapons that cause superfluous in-

jury or unnecessary suffering and weapons that are by nature indiscriminate were

found to be customary in any armed

conflict. In addition,

and

largely

on the

basis

of these principles, State practice has prohibited the use (or certain types of use) of
a

number of specific weapons under customary

international law: poison or poi-

soned weapons; biological weapons; chemical weapons; riot-control agents

method of warfare;

herbicides as a

flatten easily in the

within the

human

human

method of warfare;

bullets

as a

which expand or

body; anti-personnel use of bullets which explode

body; weapons the primary

ments which are not detectable by X-rays
are in

76

effect

in the

of which

human body;

is

to injure

by

frag-

booby-traps which

any way attached to or associated with objects or persons

entitled to special

protection under international humanitarian law or objects that are likely to attract civilians;

and laser weapons that are specifically designed, as their sole combat

function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to

unenhanced vision.

Some weapons which are not prohibited as such by customary law are nevertheless subject to restrictions.

This

is

the case, for example, for landmines and incendi-

ary weapons.
Particular care

must be taken

to

minimize the indiscriminate

effects

of land-

mines. This includes, for example, the principle that a party to the conflict using

landmines must record their placement,

as far as possible. Also, at the

end of active

hostilities, a

party to the conflict which has used landmines must remove or other-

wise render

them harmless

With over 140

to civilians, or facilitate their removal.

ratifications of the

Ottawa Convention, and others on the way,

the majority of States are treaty-bound
transfer anti-personnel landmines.

no longer

to use, produce, stockpile

While this prohibition

is

and

not part of customary

international law because of significant contrary practice of States not party to the

Convention, almost

all States,

including those that are not party to the Ottawa

Convention and are not in favor of their immediate ban, have recognized the need

work towards the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines.
The anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons is prohibited, unless it is not feasible to use a less harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat. In addition, if
they are used, particular care must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
Most of these rules correspond to treaty provisions that originally applied only
to international armed conflicts. That trend has gradually been reversed, for example by the amendment of Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons in 1996, which also applies to non-international armed conflicts and,
to
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most

recently,

by the amendment of the Convention on Certain Conventional

Weapons in 2001 to extend the scope of application of Protocols I-IV to non-international armed conflicts. The customary prohibitions and restrictions referred to
above apply in any armed conflict.
When the ICRC received the mandate to undertake the study on customary international humanitarian law, the International Court of Justice

was considering

the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, following a request for an advi-

on the issue from the UN General Assembly. The ICRC decided
therefore not to embark on its own analysis of this question. In its advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice held unanimously that "a threat or use of
nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and
sory opinion

rules of international

humanitarian law." 77 This finding

is

significant given that a

number of States undertook the negotiation of Additional Protocol I on the understanding that the Protocol would not apply to the use of nuclear weapons. The
opinion of the Court, however, means that the rules on the conduct of hostilities
and the general principles on the use of weapons apply to the use of nuclear weapons. In application of these principles

and

rules, the

Court concluded, "the threat

or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international

law applicable in armed
manitarian law."

conflict,

and

in particular the principles

and

rules of

hu-

78

Fundamental Guarantees
Fundamental guarantees apply to all civilians in the power of a party to the conflict
and who do not or have ceased to take a direct part in hostilities, as well as to all persons

who

are hors de combat. Because fundamental guarantees are overarching

rules that apply to

all

persons, they were not sub-divided in the study into specific

rules relating to different types of persons.

These fundamental guarantees

all

have a firm basis in international humanitar-

ian law applicable in both international

the study,

most of the

rules relating to

and non-international armed

conflicts. In

fundamental guarantees are couched in

tradi-

tional humanitarian law language, because this best reflected the substance of the

corresponding customary

rule.

79

Some

rules,

however, were drafted so as to capture

the essence of a range of detailed provisions relating to a specific subject, in particular the rules prohibiting

uncompensated or abusive forced labor, enforced disap-

pearances and arbitrary detention and the rule requiring respect for family

Where

relevant, practice

under international human

the study and in particular in the chapter

done because international human

rights
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life.

80

law was included in

on fundamental guarantees. This was
law continues to apply during armed
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human

conflicts, as expressly stated in the

rights treaties themselves, although

some provisions may, subject to certain conditions, be derogated from in time of
public emergency. The continued applicability of human rights law during armed
conflict has been confirmed on numerous occasions in State practice and by human rights bodies and the International Court of Justice. 81 Most recently, the
Court, in its advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a
wall in the occupied Palestinian territories, confirmed that "the protection offered

by human

rights conventions does

not cease in case of armed conflict" and that

may be rights that are exclusively matters of international humanitarian law or of human rights law, there are others that "may be matters of both these

while there

branches of international law." 82 The study does not

an assessment of customary
rights

human

set out,

however, to provide

rights law. Instead, practice

law has been included in order to support, strengthen and

under

clarify

human

analogous

principles of international humanitarian law.

Implementation

A number of rules on the implementation of international humanitarian law have
become part of customary international law. In particular, each party to the conflict must respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law by its
armed forces and other persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions or under
its direction or control. As a result, each party to the conflict, including armed opposition groups, must provide instruction in international humanitarian law to its
armed forces. Beyond these general obligations, it is less clear to what extent other
specific implementation mechanisms that are binding upon States are also binding
upon armed opposition groups. For example, the obligation to issue orders and instructions to the armed forces which ensure respect for international humanitarian
law is clearly set forth in international law for States but not so for armed opposition
groups. Similarly, there is an obligation on States to make legal advisers available,
when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of international humanitarian law, but not on armed opposition groups.

A State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law attributable to

it

and

is

required to

make

full

reparation for the loss or injury caused by

armed opposition groups incur an equivalent
responsibility for violations committed by their members and what the consequences of such responsibility would be. As stated above, armed opposition groups
must respect international humanitarian law and they must operate under a "responsible command." 83 As a result, it can be argued that armed opposition groups
incur responsibility for acts committed by persons forming part of such groups.
The consequences of such responsibility, however, are not clear. In particular, it is
such violations.

It is

unclear whether
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unclear to what extent
full

reparation, even

armed opposition groups

though

in

many

are

under an obligation to make

countries victims can bring a

civil suit for

damages against the offenders.

When

it

comes

to individual responsibility,

tarian law places criminal responsibility on

all

customary international humani-

persons who commit,

commission of or who are otherwise responsible

as

who order the

commanders or

superiors for

The implementation of the war crimes regime, that
is, the investigation of war crimes and the prosecution of the suspects, is an obligation incumbent upon States. States may discharge this obligation by setting up international or mixed tribunals to that effect.
the commission of war crimes.

Conclusion

The study did not attempt to determine the customary nature of each treaty rule of
international humanitarian law but sought to analyse issues in order to establish

what

rules of customary international

law can be found inductively on the basis of

State practice in relation to these issues.

A brief overview of some of the findings of

the study nevertheless shows that the principles

and

rules contained in treaty

law

have received widespread acceptance in practice and have greatly influenced the
formation of customary international law.

now part

Many of these

principles

and

of customary international law. As such, they are binding on

regardless of ratification of treaties
rules applicable to

The study also

all

and also on armed opposition groups

parties to a non-international

indicates that

armed

rules are
all

States

in case of

conflict.

many rules of customary international law apply in

both international and non-international armed conflicts and shows the extent to

which

State practice has

gone beyond existing treaty law and expanded the

rules

The regulation of the conduct of
hostilities and the treatment of persons in internal armed conflicts is thus more detailed and complete than that which exists under treaty law. It remains to be explored to what extent, from a humanitarian and military perspective, this more
detailed and complete regulation is sufficient or whether further developments in
applicable to non-international

armed

conflicts.

the law are required.

As

is

the case for treaty law, effective implementation of the rules of customary

international humanitarian law

is

required through dissemination, training and

enforcement. These rules should be incorporated into military manuals and national legislation,

The study also

wherever

this

reveals areas

is

not already the case.

where the law is not

clear

and points

to issues

which

require further clarification or agreement, such as the definition of civilians in
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non-international

armed conflicts, the concept of direct participation

in hostilities

and the scope and application of the principle of proportionality.
In the light of the achievements to date and the

work

that remains to be done,

the study should not be seen as the end but rather as the beginning of a

new process

aimed at improving understanding of and agreement on the principles and rules of
form the

international humanitarian law. In this process, the study can
rich discussion

and dialogue on the implementation,

clarification

basis of a

and possible de-

velopment of the law.
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This rule incorporates a reference to a number of other rules of customary international law,
namely the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons; the prohibition of attacks against
vegetation that is not a military objective; the prohibition of attacks that would cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
may be expected to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated; and the prohibition on causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
76.

natural environment. See

id.,

77.

Legality of the Threat or

78.

Id.; see also

Rule 76.

Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note

the International

Committee of the Red Cross,

UN
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8, at

226.

Committee, Statement by
Doc. A/C. 1/5 1/PV.8, 18 October 1996, p. 10,

United Nations General Assembly, 5 1 st session,

First
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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1 18-1 19 (1997) ("the ICRC finds it
envisage how a use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the rules of

reprinted in 316
difficult to

international law").

These rules include the fundamental guarantees that civilians and persons hors de combat be
treated humanely and without adverse distinction; the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of
79.

torture, cruel or

inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal

dignity, in particular

humiliating and degrading treatment; the prohibition of corporal punishment; the prohibition

of mutilation, medical or

scientific

experiments; the prohibition of rape and other forms of

sexual violence; the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade in

all

hostage-taking; the prohibition of the use of human shields; fair

their forms; the prohibition of

trial

guarantees; the prohibition

of collective punishments; and the requirement to respect the convictions and religious practices
of civilians and persons hors de combat. See HENCKAERTS

& DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 4, Vol.

I,

Rules 87-94, 96-97 and 100-104.
80.

See

id.,

Rules 95, 98-99 and 105.

81.

See

id.,

Introduction to Chapter 32, Fundamental Guarantees.

82.

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

Advisory Opinion, (July 9, 2004), 43 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1009, para. 106
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm.
83.

Additional Protocol

II,

supra note 62,

art. 1(1).
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at 1038,

Annex

List of Customary Rules of International

Note. This

list is

based on the conclusions

set

out in

Humanitarian Law

Volume I of the study on

cus-

tomary international humanitarian law. As the study did not seek to determine the
customary nature of each treaty rule of international humanitarian law,

it

does not

The scope of application of the
rules is indicated in square brackets. The abbreviation IAC refers to customary
rules applicable in international armed conflicts and the abbreviation NIAC to customary rules applicable in non-international armed conflicts. In the latter case,
some rules are indicated as being "arguably" applicable because practice generally
pointed in that direction but was less extensive.
necessarily follow the structure of existing treaties.

The Principle of Distinction
Distinction between Civilians and Combatants

Rule

1.

The

parties to the conflict

must

at all

times distinguish between civilians

and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must
not be directed against

Rule

2.

civilians.

[IAC/NIAC]

Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which

among the

civilian

Rule

members of the armed

3. All

is

to spread terror

population are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
forces of a party to the conflict are combatants,

except medical and religious personnel. [IAC]

Rule

4.

forces,

The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that party for

the conduct of its subordinates. [IAC]

Rule 5. Civilians are persons who are not members of the armed
population comprises

all

persons

who

are civilians.

forces.

The civilian

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 6. Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities.

[IAC/NIAC]
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Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives

The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule

7.

Rule

8.

objects

In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those

which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an

tion to military action

effective contribu-

and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutraliza-

tion, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 9. Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule

10. Civilian objects are protected against attack, unless

and

for such time as

they are military objectives. [IAC/NIAC]

Indiscriminate Attacks

Rule

11. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.

Rule

12. Indiscriminate attacks are those:

[IAC/NIAC]

(a)

which are not directed

(b)

which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed

at a specific military objective;
at

a specific military objective; or
(c)

which employ

be limited

a

method or means of combat

as required

and consequently,

by international humanitarian

13. Attacks

city,

and

without distinction. [IAC/NIAC]

by bombardment by any method or means which treats as a single

military objective a

cated in a

law;

in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives

civilians or civilian objects

Rule

the effects of which cannot

number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives lo-

town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of ci-

vilians or civilian objects are prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Proportionality in Attack

Rule

14.

vilian

Launching an attack which

life,

injury to civilians,

which would be excessive
anticipated,

is

prohibited.

may be expected to cause incidental loss of ci-

damage

to civilian objects, or a

in relation to the concrete

and

combination thereof,

direct military advantage

[IAC/NIAC]

Precautions in Attack

Rule

15. In the

conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare

the civilian population, civilians

and civilian
64

objects. All feasible precautions

must
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be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental
jury to civilians and

Rule

16.

damage

1 7.

[IAC/NIAC]

Each party to the conflict must take all feasible precautions in the choice of

mizing, incidental loss of civilian

life,

a view to avoiding,

injury to civilians

and

in

any event to mini-

and damage to

civilian

ob-

[IAC/NIAC]

jects.

18.

attack

Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to

may be

damage

expected to cause incidental loss of civilian

to civilian objects, or a

relation to the concrete

Rule

in-

life,

conflict

means and methods of warfare with

Rule

of civilian

must do everything feasible to verify that targets
[IAC/NIAC]

Each party to the

are military objectives.

Rule

to civilian objects.

loss

19.

and

Each party to the

may be

damage

direct military advantage anticipated.

conflict

to civilian objects, or a

and

is

not a military objective or that the
life,

injury to civilians,

combination thereof, which would be excessive in

direct military advantage anticipated.

Rule 20. Each party to the conflict must give

which may

[IAC/NIAC]

must do everything feasible to cancel or suspend

expected to cause incidental loss of civilian

relation to the concrete

injury to civilians,

combination thereof, which would be excessive in

an attack if it becomes apparent that the target
attack

life,

whether the

assess

effective

affect the civilian population, unless

[IAC/NIAC]

advance warning of attacks

circumstances do not permit.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 21. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining
a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected

which may be expected to cause the
jects.

least

danger to

must be that the

civilian lives

and to

attack

civilian

on

ob-

[IAC/arguablyNIAC]

Precautions against the Effects of Attacks

Rule 22. The parties to the conflict must take
civilian

tacks.

all

feasible precautions to protect the

population and civilian objects under their control against the

effects

of at-

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 23. Each party to the conflict must, to the extent

feasible,

avoid locating mili-

tary objectives within or near densely populated areas. [IAC/arguably

Rule 24. Each party to the conflict must, to the extent
sons and objects under

its

feasible,

NIAC]

remove civilian per-

control from the vicinity of military objectives. [IAC/ar-

guably NIAC]
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Specifically Protected Persons And Objects

Medical and Religious Personnel and Objects
Rule 25. Medical personnel exclusively assigned to medical duties must be
spected and protected in

all

circumstances.

They lose

their protection if they

mit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy.

re-

com-

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 26. Punishing a person for performing medical duties compatible with medical ethics or

compelling a person engaged in medical

trary to medical ethics

prohibited.

is

activities to

perform acts con-

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 27. Religious personnel exclusively assigned to religious duties must be

They lose

re-

commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy. [IAC/NIAC]
spected and protected in

all

circumstances.

their protection if they

Rule 28. Medical units exclusively assigned to medical purposes must be respected

and protected

in

all

circumstances.

They

lose their protection if they are being

used, outside their humanitarian function, to

commit

acts

harmful to the enemy.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 29. Medical transports assigned exclusively to medical transportation must be
respected and protected in

all

circumstances. They lose their protection

if they

are

being used, outside their humanitarian function, to commit acts harmful to the en-

emy. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 30. Attacks directed against medical and religious personnel and objects

dis-

emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with inprohibited. [IAC/NIAC]

playing the distinctive
ternational law are

Humanitarian Relief Personnel and Objects
Rule 31. Humanitarian

relief

personnel must be respected and protected.

[I

AC/

NIAC]
Rule 32. Objects used for humanitarian
protected.

relief

operations must be respected and

[IAC/NIAC]

Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission
Rule 33. Directing an attack against personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they
are entitled to the protection given to civilians
tional humanitarian law,

is

prohibited.

and

civilian objects

[IAC/NIAC]
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Journalists

Rule 34. Civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed
conflict

must be respected and protected as long as they are not taking a direct part

in hostilities.

[IAC/NIAC]

Protected Zones

Rule 35. Directing an attack against a zone established to shelter the wounded, the

and

sick

civilians

from the

effects

of hostilities

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 36. Directing an attack against a demilitarized zone agreed upon between the
parties to the conflict

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 37. Directing an attack against a non-defended locality

is

prohibited. [LAC/

MAC]
Cultural Property

Rule 38. Each party to the conflict must respect cultural property:
A.

Special care

must be taken

buildings dedicated to religion,

and
B.

historic

monuments

in military operations to avoid

art, science,

damage

to

education or charitable purposes

unless they are military objectives.

Property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people must

not be the object of attack unless imperatively required by military necessity.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 39. The use of property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every
people for purposes which are likely to expose
hibited, unless imperatively required

it

by military

damage
[IAC/NIAC]

to destruction or
necessity.

is

pro-

Rule 40. Each party to the conflict must protect cultural property:

damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity, education, the arts and sciences, historic
monuments and works of art and science is prohibited.

A.

All seizure of or destruction or willful

B.

Any form

of

theft, pillage

or misappropriation

of,

and any

acts

of

vandalism directed against, property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 41. The occupying power must prevent the

illicit

from occupied

exported property to the compe-

territory

and must return

illicitly

tent authorities of the occupied territory. [IAC]

67

export of cultural property

Customary International Humanitarian Law Study

Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces
Rule 42. Particular care must be taken

if

works and

installations containing

dan-

gerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, and
other installations located at or in their vicinity are attacked, in order to avoid the
release of dangerous forces
lation.

and consequent severe losses among the

civilian

popu-

[IAC/NIAC]

The Natural Environment
Rule 43. The general principles on

the conduct of hostilities apply to the natural

environment:

No part of the natural environment may be attacked, unless it is a military

A.

objective.

Destruction of any part of the natural environment

B.

is

prohibited, unless

required by imperative military necessity.

Launching an attack against a military objective which may be expected

C.

damage to the environment which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited.

to cause incidental

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 44. Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the
protection and preservation of the natural environment. In the conduct of military
operations,

all

feasible precautions

must be taken

to avoid,

and

in

any event to

minimize, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific certainty as to

on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve
the conflict from taking such precautions. [IAC/arguably NIAC]

the effects

party to

Rule 45. The use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or
pected, to cause widespread, long-term

ment

is

and severe damage

may be

a

ex-

to the natural environ-

prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment

may not be

used as a

weapon. [IAC/arguably NIAC]

Specific

Methods Of Warfare

Denial of Quarter

Rule 46. Ordering that no quarter will be given, threatening an adversary therewith
or conducting hostilities on this basis

Rule 47. Attacking persons
person hors de combat
(a)

anyone who

who

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

are recognized as hors de

is:

is

in the

power of an adverse
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party;

combat

is

prohibited.

A
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(b)

anyone who

wounds or
(c)

defenseless because of unconsciousness, shipwreck,

is

sickness; or

anyone who

clearly expresses

an intention to surrender;

provided he or she abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 48. Making persons parachuting from an
tack during their descent

is

prohibited.

aircraft in distress the object

of at-

[IAC/NIAC]

Destruction and Seizure of Property

Rule 49. The parties to the conflict

may seize

military

equipment belonging to an

adverse party as war booty. [IAC]

Rule 50. The destruction or seizure of the property of an adversary
unless required

by imperative military

Rule 51. In occupied
(a)

necessity.

prohibited,

is

[IAC/NIAC]

territory:

movable public property that can be used

for military operations

may be

confiscated;
(b)

immovable public property must be administered according

to the rule

of usufruct; and
(c)

private property

must be respected and may not be

confiscated;

except where destruction or seizure of such property is required by imperative military necessity. [IAC]

Rule 52. Pillage

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Starvation and Access to Humanitarian Relief

Rule 53. The use of starvation of the
prohibited.

population as a method of warfare

civilian

is

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 54. Attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population

is

prohibited.

Rule 55. The parties to the conflict must allow and

facilitate

passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which

and conducted without any adverse

is

[IAC/NIAC]
rapid and

unimpeded

impartial in character

distinction, subject to their right of control.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 56. The parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions.

Only

in case

restricted.

of imperative military necessity

[IAC/NIAC]
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Deception
Rule 57. Ruses of war are not prohibited as long as they do not infringe a rule of international humanitarian law.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 58. The improper use of the white

flag

of truce

is

[IAC/NIAC]

prohibited.

Rule 59. The improper use of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions
is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 60. The use of the United Nations emblem and uniform
as authorized

is

prohibited, except

by the organization. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 61. The improper use of other internationally recognized emblems
ited.

is

prohib-

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 62. Improper use of the
adversary

is

flags

or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of the

prohibited. [IAC/arguably

Rule 63. Use of the

flags

NIAC]

or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of neutral or

other States not party to the conflict

is

prohibited. [IAC/arguably

NIAC]

Rule 64. Concluding an agreement to suspend combat with the intention of attacking by surprise the

Rule 65.
ited.

enemy relying on

that agreement

Killing, injuring or capturing

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

an adversary by resort to perfidy

is

prohib-

[IAC/NIAC]

Communication with the Enemy
Rule 66. Commanders may enter into

means of
[IAC/NIAC]

non-hostile contact through any

communication. Such contact must be based on good

faith.

Rule 67. Parlementaires are inviolable. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 68.

Commanders may take the necessary precautions to prevent the presence

of a parlementaire from being prejudicial. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 69. Parlementaires taking advantage of their privileged position to commit an
act contrary to international
lability.

law and detrimental to the adversary lose their invio-

[IAC/NIAC]

Weapons
General Principles on the Use of Weapons
Rule 70. The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 71. The use of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate

[IAC/NIAC]
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Poison
Rule 72. The use of poison or poisoned weapons

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Biological Weapons

Rule 73. The use of biological weapons

is

[IAC/NIAC]

prohibited.

Chemical Weapons
Rule 74. The use of chemical weapons

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 75. The use of riot-control agents as a method of warfare

is

prohibited. [IAC/

NIAC]
Rule 76. The use of herbicides

as a

method of warfare

is

prohibited

a)

are of a nature to be prohibited chemical weapons;

b)

are of a nature to be prohibited biological weapons;

c)

are

d)

would cause

aimed

at vegetation that is

life,

injury to civilians,

combination thereof, which

excessive in relation to the concrete

they:

not a military objective;

incidental loss of civilian

civilian objects, or a

if

and

may

damage

to

be expected to be

direct military advantage anticipated;

or
e)

would cause widespread, long-term and severe damage

to the natural

environment.

[IAC/NIAC]

Expanding Bullets
Rule 77. The use of bullets which expand or flatten
hibited.

easily in the

human body is pro-

[IAC/NIAC]

Exploding Bullets
Rule 78. The anti-personnel use of bullets which explode within the human body is
prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Weapons Primarily Injuring by Non-detectable Fragments
Rule 79. The use of weapons the primary

effect

of which

is

to injure

by fragments

which are not detectable by X-rays in the human body is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
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Booby-traps
Rule 80. The use of booby-traps which are in anyway attached to or associated with
objects or persons entitled to special protection under international humanitarian

law or with objects that are

likely to attract civilians

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Landmines
Rule 81

.

When landmines are used, particular care must be taken to minimize their

indiscriminate effects. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 82.

A party to the conflict using landmines must record their placement, as far

as possible. [IAC/arguably

NIAC]

Rule 83. At the end of active

hostilities, a

party to the conflict which has used land-

mines must remove or otherwise render them harmless to
their removal.

civilians,

or

facilitate

[IAC/NIAC]

Incendiary Weapons

Rule 84.

and

in

If

incendiary weapons are used, particular care must be taken to avoid,

any event to minimize, incidental

damage

to civilian objects.

loss

of civilian

less

and

prohibited, unless

it is

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 85. The anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons
not feasible to use a

injury to civilians

life,

is

harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat.

[I

AC/

NIAC]
Blinding Laser Weapons

Rule 86. The use of laser weapons that are
bat function or as one of their

unenhanced vision

is

combat

prohibited.

specifically designed, as their sole

functions, to cause

com-

permanent blindness

to

[IAC/NIAC]

Treatment of Civilians and Persons Hors de Combat

Fundamental Guarantees
Rule 87. Civilians and persons
NIAC]

hors de combat

must be

treated humanely. [IAC/

Rule 88. Adverse distinction in the application of international humanitarian law
based on race, color,

sex, language, religion

or belief, political or other opinion, na-

tional or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or
is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 89. Murder

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]
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Rule 90. Torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating

and degrading treatment, are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 91. Corporal punishment

is

Rule 92. Mutilation, medical or

scientific

dure not indicated by the

of health of the person concerned and not consis-

state

prohibited.

experiments or any other medical proce-

tent with generally accepted medical standards are prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 93. Rape and other forms of sexual violence are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 94. Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 95. Uncompensated or abusive forced labor
Rule 96. The taking of hostages

is

prohibited.

Rule 97. The use of human shields
Rule 98. Enforced disappearance

is

is

prohibited.

Rule 100.
fording

is

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

[IAC/NIAC]

prohibited.

Rule 99. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty

is

[IAC/NIAC]

[IAC/NIAC]

prohibited.

[IAC/NIAC]

No one may be convicted or sentenced, except pursuant to a fair trial af-

all

essential judicial guarantees.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 101.

No one maybe accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of

any

omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or

act or

international law at the time

it

was committed; nor may a heavier penalty be im-

posed than that which was applicable
ted.

at the

time the criminal offence was commit-

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 102.

No one may be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual

criminal responsibility. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 103. Collective punishments are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 104. The convictions and religious practices of civilians and persons hors de

combat must be respected. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 105. Family

life

must be respected

as far as possible.

Combatants and Prisoner-of-War Status
Rule 106. Combatants must distinguish themselves from

[IAC/NIAC]

the civilian population

while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. If they fail to

do so, they do not have the

Rule 107. Combatants

who

are captured while engaged in espionage

the right to prisoner-of-war status.

out previous

trial.

right to prisoner-of-war status. [IAC]

do not have

They may not be convicted or sentenced with-

[IAC]
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Rule 108. Mercenaries, as defined in Additional Protocol

combatant or prisoner-of-war
without previous

trial.

status.

[IAC]

particularly after an engagement,

each party to the conflict must, without delay, take

tinction.

do not have the right to

They may not be convicted or sentenced

The Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Rule 109. Whenever circumstances permit, and
and evacuate the wounded,

for, collect

I,

sick

all

possible measures to search

and shipwrecked without adverse

dis-

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 110. The wounded, sick and shipwrecked must receive, to the
practicable

and with the

medical care and attention

least possible delay, the

quired by their condition.

No

distinction

fullest extent

re-

may be made among them founded on

any grounds other than medical ones. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 111. Each party to the conflict must take

wounded,

sick

and shipwrecked against

all

possible measures to protect the

ill-treatment

and against

pillage of their

personal property. [IAC/NIAC]

The Dead
Rule 112. Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly
each party to the conflict must, without delay, take
for, collect

and evacuate the dead without adverse

Rule 113. Each party to the conflict must take

all

all

after

an engagement,

possible measures to search

distinction.

[IAC/NIAC]

possible measures to prevent the

dead from being despoiled. Mutilation of dead bodies
Rule 114. Parties to the conflict must endeavour to

is

prohibited.

facilitate

[IAC/NIAC]

the return of the re-

mains of the deceased upon request of the party to which they belong or upon the
request of their next of kin.

They must return their personal effects to them. [IAC]

Rule 115. The dead must be disposed of in a respectful manner and their graves

re-

spected and properly maintained. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 116. With a view to the identification of the dead, each party to the conflict

must record all available information prior to disposal and mark the location of the
graves.

[IAC/NIAC]

Missing Persons
Rule 117. Each party to the conflict must take

all

feasible

measures to account for

persons reported missing as a result of armed conflict and must provide their family

members with any information

it

has on their
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Persons Deprived of their Liberty
Rule 118. Persons deprived of their liberty must be provided with adequate food,
water, clothing, shelter

Rule 119.
rate

attention.

[IAC/NIAC]

Women who are deprived of their liberty must be held in quarters sepaaccommodated as family
immediate supervision of women. [IAC/NIAC]

from those of men, except where

and must be under the
Rule 120. Children
rate

and medical

families are

units,

who are deprived of their liberty must be held in quarters sepa-

from those of adults, except where

accommodated as family units.

families are

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 121. Persons deprived of their liberty must be held in premises which are

moved from the combat zone and which safeguard their health and hygiene.
NIAC]

[I

re-

AC/

Rule 122. Pillage of the personal belongings of persons deprived of their liberty
prohibited.

is

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 123. The personal

details

of persons deprived of their liberty must be re-

corded. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 124.
A.
to

In international
all

armed conflicts, the ICRC must be granted regular access

persons deprived of their liberty in order to verify the conditions of their

detention and to restore contacts between those persons and their families.
B.

In non-international

armed

conflicts, the

ICRC may offer

the parties to the conflict with a view to visiting

all

its

services to

persons deprived of their

liberty for reasons related to the conflict in order to verify the conditions of

their detention

and

to restore contacts

between those persons and

their

families.

[IAC(A)/NIAC(B)]
Rule 125. Persons deprived of their liberty must be allowed to correspond with
their families, subject to reasonable conditions relating to frequency

for censorship

by the

authorities.

and the need

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 126. Civilian internees and persons deprived of their liberty in connection
with a non-international armed conflict must be allowed to receive
cially

near

relatives, to the

visitors, espe-

degree practicable. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 127. The personal convictions and religious practices of persons deprived of
their liberty

must be

respected.

[IAC/NIAC]
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Rule 128.
A.

Prisoners of war

must be

released

and repatriated without delay after the

cessation of active hostilities.
B.

must be
internment no longer

necessitated

after the close

C.

released as soon as the reasons

Civilian internees

of active

exist,

but

soon

at the latest as

which

as possible

hostilities.

Persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a non-international armed

conflict

must be

released as soon as the reasons for the deprivation of their

liberty cease to exist.

The persons

referred to

may continue

ceedings are pending against
posed. [IAC

(A&B)/NIAC

to be deprived of their liberty if penal pro-

them or

if

they are serving a sentence lawfully im-

(C)]

Displacement and Displaced Persons
Rule 129.
A.

Parties to

an international armed conflict

may

not deport or forcibly

transfer the civilian population of an occupied territory, in

whole or

in part,

unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so

demand.
B.

Parties

to

a

non-international

armed

conflict

may

not order the

displacement of the civilian population, in whole or in part, for reasons related
to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative

military reasons so

demand.

[IAC (A)/NIAC

(B)]

Rule 130. States

may not

deport or transfer parts of their

own

civilian

population

into a territory they occupy. [IAC]

Rule 131. In case of displacement,

all

possible measures

must be taken in order that

the civilians concerned are received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety

separated.

and nutrition and

that

members of the same

family are not

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 132. Displaced persons have a right to voluntary return in safety to their

homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons
cease to exist.

for their displacement

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 133. The property rights of displaced persons must be respected. [IAC/NIAC]
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Other Persons Afforded Specific Protection
Rule 134. The specific protection, health and
by armed

conflict

must be

respected.

assistance needs of women affected

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 135. Children affected by armed conflict are entitled to special respect and
protection.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 136. Children must not be recruited into armed forces or armed groups.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 137. Children must not be allowed to take part in
Rule 138. The

elderly, disabled

special respect

hostilities.

[IAC/NIAC]

and infirm affected by armed conflict are entitled to

and protection. [IAC/NIAC]
Implementation

Compliance with International Humanitarian Law
Rule 139. Each party to the conflict must respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law by its armed forces and other persons or groups acting in
fact on its instructions, or under its direction or control. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 140. The obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law does not

depend on

reciprocity.

Rule 141. Each State must make
military

commanders

at the

[IAC/NIAC]

legal advisers available,

when

necessary, to advise

appropriate level on the application of international

humanitarian law. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 142. States and parties to the conflict must provide instruction in international humanitarian law to their

armed

forces.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 143. States must encourage the teaching of international humanitarian law to
the civilian population. [IAC/NIAC]

Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law
Rule 144. States

by parties
sible, to

to

may not encourage

an armed

conflict.

violations of international humanitarian law

They must

exert their influence, to the degree pos-

stop violations of international humanitarian law. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 145. Where not prohibited by international law, belligerent reprisals are subject to stringent conditions.

[IAC]

Rule 146. Belligerent reprisals against persons protected by the Geneva Conventions are prohibited. [IAC]
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Rule 147. Reprisals against objects protected under the Geneva Conventions and

Hague Convention

for the Protection of Cultural Property are prohibited. [IAC]

Rule 148. Parties to non-international armed conflicts do not have the right to
sort to belligerent reprisals.

who

re-

Other countermeasures against persons who do not or

have ceased to take a direct part in

hostilities are prohibited.

[NIAC]

Responsibility and Reparation

Rule 149.

A State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law at-

tributable to

it,

including:

(a)

violations

committed by

(b)

violations

committed by persons or

its

organs, including
entities

its
it

armed

forces;

empowered

to exercise

elements of governmental authority;
(c)

violations

instructions, or
(d)

violations

committed by persons or groups acting
under

its

direction or control;

committed

acknowledges and adopts as

by
its

private

own

in

on

its

which

it

fact

and

persons

or

groups

conduct.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 150. A State responsible for violations of international humanitarian law is
quired to

make

full

re-

reparation for the loss or injury caused. [IAC/NIAC]

Individual Responsibility

Rule 151. Individuals are criminally responsible for war crimes they commit. [IAC/

NIAC]
Rule 152. Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war
crimes committed pursuant to their orders. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 153. Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war
crimes committed by their subordinates

if they

knew, or had reason to know, that

commit or were committing such crimes and did
not take all necessary and reasonable measures in their power to prevent their com-

the subordinates were about to

mission, or

if such

crimes had been committed, to punish the persons responsible.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 154. Every combatant has a duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful order.

[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 155. Obeying a superior order does not relieve a subordinate of criminal
sponsibility

if

the subordinate

knew

that the act ordered

78

re-

was unlawful or should

Jean-Marie Henckaerts

known because
NIAC]

of the manifestly unlawful nature of the act ordered.

have

[I

AC/

War Crimes
Rule 156. Serious violations of international humanitarian law constitute war
crimes.

[IAC/NIAC]

Rule 157. States have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts
over war crimes. [IAC/NIAC]

Rule 158. States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals

armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.
They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and,
if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. [IAC/NIAC]
or

Rule 159. At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power must endeavour to
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons
international

armed

conflict,

who have

participated in a non-

or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related

armed conflict, with the exception of persons suspected of, accused of or sentenced for war crimes. [NIAC]
to the

Rule 160. Statutes of limitation

may not

Rule 161. States must make every
each other in order to

facilitate

apply to war crimes. [IAC/NIAC]

effort to cooperate, to the extent possible,

the investigation of war crimes

of the suspects. [IAC/NIAC]
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An Australian Perspective
on the ICRC Customary International
Humanitarian Law Study

Timothy L. H. McCormack*
Introduction
a pleasure for me to be here to participate in this panel discussion on the InItternational
Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Customary International
is

Humanitarian Law study (hereinafter the Study)

for several reasons.

I

have great

War College and its important contributions to the development of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) over many years. This is the first opporrespect for the Naval

tunity

I

have had to travel to Newport to participate in the annual International

Law Conference and
and

to Professor

from

I

am

indebted to the Stockton Professor Charles Garraway

Dennis Mandsager for their invitation to

me

to

make

the trip

Down Under. I have also had a long association with the ICRC customary law

study and have been looking forward to the opportunity to engage with others in

response to the Study in a public forum such as
I

also confess that

Newport, Rhode Island has a reverential aura about

hearts of Aussies like me.

mous winged

keel

this.

It

was

came from

in this place in 1983 that Australia II with

three races

down

to wrest the

"Auld

it

in the

its

infa-

Mug" from

the

McCormack is the Foundation Australian Red Cross Professor of International
Humanitarian Law and also the Foundation Director of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law,
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia.
* Professor
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New York Yacht Club

—the

fiercely competitive custodians

of the America's Cup.

The Cup had never left American hands since it was won by America (hence the
Cup's name in honor of its inaugural winner) in the inaugural race against the
Royal Yacht Squadron around the Isle of Wight in 1851, until, after 132 years and
multiple unsuccessful challenges, the Aussies finally broke the

US

stranglehold.

It

we were unable to match
anything like the US ability to successfully defend the Cup against successive challenges (24 in total). In 1987 Dennis Connor regained the Cup and returned it to the
is fair,

although nationally unpalatable, to concede that

United States
Kiwis and

—

this

time to the San Diego Yacht Club

—before

now the Swiss. The Aussies have never come close to

All this to say that

it is

special to

be here in Newport and

I

it

was won by the

retrieving

it

since.

do not take the opportu-

nity for granted.

My intention

is

to briefly explain the nature of

tomary law study before

some thoughts on
ready manifest
Study.

Then

I

—

in

move

to

more

substantive observations.

positive benefits of the Study

I

want

the custo offer

—some potential and others

al-

way of congratulating the ICRC on the publication of the
add some of my own thoughts on reasons why the ICRC ought

as a

will

not be surprised by the

and which,

I

my involvement with

level

of criticism of the Study which has already emerged

my view, will continue largely unabated.
Personal Involvement with the Study

As the incumbent of the Australian Red Cross Chair of International Humanitarian Law,

it is

sometimes wrongly assumed that

I

am

an

official apologist for

only the Australian Red Cross but also for the entire Red Cross

not

Movement includ-

The assumption is wrong because my appointment is to the University of Melbourne and not to the Australian Red Cross. It was agreed at the time the
Chair was established that the incumbent would exercise academic freedom as an
employee of the University and would not necessarily act as a spokesperson for the
Australian Red Cross. On many occasions I have participated in the Australian
public debate on international humanitarian law related issues on behalf of the
Australian Red Cross but it is also true that on other occasions I have had to distance myself somewhat
either because I disagree with the position of the national
society or, more commonly, because the decision to speak out publicly about certain issues conflicts with one or more of the Fundamental Principles of the Red
Cross Movement. I accept that the "wearing of different hats" invites confusion
and can be a recipe for misunderstanding but I am learning to live with those negatives. I am a firm believer in the Red Cross Movement and not because of the Chair
ing the ICRC.

—

I

occupy. That belief does not translate automatically into support for every
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ICRC takes. When it comes to the customary law study I would characterize myself as cautiously supportive and I intend to explain what I mean by that

position the

general characterization in due course.
I

was responsible

for the preparation of the Australian national report consti-

tuting one of the forty-seven such national reports forming the primary source of

evidence of State practice and expressions of opinio juris
has reached

its

conclusions.

The process of searching

for

upon which

the

ICRC

and identifying evidence

of Australian practice and national expressions of opinio juris in the areas of international humanitarian law covered

more of

will say

study

my

pated the publication of the Study

it

much

ICRC

over to the

sooner than 2005.

sheer magnitude of the published Study just

how

for Australia.

I

early in 1998,
It is

antici-

1

obvious from the

massive an undertaking this

Now I can see that I was entirely unrealistic to have expected to
Then though,

see the published version of the Study years earlier.

slipped

one

here to say that having worked hard to finalize the Aus-

and then having handed

project really was.

a novel

observations of the benefits of undertaking this national

later. It is sufficient

tralian report

by the Study was

by post- 1998,

1

remember growing

sage of time, particularly because of
tional Australian practice

increasingly disappointed

my acute

had occurred

awareness that so

by the pas-

much more

na-

in the course of military operations in

East Timor, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Bougainville
in inter-governmental fora

as the years

around the world and

and

in the

Canberra

in

Solomon
itself in

Islands,

the inter-

vening period since the Australian report had been submitted to the ICRC.

The ICRC worked hard to cover developments in State practice up to the cut-off
date of 2002 but

I

am

same documentation
reports.

convinced that their
as

own

staff

could not have accessed the

had been possible during the preparation of the national

The authors of the Study make

a concession to this effect in their "Intro-

when they acknowledge that "the purpose of the additional research was
also to make sure that the study would be as up-to-date as possible and would, to the
duction"

extent possible^ take into account developments
earlier

acknowledged that "national sources are

a country."

1

Consequently,

seems to

when Yves Sandoz

speaks of a

me that the photo is from the late

2002 and that there has already been a

many expressions
I

am

up to December 31, 2002" having
more easily accessible from within
"still

photograph of

reality," 2

some touching up in 2000prodigious amount of State practice and
1990s with

of opinio juris since then which are not reflected in the Study.

correct in that assessment

it

graph was taken and questions

will

it

very soon be a decade since the

will inevitably

the Study.
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Some Positive Observations
I

do want

enormous

this

volumes

ICRC on

to take this opportunity to congratulate the

is

The more than 5,000 pages of the Study in three separate
and vast that there must have been many opportunities for

project.

so detailed

the individuals involved in the Project, as well as for the
seriously

the completion of

ICRC as an institution, to

doubt whether the Study would ever be concluded and appear

The fact that it has been published at all
ICRC, not only to grasp the initiative and
through to

its

completion.

is

testament to the

commitment of the

to resource the project, but also to see

offer the following observations

I

in print.

positive contributions the Study has already

made

or

is

it

about some of the

likely to

make

in the near

future.

Providing a Significant Australian National Catalyst
Yves Sandoz proposes his
"this study will

cess

own

have achieved
3

but as a beginning."

reflection, discussion

test for the success

goal only

its

It is

if it is

of the Study by suggesting that

considered not as an end of a pro-

my observation that the beginning of the process of

and debate on both the content of customary international

humanitarian law, as well as on

its

more

effective

implementation,

commenced

moment of publication of the Study. In Australia's case,
the announcement by the ICRC of its decision to undertake the Study and the invimuch

earlier

than

at the

on evidence of State practice and expressions of opinio juris presented an unprecedented opportunity. There had never
tation to Australia to prepare a national report

been a comprehensive audit of Australia's approach to customary international
humanitarian law and

this particular exercise resulted in a

unique collaboration

between the key Australian Government Departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs

and Trade and the Attorney-General.

The preparation of the Australian study exposed examples of inconsistency and
inaccuracy on national approaches to aspects of international humanitarian law.

Two

examples

prohibition

will help illustrate

on the use of weapons which
4

fering or superfluous injury. In
stantiating State practice

Volume

I.

it

ICRC Study

the

is

are of a nature to cause unnecessary suf-

to support the articulation of the Rule in

In the assessment of national support for the existence of customary
cite, inter alia,

the "Australian Military Manual," 5

"weapon use will be unlawful under LOAC when
of proportionality by causing unnecessary suffering or in-

states in relevant part that

breaches the principle

jury." 6

Rule 70 of the

Volume II of the Study the ICRC provides the sub-

and opinio juris

Rule 70 the editors of the Study

which

my meaning.

On one reading of this sentence there is clear confusion between the rule of

proportionality and the rule

on superfluous injury or unnecessary
84

suffering.
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rule of proportionality is intended to protect the civilian population

terious effects of
tionality
is

when

armed

conflict.

The use of weapons

the expected loss of civilian

life

violates the rule of propor-

and/or damage to

excessive relative to the expected military advantage

from the dele-

from an

civilian

property

attack. 7 In contrast,

on superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is intended to benefit combatants by prohibiting the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
the rule

unnecessary suffering to those combatants who might otherwise be subjected to
tack from such weapons.

It is

also possible to read the offending sentence to

superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to the civilian population,

e.g.,

at-

mean

that the

expected loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property is excessive (superfluous
or unnecessary) relative to the expected military advantage to be gained.

terminology is

the

wrong in law and on the second reading, the choice of
confusing and unhelpful. On either interpretation, the preparation

reading, the assertion

first

On

is

of the Australian national report helped to flush out examples such as this which

can

now be rectified and improved.

My second example also relates to the Rule of Proportionality—incorporated in
Rule 14 of the

ICRC Study. Again in the assessment of State practice to substantiate

the existence of the customary law rule 8 the authors

Manual"

Military

Collateral

LOAC

the "Australian

cite, inter alia,

that states in relevant part that:

damage may be the

and, accordingly,

it is

result

of military attacks. This fact

recognised by

is

not unlawful to cause such injury and damage. The

principle of proportionality dictates that the results of such action
excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated

There
ality

is

no ambiguity here. This

wrongly

civilian life

asserts that the test for proportionality

and/or damage to

I

both

explicitly

attack.

must not be

9

particular articulation of the rule of proportion-

civilian

property

ipated military advantage. Articles 51(5)(b)
10

from the

speak of the expected loss

is

is

whether the actual

loss

excessive in relation to the antic-

and 57(2) (b) of Additional Protocol
of civilian life and/or damage to civil-

ian property weighed against the anticipated concrete military advantage.

The

treaty law (pursuant to the

and

at

official

loss

its

legal position

above-mentioned provisions of Additional Protocol

customary international law

deed the expected

The

on the test for proposition of the Government is that the test at

Australian military has not suddenly altered
portionality in attack.

of civilian

(as

life

encapsulated in the ICRC's Rule 14)

is

I)

in-

weighed against the anticipated military ad-

vantage and certainly not the actual loss of civilian
anticipated military advantage.

of

life

weighted against the

The preparation of the Australian

85
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helped to expose

this

inaccuracy in the Australian military publication on the law

of armed conflict.

The preparation of the Australian national report involved the identification of
literally hundreds of government documents
many of them classified and requiring official approval for release. As representatives from different government
departments poured over the documents identified by research teams, it became
increasingly obvious that many of the documents had never been retrieved from
files once those files had been stored. This process proved to be cathartic for those
involved as we read through statements of Australian Government positions taken

—

in various multilateral fora in the past.
lished, Australia has the

and

opportunity to

Now that

revisit the

ICRC Study has been pub-

the

preparation of its national report

measure the ICRC's articulation of customary

to

rules against

more

recent

Australian State practice not covered by the Australian national report. This op-

portunity would not exist but for the

edgement ought
surprised

my view,

acknowl-

some of the other 46 States which also prepared national reports

ICRC Study have

for the

and, in

initiative

made and gratitude expressed to the ICRC for it. I would be

to be

if at least

ICRC

not had similar experiences to the Australian one

I

have

described.

Creating a Rich Source of Comparative Primary Material

The prodigious

of the

effort

ICRC and the

Study's editors to complete the project

has resulted in over 4,400 pages (in the two volumes of the so-called "Practice" section of the Study) of references to national (and, in
case law,

lation,

military

some cases international)

manuals and statements of national government

representatives in relevant inter-governmental conferences. There

source like this in the
ternational

takes the

which

simply no

re-

of international humanitarian law. The Yearbook of In-

this

effectively

supplements the

form of "Country Reports" on

around the world
However,

is

Humanitarian Law provides a helpful and detailed annual survey of

State practice
rial

field

legis-

in national

ICRC
State

The Yearbook matepractice and developments
Study.

approaches to international humanitarian law. 11

annual report obviously only covers national developments within

volume of the Yearbook and is sorted by country name in
order certainly not by ICRC rule in the customary law

the calendar year of each

English alphabetical

—

am not suggesting that the Yearbook obviates the need for the ICRC to update its own Study. Rather, I am suggesting that apart from the "Country Reports"
study.

I

know of no other attempt to gather primary source mateand that reality places the ICRC Study in a unique position.

section of the Yearbook
rial

from

It is

on

States

not

difficult to

I

conceive circumstances in which the comparative material

State practice in the

Study

will

be extremely useful. In
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on international law issues in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, for example, I
can imagine that the Study's two Practice volumes could provide an invaluable
source of references to a range of case law, legislation and military manuals on national approaches to the criminalization and prosecution of the war crimes of murcuriae

der, willful killing, torture, willfully causing grave suffering, cruel treatment,

wanton destruction of villages and plunder of public and private property. I am not
suggesting that the two Practice volumes would be the sole source of investigation,
but the fact that they exist and are structured on the basis of topic corresponding

—

with the articulation of the customary law rules in Volume
that these
I

volumes

will

It is

international jurisprudence proliferates there
it is

registry staff

—are

is

undoubtedly the case that
increasing reliance

national sources because they are

want of entree

regu-

more

as the

interna-

of interna-

and jurisprudence

supplement international sources. The natural tendency has been to

own

on

also the reality that practitioners in this field

tional law are often required to resort to national legislation

practitioner's

all

law and/or legislation to flesh out the substance of

ever-emerging body of international law.

tional sources. But,

—ensures

Others practicing in the area of international

—judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and

larly referring to national case

this

of the Study

be consulted regularly.

am surely not alone in this view.

criminal law

I

familiar

rely

and

upon the

accessible

ICRC Study

and

for

will

provide a welcome starting point for comparative criminal law research.

Of course it is

far

into other national sources.

I

suspect that the

to

too simplistic to suggest that only international criminal law-

on the comparative material in the Study. Copies of this Study will be
routinely pulled off the shelves of government legal advisers in foreign ministries,

yers will rely

The sheer size of the Study will
ensure that the advice of those government lawyers who do take the time to familin defense establishments

iarize

and

in justice ministries.

themselves with the contents of the Study will be eagerly sought.

Sparking a Global Discussion

The publication of the long-awaited Study has already spawned a succession of
conferences and seminars focused on the results of the Study and reactions to it.
Our own panel discussion here follows on from sessions at Chatham House, at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, in The Hague and
precedes planned events in Bangkok, Brussels, Montreal,

and Warsaw. The rush
continent in the world

to discuss, to analyze, to question
is all

the regard

it

will

how the

come

and

Delhi, San

to criticize

Remo

on every

indicative of the intensity of anticipation of the final ta-

bling of the Study and, perhaps
for clarification as to

New

more importantly for most observers, a keen desire

Study might be

to have in the future.
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utilized,

It is

how it will

in this sense that

be received and
I

entirely agree
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with Yves Sandoz's view that the publication of the Study is not the end but the beginning of a process and the
testing of its findings as

it

ICRC is right to ask for as much feedback,

debate and

can receive.

The arrival of the Study also seems to have spawned a new debate on customary
international law itself what it is, how it is formed, what sources should be relied
upon to determine its content, the identification of the precise relationship between treaty law and the development of custom. This debate is redolent, even if

—

smaller in scale, of the debate following the decision of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the

sion, there
is

is

Nicaragua

case.

Now, of course, almost 20 years after that deci-

new generation of international lawyers involved in the debate. That
healthy development and one for which the ICRC should be

a

surely a

congratulated.

The Inevitability of Criticism for Articulating
Customary International Law Rules
Despite the

many ways

in

which the Study

will

be utilized and relied upon, the

ICRC ought not be surprised either by the intensity of,
the criticism directed against the Study.
international law acknowledged
Justice in his

or by the specific details

of,

The "notorious imprecision" of customary

by Judge Koroma of the International Court of

"Foreword" to the Study 12

Study represents a laudable attempt to

is

a double-edged

clarify

sword for the ICRC. The

some of the inherent imprecision but

the reality of that imprecision emboldens others to challenge the ICRC's attempts

The applicability of the adage "we know it when we see it but canpin it down" to customary international humanitarian law may leave

at clarification.

not quite

many academic international lawyers dissatisfied while simultaneously providing a
sense of confidence to national government legal advisers.

such advisers can
tional law

on

tell

their

I

am not suggesting that

governments that the content of customary interna-

a specific issue

is

whatever the government wants

attraction of the "notorious imprecision"

the edges of the specific detail of a rule.

is

it

be. Rather,

one

the slight ambiguity, the elasticity at

Any attempt to introduce precision and cerdraw criticism as
simply not agree with some of what has

tainty in the articulation of the specifics of the law will inevitably

interested parties, particularly States, will

been included and also with some of what has been omitted.
Irrespective of the Authority of the Articulating Organization
All those involved in the study

and practice of international law in the latter half of

the 1980s are unlikely to forget the deluge of academic articles following the deliv-

ery of the Court's judgment in the Nicaragua case.
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was

as if the

Judgment
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breached a

dam wall

unleashing a torrent of criticism and condemnation

—some

of it focused on the Court's decision on jurisdiction and some of it on the merits,

but

much of it directed at the Court's reasoning in relation to the formation of cus-

tomary international law and on the process of identifying the content of customary rules

on the use offeree by

descriptive enough: "Icy

United

States,

The

International Law:

States.

13

Day at the ICJ";

International Court

some of the articles are
"Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The

Just the titles of
14

and the Nicaragua

The 'Academic' and the 'Real'";

of Justice at the Crossroads."

16

case"; 15 "Nicaragua

and

and "The International Court

17

Hilary Charlesworth's criticisms are particularly pertinent to our present discussion and

I

reproduce some of them in

detail.

Generally, in Nicaragua, the Court appears to
constitute state practice. Its analysis

is

Charlesworth claimed

that:

expand the category of activities that can

not easy to follow for the discussion of

state

and opinio juris is often elided and it is sometimes uncertain whether the Court
regards a particular action as state practice, opinio juris, or as doing service to both. The
Court relies upon the acceptance of treaty obligations as state practice. While this is a
generally accepted source of state practice, the Court places special emphasis on the
fact that both Nicaragua and the United States have accepted particular treaty
obligations as evidence that they at least are firmly bound by such norms. Unlike jurists
such as D'Amato, who regard only actions which have physical consequences as state
practice, the Court accepts General Assembly resolutions and resolutions of other
international organisations, particularly those in which Nicaragua and the United
practice

States participated, as
jurists.

forms of state

practice. This

The Court, however, does not appear

approach accords with that of many

to discriminate

between international

and lexferenda. The
Court places considerable reliance on the Declaration on Friendly Relations which is
couched in legislative language. But it also relies on other resolutions and agreements
whose language is not mandatory. 18
fora,

Even

if

nor does it discriminate between resolutions based on

the Court in Nicaragua

had been more

lex lata

precise about

its

tween evidence of State practice and expressions of opinio juris,

judgment would have been

ment of the material
in substantial part

criticized

delimitation be-

it is

likely that the

by those who disagreed with the judges'

falling into either category.

The

criticism has

assess-

been exacerbated

by the Court's lack of clarity as to categorization,

as well as

by its

apparent failure to accord appropriate weight on the basis of a more nuanced and
discerning approach to the material

The key point here

is

that in

its

it

considered.

attempt to bring precision to the "notoriously

imprecise" customary international law, the ICJ was subjected to a barrage of criticism. If the ICJ was subjected to such a formidable assault, the
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expect to be

immune from a similar intensity of opposition in relation to its meth-

upon and the conclusions it has reached.
Another example of criticism of a body articulating customary international law

odology, the material

on

it

seeks to rely

and subsequent adoption of the Statute
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The

a particular topic involved the drafting

for

UN Security Council had called for a report from the UN Secretary-General with a
Statute for the proposed Tribunal to be attached. 19
to the

The

Office of the Legal Adviser

UN prepared the Draft Statute on the basis of customary international law

explaining that:

The international tribunal should apply rules of International Humanitarian Law
which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of

some but not all

States to specific conventions does not arise. This

would appear to be

particularly important in the context of an international tribunal prosecuting persons

responsible for serious violations of International Humanitarian Law. 20

That stated rationale for the adopted approach could hardly be disputed.
risdiction ratione personae of the

ICTY was

sponsible for violations of the Statute

Yugoslavia,

it

was

and police

on the physical

all

persons allegedly re-

territory of the

Former

members of paramilitary organizations and other
In any case, even for those members of State militar-

essential that

non-State entities be covered.
ies

to extend to

If the ju-

forces, State succession issues at the

time of the dissolution of the

Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ensured some uncertainties
cise treaty obligations

as to the pre-

of the newly independent former Federal republics.

Understandably, the

UN Office of the Legal Adviser took a cautious approach to

the definition of the crimes within the

ICTY Statute. The principal criticism leveled

against the Draft Statute (which was, perhaps surprisingly, adopted without

amendment by the UN Security Council 21 ) has been that it was too conservative in
its approach. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY is the source of the best-known
criticism of the drafting of the Statute. In the course of the trial of Dusko Tadic the
Appeals Chamber had to decide whether or not to accept the challenge of the accused to the Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction over him. In relation to Article 5 of
the

ICTY Statute defining Crimes Against Humanity, the Appeals Chamber stated

that:

It is

by now a

settled rule

of customary international law that crimes against humanity

do not require a connection

to international

points out, customary international law

armed conflict. Indeed,

as the Prosecutor

may not require a connection between crimes

humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by requiring that crimes against
humanity be committed in either internal or international armed conflict, the Security
against
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Council

may have

defined the crime in Article 5

customary international law.

Prima

facie this criticism

is

more narrowly than

necessary under

22

tempered and

relatively benign.

Coming

as

does,

it

though, from an international judicial body, the criticism was taken very seriously
indeed. At the negotiations for the Statute of the International Criminal Court in

Rome,

for example, reference

was made

to

both the text of the Statute of the Inter-

national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which omits a requisite nexus with
conflict in the definition of crimes against

humanity,

as well as the

armed

ICTY Appeals

Chamber decision in Tadic as bases for departing from the approach in Article 5 of
the ICTY Statute. 23
The drafting of the Statute for the ICTY and the criticism leveled against it was
on

clearly

Nicaragua

a significantly smaller scale than the response to the ICJ decision in the
case.

eral declarations

formed

more

—with

on the basis that the ICJ made genon the nature of customary international law and how it is

That

is

at least partly explicable

significant implications for future cases before the

generally. In the case of the Statute of the

Court

as well as

ICTY, that instrument established

an important precedent for future international criminal tribunals but the customary international law implications were limited to the subject matter of international criminal law.

The

fact

remains, however, that both the ICJ and the Office of the Legal Adviser

found themselves the subject of criticism

in response to respective efforts to articu-

late the

content of customary international law in a particular area and, in the ICJ's

case, in

response to the Court's articulation of the process for the development of

customary international law

rules.

Given that highly regarded institutions such

these have been subjected to intense scrutiny

expect to be
It is

and

criticism, the

ICRC should

my analysis is flawed. I have suggested that criticism is inevita-

ble regardless of the authority of the articulating organization. Perhaps that

An

is

in-

organization no one takes seriously might purport to articulate the

content of customary law on a particular issue and receive no
cisely

not

immune.

possible that

correct.

as

critical

feedback pre-

because of the lack of respect for the articulating institution. That

is

surely

not the case in relation to the ICRC. The publication of the customary law study

under the imprimatur of the ICRC ensures that the Study
ously indeed

—

will

be taken very

seri-

precisely because of the international standing of the institution.

Had the Study been prepared by an academic institution, for example, or by a nongovernmental organization (quite apart from the obvious question of how any
such institution would have gathered the material from States as effectively as the

ICRC),

it is

much

less likely that the

Study would have attracted anything
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scrutiny

it is

receiving. But, since

the

it is

ICRC that has published the Study, States

cannot act as the proverbial ostrich with their heads in the sand, simply ignoring
the Study in the pretence that

it

will

have no

hope

effect or in the

that

it

will

conve-

niently disappear.

Irrespective of the Rigor of the Process Leading to the Articulation

Criticism of the Study

is

rigorous as possible in

its

vant State material and to

by the ICRC

also inevitable despite the attempt

to be as

approach to the identification and compilation of releits

assessment and articulation of the content of custom-

The editors of the Study explain in some detail
the steps in the process of preparing the Study
the establishment and oversight of
the Study at all stages by the Steering Committee, the undertaking of 47 national
studies, the additional collection of material from relevant international organizations (including from the ICRC's own archives), the supplementary collection of
material from the countries the subject of national reports as well as from other
States not the subject of national reports and the establishment and work of the
Academic and Governmental Expert Advisory Group. 24 I am sure that many will
appreciate the efforts of the ICRC to undertake the Study on the basis of a clear,
transparent and defensible approach. Those efforts will undoubtedly translate into
greater weight and authority extended to the Study. But, those efforts, while admiary international humanitarian law.

—

rable, will

Many

not eliminate criticism of the Study.

examples of State practice

are, in fact, the acts

of individual advisers

within national delegations in the context of multilateral fora
their national
act

—with the

blessing of

governments of course. Individual members of delegations regularly

on the basis of agreed broad national parameters. National statements

ally carefully

reality

is

checked through an interagency process in national capitals but the

that individual

members of delegations
ties.

are usu-

members of

—have broad

national delegations

minutiae of multilateral negotiations and develop
text.

particularly senior

discretion in the pursuit of national priori-

In particular, individuals within national delegations

nuances of a negotiated

—

become involved

specialist

in the

knowledge about the

In circumstances where such individuals

become the

national experts in relation to particular issues in sustained multilateral negotiations, those individuals often also

assume the mantle of national

institutional

memory. Those individuals know exactly what was meant by a particular intervention, how an intervention was received by other States, the differences between
some States' articulated positions and their true intentions (or the failure to reveal
true intentions). The authors of the ICRC Study have had to make decisions about
the wording of some customary rules derived in part from treaty provisions. Some
individuals involved in the specific treaty negotiations have criticized the
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misunderstanding the context of negotiations and for misrepresenting specific national acts to support the

One

ICRC version

of the best examples, to

of the customary

my knowledge,

of this

rule.

phenomenon

is

the inter-

vention by Hays Parks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International

Law

in April 2005. Parks

was on a panel to discuss the ICRC Study and,

having only received his personal copy a few days before, undertook what he char-

on some of the conventional weapons issues he had been exinvolved with for almost two and half decades as a member of the US

acterized as a "biopsy"
tensively

delegation to the Certain Conventional
tions in Geneva. Parks looked
see that the

Study quotes a

first at

USSR

Weapons Convention 25 (CCW)

negotia-

incendiary weapons and expressed surprise to

Statement to the

effect that

Moscow was

"in fa-

vour of the prohibition of means of warfare which were particularly cruel, because
their use

was incompatible with the norms of international

was napalm."

26

law.

One such means

Parks asserts that the Study, at least on this issue, lacks a sense of

context in relying as

it

does upon the Soviet Statement as

if that

represented a state-

ment of State policy. The United States had changed its position late in the conference process and announced that it would support a protocol regulating the use of
incendiary weapons. Parks explains that that change of US policy threw the Soviet
delegation into disarray.

The

Soviet Ambassador, Victor Israelyen, conceded subse-

quently to Parks that the very statement which the

ICRC Study relies upon in part to

support the emergence of a customary rule on incendiary weapons was in

fact a

smokescreen. The Soviets assumed that the United States would not compromise

and accept a protocol on incendiary weapons and so were hiding behind the

US

original

The change of US policy exposed the real Soviet position and Parks
claims that "the Soviet Union had no intention of accepting a prohibition on incendiary weapons, as the Warsaw Pact had huge stocks it fully intended to employ."
Whether or not the Soviet Statement tips the balance one way or the other in
position.

ICRC claiming the existence of the customary rule is hardly the critical
point here. What is at stake is the nature of the material the ICRC has relied upon in
terms of the

upon

order to assert the formulation of customary rules. The explicit reliance

statement that, in
a

customary rule

may have been

fact,

did not reflect either State practice or opinio juris to support

will inevitably increase skepticism

relied

upon

fails

to refer to

about what other materials

in the Study. Parks claims that statements

priority over the actual practice of States in

Study

a

armed

conflict.

He

seem

questions

to take

why the

and discuss the North Vietnamese use of flamethrowers

in

its

1968 Tet offensive, for example, or the Soviet use of incendiaries in Afghanistan

and the Russian use of incendiaries
about exploding

bullets.

the Raufoss 12.7

mm

The ICRC

is

in

Chechnya. 27 Parks makes similar claims

uncomfortable about the widespread use of

multipurpose round, which the institution claims can

93

Australian Perspective on the ICRC Customary Law Study

explode on impact with the

human

body. Parks, and other government lawyers,

dispute this finding. Parks asserts that the Study

two dozen
tories

and

States include the Raufoss 12.7

that at least

some of those

fails

to

mention that more than

mm multipurpose round in their inven-

States

have communicated to the

ICRC

that

they have undertaken legal reviews of the round and believe that the continued use

of the round

is

compatible with existing legal obligations. 28

These are serious criticisms and, in

my view, more of them are likely to flow. As

who have been

those individuals, like Parks,

intimately involved in the develop-

—not only the
the supporting material— the ICRC

ment of the law take the time to read the detail of the Study
tion of the rules themselves but also

increasingly be subjected to criticism that

represented the material
lishes this rule as a

it

norm

it

claims supports the assertion that "State practice estab-

of customary international law."

Terms

have referred a number of times to Yves Sandoz's claim
[T] he study will

It

that:

goal only if it is considered not as the end of a process
what has been accomplished but also what remains
be done. ... [T]he study makes no claim to be the final

have achieved

but as a beginning.

will

has overlooked, misinterpreted or mis-

Particularly When Rules Are Articulated in Absolute
I

articula-

its

reveals

unclear and what remains to

word. 29

welcome self-effacing here and no doubt Sandoz is absolutely genuine in
his request that the Study be read, be discussed and be commented upon. However,
There

it

is

a

seems to

veals
last

what

me that there is a measure of incongruity in the claim that the Study reis

unclear and what remains to be done

word on customary

that

does not represent the

it

—and the manner

international humanitarian law

which the 161 Rules themselves are worded.
terms followed by a

—

summary

All of

them

in

are written in absolute

statement which invariably includes an absolute

finding that State practice establishes this rule as a

norm

of customary interna-

armed conflicts or in both).
Occasionally there is a reference to an issue which is not covered by the Study. Rule
155 on obedience to superior orders is an example. The Study specifically mentions

tional law (either in international or non-international

that other defenses, including the defense of duress,

by the Study,

30

demonstrating that the Study does not purport to be exhaustive.

However, in relation to the
used

is

may apply but are not covered

issues

which are covered by the Study, the language

absolute.
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Others have commented upon

this aspect

of the Study. Daniel Bethlehem, for

example, notes the pro forma approach of following the formulation of the customary rule with a "summary":

which, almost without exception, asserts 'State practice establishes this rule as a
of customary international law.

.

.

.'

There are occasions in which

norm

this affirmation

is

followed by a statement noting ambiguity or controversy in respect of some element of
the rule, but the affirmation of customary status stands

I

imagine that

it

would have been unpalatable

fast.

31

for the

ICRC

to formulate rules

of customary international humanitarian law other than in absolute terms.

may

equivocal approach to formulation

An

have undermined the purpose of the

—something the ICRC

Study by creating a sense of uncertainty and ambiguity

an institution

is

committed to avoiding. But

rightly

formulation of the rules there seems

little

room

position to the emergence of a particular rule.

I

for

in the existing

as

approach to

acknowledging dissent or op-

am unable to shake the sense that

the formulation of rules in the absolute terms that appear in the Study invites dis-

agreement and criticism rather than discussion and constructive comment.
I

I

hope

am proved wrong.
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Yoram Dinstein*
x

The Study

TheHumanitarian Law

publication in 2005 of an impressive Study of Customary International

(IHL) by the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) (hereinafter the Study)
Study

—done

in

is

undoubtedly an important landmark. The

two parts (Rules and

and debated

for a long time to

the case law

and

come.

Practice)
It

no scholar or

—

is

bound

to be scrutinized, cited

will leave its imprints in the future

in the legal literature, and,

success of the enterprise,

The mandate

1

whatever one's view

is

Crescent. For an entire decade, the

gether.

The

project

and government

was based,

ICRC

inter alia>

it.

Study came exactly ten years prior to

publication (1995), from the 26th International Conference of the

Red

of the overall

practitioner can afford to ignore

for the preparation of the

both in

on

its

Red Cross and

spared no effort to put the Study to-

extensive consultations with academic

experts; nearly fifty reports of individual States' practice, submitted

by national research teams; research on the practice of international organizations
produced by several additional teams; and further archival research pursued by the

ICRC

itself.

tice) is

The

resulting

two volumes

published in two separately

(for reasons

bound

parts)

of sheer

size,

Volume

II

(Prac-

comprise more than 5,000 printed

Yanowicz Professor of Human Rights and Pro-President, Tel Aviv University (Israel). This
was first published in volume 36 of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2006) and is
reprinted with permission. © 2006 by Yoram Dinstein.
*
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pages (621 covering Rules and commentary thereon; and 4,41
tice

and appendices). The

final

1

encompassing Prac-

product represents the largest scholarly undertak-

ing (on any theme) ever undertaken in the long history of the ICRC.

Since this article
size

is

an unadorned critique of the Study,

two important personal

prise:

I

am

points. First,

I

subsequent consultations convened by the ICRC; and

—which

I

liberally

—

used

would

like to

was marginally involved

responsible for the Israeli country report;

portunity

I

I

empha-

in the enter-

have participated in

I

have been given ample op-

to express reservations about earlier drafts of

Volume I (although I had not seen Volume II prior to publication). Secondly, and
even more significantly, I feel that the initiative was absolutely right, even if I do not
approve of some of the results. Indeed, I take credit for being probably the first to
have put on record the idea of launching a project with a view to examining the text
of Additional Protocol
tional law.

I first

I

2

of 1977 against the background of customary interna-

raised the proposal publicly in 1987, in a conference

convened in

Geneva on the 10th anniversary of the conclusion of the two Additional Protocols
of 1977, where

I

happen

I

said:

to believe that

it is

very important to try to pinpoint those provisions of

which are either reflective of existing customary international law or at least
are non-controversial to such an extent that there is every reason to believe that they
will crystallize as customary international law in the near future.
Protocol

I,

A year later, in another International Colloquium held at Bad Homburg in 1988
(the proceedings of which have

been published),

I

reiterated the argument:

The insertion of clauses like Article 44 in the Protocol is lamentable. All the same,

these

overshadow other provisions reflecting customary lex lata or widely
To my mind, an attempt ought to be made to identify in an
authoritative way those sections of the Protocol which are declaratory or noncontroversial (I should hasten to add that, in my assessment, the great majority of the
norms of the Protocol - perhaps as many as 85% - qualify as declaratory or nonclauses should not

supported

lex ferenda.

controversial).

Such an evaluation of the Protocol's

informal meetings of experts like the present one, and
to Israel but also to other countries

-

it

text could
will

be undertaken by

prove invaluable not only

primarily, the United States

- which

are not

expected to become contracting parties in the foreseeable future.

I

have broached

that

it

has

much

In other words,

this idea before,

but have

failed to

persuade the

ICRC representatives

merit. 3

my main concern was to bridge over what I like to call the "Great

Schism," 4 dividing Contracting from Non-Contracting Parties of Additional
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15% or so of the text (such as Article 44, which will be adverted to below) thoroughly rejected by the latter States. The ICRC in the late 1980s
Protocol

I

because of the

was unenthusiastic;

its

apprehension being that such an exercise might undermine

the authority of Additional Protocol

I

as a treaty.

Admittedly, the Study goes in several different directions, compared to
idea.

A critical

segment of the Study

and Additional Protocol
find

most

II

5

relates to non-international

armed

me in the

(something that did not occur to

my own
conflicts

1980s but

I

useful today). There are also sections dealing with law of armed conflict

norms contained

in treaties other than Additional Protocols

I

and

II,

particularly

those dealing with prohibited weapons (an addition which has merit, although

it

has certainly complicated the process). Conversely, not every clause of Additional
Protocol

I is

dealt with (an

omission that I find puzzling) and not much attention

is

given to lexferenda stipulations that seem to be non- controversial (for instance,
those provisions dealing with
nal idea, the entire project

civil

is

defense). 6

From the subjective angle of my origi-

upside down. Instead of systematically examining

by article, what is presented in the Study is a set of independent
Rules with only the commentary indicating the relationship (if any) to provisions
Protocol

I

article

of Protocol

I. Still,

tured, the three

much

as

I

may

have wished the Study to be differently struc-

volumes have to be taken

as they are.

The Methodology
Let

me start with some comments about Volume II

(Practice). This

ological

underpinning of the Rules plus commentary, and

ing;

overwhelming. However, when one

it is

tens of thousands of cites, one begins to get

size

its

tries to get into

is

is

the

method-

not just daunt-

the thicket of literally

underwhelmed

for reasons that will

become apparent in the ensuing text of the present article. Indeed, to my mind,
Volume II is proof positive of the adage that sometimes more is less.
The preliminary question that must be addressed is: what is customary international law? The classical definition of international custom is encapsulated in the
well-known formula of Article 38 ( l)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice: "international

custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law/' 7

The font et origo of customary international law is, in essence, the general practice
of States. States are the main actors in the international arena, and it is their general
practice that constitutes the core of custom. Without State practice there is no general

customary international law.

What

does State practice consist of? There

is

much

scholarly debate over the

question of whether conduct constitutes the sole expression of custom-making
practice,

and whether statements

—

at

times referred to as mere "claims" 8 or as
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"verbal (as distinct

from "physical")

acts" 9

—count.

I

share the view of the authors

of the Study that "[b]oth physical and verbal acts of States constitute practice that
contributes to the creation of customary international law." 10 Nevertheless, not every statement counts:

and

in

it all

depends on

who

is

making the statement, when, where

what circumstances. The Study has attached an import

most comprehensive generic

fashion.

to statements in a

strongly believe that this

I

is

going way too

—

gamut of admissible statements as grist to the mill of State practice
must be much more focused and filtered.
The Study includes much State practice but a lot besides. One cannot cavil that
the

far:

the Study incorporates the practice of inter-governmental international organizations (IGOs).

To some extent, this is due to the fact that IGOs may have an interna-

tional legal personality of their

own, 11 but additionally it must not be forgotten that

IGOs

Member States of an IGO may therefore contribute

are comprised of States.

to State practice

nization.

through their conduct and statements within the fold of the orga-

As pronounced by the International Court of

Opinion on Nuclear Weapons,

Justice in

its

Advisory

UN General Assembly resolutions (not binding as

such) "can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing
the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris." 12

In contradistinction to IGOs, the role of non-governmental organizations

(NGOs)

in international

law-making

is

confined to a consultative status, 13 not to

mention lobbying and other behind-the-scenes

activities vis-a-vis States.

whatever their standing, can never contribute directly through their
to the creation of customary norms. This

unique

lot

true even of the

—NGO, the ICRC. Admittedly, the ICRC

functions to carry out.
It is

is

14

own

NGOs,

practice

most important

—and

assigned by

IHL important

But that fact does not turn the ICRC into a

State-like entity.

is

therefore surprising (and inappropriate) that the authors of the Study give a

of attention to the practice of the

ICRC itself15

(and occasionally even to that of

Amnesty International 16 ). ICRC reports, communications,
recapitulated at some length in Volume II
press releases, statements and the like
of the Study are simply not germane to customary international law, unless and
until they actually impact on State practice. It is true that "the official reactions
other

NGOs, such

as

—

—

which ICRC statements
practice: this

The ICRC

is

State practice

is

are State practice." 17

and

it

However,

this

is

not

ICRC

should be subsumed under the right heading.

plays in such circumstances the role of a catalyst for the evolution of

State practice, but

practice

elicit

that

no more. One problem with the erroneous designation of such

when ICRC

appeals exhorting States to action are registered as

ICRC practice, the gaze shifts from the actor to the catalyst.
ful in eliciting a positive

response from States,

18

no

real

happens when the ICRC's appeal evokes no response?
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If the

harm
At

is

ICRC is successdone. But what

best, the

ICRC

action
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proved

itself to

be irrelevant. At worst,

it is

an indication a contrario that States are

not willing to accept the position of the ICRC.

The ICRC practice at least deserves that designation, albeit it does not qualify in
the context of the term of art "practice" employed in the definition of customary
international law. But, in a manner bordering on the bizarre, the Study goes far be-

yond anything remotely resembling
the Institut de Droit International
practice"?

when

20

Whose

practice?

practice.

—weighty

as they indisputably are

The same question

21

There

is

much

as "other

American Law

Institute

is

and most egregiously when scholarly books (however

When

prestigious) get a similar classification. 22

the reader cannot be

—

an even starker way,

arises, in

the Restatement prepared under the aegis of the

cited as "other practice,"

tice,

How can one refer to resolutions of

blamed

for a

everything

modicum

reliance in the Study

on

is

categorized as prac-

of skepticism.

a host of military manuals, especially

Volume I (Rules). Indeed, it appears that the authors
themselves sharing perhaps some of the skepticism re the plethora of items collated in Volume II (Practice)
opted, to be on the safe side, to predicate the Rules
more on legislative codes and military manuals than on any other single source of
practice. This editorial decision should be commended. Irrefutably, legislative

where

really counts, viz. in

it

—

—

codes and military manuals

(i.e.,

binding instructions to the armed forces) are in-

valuable sources of genuine State practice. However, are

manuals

From

in the

the documents called

Study authentic manuals?

personal knowledge,

—
manual. As
on
publication—
Laws of War of 1998
I

all

23

tried

I

can

attest that the so-called Israeli

—

throughout the Study

cited quite often

Manual on

is

the

not a genuine

several occasions to point out to the authors of the

Study

—

no avail this is merely a tool used to facilitate instruction and training, and it has no binding or even authoritative standing. The insistence on regarding the text as a manual has led the authors of the Study to a
number of errors. Thus, in the context of Rule 65 (whereby "[kjilling, injuring or
prior to

its

to

capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy
fact that Israel

is

prohibited"), 24

I

alerted

them

to the

does not accept the words "or capturing" as a reflection of custom-

They refused to accept this, and, in the commentary on Rule
65, even singled out the so-called Israeli Manual as the "exception" among nonContracting Parties to Additional Protocol I: other manuals of these countries do
not mention "capturing"; the Israeli Manual does. 25 As it turns out, the cite given in
a footnote does not refer to the so-called manual at all, but to another booklet. 26
ary international law.

When

one checks out the matching material

that (a) the paragraph cited does quote the

there

is

no mention of "capturing"

cited) refers to capture,

in the Practice

"Manual"

at all; (b) a

but the quote

is

volume,

it

turns out

(rather than the booklet) but

previous paragraph (not the one

from that other booklet (rather than the
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"Manual"), and, for that matter,

it is

based on a secondary source! 27 Thus, in decid-

ing that the "Manual" trumps any and

Since

nobody can

all

disclaimers, they went completely astray.

afford the time to go through every cite in a Study comprising

thousands of pages,

I

can only express the hope that

this

wild goose chase

is

the ex-

ception rather than the rule.

But

is

the Israeli "Manual" the only non-manual?

tioned that there are

ual).

wonder.

It

should be men-

many references to a UK manual of 1 98 1 on the Law of Armed

Conflict (listed separately
28

I

and independently of the 1958

In reality, there have been only three

British Military

Man-

UK manuals on the subject of the law of

armed conflict. The first one (written jointly by L. Oppenheim and Colonel JE
Edmonds) was a chapter of the Army Manual of Military Law published in 1914
and revised in 1936. The second (written by Hersch Lauterpacht with the assistance
of Colonel Gerald Draper), again a part of the Army Manual of Military Law, came
out in 1958. The third (written jointly by several authors), a completely new and
separate Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, was issued by the Ministry of Defence in 2004, not in time for inclusion in the Study. It is not clear what the 1981
text represents.

When the ICRC decided to look into its own
some 40
erybody hoped
search

recent

armed

conflicts, the

news was greeted with enthusiasm. Ev-

would yield

that the research

(otherwise closed) archives to re-

a trove of inaccessible State practice.

In the event, the results have been quite disappointing. First
flicts

are specified in a general

concerned

made

is

list,

29

no

off,

although the con-

identification of the State (or rebel group)

in context. This already diminishes considerably

from the

weight that one can attach to the practice concerned. Secondly, and even more
nificantly, the "practice" cited

is

often of no practical use.

sig-

What value added to the

law of armed conflict in non-international armed conflicts can be derived, for instance,

from the following vignette: "The Head of Foreign Affairs of an armed op-

position group told the
to respect

and

lamentably,

ICRC in

1995 that his group was conscious of the necessity

to spare the civilian population during an

armed

conflict"? 30 This,

quite typical of the kind of statements that the Study distilled

is

the archives. Even

when more

specificity

is

from

added, the result can be the following:

ICRC request to protect the civilian popby government troops. He replied that as long as they pro-

"In 1991, an official of a State rejected an
ulation

from

pillage

vided a hiding place for rebels, the army would burn the

However,

this

behaviour was not representative of the general opinion of the mili-

tary personnel

met by the ICRC

deny a hiding place to
State

in this context." 31 If civilian fields are burnt, to

rebels,

why is this legally deemed "pillage"? 32 And, whatever

why

does one statement by one unidentified organ of an

the juridical taxonomy,

unknown

fields if necessary.

—inconsistent with other statements by other organs of the same
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State

—shed any

light

on

that State's practice?

We are not told what actually hap-

pened or what the circumstances were; nor are we informed about the
ranks of the

officials

adverted

to.

And

so

relative

goes.

it

The Rules
on methodology, it is necessary to consider some of the
Rules constituting the backbone of the Study and the commentary thereon. I
do not take issue with many of the black-letter Rules and much of the commentary,
Having focused so

far

—

—

Volume I of the Study. But I believe that there are grave errors in the
formulation of some of the Rules, and part of the commentary, in ways that adas presented in

versely affect the ability of the Study to project an

Rule

starts off with

1

image of objective scholarship.
a

an unassailable statement that [t]he parties to the conflict

must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants." 33 But then, in Rule
5, the dichotomy changes from civilians/combatants to civilians/members of the

armed forces:
Is

" [c] ivilians

are persons

who are not members of the armed forces." 34

that so? Rule 3 rightly states that, in fact, not

all

members of the armed forces are

combatants, since medical and religious personnel are excluded from that category. 35
forces

By

is

the

same token, not every person who

a civilian. In particular,

a person

who

is

not a

member

by directly (or actively) participating in hostilities,

claims to be a civilian loses that protective mantle and becomes a

(perhaps unlawful) combatant. 36 Even Additional Protocol
Article 48
in

its

37

—

of the armed

distinguishes between the civilian population

definition of civilians

—

Article 50 ( l)

38

—

I,

in

its

"Basic rule"

and combatants; and

prescribes that civilians are persons

who do not belong to certain categories of persons, including the category referred
to in Article 4A(2) of

Geneva Convention

(III)

(covering irregular troops). 39

By

switching the dichotomy from civilians/combatants to civilians/members of the

armed forces, the Study lays the ground to loading the legal dice. If the antonym of
civilians under customary international law is members of the armed forces, it follows

(as the

hostilities

right

(or

ICRC

do not

approach
actively)

is

who

believes) that civilians

directly (or actively) participate in

—

think the

lose their classification as civilians. Conversely, if

as

—

who

the

antonym of civilians

participate

in

is

may

hostilities

combatants, civilians
turn

themselves

into

I

directly

unlawful

combatants.

One
tracting

—sharply dividing ConAdditional Protocol — the
and

of the cardinal causes for the "Great Schism"

and non-Contracting

Parties to

I

is

utter

unqualified rejection by the latter countries of those provisions of the Protocol
that, to all intents

cases except spies

and purposes, eliminate the
and mercenaries.

40

The
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in all

lies in

the
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combination of Articles 43 and 44. 41 Rule 4 of the Study simply
the language of Article 43 of Additional Protocol
the conflict consist of all organized
a

command

I:

armed forces, groups and units which are under

this definition as

the impression that organization

its

subordinates." 42

The

customary international law, trying to create

and discipline

—whereas

(rather than distinction

from civil-

commentary briefly refers to the
cumulative, Hague and Geneva conditions of lawful combatancy (which

ians) are the gist of the matter;

other,

and

the

non-Contracting Parties to Additional Protocol
sence)

some of

"The armed forces of a party to

responsible to that party for the conduct of

commentary treats

reiterates

—

it

makes short

shrift

of them and

I

continue to regard as of

somehow manages

to convey the

es-

mes-

sage that even Article 44 of the Protocol (one of the key sources of the "Great

Schism") hardly presents a
In a written
sion of Rule 4,

comment
1

real

to the

problem. 43 This

ICRC on an

is

plainly misleading.

earlier (but

not

much

different) ver-

stated:

and commentary are highly objectionable. Israel utterly and
unreservedly rejects Articles 43-44 of Additional Protocol I as a source of customary
international law. Israel adheres to the original texts of the Hague Regulations and the
Geneva Conventions and does not accept any and all changes that Articles 43-44 of the
Protocol purport to introduce. Allow me to add that the objections to Articles 43-44 lie
at the root of the refusal to ratify the Protocol. Should the ICRC attempt to gloss over
the fundamental differences of opinion re this crucial issue, the whole study will be
Rule

4.

The

text

irremediably flawed.

The authors of the Study did not heed these cautioning words, nor did they choose
in
to allude to them in the commentary's footnotes. Instead, the commentary
trying to establish the case for the customary nature of Rule 4 and in attempting to

—

create the false impression that the

the discipline

customary definition

and organization of the armed

forces

is

mainly concerned with

—purports

practice of non-Contracting Parties to Additional Protocol

I:

to rely even

on the

a footnote relies spe-

44

on the practice of the United States. The US text cited (appearing in The
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations) is quoted in the Practice volume, but lo and behold: it does not confine itself to discipline and organization; it explicitly speaks about members of forces "who are under responsible
command and subject to internal military discipline, carry their arms openly, and
cifically

otherwise distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population." 45 These

last

Hague/Geneva conditions are of course the crux of the issue. And, in the Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook, the text is followed by a footnote which mentions expressly the construct of unlawful combatants. 46
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It

must be added

that

when the emergence

of customary international law sub-

sequent to a treaty (in this instance, Additional Protocol

examined,

I) is

practice of non-Contracting Parties that carries the day. In the 1969 North Sea
tinental Shelf cases, the International

Court of justice made

it

the

it is

Con-

amply clear that

—

in

analyzing the post-treaty practice of States, with a view to establishing whether a

—

new custom has been created in the wake of the treaty

it is

required to leave aside

(and not to consider as a reliable guide) not only the practice of Contracting Parties

among themselves but even

Contracting Parties, since they were
cation of the Convention."

47

among

the practice
all

States that shortly

would become

"acting actually or potentially in the appli-

The Court held that " [f]rom their action no inference

could legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary international
law" generated by the treaty. 48 The Court therefore concentrated on the practice of
"those States

.

.

.

which were not, and have not become

parties to the Convention,"

the goal being to find whether an "inference could justifiably be

believed themselves to be applying a
law."

49

they

made

mandatory

rule of

drawn

that they

customary international

The authors of the Study are fully aware of this ruling of the Court, although
a deliberate decision not to confine the Study to the practice of

Contracting Parties to Additional Protocol

I.

50

On

non-

the central issue of unlawful

combatancy, that decision led them to an overt misreading of customary international law.

There are manifold other

issues.

For instance, Rule 6

states, as

a matter of cus-

tomary international law, that "[civilians are protected against attack unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 51

most of the sentence. However, the words "and

on

Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol

Commander's Handbook, which
that the text omits the

written

comments to

is

words "and

the

ICRC,

I

Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the 1998
It is

are based

are contested.

The Study

on
The

relies

States,

but

for such time"! 54

which

—

Moreover, although in
6. Israel

incidentally

my

does not accept the

—has been removed from

,"

no account was taken in the Study's commentary
remark itself or of the deletion of the words "and for such time" from

Article 8 of the

either of the

—which

for such time"

had observed: "Rule

qualifying phrase 'for such time',

Rome Statute

—

challenge

when one takes a look at
explicitly cited more than once, 53 it is striking

United

practice, including that of the

I

52

Nobody would

.

.

.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 55

not proposed here to parse every Rule in the Study. However,

it is

notewor-

thy that Rule 35 sets forth that "[directing an attack against a zone established to
shelter the
ited."

56

wounded, the

sick

and

civilians

from the

As the commentary mentions, the idea

23 of Geneva Convention

(I)

57

and

Articles

(dealing with hospital zones, safety zones

is

effects

of hostilities

prohib-

based on the provisions of Article

14-15 of Geneva Convention (IV) 58

and neutralized zones). But,
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Commentary on Geneva Convention
strictly speaking,

have any

(I) states

legal existence, or

categorically, "[t]he zones will not,

enjoy protection under the Conven-

such time as they have been recognized by the adverse Party." 59 The

tion, until

same observation appears

Where does

Commentary on Geneva Convention

in the

the text of Rule 35 even imply that the establishment of a protected

zone cannot be effected without the prior consent of the other
It

seems that the concept of consent

is

side?

not an easy construct for the framers of

the Study. Thus, Rule 55 states tout court that "[t]he parties to the conflict

low and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian
in need,

which

is

impartial in character

tinction, subject to their right of control."

Additional Protocol

I,

tions."

and conducted without any adverse
61

This obligation

is

except that Article 70 adds the pivotal caveat (missing from

that Article 70

may be

I

relief ac-

does not claim

construed as precluding refusal of agreement to

allow relief for arbitrary or capricious reasons. 63 Surely, as
"[i]t is

dis-

based on Article 70 of

Even the ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol

more than

must al-

relief for civilians

Rule 55): "subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such
62

(IV). 60

I

have argued elsewhere,

impossible to assert, at the present point, that a general right to humanitar-

ian assistance has actually crystallized in positive international law." 64 This

prime example that the Study
tracting

—instead of looking

and non-Contracting

scends the Protocol (which

realm of the

lex

is

for a

former

a

compromise between Con-

Parties to Additional Protocol
lex lata for the

is

States)

I

—

actually tran-

and moves into the

ferenda (for both the former and the latter States). Curiously

enough, in the commentary on Rule 55, the requirement of consent in Additional
Protocol

I

and Additional Protocol

II is explicitly

mentioned, but there follows a

vague statement that "[m]ost of the practice collected does not mention
quirement."
it is

65

no footnote accompanies the proposition, and

Uncharacteristically,

not spelled out whose practice

this re-

this

is

in reference to.

Rule 45 of the Study66 confirms the customary standing of the provisions of Articles

35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol

I,

which prohibit the use of methods

damage to
environment. The commentary on Rule 45 mentions objections by
United Kingdom and the United States, adding:

or means of warfare expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe
the natural

France, the

67

[Tjhese three States are especially affected as far as possession of nuclear weapons

is

concerned, and their objection to the application of this specific rule to such weapons
has been consistent since the adoption of this rule in treaty form in 1997. Therefore,
the doctrine of "persistent objector"
these three States are not

weapons

is

is

bound by

if

possible in the context of humanitarian rules,

this specific rule as far as

concerned. 68

108

any use of nuclear

Yoram Dinstein
The extract reveals total confusion between two completely disparate concepts in
the modern analysis of customary international law, namely, "persistent objector,"
on the one hand, and "States whose interests are specially affected," on the other.
The "persistent objector" doctrine (supported by most commentators) maintains that a State, which persistently and unequivocally objects from the outset to
the emergence of a new customary rule, cannot be held bound by that rule. 69 A
timely "persistent objector" cannot be caught in the net of the

new custom, but

otherwise that custom will bind the entire international community. In other

words, the custom will consolidate
will

—notwithstanding the opposition—although

it

not affect the "persistent objector."

The construct of "States whose interests are specially affected" was developed by
the International Court of Justice, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 70 These
are States with priority in contributing to the creation of customary international

law (the paradigmatic example being that of the chief maritime States where the
law of the sea

is

concerned).

If several "States

object to the formation of a custom,

When
France

three nuclear Powers

—

—have taken the position

no custom can emerge.

the United States, the United

that Rule 45 does not reflect

conclusion that

(at the

—and
emerged —
Study

most) the three Powers can only be viewed as "persistent

that, therefore,

the

when adopted in

gets the

they will not be

is

bound by

be denied that three leading members of the small and
vocally since 1977. Surely, as "States

By repudiating the

custom which has

is

no question

and 55( 1) were innovative in character.

whether custom has developed

fected," the three countries

the

law completely wrong. There

1977, Articles 35(3)

question, consequently,

it

customary interna-

is

objectors"

opposed

Kingdom and

no doubt that they act as "States whose interests are specially afconceded by the commentary quoted above). By arriving at the

tional law, there

fected" (as

whose interests are specially affected"

thereafter,

and

it

that,

71

cannot

select "nuclear club"

whose

The

have

interests are specially af-

cannot be relegated to the status of persistent objection.

means of
warfare, the three nuclear States have not merely removed themselves from the
reach of such a custom: they in fact managed to successfully bar its formation (as a
minimum, with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons).
Finally,

the

Rule 77

human body

is

putative custom protecting the environment from

states that "[t]he use

prohibited."

72

1

all

of bullets which expand or flatten easily in

explicitly transmitted to the

position of Israel re the use of expanding bullets, namely, that

ICRC

it is

the official

permissible for

domestic law-enforcement purposes, as well as in the fight against terrorists and
"suicide

bombers" (when every split-second counts and there is a vital need

vent the completion of their heinous attack).
reflected in the

commentary.

109

Once more,

to pre-

unfortunately, this

is

not

The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study

Conclusion

In order not to further complicate the discussion,

did not get into specific issues

I

of non-international armed conflicts in this paper. This

Study

is

unassailable

where such

But an examination of

conflicts are concerned.

the Study's provisions thereon raises different issues

On

not to suggest that the

is

armed

the whole, as regards international

and deserves a separate paper.
conflicts,

I

am

afraid that the

Study clearly suffers from an unrealistic desire to show that controversial provisions of API are declaratory of customary international law (not to

mention the

By overreaching, I think that the
Study has failed in its primary mission. After all, there is no practical need to
persuade Contracting Parties to API that it is declaratory of customary international law. Whether or not such is the case, Contracting Parties are bound by
API by virtue of their consent to ratify or accede to it. But there is a need to persuade non-Contracting Parties that they must comply with a large portion of API:
occasional attempt to go even beyond API).

not because

it is

a treaty but because

it is

general custom.

I

do not think

that

non-

Contracting Parties will be persuaded by the conclusions of the Study. Thus, the authors missed a golden opportunity to bring Contracting
Parties to

API

closer together. Indeed, at least

on some

and non-Contracting

central points, far

from

bridging over the present abyss, the Study will only drive the two sides of the

"Great Schism" farther away from each other.
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PART III
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DISSEMINATION

V
The American Red Cross and International
Humanitarian Law Dissemination

Lucy Brown*

—

We heard about Nuremburg and stuff about World War II in other classes in school,
but

it

didn't really

mean anything

.

.

.

now I understand why ifs

important.

Introduction
over
For
United
well

a decade, the

American Red Cross (ARC) has been

States civilian population that international

is

telling the

humanitarian law (IHL)

an important subject about which everyone needs to be knowledgeable. The

ARC outreach occurs primarily at a grassroots level, through our chapter network
around the country, and focuses on dissemination to the general

public.

hope, and a goal of our dissemination, that the majority of students
adults

—

in the

United States

above did, that they

will

be able to

know what IHL

is

1

our

as well as

high school student quoted

and they understand why it's important.

IHL Dissemination
Since the attacks of 9/1

say, as the

—

It is

in the

and the US engagement

US Context
in Afghanistan

and Iraq there has

been a marked increase in organizations speaking to the American public about
IHL.

I

think this

ful that

is

very much a "good news/bad news" phenomenon.

Americans are much more interested

* Senior Advisor, International

in a subject that not

Humanitarian Law, American Red Cross.

It is

wonder-

many found

International Humanitarian

Law Dissemination

What is unfortunate is the reason they find
now affects many more people in this country.

relevant only a few years ago.

vant

—

that

armed

conflict

it

rele-

The Role of the American Red Cross

We are often asked, especially by those in the military, why we say "international
humanitarian law" instead of "law of armed conflict" or "law of war." The answer
is

that while

we sometimes

humanitarian one and

it is

In our courses we situate
ing

Hague

groups in

use the terms interchangeably, our perspective

is

the

focused primarily on teaching the Geneva Conventions.

IHL within the wider context of international law, includ-

Our objective, however, is to increase protection for vulnerable
armed conflict and facilitate humanitarian work by raising awareness
law.

within the general public about the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Protocols.

While the content of our training overlaps with the

training, the military understandably has

cusing on the

military's

law of war

an additional emphasis on Hague law, fo-

means and methods of warfare.

Red Cross Movement
what it is and what it is not. We have learned that many people think the Red Cross
is a human rights organization, and that IHL is synonymous with human rights
law. We explain to them, for example, that while the Red Cross is not a human
rights organization as such, much of the work it does benefits people's human
In our dissemination

we

also explain the role of the

rights.

Sometimes members of the public are surprised to discover the Red Cross
an organization whose primary purpose

is

to

promote peace. However, we

is

not

discuss

how a byproduct of Red Cross efforts in conflict regions can help facilitate a return
to peace,

and a byproduct of Red Cross principles being understood and acted on

can help promote peaceful coexistence

among antagonistic groups.

Sometimes we have to correct the mistaken notion that the Red Cross is responsible for enforcing the rules

of IHL against those

who commit

violations.

I

think

people imagine some kind of international Red Cross police force and expect to see

Red Cross staff providing testimony against war criminals. They do not realize how
impossible that would be for a Movement based on the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality
whose most powerful weapon may be its ability to be
present on both sides of a front line.
One of our challenges over the years is what to call our program. Just the term
"international humanitarian law" is a real mouthful and can be very off-putting.
That is why we settled on "Humanity in the Midst of War." That phrase comes
much closer to expressing the message we want to convey that respect for IHL

—

—
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helps ensure that the principle of humanity,
will

continue to

exist,

and humanitarian actions themselves,

even in the midst of war.

We let people in our classes know that they,

as individuals,

have an important

making this happen. Many people feel a profound sense of helplessness when faced with the brutality and suffering of war. They would like nothing
more than to turn away. We tell them IHL makes a difference and that they themrole to play in

can make a difference

selves

—

for humanity.

Why Is the ARC Involved in Dissemination?
Our

responsibility for dissemination derives

our role as an auxiliary to the
Charter.

The

from the Geneva Conventions and

US Government under our

1905 Congressional

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies are to "dissemi-

Statutes of the International

explicitly state that

nate and assist their governments in disseminating international humanitarian
law; they take initiatives in this respect."

The American Red Cross began its dissemination program with a 1988 grant
from the US Institute of Peace that enabled us to develop our educational materials
for the general public. Then in 1991 the International Services Department of the
American Red Cross received an internal grant to develop an instructor training
curriculum. Starting in 1993

we began

a series of instructor training courses.

What Is the Message?

We focus on very basic messages that address protection and human dignity.

Ex-

amples include:
•

That those no longer taking an active part

captured combatants, and civilians

in hostilities

—wounded,

sick

—must be protected from harm and

and

treated

with respect regardless of what side they are on.
•

That people in these protected groups are entitled to humane treatment. We

ask a class what rules they think should apply in

armed

"How

killed

"What
•

should a prisoner be treated
if

the prisoner

is

Another message

enforcing

IHL and

if

he has just

We

Then we

ask:

your buddy?" and then

your brother?"
is

that

that the

governments have the primary responsibility

for

Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red

Cross in particular, has a role in implementing
•

conflict.

it.

point out that the Geneva Conventions are treaties, agreements

negotiated by governments, and they therefore reflect a balance between

humanitarian protections and military objectives. This comes as a surprise to

some

people,

who wonder why IHL

doesn't just outlaw war.
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We

•

importance of the principle of distinction (combatant

stress the

noncombatant), but also

discuss

how

civilians

can

by

protections

lose

vs.

participating in the fighting.

We talk about the US military's own training for soldiers and give examples

•

of

how

the provisions of the

military operational training.

war training video
of the

in

Law of War"

our
as

Geneva Conventions have been incorporated

into

We now show a portion of a US Marine Corps law of

classes

and distribute a handout on the "Basic

provided to Marines.

We

believe

it is

Principles

essential that the

American public understand how seriously the majority in our military takes

this

body of law.
These are a few of the basic messages we think an informed public needs to

know.

Who Do We Want to Reach—What Target Groups?
Our

dissemination program

audience

we

is

designed primarily for the general public.

reach best, as anyone

safety classes, to

name

who

is

familiar with our

a few, understands.

It is

first aid,

It is

the

CPR or water

seen as part of our organization's

mission to help communities prevent, prepare for and respond to emergencies.

However, within the general public we have some priority audiences, including:
1)

American Red Cross

inators; 2)

internal audiences

youth and educators; and

3)

and prospective instructor/dissem-

opinion leaders within the general public,

including in the media, academia, and in

community leadership

positions.

We do offer some programs for more specialized or expert audiences, but these
are fewer in

tion

number and are mostly dependent upon the level of expertise, motiva-

and opportunity of individual

instructors.

How Do We Do It?
Our dissemination program

is

based on a national instructor training model

through which over 300 American Red Cross instructors have been trained in over
25 training sessions. Since 1993 these instructors have reached over 324,000 people

through introductory courses and presentations in communities around the country.

These courses and presentations have been organized and coordinated by our

network of over 800
the capacity to offer

local chapters, although, of course, not

all

our chapters have

IHL instruction. It is important to realize that for the most part

instructors are not legal experts, but act instead as facilitators to guide
late

discussion and learning.
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and stimu-
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While the IHL courses tend to generate excitement and interest in those who
attend, we have had limited human and financial resources from the very beginning of the dissemination effort and our reach has been

much

smaller than

we

would like. We hope to change that. We recently streamlined our instructor training model and the IHL course itself to bring them more into alignment with other
American Red Cross training models, thereby hopefully expanding the number of
people

we can

reach.

Exploring Humanitarian

A

Law and IHL Dissemination

major part of our current strategy

is

to

to

Youth

make IHL dissemination

through a program called "Exploring Humanitarian Law"

—

to

youth

a priority.

Why Focus on IHL Dissemination to Youth?
The advantage of exposing young people to the Geneva Conventions at an early age
is obvious. As one military lawyer put it rather succinctly, "The last thing we want is
for young people to come into the military thinking it's okay to harm prisoners."
Exploring Humanitarian Law (EHL) is the best material I have ever seen for
teaching IHL to youth. To date, the feedback from teachers and students has been
overwhelmingly positive. As one student said:
you a whole new perspective ... a bigger perspective. People don't think about
these things because we live in America and war seems so far away
but war isn't
really far away and all of this is a lot closer than people think. It changed the way I
It

gives

.

.

.

think

EHL

was developed by the ICRC working with the Educational Development

Corporation, based in Boston, and the American Red Cross was one of the original
pilot sites.

It is

a resource pack of materials designed to use with adolescents

and

can be used alone or to enrich existing classroom materials.

EHL teaches students respect for human life and dignity, ethical judgment, life
skills,

global citizenship, the protections of the

Geneva Conventions and the role of

Red Cross. Students learn by actively participating in a series of ethical explorations that look at both historical and contemporary examples and that examine
the

concepts such

as:

•

Human dignity

•

Obstacles to humanitarian behavior

•

Dilemmas
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«

The chain of consequences

•

Multiple perspectives

Law

Exploring Humanitarian

is

Law Dissemination

currently being implemented in 95 countries

through national Red Cross and Red Crescent
tion. In the

United

States,

school social studies; but
tory, anthropology,

it

societies

and

ministries of educa-

has been aligned with the national standards for high

it is

also

used in other

classes, including:

psychology, his-

economics, global studies, geography and political science. Ex-

tracurricular groups have

begun using the

materials, including

Reserve Officer Training Course classes. These materials resonate
level

some Junior
at the

deepest

with both students and teachers.

The American Red Cross is currently seeking funding to expand the program to
reach thousands of teachers and millions of students. We are working on the development of an EHL distance-learning course for teachers and exploring ways to include the study of IHL in the curriculum offered by American high schools. It is
not an easy task in a country with, in

effect,

50 separate departments of education.

we can expand EHL into many more classrooms, it will be a major
leap forward for IHL dissemination in the United States. We have shared these
materials with individuals at the Department of Defense, who have responded
However,

if

very positively.

Conclusion

A few years ago when I was interviewed by MTV for an article they wrote for their
online news titled
"All's fair in love

to

What Are the Geneva

Conventions?

and war" only got it half right.

draw the attention of a young audience

I

explained that whoever said

My remark was obviously designed

to the fact that there are widely agreed

upon standards for humane treatment in war. Making these standards much more
widely known and accepted is a goal worthy of all our best efforts.
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David Lloyd Roberts*
Introduction

The armed

Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) approach to training
forces in the law of armed conflict, as well as some of my personal

International

the

approaches, will be addressed under the following subheadings:
•

Problems that might be faced by armed forces in teaching and applying the law.

•

The need to accept that training must be based on the

realities

and pressures

of combat.
•

The approach

•

Suggested gaps in the teaching of the law.

•

Views on whether that training

to training soldiers,

is

young

officers

and senior

officers.

accepted and implemented in battle.

The ICRC Approach
In terms of dissemination, the

ICRC

has a supporting

role. Its

aim

is

to assist the

military wherever possible in carrying out their responsibilities in relation to train-

ing

*

and teaching the law of armed

conflict. Its

mandate stems

directly

from the

Independent consultant and lecturer in the law of armed conflict and human rights law, as well
humanitarian security issues. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone unless

as

reference

is

made

to specific

ICRC

policy.
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Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, 2 as well as resl

stemming from the Fourth Session of the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
olutions

Armed Conflicts. 3
How does the ICRC carry out this mandate? In its headquarters in Geneva, the
ICRC has a small department dealing with relations with armed and security

Applicable in

forces.

Then throughout the world there are officers based on regional delegations.

known as "Delegates to the Armed Forces." All are retired and all
have seen some form of operational service with their own forces or with the
United Nations. Their task is to make contact with the armed forces of the region in
which they are working and to explain how and to what extent the ICRC can offer
These

officers are

assistance based
eration.

It is

on

certainly not the

sponsibility of an

have their

their particular requirements.

own

The key is

assistance

and coop-

ICRC's mandate or intention to assume the

full re-

armed force to train its own personnel in the law. Many countries

system of dissemination in place while others have nothing.

The strategy is essentially one of encouraging armed forces to integrate the law
of armed conflict into their training and operations. This is based on initial confidence building, e.g., meetings, briefings and introductory courses. This would be
followed by training courses for selected officers resulting in the actual training of
trainers. Thereafter, the ICRC might offer assistance in the drawing up of law syllabi so that the law is integrated into all levels of training and operational planning.
The ICRC Delegates to the Armed Forces can offer the following:
•

A wide-ranging experience in combat and other military operations. These

new and

different experiences can

be shared with an armed force to broaden

knowledge.
•

Access to good teaching material, produced by the

specifically tailored to the

ICRC

in

Geneva and

needs of the particular country. The ICRC's

Teaching File for Armed Forces

is

a

good example of this.

Its

purpose

is

new

to provide

instructors with the basic tools they require to conduct lessons in the law of armed
conflict. It consists

rights

of twelve lessons covering the whole subject, including

human

law and standards applicable to the use of force in internal security

operations. 4

It

has been translated into a

number of languages

including French,

Russian, Chinese, Spanish, Mongolian and Amharic. In order to keep abreast of

new developments

or simply for

more

detailed advice

on

particular issues, the

delegates also have access to the large legal department at the

ICRC headquarters

in Geneva.
•

The

delegates bring to their instruction their operational experience, but

because they are also from the

ICRC

they are impartial and neutral in what they

122

David Lloyd Roberts

have to

say. It

law to their

is

for the students

and

staff

own particular circumstances.

of colleges and academies to relate the
It is

definitely not the role of the

ICRC

instructor.
•

Because they have been soldiers and because they have

at their

own

know how

military academies or staff colleges, they

lecturers to send students to sleep, particularly

therefore to inject realism
their audience

and

when

the topic

interest into their presentations

by a mix of programming and training aids. Case

to-date examples are a particularly valuable

through lectures

sat

way of bringing

is

easy
law.

and

it is

for

They

try

to motivate

studies using up-

the subject alive and

encouraging a cross flow of ideas and discussion. In addition to lectures and
courses, the instructors can offer assistance with seminars, training

programs and

the provision of training booklets. Courses can be tailored to the specific needs of

army, navy,

air force,

The human rights law
of internal violence are more and more in

paramilitary and police personnel.

and standards applicable to lower levels

demand,
•

more
Italy

particularly

from the

ICRC

Finally, the

military.

can sponsor senior officers

at courses either in

regularly, at the International Institute of Humanitarian

where they have the opportunity

Geneva, or

Law in San Remo,

to interact with officers

from

a range of

countries.

Personal Approach

To

teach the law you

military audience

the law

is

sound.

the battlefield.

if

in

it.

There

you did not. Based on

It is

It is

must believe
useful

when

is

no way you could possibly bluff a

my experiences of conflict, I believe that

teaching the law to point out that

it

was born on

very much soldiers law molded by our ancestors' experiences of

The law is rich in military tradition and custom; for example, ruses of war,
perfidy, and the truly customary white flag of truce. One of the principles of war is
simplicity of action. The law is also simple and straightforward. It is full of good
practical guidance. In no way does it hinder your actions on the battlefield or, as
some may think, tie one hand behind your back. In no area does it conflict with the

battle.

principles of war, such as maintenance of momentum, concentration of effort, sur-

and so on.
The law to which we're

prise

referring

is

today usually called either international hu-

manitarian law or the law of armed conflict.

spond more
term

I

I still

readily to the subject if we refer to

will use in this article.

Knowing the
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find,

as the

however, that soldiers

"law of war," and that

is

re-

the

attitude of soldiers to the subject of the

Teaching the Law of Armed Conflict

law,

like to

I

I

would

like to take a
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begin lectures by putting them on the spot and making them think

the very outset about the subject so

that this

to

I

at

begin the very first lecture by saying to them:

guess at what you're thinking right now.

Some probably think
rest. You may be

an ideal opportunity to catch up on some well-earned

on the assault course or on maneuvers.
This is absolutely marvelous. I can switch off and let this instructor ramble on for 45
minutes. I know all about the Geneva Conventions anyway the law is part of my
culture and our military traditions. I really don't need to listen to all this legal mumbosaying to yourself "thank goodness I'm not

—

jumbo."

The more skeptical and cynical might well be thinking along the lines of Cicero,
the very famous orator of ancient Rome, who stated, "Laws are silent amidst the
clash of arms." 5 In other words, war by its very nature is beyond the law. Wars
break out when the rule of law breaks down, so that there are no longer any rules.
It's like finding yourself in the middle of a football match without referees or umpires, so just go for it. The mentality becomes, "We have to win at any cost, so let's
forget the legal do-gooders."

Some may hold the view that consideration of the law, while
lawyers, leaves
cold.

I

am

most operational

sure that the

mind dust-covered
to put

it

officers,

word "law" on

old books and

and

of great interest to

certainly every soldier, absolutely

military

programs immediately brings to

instills feelings

of boredom or remoteness and,

quite bluntly, irrelevance.

Some might actually think the law is important for any professional soldier, but
Becoming conversant with the law represents a massive
investment of time and effort. How, on top of all the other commitments, can one

they are frightened by

it.

be expected to come to grips with the subject?

At

this stage,

on the

issue?"

the subject

and

if time

allows,

one can pose the question "where do you stand

Having heard what the students think and having involved them

from the

outset, the time has

come

to gently point out that they

not be quite as knowledgeable as they originally thought. This

is

in

might

done by running

over once again the differing attitudes described above and asking, "This question
is

for those of you

that

is

fine,

who know all about

but can you

tell

me

the

exactly

Geneva Conventions.

what these mean?"

holding a white flag appears on a PowerPoint

slide,

hands

If you really do,

A picture

flash

of a soldier

up and

inevitably,

means I want to surrender." It is not the time to teach
just yet, so we put the class on hold with the reply, "Let's see later in our lessons if
you were right or wrong." We move on to the next slide and here few, if any, students know what the symbol of large orange circles is designed to protect. 6 The lesthe class answer will be "It

son continues in

this vein.

For example, we can then ask the
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class if

they are sure
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about their exact duties in relation to the following categories of persons and obcaptured combatants,

jects:

civilians, the

wounded, both military and

To

those

without

we

protective

emblem, and the

civilian.

who may be among

rules,

Red Cross

the skeptics

and

believe that

war must be fought

ask:

Perhaps you would like to consider whether it would be useful to you in battle for some

you have been captured, from torture while
or from poisonous gas attacks from your opponent; or to protect

provisions of the law to protect you,

under interrogation,

you

And

if you

are a civilian.

to those

who

think the subject

Are you absolutely sure what your

how and when you

flamethrowers?

How

security operations?

end

by

It is

differ

to

hope

you and

awake and most are now

and motivated

important in

irrelevant,

we can

ask:

when planning an

attack?

can use weapons such as booby traps and

saying, "I

—

the subject

and

from the law applicable

to internal

Are there any differences?

the relevance of the law of war
fully

dull

does the law of war

this introduction

now, most are

is

legal responsibilities are

Are you sure

I

if

this

to learn

on
those under your command." By

that this has allowed
to

fully

you

to focus

aware of their shortcomings in

more.

approach to training that the instructor has

with his military audience.

An instructor who has

credibility

experienced conflict will have a

The rapport and understanding in both directions will be immediate and will make any teaching more relevant and acceptable. Even the language and jargon used will be more digestible
and acceptable to the audience. This, as I mentioned earlier, is exactly the approach
used by the ICRC.

head

start in getting the subject across to the

audience.

Problems Faced by Armed Forces in Teaching and Applying the Law

armed forces, one must accept that there are certain problems that have
to be taken into account. Even in the very best of armed forces there will always be
constraints on training time. At a military academy or a staff college, the commandant will always be pulled in numerous directions to include more of this or that in
the syllabus. It is a brave commandant who insists on maintaining a module on the
In training

law of war. Yet

it is

in these very institutions that a nation's future high

command

must be instructed in the provisions of the law that are one day likely to influence
them and their decisions as commanders. Ignorance of the law in light of a nation's
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obligation under the

Geneva Conventions

to teach the law

is

inexcusable.

peacetime that we have time to consider the law; once the balloon goes up
too

It is

it is

in

then

late.

Commanders must believe in the law and demonstrate by their interest and emon training in peacetime, and, of course, by their behavior in battle that they
respect the law. Commanders must be trained to know the law and their responsi-

phasis

bilities

bad example or giving unclear, ambiguous orders has
caused problems in the past and has been a principal root cause of grave

within

certainly

Setting a

it.

breaches of the law.

Once when teaching a bunch of young cadets we came to the coffee break. We
were sitting with the commandant and his senior officers, separated, thankfully,
from the cadets. "What you are saying David is all very well but at the end of the day
I have found that the only way to get information out of a terrorist is to break his
legs!"

I

could see and tell from the reaction of my students that they were interested

of barracks room
—
message would soon be adjusted "OK,
what you have

and

receptive.

However, with

forget

the

way we do

Another

real

cism out there

what you are
do. But

with

it

just

been told. This is

here!"

problem

is

that there

at the coalface

is

indeed a great deal of skepticism and cyni-

of the law of war. Most audiences will say,

telling us. It's all

"We accept

very well us abiding by the law, which of course

what about our opponents? They continually break the law and

it."

That

is

the old "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth" argument.

"Have you been to teach in country XYZ

Why don't you,

my

attitude or culture,

this sort

the

law?" Sometimes

it is

ICRC, or the

UN

(a potential

away

They

opposing belligerent)

ask,

as well?

do something about those who abuse the

very difficult to accept that in the long run

the high moral ground

get

we

it is

better to adopt

when you know that today your opponent

has a policy of

using suicide bombers and a "no quarter" policy!

Following on from this
so often the case,

it is

is

the general feeling that the law is toothless.

abused, the chances of any international body such as the

United Nations putting an end to
tions.

There

refer to

is

When, as is

it

are slim.

The powerful can get away with viola-

not a great deal of faith in the United Nations. Often audiences will

UN resolutions, which are ignored or circumvented. There

cynicism surrounding the International Criminal Court.

minish as the court finds

its feet

and produces results;

No

is

also

much

doubt, this will di-

for the present, however, this

cynicism remains.

came face to face with this general feeling of cynicism. It
was at the end of a two-week session for a very bright group of officers. A senior
commander arrived from the Ministry of Defense for the farewell speech. We
spoke a little beforehand and I had told him what I had been doing with the ICRC.
At a course in Africa,

I
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In front of the assembled officers, he thanked

me very much

for

my lectures

and

noted that I had spent many years teaching armed forces in Third World countries.

He

said,

rules in

"Of course we know

all

about the law of war and have always applied the

our fighting with our neighbors.

be better spent educating the more

seem need

it

more than

us!"

May I suggest that the ICRC's time would

civilized nations in this subject

who

it

would

My course coincided with the disclosures in the writ-

ten press and television of the alleged abuses of prisoners in

Abu

Ghraib.

Training Must Be Based on the Realities and Pressures of Combat

It is

important in training to accept that there are sometimes severe

pressures placed

There

stress.

and

might incline them to disregard the

a soldier in battle that

supposed to obey. There

rules they are

hunger and

upon

difficulties

may be

fear, tiredness, frustration, anger,

may be the need to overcome the

inclination for revenge

or retribution. This must be controlled by good training, and good clear orders

which are enforced by good commanders

some of the

Let us take a look at

armed

at all levels.

pressures.

whatever his or her rank, has a personal responsibility to comply

forces,

with the law and to ensure that

it is

complied with by others and to take action

7

the event of violations. If you break the rules,

own

courts.

It is

We know that every member of the
in

you can be tried, and not just by your

8

no defense

to a

with a superior order.

war crime

to say that the act

was committed in compliance

A soldier who carries out an order that is illegal under the law

of war

is

stances

which made that order unlawful or could reasonably have been expected to

guilty of a

war crime, provided

that he or she

was aware of the circum-

be aware of them. 9
This point

is

of great significance to any soldier.

It is

a simple point to

make but

much more difficult for soldiers to carry out in the field. It means they must refuse
a command if they believe it to be plainly unlawful. Surely unflinching loyalty and
obedience to superior commanders are fundamental to any armed force. This
true,

but there

is

clearly a higher loyalty, to

your State and

its

laws.

is

The duty of all

comply with unlawful orders is quite clearly established in internaDuring the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials that followed the Second

soldiers not to

tional law.

World War,

the defense of superior orders, while considered a mitigating factor in

relation to sentencing, in

no way excused law breakers. The principle has been reaf-

firmed in modern tribunals such as those
in the

former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

set

If an

up to

order

deal with

is

war crimes committed

plainly unlawful, a soldier has a

duty not to carry it out. Superior orders might be used in mitigation of an offense,

and might

result in

reduced punishment, but not as an excuse for an offense.
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pressures.

How about dealing with prisoners of

categories of captured persons?

Whether they have surren-

dered or not, they become protected persons under the law the instant they fall into
the

power of the adverse

party.

The law

clearly states that

it is

forbidden to

kill

or

who has been taken prisoner or who is hors de combat. That's
how does it translate onto the battlefield? During and immedi-

mistreat a combatant
fine

on paper but

ately after

combat, soldiers are

still

hyped up; the adrenaline

is

running very high.

One minute they may be required to kill the enemy and the next they have to treat
him with kid gloves even though he might well have killed or wounded some of
their

comrades.

This
best

is

obviously a difficult situation, but professional soldiers must cope. The

way is to put yourself in the prisoners' position. "Do unto others as you would

How would you like to be treated if you had been cap-

have others do unto you."

who now have the upper hand, the time has come to

tured? As professional soldiers

show humanity and respect for your opponents.
The POWs are no doubt tired, disorientated and very frightened. No good soldier or commander should take advantage of their plight or vulnerability. Bullying
or mistreatment of POWs
frustration

might

is

a real

result in this

problem immediately

after capture.

Anger and

being vented against the prisoner.

Misguided attempts by unprofessional soldiers to gain information can lead to
problems. The law

is

quite clear

on

No

this.

coercion whatsoever

force a prisoner to give information. Torture, both physical

or degrading treatment or punishment

is

may be

used to

and mental, inhumane

absolutely prohibited. 10

The argument of military necessity can never be used to justify torture. For example, we can never say that we needed to torture someone because we knew they
had vital information that might save the lives of others (sometimes referred to as
the "ticking

bomb

scenario"). In combat, torture

military purpose except perhaps to vent anger.

is

not only

It is far

it is

skills

you.

and motivated

soldier will

tell

you nothing

little

within the law to

sometimes

questioning" can waste valuable time and in most cases will be
trained

serves

more sensible to send a sus-

pect to the rear where trained interrogators can use their

gain information. Battlefield interrogation, or as

illegal; it

or,

called "tactical
futile.

A

well-

even worse, try to mislead

A frightened prisoner might tell you anything just to ease his plight; so again

the information

is

qualified interrogators?

Do

Anyway, who

do the questioning? Are they
they know what they are doing? Is the information you

unreliable.

will

gain reliable?
Prisoners

must therefore be moved

as

soon

as possible to the rear

and must not

be unnecessarily exposed to danger in the meantime. They must not be compelled
to engage in activities of a military character, for
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a minefield.

They must be protected

against acts of violence, intimidation, insults

or public curiosity. For example, television crews
a whole, but only

on condition

that

may take pictures of the group as

no prisoner of war

is

individually identifiable.

This has not been the case in recent history, with those on both sides flouting the law.

Training Methodology

Soldiers

For soldiers to understand and implement the law

and

ble

digestible way.

teach and to train.

It is

in peacetime that

Once the

it

must be presented

we have time

fighting has started,

it is

too

in a credi-

to consider the law, to

For

late.

soldiers, the

needs to be a part of normal behavior in action. Just as they are taught to

employ camouflage and concealment,

ons, to

should also be taught the basics of the law so that
action. In battle, a soldier

or rules.

He

etc., as
it

weap-

fire

a matter of routine, they

becomes second nature,

cannot be overburdened with complicated

needs simple and understandable guidelines, especially

spect the law in a

law

combat environment. The KISS approach (Keep

legal

jargon

he

to re-

if

It

a reflex

is

Simple Stu-

Long lectures will not be appreciated. The best approach is
one based on short practical exercises or demonstrations to bring out points and
then making sure they are repeated in training. Ambush drills, section attacks, and
fighting in built-up areas exercises can all have a small element of law of war training incorporated into them. The scope is simply dependent on the interest and enpid)

is

certainly the best.

thusiasm of the instructor. For example, exercises could easily include capture
drills;

and evacuation of the

correct treatment of prisoners of war; treatment

wounded

(yours and the enemy's); and respect for the civilian population and pro-

tected property. Drills for dealing with the white flag of truce

and dealing with hu-

manitarian aid convoys are further examples. All of these scenarios can be built
into field exercises without too

training

much more

subject.

difficulty; indeed,

they tend to

make

field

interesting.

In this way, tactics

same

much

and law of war

issues are seen to

be part and parcel of the

They become accepted routine procedures,

i.e.,

a matter of

normal

behavior in action. Classroom instruction for soldiers should be kept to the mini-

mum. Some lectures will be necessary to set the scene.
as a

Perhaps one or two periods

maximum, any more and they are likely to prove counterproductive. Here the

use of playlets to demonstrate a point

and wrong way to deal with

is

particularly useful, for example, the right

a captured combatant. In addition, up-to-date

ples of law of war issues, pictures of real events, video clips

movies

—and so on

—sometimes from war

are important in maintaining interest.
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own law of war

produced

their

in getting

key messages on the law across to

training videos; they find

them

particularly useful

soldiers.

Junior Officers
Training of junior officers

is,

in

my view, probably the most important aspect of all.

These future commanders must be given the opportunity to learn and
the subject

from the

done properly
needs to

know

a

outset.

young

for the

The time spent on

this training

can be taught

the law of

officer

whole of his

all

reflect

on

need not be long.

war lessons he

If

really

career. Eight to ten periods covering will give

them the background knowledge they need. There is a need to set the scene and explain the

when

background to the law

the law applies.

The

—how

it

originated,

status today,

its

aims and

principles of the law, in particular those relating to dis-

tinction, military necessity, proportionality
if

its

and limitation

taught to junior officers will act as a foundation for

all

are very important

and

future training, planning

on command responsibility. Commanders
must be trained in the law and their responsibilities within it. The law in relation to
the conduct of operations is of course of paramount importance. Periods on weapons and the law and logistics and rear areas, including prisoner of war camps,
and operations. There must be

a period

should be included. Today, the law of belligerent occupation might be quite important. Perhaps the law applicable to lower levels of violence should be included

so that the differences in approach

and

in the rules are

known from the outset.

ternal security operations, post-conflict situations of restoring law

UN peacekeeping
Field exercises

(as

In-

and order or

opposed to peace enforcement) operations come to mind.

and model room

exercises can incorporate law of war aspects to re-

inforce this teaching. Case studies

and military history can also be used to draw out

on the law as the course progresses. I think it is also very important that junior officers are left in no doubt as to their responsibilities to teach the law to their
subordinates and perhaps to give them some ideas and tools to do that.

lessons

Senior Officers and Staff Officers
Staff colleges

and war

colleges are ideal places to reinforce the lessons learned as a

The officers at
these places of learning will be filling important posts in the future and some will be
cadet and junior officer and to consider broader issues of the law.

destined for high
light

command. Case

studies of recent conflicts can be used to high-

not only tactical or strategic issues but also law of war concerns. Topics could

include

command responsibility.

in this area resulting

Indeed, there are a

from recent experiences

in Iraq

number of useful case studies
and in the former Yugoslavia.

Targeting and the law would be another important topic, in particular recent

les-

sons relating to the principle of proportionality and distinction, the avoidance of
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collateral

damage, the problems caused to planners and commanders by dual-use

on which to base targeting decisions.
There are a number of good case studies resulting from the conflicts in Kosovo, Afand the need

targets,

for

good

intelligence

ghanistan and Iraq. Logistic implications of the law are areas worthy of study at this
higher level. For example, the treatment, handling and back loading of prisoners of

war or
There

casualties.
is

Then

there are

UN operations/coalition operations and the law.

plenty to cover.

Gaps

in

Teaching the Law

Do armed forces actually pay the required attention to the law? How much training
actually takes place? Will they apply

many armed
Almost

all

forces insist

on

it

in battle? All these are

hard to

a formal qualification in the law

from

assess.

How

their soldiers?

countries require everyone to pass a written and practical test in the law

How many soldiers that we send into combat have
to pass a test on the laws of war? We know that States have undertaken to respect

before he or she can drive a car.

and

to ensure respect for the

many actually do?
To a very large

Geneva Conventions

in all circumstances,

but

how

community relies on the ICRC to disseminate the law to armed forces. They do a good job but with some 20 delegates
devoted to the task, and a few "on call" consultants, their impact on armies that in
some cases exceed one million persons might be considered a pinprick. Some in the
extent the international

may believe that as
"guardians" of the Geneva Conventions, the law of war is very much the ICRC's re-

United Nations and large non-governmental organizations

sponsibility

and

that they should not interfere. If we are to rely exclusively

on the

ICRC then their efforts and staff devoted to this particular task must be greatly increased. Of course, we should not rely on them entirely. It is a nation's responsibility to

ensure their armed forces are fully aware of their legal responsibilities in

combat.
I

flict

It is

a national responsibility to enforce

have found a

thirst for

below the threshold

knowledge of the law that applies

and standards come into

play.

There

is,

in

for the law.

to the levels of con-

for the application of the international

these lower levels of conflict that domestic law

be

and ensure respect

law of war.

and international human

my view,

It is

rights

a definite gap here that

in

law

must

Many nations are facing situations of internal violence and disturbances,
the military terms them, internal security situations. Many are interested in

filled.

or as

the law applicable to peacekeeping
straint

and minimum

and post-conflict

situations,

force are required, the opposite of what

dier in conventional warfare.

Although such situations

responsibility of the police, there are occasions
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when

where

i.e.,

re-

is

required of a sol-

will, in

the main, be the

the

armed

forces

might be
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upon to assist,

some cases take over completely until law and order can
be restored. This is occurring more and more frequently. If the armed forces are
deployed into these situations with no knowledge of the law, with inadequate
called

training

or in

and without the equipment necessary

then mistakes are likely which might well

make

to

produce a graduated response,

the situation worse.

Acceptance and Implementation of the Law
Finally,

think

I

it is

important to consider whether and

how well the law is actually

being accepted and implemented by soldiers in battle even
the gaps are

all filled.

The

cynical

and

skeptical might, as

if training is

mentioned

perfect

and

at the outset,

agree with Cicero that in the reality of the recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and
the ongoing "war

on

terror" the rules are indeed very often "Silent midst the clash

of arms."
Is

on my experience, when it comes to practical
prisoner of war treatment, prohibition of torture, guide-

the situation that bad? Based

law of war issues such as
lines for attack, use

of weapons,

etc., I

never had anyone arguing the toss 11 with the

content of the law, which says a great deal about
sense. Superior orders

practicality

its

sometimes cause problems and

I

and

have covered

common

that.

We mostly only hear the bad things. As someone once said, "If a dog bites a man,
hardly news.

On the other hand, if a man bites a dog, then it's going to be exten-

sively reported."

There have indeed been numerous reports of violations of the law,

it's

but very rarely are reports
fort

is

made on how well

it is

being applied, on

how much ef-

being put into target planning to avoid collateral damage, or on efforts to

spare and protect the civilian population.

Perhaps from a cynical standpoint one could point out that the armed forces

and civilian political leaders are now much more aware of their responsibilities and
the dangers of breaking the law because of the

CNN, BBC or "Al Jazeera" factor.

It

can make a commander's eyes water as he sees his promotion prospects disappearing

when having

to explain a mistake to

CNN's

Christiana

Amanpour

or BBC's

John Simpson.

We cannot rest on our laurels, the gaps must be closed and we must make continued and indeed greater efforts to teach and ensure
the law

all

combatants understand

and apply it on operations. Offenders must be brought to justice, punished

and be seen

know as

to be punished.

a reflex action

At the end of the day,

if

soldiers in tight situations

how they should react then we have

132

achieved our aim.
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PART IV
MODERN WEAPONRY AND WARFARE

VII
War, Technology and the Law of Armed
Conflict

Michael N. Schmitt*

War,

technology, and the

norms governing warfare have influenced

each other dramatically since the beginning of organized conflict.

1

When the resulting hostilities run

Technology determines how wars can be fought.

counter to prevailing values or interests, law and other prescriptive strictures often

emerge to

restrain them. 2 This occurs either

icy decisions
lar

by belligerents (generally

manner. In the

law when
Finally, as

through treaties or as the result of pol-

States) to

latter case, the practice

conduct themselves in a particu-

matures into customary international

becomes "general" (widespread) and "accepted as law" by States. 3
the norms governing war become outdated, law is reinterpreted, ig-

it

nored, or discarded.
In the 21st century, the pace of technological change in warfare has quickened.

This article asks

near future.

It

how war and law are likely to react to, and upon, one another in the

begins with a brief survey of the normative architecture governing
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and means (weapon systems) of warfare. Technology is then reviewed, with particular emphasis on current weapons development programs and

methods

(tactics)

overall trends.

The

article

influence the application

concludes with an analysis of how this technology

and interpretation of the law of armed

may

conflict.

The Law Relevant to Technology
In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized the law of
conflict's

two "cardinal" principles

armed

in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear

4

Weapons. Distinction, the first, provides that "States must never make civilians the

and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of
distinguishing between civilian and military targets." In other words, weapons
object of attack

must be both capable of discrimination and used discriminately. The second disallows weapons that cause combatants unnecessary suffering. Nearly all law of

armed

conduct of hostilities, whether

conflict prohibitions related to the

treaty-

based or customary, find their genesis in these principles.

The 1868

St.

Petersburg Declaration, which dealt with explosive projectiles,

ushered in the modern era of limitations on methods and means of warfare with

its

pronouncement:
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during

war

is

to

That for
That

weaken the

this

military forces of the

purpose

this object

it is

enemy;

sufficient to disable the greatest possible

number of men;

would be exceeded by the employment of arms which

uselessly

aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable;

That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of
humanity.

Other

5
.

.

.

efforts to restrict military

technology followed 6

—

projectiles

and explo-

dropped from balloons (1899 and 1907); gas and chemicals (1899, 1925,
1993); expanding bullets (1899); submarine mines (1907); biological weapons

sives

(1972); environmental modification techniques (1976); non-detectable fragments
(1980); mines

and blinding

& booby traps

lasers

(

(1980, 1996,

and 1997); incendiary weapons (1980);

1995). 7

Undoubtedly, further attempts to regulate weaponry will be launched. Possible
topics include depleted
tacks, non-lethal

uranium

shells, cluster

munitions, computer network

at-

8

weapons, and space-based offensive operations. The prospect of

States agreeing to accept limits

on

their

weaponry depends on
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from whether they possess or

are likely to be attacked with them, to the degree of

and domestic concern about their impact on the civilian population.
The international community also regulates methods and means of warfare
through non-weapon specific law of armed conflict principles. Two early compilainternational

tions were the Regulations

annexed to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the

Laws and Customs of War on Land. 9 These regulations

set forth the

most basic limi-

on the conduct of hostilities, that " [t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited." 10 Other relevant provisions include a ban on

tation

poison 11 and "arms,

projectiles,

13
ing"; 12 acceptance of ruse;

or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffer-

and a requirement to take

"all

necessary steps" to "spare,

as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes,
historic

monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected,

provided they are not being used

The most comprehensive
fare

is

time for military purposes." 14

codification governing

the 1977 Protocol Additional to the 1949

Protocol

such as

I)

and the United

many of the

conflict.

methods and means of war-

Geneva Conventions (Additional

which governs international armed

Israel, India,

recognize

armed

at the

conflict.

15

Although key

States

States are not party to the instrument, they

Protocol's provisions as reflective of the customary law of

16

Hague principles that there are limits on methods
and means of warfare and that weapons causing superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering are banned. 17 More significant, is Article 48, which sets forth the core law
of armed conflict principle, distinction: "In order to ensure respect for and protecArticle 35 restates the basic

tion of the civilian population
all

and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at

times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between

civilian objects

and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations

only against military objectives." Articles 51 and 52 build on this requirement.
Article 51: (2)

The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be

the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which

spread terror

among the

civilian

all

objects

(2) Attacks shall

by

this Section, unless

for such

not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian

which are not military objectives

be limited

and

hostilities.

Article 52: (1) Civilian objects shall

objects are

to

population are prohibited.

(3) Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded

time as they take a direct part in

is

as defined in

strictly to military objectives.

paragraph

2.

In so far as objects are

concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
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purpose or use make an

location,

effective contribution to military action

total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the

and whose

circumstances ruling at the

time, offers a definite military advantage.

In a related prohibition, Article 51.4 bans "indiscriminate" attacks

them

defining
(a)

on

civilians,

as:

those which are not directed at a specific military objective;

(b) those

which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed

at a

specific military objective; or
(c)

those which employ a

by

method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be

and consequently, in each such case, are of a
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without

limited as required

nature to strike

this Protocol;

distinction.

Subpart

(a)

of the

article

contemplates the indiscriminate use of a weapon sys-

tem capable of being aimed or otherwise

controlled,

i.e.,

one that

is

by nature

dis-

criminate. Iraq's launch of SCUD missiles against Israeli population centers during

the 1990-91 Gulf War constitutes the textbook example. 18

address indiscriminate weapons, the use of which
(b) deals

is

The remaining subparts

prohibited altogether. Subpart

with weapon systems incapable of being aimed directly

at a military

ob-

jective.

A long-range missile with a guidance system so rudimentary or unreliable

that

chances of striking a military objective are almost happenstance

its

this category.

19

By

contrast, subpart (c) outlaws use of aimable

duce uncontrollable
through a

if

A

an attack

that pro-

biological contagion that spreads uncontrollably

civilian population, albeit initially targeted against

mizes such weapons.

Even

effects.

weapons

illustrates

combatants, epito-

20

is

directed at a combatant or other military objective,

and the

weapon system employed is both discriminate by nature and used discriminately, it
must be proportionate. Codified in Article 51.5(b), the principle of proportionality
prohibits attacks which "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 21

The law of armed conflict styles injury or death of civilians as "incidental injury,"
whereas damage or destruction of civilian property is labeled "collateral damage."
Finally, attackers must take "precautions in attack" to minimize harmful effects
on civilians and civilian objects caused during an otherwise lawful strike. Article 57
sets out the requirements, the bulk of which represent customary law of armed
conflict. 22 The principle requires "those who plan or decide upon an attack" to do
"everything feasible" to ensure they are not attacking civilians, civilian objects, or
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items or individuals

who enjoy special protection; to "take all feasible precautions"

when choosing weapons and tactics in order to minimize incidental injury and collateral damage; and to select that military objective from among those yielding a
"similar military advantage" that "may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives

to

and

to civilian objects."

Beyond the general principles, Additional Protocol I extends special protection
specified objects, most notably medical establishments, cultural objects, places

of worship, objects indispensable to the civilian population, the natural environ-

ment, and works and installations containing dangerous
creasingly significant

is

the prohibition

feigns protected status to
feigning:

kill,

on

Also proving in-

perfidy. Perfidy occurs

injure, or capture the

an intent to negotiate under a

forces. 23

flag

when one

party

enemy. 24 Examples include

of truce or surrender; civilian status;

being sick or wounded; and protected status (indicated by uniform or emblem) of
the United Nations or a State not party to the conflict. 25
In addition to treaty law, the customary law of armed conflict imposes certain

on methods and means of warfare. Given the fact that the applicability
provisions found in law of armed conflict treaties preclude their operation in many
26
In this regard,
conflicts, customary law provides the key constraints on warfare.
recall the Martens Clause, the contemporary formulation of which is found in Artirestrictions

cle 1.2

of Additional Protocol

I:

"In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other

international agreements, civilians

and combatants remain under the protection

and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience." 27

The dilemma with customary law lies in determining its content. The International Committee of the Red Cross recently released its Customary International
Humanitarian Law study. Based on extensive surveys of State practice and pronouncements, the study attempts to capture the current customary law of armed
conflict in writing. 28 Although somewhat controversial, it represents the only comprehensive attempt to do so in any systematic, internationally vetted fashion.
The study reiterates most norms described above, drawing heavily on the text of
Additional Protocol I. Chapter 21 restates the ban on the use of methods or means
"of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering" and on indiscriminate weapons. 29 The subsequent chapters prohibit poison, biological weapons, chemical weapons, riot-control agents as a

method of warfare,

herbicides, expanding bullets, exploding anti-personnel bullets,

certain uses of

weapons with

non-detectable fragments, specified uses of booby-traps, and laser weapons designed to cause blindness. 30
Part

I

of the study

sets

out the broad law of armed conflict prohibitions: attack-

ing or terrorizing civilians (unless directly participating in hostilities); 31 attacking
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other than military objectives; 32 perfidy; 33 and indiscriminate attacks, including
the use of indiscriminate weapons, using discriminate

and

indiscriminately,

treating distinct military objectives in a concentration of civilians or civilian

objects as a single target. 34

It

further contains the principles of proportionality35

in attack. 36 Rules governing medical, religious, humanitarian re-

and precautions
lief,

weapons

and peacekeeping personnel and

property; works

and

objects; journalists; protected zones; cultural

installations containing

vironment are found in Part

II.

dangerous

forces;

and the natural en-

37

The aforementioned instruments and principles represent the core normative
boundaries applicable to methods and means of warfare
and which they will in.

fluence. Before turning to these dynamics,

it is

.

.

useful to consider 21st-century mil-

itary technology.

The Technology Relevant to Law

Too often, thinking about war focuses on weaponry. Yet, weapons are simply one
component of a "weapon system," i.e., "a combination of one or more weapons
with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery
and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency." 38 It is the weapon
system, often incorporating technology more complex than the weapon itself,
which determines success or failure. For instance,

in

an air-to-ground engagement

against a fleeting target, the intelligence assets that allow the target to be identified

and the communications, command, and control networks
possible are as essential to mission success as the aircraft

Simply put,

fully

that

make rapid attack

and the bomb

it

drops.

understanding combat operations requires consideration of

the technologies having a direct causal relationship to

all

weapons employment.

Therefore, this article adopts an inclusive approach to the technology of future

war, looking
Specific

first at specific

development programs and then

Programs: Since the United States armed forces enjoys a technological

edge over every other military in the world
best indicator of technology's vector

programs.
Projects

at general trends.

39

lies

in

(a

gap that will certainly widen), the

US military research and development

Within the Department of Defense, the Defense Advanced Research

Agency (DARPA) oversees future technologies. 40 DARPA's current

re-

search centers around eight "strategic thrusts." 41 Because they provide a feel for the

technology likely to be fielded on the 21st-century battlefield,

it is

useful to briefly

review each category.
1 )

Detection, Precision Identification, Tracking, and Destruction of Elusive

Surface Targets. Today, weapons fielded by advanced militaries are highly accurate.

However, target detection,

identification,

142

and tracking continue

to present
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The unsuccessful decapitation
leadership during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) offers a

major hurdles to even the best-equipped

campaign against

Iraqi

classic illustration.
kill

forces.

US air forces conducted 50 highly accurate strikes, yet failed to

even a single targeted individual. 42 The problem lay both in the unreliability of

some intelligence and the inability to leverage reliable information quickly enough.
In response to such challenges,

DARPA hopes to find ways to collapse the cur-

rent sequential targeting process (find,
into an uninterrupted
instance,

(gather

fix,

track, target, engage,

and continuous one

and assess

results)

that adapts to battlefield events. 43 For

new technologies will blur the traditional distinction between intelligence

and process information), plans (determine what to do

in response to that

information), and operations (execute the plan). Platforms that carry both sensors

and weapons,

like the Predator, are

future, systems will operate without

form

will search for, identify,

merely the

human

ages developing systems that will

ers

of the iceberg. 44 In the near

input; in other words, a single plat-

and destroy targets autonomously. 45

Networking represents the other thread

and weapons with

tip

first

in this strategic thrust.

"connect more and more sensors, platforms,

a variety of communications links,"

and commanders"

and

to "take advantage of the massive

to increase the speed, accuracy, agility,

ple illustration, a Predator

DARPA envis-

later

permit "comput-

amounts of data

available

46

In a sim-

and capability" of combat forces.

might use video to track a target.

When it enters an area

of heavy foliage, the networked system would automatically switch to foliage penetrating radar. In response to the radar returns,

ranging) sensors

compared

would produce

3D LADAR

(laser detection

a detailed three-dimensional

to computerized geometric

and

image which can be

models to accurately identify the

target.

Technology will have seamlessly linked sensors to sensors to shooters.
2) Robust, secure self- forming tactical networks.

supports the previous one,

it is

Although

this strategic thrust

not limited to target destruction. "Network centric"

operations "turn information superiority into combat power so that the United
States

and

its allies

have better information and can plan and conduct operations

more quickly and effectively than any adversary." 47 Doing so depends on highly
advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems integrated into a single network. 48 The
far

goal

is

an

ability to rapidly gather, process,

ponent, while hindering
as "getting inside the
inside,

its

efforts to

and

react to information about

do the same. In military terms,

enemy's observe-orient-decide-act

you control the

flow, pace,

(OODA)

this is

loop."

and direction of battle. Eventually,

an op-

known

49

Once

disorienta-

tion paralyzes your adversary. 50

DARPA is pursuing a number of systems along these lines.

For instance,

it

has

developed prototype self-forming, self-healing networks, such as the Small Unit
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Operations Situational Awareness System

squad

level to

(SUO SAS). SUO SAS will be used at the

allow soldiers in complex physical environments such as

cities

and

communicate with each other and monitor the location of fellow squad members.
3) Networked manned and unmanned systems. This thrust teams manned and

jungles to securely

unmanned

systems to leverage the unique qualities each

offers.

An example

is

the

backpack portable Micro Air Vehicle, which will perform intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance functions

for small units.

Another

is

the

Unmanned Ground

Combat Vehicle, a system providing fire support missions for ground forces. 51 Unmanned systems are especially useful in high threat environments or where the alternative (e.g., manned aerial reconnaissance) is labor intensive, costly, or in short
supply. 52

Urban Area Operations. Because of the advantages US forces enjoy on the
open battlefield, adversaries increasingly confront them in urban areas where they
can take advantage of clutter and proximity to civilians and civilian objects to mask
4)

their location or shield their activities. Events in Iraq

have shaped the direction of

research in this area. Present studies include systems to detect

enemy forces,

ex-

bombers and improvised explosive devices), and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD); distinguish combatants from civilians and
threats from civilian objects in crowded areas; "tag" a potential target (individual
or object) to allow it to be monitored; employ weapons of variable effectiveness
(non-lethal to lethal) to minimize collateral damage; and make individual soldiers
and unmanned systems vertically mobile. An illustrative example is the Boomerang shooter detection system, which calculates the direction from which shots have
been fired at a moving vehicle to enable effective return fire. Another is the Command Post of the Future (CPOF). Presently, command and control (C2) is exercised from a distinct physical location
a command post. CPOF creates a virtual,
plosives (including suicide

—

mobile, distributed, collaborative

from

different locations, but

still

in

which key participants operate

collaborate effectively in real time.

5) Detection, Characterization,
light

C2 system

and Assessment of Underground

Structures. In

of US capabilities to accurately target aboveground structures, adversaries are

using underground

WMD),

facilities for

such purposes as hiding weapons (including

They range from the
caves used by the Taliban and al Qaeda to the huge underground bunkers found in
protecting leadership, C2, and mustering forces.

Iraq. 53

DARPA has

responded with the Counter-Underground

program will develop ground and airborne
tical,

and chemical sensors that

locate
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and

construction, layout,

vulnerabilities;

and conduct post-attack

battle

damage

assessment to determine the need for reattack.

Assured Use of Space. Operations

6)

like

those taking place in Afghanistan and

would be unimaginable without space-based communications, navigation,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and weather systems. From satellite imagery to handIraq

held global positioning system locators, space

To

warfare.

leverage space,

is

integral to every facet of high-tech

and deny enemies the same opportunity,

DARPA has

focused efforts in five areas: rapid and affordable space access; situational awareness in space (what

is

there

and what

is it

doing); protecting

US

spaced-based as-

preventing adversaries from using space-based assets; and using space in

sets;

support of earth-based operations.

Numerous programs
craft to refuel,

Telescope
objects.
cle,

is

a

are underway. Orbital Express involves

upgrade, and maintain other spacecraft. The Space Surveillance

ground-based telescope with the capability to search space for small

Perhaps most significant

which

will traverse space to

7) Cognitive

to

the Falcon program's Hypersonic Cruise Vehi-

speed

travel.

computers by creating computers that adapt to

Such computers "learn" from

their experiences

and adjust

users.

their activities accord-

For instance, they can be used in operations centers to deal with fast-paced,

complex
and

is

Computing. Cognitive computing reverses the process whereby

computer users adapt
ingly.

automated space-

situations

by using past experiences

craft responses thereto.

ishes significantly.

PAL will

When

An example

is

anticipate an individual's

to filter

and

prioritize information

this occurs, the possibility

of surprise dimin-

the Personalized Assistant that Learns (PAL).
(e.g.,

decision-makers or intelligence analysts)

needs based on previous experiences and prepare materials for them before being
tasked to do so.

The Bio-revolution. This DARPA strategic thrust envisions technologies that
either work with the human body or imitate nature. Examples of the former in8)

clude programs that maintain physical and mental performance despite

vironmental conditions

like heat

stress,

en-

or altitude, lack of sleep, or insufficient nutrients.

"Legged" robots able to traverse rough terrain better than wheeled vehicles (in one
case

modeled on

a cockroach), optics based

sects that calculate

is

Programs.

DARPA

works

Three merit particular mention. The

the Structural

and sensors inspired by in-

in areas other than

first is

materials.

Amorphous Metals program, which

phous microstructures

that yield hardness

Such materials might be of
shells that

the eye,

room temperature exemplify the latter.

9) Miscellaneous
thrusts.

on

54

its

One current effort

studies materials with

much

amor-

and strength previously unattainable.

use, for example, in replacing the depleted

have generated so

strategic

uranium

controversy. Other possibilities include an
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unobtrusive

"morphing"

external

skeleton

for

aircraft structures that

soldiers

heavy backpacks and

carrying

change shape while airborne to vary the

flight

envelope (much as the body of a bird does).

Microsystems comprise a second area of
States

much of its current technological edge.

matically increases the functions performable

one that gives the United

interest,

In particular, microtechnology dra-

by computer

chips, thereby

enhanc-

ing the processing capabilities of military systems. Similarly, smaller

weapon

systems on aircraft or vehicles yield greater range, mobility, and carrying capacity.
This allows striking

The

third area

is

more

targets with fewer platforms.

information technology. Present projects include peta-scale

55

autonomous vehicle navigation, and collaboration between humans
and robots or robots and robots. The High Productivity Computing Systems program is improving computer efficacy in activities such as cryptanalysis and weather
forecasting by a factor of 10 to 40. Also noteworthy is the Improving Warfighter Information Intake under Stress program, which non-invasively monitors human
computing,

cognitive load so information provided to the warfighter does not overload

thought processes.
General trends: The aforementioned programs offer a real-world glimpse into
the technology of future war.
lenges, such as the
reflect

Some

are understandable reactions to current chal-

urban warfare and underground

facility

programs, while others

weaponry trends already underway. Since the characteristics of weapon sys-

tems, not individual systems, determine conflict's character,
rize those trends
1) Precision.

ability

sion,

most

it is

useful to

summa-

likely to persist.

Precision

must be distinguished from accuracy. Accuracy

of a weapon to strike a specified location,

by contrast, involves identifying

known

as the aimpoint.

targets in a timely fashion

and

56

is

the

Preci-

striking

them

accurately.

Many weapons are highly accurate, with circular error probable (CEP) calculations now measured in feet. 57 Accuracy lessens the risk of causing collateral damage
and incidental

injury,

not only because weapons hit closer to their intended

aimpoints, but also because the

more

accurate they are, the less explosive charge

needed to achieve the desired probability of damage (PD). 58 While we can expect

CEPs to progressively improve, the unfortunate reality is that few States can afford
and associated launch platforms necessary to
conduct truly accurate operations. 59 This being so, the task for research and devel-

the "precision guided munitions"

opment is affordable accuracy. 60
A more prevalent trend in precision warfare is improved ability to locate,
tify,

and track targets

—transparency of the

from an array of information

battlefield.

Today's warfighters benefit

sources: imagery intelligence (IMINT);
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intelligence

(HUMINT);

signals intelligence

(SIGINT); measurement and signa-

(MASINT); open-source intelligence (OSINT); technical intelligence (TECHINT); and counterintelligence (CI). 61 Moreover, aircraft such as the
AWACs, JSTARS, and UAVs offer transparency in real-time, 62 while equipment
like night vision goggles allow soldiers and airmen to locate and target the enemy in
adverse conditions like darkness and poor weather. All indicators point to continture intelligence

ued improvements

in this area.

2) Coordination,

command, and

Another discernable trend

control.

proved coordination horizontally and better

DARPA's work

in

network centric warfare

command and

is illustrative,

for

it

is

im-

control vertically.

demonstrates that

future high-tech militaries will fight as networked entities, rather than hierarchical
organizations.

Networking permits quicker
critical

collection, fusion, analysis,

and dissemination of

information (such as the location of a fleeting target); better decisions

about the platforms able to respond most effectively to

ongoing operation; increased

ability to

it;

greater control over an

coordinate operations in real-time with

other friendly forces; enhanced responsiveness to unanticipated events that arise as
the operation unfolds; less risk of friendly operations interfering with each other;

and greater ability to deal with enemy threats. Taken together, networking is one of
two keys

to operating within the enemy's

An example

is

OODA loop.

Blue-Force Tracker, a satellite-based tracking and communica-

tion system that allows computerized data integration

and dissemination to troops

With Blue-Force Tracker, all echelons of command and staff can follow
a battle and provide combat support. Using a combination of computer maps,
real-time automated data updates (on friendly and enemy locations, as well as
other battlefield information), and chat room coordination, troops engaging the
enemy no longer have to rely on preplanned support or that which happens to be
"on-station" (in the vicinity). Instead, they can draw on the full range of theater asin the field.

sets,

near simultaneously. 63 Blue-Force tracker, currently fielded in Afghanistan

and Iraq, is merely the tip of the iceberg in terms of the networking likely to characterize tomorrow's battlefield. 64
3)

Transparency. As mentioned, transparency

improve precision

attack.

enemy actions and

proactively counter them.

an adversary's

OODA

is

the current focus of efforts to

But transparency also allows warfighters to anticipate

loop.

It is

the second key to getting inside

Equipped with improved

command and

control,

transparency, precision, and the ability to operate at night and in all-weather conditions, the high-tech military

can sculpt the course of most ongoing battles against

lesser-equipped foes.
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Space enjoys particular importance in this regard, not only as the ultimate "high

ground" from which to observe the enemy, but

may be

information
lites);

transmitted

(e.g.,

hence the centrality of space in

also as a

medium through which

by communications and navigation

US development

satel-

programs. Transparency

also undergirds efforts to link sensors for persistent battlefield coverage, as well as

the

unmanned

of

fielding

systems

to

maintain

coverage

in

high

threat

environments.
4) Soldier effectiveness. Several of the
cally

improve the

programs described

earlier will

dramati-

effectiveness of individual soldiers relative to their opponents.

The bio-revolution and cognitive computing thrusts are illustrative, with potential
further gains from research in tactical networking, manned-unmanned collaboration, materials, and microsystems. These programs cap a long-record of providing
individual soldiers competitive advantages over their foes, represented by such
currently fielded systems as night-vision goggles, light weight body armor, global
positioning systems, individual weapons equipped with advanced sighting, and
hand-free communications capability. The relative effectiveness and survivability
of the individual soldier in militaries capable of acquiring such technology will

only increase over time.
5)

Unmanned and

come common on
though

man-out-of-the-loop systems.

the

modern battlefield (and

systems

early

provided

Unmanned systems have be-

off in the global

rudimentary

battlefield

war on

terror). Al-

surveillance

and

UAVs are evolving into weapons platforms. A variant of the
Predator, the MQ-1, is now armed with two Hellfire missiles, allowing it to directly
reconnaissance,

engage targets

65

it

locates, as in the

Senyan al-Harthi,

al

CIA-controlled strike on a car carrying Qaed

Qaeda's senior operative in Yemen, in 2002. 66

It is

only a mat-

UAVs and other unmanned systems conduct attacks without the
involvement of a human decision-maker.
ter

of time before

6) Variable lethality

and destructiveness. As noted,

DARPA is assessing weapons

of variable lethality for use in urban areas. This effort builds on the extensive nonlethal systems

(more accurately labeled

less-than-lethal) research

done

to date. 67

The difference is that in the past such systems were viewed primarily as useful in
crowd control and other low-intensity situations. However, urban combat in Iraq
has demonstrated the utility of weapons with differing destructiveness and
lethality

even in relatively intensive combat. This

is

particularly true

when civilians

and civilian objects are used as shields. Thus, field commanders are actively seeking
ways to effectively attack the enemy in an urban setting while limiting collateral

damage and
7)

incidental injury.

Other significant trends. As warfare becomes more complex, technology may

outpace the

ability

of uniformed personnel to develop and maintain proficiency in
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its

operation.

Some

technologies, such as

computer network or space operations,

member of the armed forces lacks. Or, given the
limited numbers of a particular system in the inventory, it may be cost prohibitive
require education that the average

to develop training
logical

programs

for military personnel.

Whatever the

case,

techno-

complexity suggests a greater civilianization of the battlefield and a closer

nexus between

civilians

and the conduct of hostilities.

Future battlefields will also be

less cluttered

with military personnel and equip-

ment. Simple cost calculations put massive inventories of equipment beyond the
reach of most countries, as does the per item cost of advanced

B-2 bomber, for instance, has a

life

weapon

cycle cost of 2.5 billion dollars. 68

systems.

At

A

this price,

numbers to make risking it
in combat reasonable. And high-tech weapons are much more effective than their
low-tech counterparts, thereby requiring the use of fewer weapons platforms to
only the United States can

field the aircraft in sufficient

achieve a given objective.

At the same time,
political

militaries

throughout the world are downsizing, usually for

and economic reasons. Compensatory technology has

tions possible.

Unmanned

Finally,

is

to effective

reduc-

more

OODA loop, the less important raw

combat operations.

although not a specific

DARPA focus,

from ever-greater distances and

able

made

systems are but one example. Additionally, the

technology allows penetration of an enemy's
troop strength

also

launched beyond visual range (BVR).

69

altitudes.

future

weapons

will

be employ-

Current systems are frequently

For instance, during Operation Iraqi Free-

Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (BGM-109),
which have a range of 690 miles. US forces also launched, inter alia, over 900 AGMdom, naval

vessels

launched 802

65 Maverick air-to-ground missiles, with a range of over 17 miles, and 408
88

HARM

(high speed anti-radiation missile), with a 30-mile range.

quency of BVR engagements

70

AGM-

The

fre-

only increase as those with long-range precision

will

systems leverage them to stay outside the enemy's threat envelope.

Range, the ability to locate and
fenses,

71

have made

battlefields

fix distant

—from day one.

tory

Battlefields

enemy

de-

four dimensional (land, sea, air/space, and

cyberspace) and spatially unlimited.

along fixed lines of troops; instead,

enemies, and penetrable

War is no longer necessarily linear, i.e., fought
it may encompass the opponent's entire terri-

have been replaced by "battlespaces."

The Impact of Technology on Law
The technologies described above are dramatically influencing the application and
interpretation of the law of armed conflict. They will continue to do so in the future.
First and foremost, such technologies exacerbate the asymmetry that already
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challenges certain key law of armed conflict principles. Second, they complicate efforts to distinguish

combatants and other military objectives from

civilians

and ci-

and somewhat paradoxically, modern technology empowers
avoid collateral damage, incidental injuries, and mistaken attacks. As

vilian objects. Third,

militaries to
it

does

so,

however, troubling expectations regarding casualties are surfacing, ex-

pectations that endanger current understandings of the law of armed conflict.

Asymmetry: The technologies of war already on the battlefield, and development

programs like those described above, will create a degree of asymmetry between the
high and low-tech forces that has seldom been observed in military history. 72 Hightech forces locate their enemies

more

observe their actions with better un-

easily;

derstanding; anticipatorily react to those actions with greater speed, coordination,

and

effectiveness; field

and better able

vivable
their

weapons systems and
to neutralize

enemy

soldiers that are infinitely

defenses;

employ weapons

more

that strike

aimpoint with a degree of force precisely metered to achieve the desired

of destruction; and assess the results of their actions, and readjust
quickly and with a high degree of

reliability.

And,

as first

sur-

if necessary,

level

very

demonstrated during

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, technology has reached the point

where these

tasks can be

performed around-the-clock. 73

Even numerically superior low- tech militaries with positional advantage cannot
prevail against such forces in conventional combat. At the start of the recent conflict,

one

ground force of nearly 400,000. 74

Iraq fielded a
less

than half

its size.

75

It

was defeated

in six

weeks by

Further demonstrating the impact of asymmetry, the

Iraqi air force never even left the ground.

Meanwhile Coalition

aircraft flew 20,733

fighter/bomber sorties over territory with an air defense system that was robust by

contemporary standards. Only one fixed wing
to hostile

fire.

76

And

in

its

aircraft,

an A- 10 Warthog, was

most inhospitable environment, the urban

technology prevailed. For instance, during the battle for Fallujah,
killed nearly 1,200 insurgents while suffering

lost

battlefield,

US Marines

only 50 casualties. 77

Cynics will point out that weapons advances historically either find their way to
the

enemy or soon

fall

victim to effective countermeasures. 78 As an example, Iraqi

insurgents are using mobile phones to rapidly coordinate attacks
forces

and detonate roadside bombs.

Similarly,

on Coalition

complex US Department of De-

fense systems are regularly the target of cyberattacks. But the prospects of disad-

vantaged forces turning the tables on their high-tech opponents in the near term

remain

slight.

Low- tech forces face two basic challenges in modern warfare: 1 ) how to perform
the most basic function in combat, survival; and 2) how to engage the enemy, either to defeat it or to so alter its cost-benefit calculations that it withdraws from the
fray voluntarily.
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Consider survival. Facing an adversary armed with advanced C4ISR and imme-

weaponry, the best survival option

diately available precision

spotted in the

first

place.

is

to avoid being

Lawful methods to avoid discovery include, inter

alia,

camouflage, ruses, jamming, and spoofing. 79 As demonstrated during the unsuccessful Coalition decapitation strikes,

vanced detection systems.

80

simply staying on the

move can frustrate ad-

And militaries have always used physical features such

canopy, mountainous areas, caves, underground bunkers and tunnels,

as jungle

and urban

areas, as well as night

But, as noted, research

from jam

resistant

ping caves. So

is

and weather, to mask

underway on systems

their presence.

to counter each of these tactics,

networked information networks to chemicals capable of map-

how

does the out-teched side survive? Increasingly,

it

does so by

armed conflict principles. Iraq is the paradigmatic example. During the first Gulf War, Coalition forces slaughtered Iraqi military units wherever they met in open battle. 81 By 2003, the technology available to
US forces had radically improved, while the Iraqi military had not recovered from
its earlier defeat and the ensuing sanctions regime. Wisely, then, the Iraqi army

blurring or even discarding law of

avoided open confrontations.

To keep

the Coalition troops from identifying them,

promptly discarded
prohibition

on

their uniforms.

82

attacking civilians, but

The

tactic

many

Iraqi soldiers

has no dejure relationship to the

endangered them in the sense that Coali-

it

who posed

a threat, thereby heightening the

risk of mistaken uses of force against innocents.

Because such mistakes of fact are

tion soldiers were less certain about

more reasonable than would be the case where civilians and combatants are clearly
distinguishable, the law of armed conflict's deterrent effect was effectively
weakened.

members of the military who merely wear civilian clothes do not vilaw of armed conflict. Rather, they lose combatant status because they

In fairness,
olate the

lack the prerequisites thereof set forth in Article 4 of the Third
tion.

83

Article 4A(1) provides that

status. Article

militia not

4A(2)

sets forth

members of the armed

forces enjoy

four cumulative conditions which

combatant

members of

a

forming part of the armed forces (and members of other volunteers

corps, including resistance fighter)

these conditions are inherent in the
to those

Geneva Conven-

encompassed

must meet

to be lawful combatants. Because

meaning of "armed forces," they apply equally

in Article 4A(1). 84

The

"having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable

relevant criterion in this context
at a distance,"

one

typically

is

met

through uniform wear.

Two

consequences attach to the

qualify as prisoners of war.

85

loss

of this status.

First,

those captured do not

Second, because only combatants have the right to

"directly participate" in hostilities, 86 others enjoy
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their actions during the hostilities.

While

it is

not a war crime to attack the enemy,

may amount to a criminal offense (e.g., murder) under the national law of
capturing forces. Lacking immunity, they may be prosecuted in the courts of any
doing so

State with subject matter over the offense

fender.

and personal

jurisdiction over the of-

87

Another technique
status. Iraqi regular

for avoiding identification

is

feigning specially protected

and irregular forces did so, for instance, by misusing protective

emblems. One recurring tactic was to

seize

ambulances and use them as scout vehi-

marked the Ba'ath Party building in Basra with the emblem of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Party buildings
were regularly used as military supply depots and mustering points. 88 The law of
armed conflict expressly prohibits the display of the distinctive emblems of medical and religious personnel, transports, and units, or the personnel, property, and
cles. Iraqi militia

activities

forces also

Movement of the Red Cross and Red

of the International

other than their intended purposes.

Sometimes one cannot avoid being
case,

an increasingly common survival

civilians
tarily,

and

civilian objects as shields.

an important distinction

The war in

Iraq

is

identified
tactic

90

is

vis-a-vis the

by the enemy.

law of armed

illustrative. Iraqi forces, especially

Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol

tions,"

by one

immune from
from

a prohibition that

side does not

own obligations.

on shielded

I

is

in the area. 91

military operations, in particular in attempts to

attacks or to shield, favor or

theless

93

impede military operaViolation of this

impose an absolute obligation on the other to

94

the resulting concrete

ticipants

the paramilitary Fedayeen,

unquestionably customary.

it

refrain

norm

from

release the attacker

at-

from

Therefore, the principle of proportionality applies to attacks

any other incidental injury or

from attack by

conflict.

forbids the use of "[t]he presence or

targets; if the likely injuries to (or

tary shields are

the use of

and children, to shield their activities.

tacking the shielded object or persons, but neither does
its

the

population or individual civilians ... to render certain

civilian

shield military objectives
92

is

may serve voluntarily or involun-

whenever they observed Coalition helicopters

points or areas

i.e.,

that

common tactic, they drove their vehicles next to those of civil-

For instance, in one

movements of the

When

"counter-targeting,"

Shields

frequently forced humans, including women

ians

Crescent, for

89

and

collateral

death of) the shields, together with

damage caused,

is

direct military advantage, attack

an exception, for they lose

their

excessive in relation to
is

prohibited. 95 Volun-

law of armed conflict immunity

"directly participating" in hostilities. 96 Obviously, since direct par-

may be

attacked,

it

would be incongruent

count in proportionality calculations.
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Civilian objects are also useful in counter-targeting. Iraqi forces often located

military

equipment and troops

in or near civilian buildings, including specially

protected locations. For instance, as Coalition forces

moved north

the Fedayeen

used such protected locations as al-Nasiriyya Surgical Hospital, the Baghdad Red
Crescent Maternity Hospital, the

Imam

Hanifa mosque as bases for operations.

98

Ali

Later,

mosque

and the Abu

in al-Najaf,

during the battle for Fallujah, 60 of

mosques and three medical facilities were so used."
Although no express provision on using civilian objects as shields

the city's 100

law of armed

conflict,

such actions violate Additional Protocol

gations to "endeavour to
civilian objects

remove the

I's

exists in the

Article 58 obli-

civilian population, individual civilians

under their control from the vicinity of military

and

objects; avoid

locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas; [and] take the

other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians

and

civilian objects

under their control against the dangers resulting from military

operations," albeit only "to the
to refrain

maximum extent feasible." 100 It is always "feasible"

from intentionally placing military equipment and personnel

civilian objects in

Even more

order to keep the former from being attacked.

clearly a

tected objects to

in or near

law of armed conflict violation

compensate

misuse of specially pro-

is

for technological disadvantage.

The

First

Geneva

Convention provides in Article 19 that "responsible authorities shall ensure that
medical establishments and units

are, as far as possible, situated in

.

.

such a manner

that attacks against military objectives cannot imperil their safety." Additional

Protocol

plainer

I is

still:

"Under no circumstances

shall

medical units be used in

an attempt to shield military objectives from attack." 101 Further, "historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples" receive analogous protections under the Protocol. 102

Iman Ali and Abu Hanifa Mosques, mentioned above,
tant Shia

and Sunni shrines

respectively.

Absent special protection,
future purpose

is

tus withdraws

it

objects has

military.

104

aside

can become military objectives due to

through use for military actions, or when their

Moreover, each treaty granting specially protected sta-

upon misuse. 105 Thus,

little effect

as a

matter of law, shielding with civilian

from influencing proportionality

Assuming the technologically weaker forces
enemy. One

impor-

103

civilian objects

their militarily significant location,

qualify, for they are

The

survive, they

logical, albeit unlawful, tactic for

adopted a number of other perfidious

doing so

calculations.

still

is

need to attack the

perfidy. Iraqi forces

tactics to offset the Coalition's technological

superiority. Recall that Iraqi forces regularly fought in civilian clothes, a perfidious
act if done as

usually

don

an element of an attack tactic.

civilian clothes. Additionally,
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Of course, this is precisely why soldiers
they feigned surrender and used stolen
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ambulances to approach Coalition

more vulnerable by lowering their

themselves

Another

bombings

hoping

forces,

tactic

adopted in Iraq

suicide

is

attests either to the success

guard.

opponents would make

106

bombing. The increasing frequency of

of the tactic against superior forces or the

relative lack of alternatives in the face of

directed against combatants

their

such superiority. 107 Although lawful

and military

protected status to approach targets, as

objectives,

the

is

108

when

the

bomber

norm, the attack

is

if

feigns

perfidious.

Typically, though, civilians (unlawful combatants) carry out suicide attacks. Their

mens

whether doing so constitutes perfidy.

rea determines

their actions

comprise direct participation in

If

merely attacking,

On the other hand,

hostilities.

wearing of civilian clothing forms an integral part of their attack

committed

tactics,

if

the

they have

perfidy. 109

Eventually, the technologically disadvantaged side
likely to prevail

and reframe the

conflict

by

may

conclude that

it is

un-

shifting attention towards a center of

110

As Clausewitz recognized, war is the continuation of politics by other means. This being so, when facing overwhelming odds, it is
gravity other than the military.

quite rational to

abandon the

principle of distinction altogether

and attack

civil-

ians as a center of gravity.

Both

practicalities

practical perspective,

and
it is

objectives

compel adoption of such a

strategy.

From

a

impossible to protect the civilian population effectively,

no matter how robust one's technological wherewithal. Crippled by technology in
a classic fight, the disadvantaged side responds asymmetrically

by attacking its op-

ponent's vulnerabilities.

when the objective is to take the fight out of
an enemy without defeating it militarily. For instance, the goal may be to rupture a
coalition, as in Iraqi targeting of Israeli cities in 1991. 111 Attacking civilians may
Attacking civilians

also

be intended to

is

also appealing

affect

non-governmental and intergovernmental organiza-

tions. In Iraq, for instance, insurgents attacked the

an

UN and ICRC headquarters in

effort to force their withdrawal. Similarly, civilian targeting

flict

appear too costly to belligerent States and

der of foreign hostages in Iraq

such crimes are proving
tacker's

lation

is

designed to convince

effective.

US

partners to leave Iraq;
at-

own. One goal of the attacks against Iraqi civilians is to convince the popu-

it

will

be

safer

without Coalition forces.

a sadly frequent asymmetrical

More

directly, attacks against

and law enforcement personnel

to deter cooperation with the Coalition.
is

The kidnapping and mur-

Or, the "target" population might be the

civilian politicians, judicial officials,

ians

citizens.

can make the con-

are designed

Whatever the motivation, attacking

civil-

method of countering battlefield technologi-

cal advantage.
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Beyond unlawful methods, the technologically weaker side may resort to compensatory means of warfare. Two at the center of discussion are computer network
attack (CNA) 112 and weapons of mass destruction.
CNA represents "war on the cheap" for an otherwise technology starved belligerent, for cost

is

limited to acquisition of off-the-shelf computers

and computer

software, access to the target network,

higher-tech an opponent, the

more vulnerable

it

and exploitation

expertise.

Moreover, the

to such attacks. Terrorist

is

groups are already effectively using websites to conduct information campaigns,
the broadcast of beheadings representing the extreme example. Concerted, orga-

nized offensive use of information technology will soon follow.

There

is

nothing unlawful per

computer network attack

se

On

about cyberattacks.

assets are readily available, the

precautions in attack requirements

the contrary,

law of armed

may sometimes mandate

when

conflict's

their use because

CNA usually risks less collateral damage and incidental injury than kinetic weapons. 113 That said, the proportionality principle applies to
tacks. This

is

a particularly

meaningful limitation on

CNA,

as

does in

it

all at-

CNA because civilian systems

are often linked to military networks (thereby risking the spread of viruses

other computer contagions), 114 and because
use entities

(e.g.,

power

grids).

many potential CNA targets are dual-

115

As suggested by DARPA's programs, high-tech
threat

and

are developing robust defenses. This

ing attention towards

and

more penetrable

civilian

militaries

have recognized

this

may have the ironic effect of turnnetworks. In a networked world,

the consequences of such attacks could be disastrous. Imagine cyberattacks against

and distribu-

global financial networks, air traffic control systems, water treatment
tion

facilities,

nuclear power plants,

oil refineries

and

pipelines, or medical data

systems.

The
flict

issue of whether attacks

on

civilian

has generated an interesting debate.

networks violate the law of armed con-

Some

experts argue that

all

tions against civilian networks violate the principle of distinction.

view

is

CNA opera-

116

The

better

that the law of armed conflict only prohibits those rising to the level of an

"attack."

Although Article 48 of Additional Protocol

I

requires Parties to "direct

their operations only against military objectives," every other relevant Protocol

prohibition cites "attack" as

its

operative criterion. 117 "Attack"

is

a term of art de-

fined in Article 49 as "acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or
in defence."

Given advances in military technology,
terpret the

term "attacks"

as

it

would be unreasonable

to further in-

being limited to those conducted through kinetic

means. Indeed, universal consensus

and radiological operations qualify

exists that non-kinetic biological, chemical,

as attacks.
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But

at the
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time, the express
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reference to violence can only be interpreted as implying violent consequences

118
,

Thus, a military operation causing injury to humans (or severe mental suffering)
or physical
fice.

damage to property is an

attack. 119

Mere inconvenience would not suf-

Universal acceptance of the proportionality principle as considering "inciden-

tal loss

of civilian

life,

injury to civilians [and]

damage to

civilian objects"

supports

this interpretation.

In addition to exploiting the cyber-vulnerabilities of technology dependent

disadvantaged foes

societies,

States are acquiring

may

fight asymmetrically

with

WMD. A number of

WMD ostensibly to deter attack by technologically advan-

taged militaries, most notably North Korea. 120 Doing so

on the part of those facing militarily dominant rivals.
The law of armed conflict outlaws chemical and

is

a predictable response

biological

States party to the various instruments cited above. Arguably,

the

same for the rest.

prohibitions

is

121

Yet,

attested to

by the extensive

customary law does
be able to operate in

understandable, for biological and chemical

and

easily deployable. 122

not battlefield use that generates the greatest concern. The dynamic of

asymmetry operates
it

is

efforts they take to

are relatively low- tech, cheap, accessible,

it is

for

That States do not have great confidence in these normative

contaminated environments. This

weapons

weapons use

in the biological

CNA.

does vis-a-vis

and chemical context

in

much the same way

Facing militaries equipped to withstand biological and

chemical attacks, opponents

may decide

civilians

pose the more attractive

target.

Thus, beyond the general prohibition on use, violation of the distinction principle
logically (albeit not lawfully) results

from severe disadvantage

in conventional

weapons systems.

The

case of nuclear

weapons

is

more complicated.

In

its

1996 advisory opinion

on The Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice opined
that their use "would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian
law."

However,

it

added the caveat that

it

could not "conclude definitively whether

would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme cirwhich the very survival of a State would be at

the threat or use of nuclear weapons

cumstance of self-defence, in
stake." 123

These conclusions demonstrate a
fare.

124

relative

Clearly, there are circumstances in

comply with the

misunderstanding of nuclear war-

which the use of such weapons would

principle of distinction, including proportionality. 125 That there

are probably nine nuclear powers, including

all five

of the permanent

members of

the Security Council, further draws the Court's conclusions into question. 126 For
these

and

related reasons, the

Customary International Humanitarian Law study
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wisely refrained
biological)

from

weapons

asserting that the use of nuclear (in contrast to chemical

violates the

customary law of armed

conflict.

and

127

But the days of imaging nuclear warflghting generally faded away with the Cold

War. Today, a limited number of nuclear weapons would not be decisive in

a battle

against determined high-tech forces like those of the United States. Therefore, be-

yond deterrent saber-rattling, the most likely nuclear scenario in the early 2 1st century is use of a small, low-yield, unsophisticated weapon against a population
center, for holding the population at risk (or attacking

age over an opponent.

The perverse

leads, at least in theory, the

it)

offers the greatest lever-

logic of technological

asymmetry

yet again

disadvantaged belligerent towards extreme measures

violating the law of armed conflict.

on technology
possessed by one side impelling its lesser-equipped opponent beyond the boundaries of the law of armed conflict. But the effect of technological asymmetry may be
Each of the dynamics of asymmetry sketched out thus

far centers

subtler, resulting in shifting interpretations of the law, rather
tion.

Most

significantly, the

than outright viola-

scope of military objectives and the principle of pro-

portionality are likely to be so affected.
Recall that the principle of distinction limits attacks to combatants
objectives.

128

Military objectives are objects that

military action," the attack
Typically, the concept

is

on which

and military

"make an effective contribution to

will yield a "definite military advantage."

interpreted narrowly, requiring a relatively direct nexus

between the object attacked and the conduct of hostilities. 129 But to the extent military assets are difficult to attack

due to an adversary's technological edge, an incen-

tive exists to characterize entities

more

with a weaker nexus to combat, but which are

vulnerable, as military objectives. Thus, for instance, while

that a munitions factory qualifies, a disadvantaged side
dustries providing

In

fact,

income

to finance the

the United States

may have

war

effort

do

all

would agree

might argue that other

in-

as well.

inadvertently strengthened the position of

who would so argue by adopting a broad interpretation of military objectives
in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard's The Commander s Handbook on the
Law of Naval Warfare. In that manual, military objectives are described as objects
those

contributing to the enemy's warflghting or war-sustaining capability.

book goes on
fectively

to note that "[e]conomic targets of the

enemy that

indirectly but ef-

support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability

attacked." In light of this interpretation,

which is labeled customary,

contest adoption of a similar approach

by

termined to impose costs on

its

a technologically

The Hand-

may

it is

also

be

difficult to

weaker opponent de-

superior enemy. 130

Paradoxically, militaries that outclass their adversaries

may

also see merit in a

broad interpretation of the concept of military objectives. Technology, particularly

157

War, Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict

when not

possessed by an opponent, makes possible strategies that otherwise

might not be viable. Most notable in

this regard are coercive strategies,

not to defeat the enemy militarily, but rather to coerce
lar

it

which seek

into engaging in a particu-

course of conduct (or desisting from one) through imposition of unacceptable

costs.

The archetypal example

Operation Allied Force,

is

NATO's 1999

air

cam-

paign to force the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to quit killing Kosovar Albanians

and negotiate a

NATO

political settlement

the basis of the Rambouillet Accords. 131

on

never harbored a desire to defeat Yugoslavia militarily.

President Clinton famously announced that

ground

forces.

132

aim was

Instead, the

the contrary,

NATO had no intention of sending in

employ force

to

On

to alter the cost-benefit cal-

culations of the Yugoslavian leadership, particularly Slobodan Milosevic.

From
paigns

is

a law of armed conflict perspective, the predicament with coercive
that destruction of military targets

cam-

may not affect the enemy leadership as

much as holding its political power base, the civilian population, or personal finanThis being so, there

cial assets {inter alia) at risk.

objectives as

encompassing

is

an incentive to define military

attractive coercion targets. Indeed,

one distinguished

commentator has gone so far as to suggest that elements of the principle of distinction should be abandoned altogether to permit targeting along these lines. 133

The adoption of effects-based operations (EBO)

—

places attrition strategies that progressively destroy
strikes

a targeting

enemy

designed to achieve particular well-defined effects

of thinking about coercive strategies.

134

re-

forces with surgical

—coincided with the

Advanced technology,

and C4ISR, has rendered effects-based operations

stealth,

approach that

rise

especially precision,

feasible

by making

it

enemy systems, identify those aspects thereof that
and penetrate enemy territory to conduct precision

possible to reliably deconstruct

can yield a defined
strikes.

effect,

135

Inevitably, concentrating

on

effects will lead to strategies

aimed

at

achieving

them without necessarily destroying the enemy's military as the means of doing so.
As discussed, there are already suggestions along these
campaigns.

tendency

A closely related

is

lines

with overtly coercive

doctrine with the potential for operationalizing this

axiological targeting.

axiological operations distinguish

Made

between

possible
utility

by advanced technologies,

and value

targets.

136

Utility

is

the

future usefulness of a prospective target to the enemy, whereas value constitutes
relative

worth. In

utility targeting, the attacker seeks to

they need to operate by striking military objects such as
headquarters, and

command and

(although including

utility targets)

prioritizing targets based

tion)

is

likely to affect

control. 137

on

focus

on the extent

to

decision-making.

138
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By

forces

what

airfields, vehicles, troops,

contrast, axiological operations

objects the

which

deny enemy

its

enemy

leadership values,

their destruction (or neutraliza-
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Although affecting cost-benefits calculations is often one mission planning goal,
axiological operations elevate

it

As with coercive

to the central purpose.

strategies,

viewing military operations in this manner drives one towards interpreting the

concept of military objectives very liberally or, perhaps, even ignoring the principle
of distinction.
Application of the proportionality principle

may also be affected in subtle ways

by technological disadvantage. Understandably, the technologically weaker side
tends to view all victories over its superior opponent as momentous. To some extent they

may be, for even minor successes by the weaker side embolden one's own

troops and can demoralize an adversary. As a result, the weaker side might overvalue military advantage
eral

damage

when determining whether

are excessive.

and

incidental injury

collat-

Conversely, facing defeat, the weaker side

may

undervalue collateral damage and incidental injury, for risk to enemy civilians
unlikely to resonate as forcefully given

The

technologically superior side

own

its

certain of ultimate victory, the importance of
less heavily in the

dire straits.

liable to reverse these tendencies.

is

any one military success

proportionality calculation. Casualty aversion

dominant forces reflects this dynamic in

collateral

advantaged belligerent

damage and

Nearly

will

on the

weigh

part of

a slightly different context; the greater the

likelihood of victory, the less willing the prevailing side
Similarly, the

is

may

to place

its

forces at risk.

enemy
avoid them

attribute considerable value to

incidental injury because

without jeopardizing its pending victory. This
ability to globally report civilian losses in

is

is

it

has

more leeway to

particularly true given the media's

near real time.

Of course, it is impossible to objectively relate the value of military advantage to
damage and incidental injury; they are dissimilar values that cannot be
compared meaningfully except in the extreme cases. Be that as it may, the proportionality principle does cause warfighters pause when planning and executing attacks. The degree to which it does so depends in part on the extent of one's combat
collateral

wherewithal relative to the enemy.
Finally, as

we have seen in Iraq and as recognized by DARPA, technological dis-

advantage drives one from the open battlefield into either terrain that masks location or urban areas. In the case of the former, such as jungle or
terrain, there

is

seldom risk to

civilians, for

it is

appeals to the vulnerable side. But as noted,

systems that deny the

enemy

mountainous

the very remoteness of the areas that

DARPA

is

working hard to develop

the protection of jungle canopies, caves, etc.

occurs, disadvantaged forces will be

As

this

pushed into urban areas where, despite emerg-

ing urban warfare technology, the proximity to civilians

and the difficulty in distin-

guishing combatants (who will often wear civilian attire) from civilians will offer
greater

hope of survival.
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It is

apparent that technological asymmetry creates faultlines in international

humanitarian law. Yet, advanced technology will
plication of the law of

armed

affect the interpretation

ways wholly

conflict in

distinct

and ap-

from asymmetrical

warfare.

Hindering Distinction: Technology complicates application of the principle of

Much is often made of the fact that many
as described above, systems are now being

distinction, but not always as advertised.

weapons

are launched

BVR.

Further,

developed in which an attack occurs without direct involvement of humans. There
is

a persistent tendency to characterize both

BVR

and "man-out-of-the-loop"

technologies as weakening the ability to distinguish. Their use, so the argument
goes, violates the precautions in attack requirements to
verify that the objectives to

"do everything

be attacked are neither civilians nor

and

are not subject to special protection"

to "take

all

feasible to

civilian objects

and

feasible precautions in the

choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event

minimizing, incidental loss of civilian
objects."

139

life,

injury to civilians

and damage to civilian

For instance, some have claimed that an accidental attack on an Alba-

nian refugee column during Operation Allied Force and the bombing of marked

ICRC warehouses during Operation Enduring Freedom
had the

pilots

While

it

flown low enough to see the

may be true in individual cases that human involvement enhances tar-

get identification

and incidental

enough

targets.

could have been averted

140

and

verification

injury, this

is

to actually see the

and lowers the probability of collateral damage

not always the case. Most significantly, getting close

enemy

brings with

it

vulnerability to

enemy

fire.

This

fact

alone affects one's ability to perceive accurately. So too does taking the eva-

sive

maneuvers necessary to avoid being

a stable launch platform

and

sufficient

hit, for

some

precision

weapons require

time to acquire and lock onto a

target.

weapons become more accurate with distance and altitude because there is greater opportunity for the weapon to guide to the target.
Finally, there is no scientific basis for concluding that human perception and
Further, certain precision

judgment
was,

it is

is

necessarily

more

acute or reliable than that of machines. Even

appropriate to consider the safety of one's

own

forces

if there

when assessing the

propriety of a strike. Force protection cannot alone outweigh any degree of collateral

damage and

incidental injury, but

it is

certainly a proper consideration for

the attacker. 141

A

greater obstacle to application of the distinction principle

is

proximity of military objectives to civilians and civilian objects, a

the growing

phenomenon

caused in part by technology. Perhaps most significantly, the range and precision

and the

ability to

generate attacks

made

by advanced ISR,
very quickly using networked C4 have

of weapons, the transparency of the battlefield
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transformed traditional

battlefields,

relatively identifiable line

know

on which

as the

FEBA

forces typically engaged along a

(forward edge of the battle area).

Linearity allowed civilians to distance themselves
tent,

from the

although the advent of airpower dramatically limited their

As noted, current technologies have transformed the

some exability to do so.

hostilities to

linear battlefield into a

combat operations often occurring simultaneously on the
ground and high seas, in air and space, and through cyberspace. 142 And distance is

battlespace, with

no longer an

mount

obstacle; hi-tech militaries such as those of the

attacks very quickly almost

United States can

anywhere they wish. During Operation

Iraqi

Freedom, for instance, there was no part of the country that the Coalition could
not monitor and attack.

The

momentous. Because hostilities can take place
which civilians flee may itself become the site of attacks.

distinction implications are

everywhere, a location to

made strikes against targets within populated areas viable. Imprecision ironically protected civilians, for many attacks, especially in urban
areas, could not be mounted due to the potential for unacceptable impact on the
civilian population. With modern weaponry, this de facto protection disappears
In particular, precision has

and

since strikes against military objectives near civilians

possible without causing "excessive" collateral

even with high-tech weaponry,

and incidental

it

civilian objects are often

damage and

incidental injury. Yet,

remains impossible to avoid

injury. Therefore,

all

by opening populated areas

damage

collateral

to military opera-

tions, precision denies civilians risk-free sanctuary therein.

Other aspects of modern weaponry increase the presence of civilians or
objects near

combat operations. For instance, there

are

civilian

more civilian employees and

on the modern battlefield. Downsizing, cost-cutting measures, and unanticipated demands for troops are partially responsible. But advanced technology
contractors

also drives civilianization. In

advanced systems
for

its

some

cases, there

may

not be sufficient numbers of

in the inventory for the military to develop training

own personnel.

programs

Thus, weapon systems contracts often include maintenance

and operations personnel. Or the systems may simply be so complex that few in the
military have the

background necessary to be trained

to handle them.

Additionally, because of the prohibitive cost of developing high-tech systems,

armed

forces are turning to "off-the-shelf (civilian) equipment. Thus, a factory

producing items used by the military
tion, unless a strike

same

is

a valid target despite

its

civilian

produc-

thereon would violate the principle of proportionality. The

applies to locations

where the items are

stored. Militaries also increasingly

and functions (such as airfields, electrical generation, civilian
transport, communications assets) for their military needs. All such objects and
use civilian

facilities

dual-use locations are military objectives by the "use" criterion.
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become military objectives by virtue of "purpose." In all
by definition result in collateral damage, and, in many

are planned for use, they

these cases, attacks will

cases, incidental injury to civilians. 143

Enhancing Distinction: At the same time, technology often
the

first

place, collateral

damage and

complete knowledge about what
civilians will

being attacked; a lack of understanding of how

no more than necessary is

unsure whether the desired

achieved.

incidental injury are typically caused by: in-

be affected; inaccuracy; an inability to precisely meter the force ap-

plied to ensure
is

is

fosters distinction. In

level

used;

and

restriking a target because

one

of destruction or neutralization has been

The advanced technologies described above,

as well as the general trends

noted, will counteract these causal factors to varying degrees. Transparency will

provide a greater quantity of information about the target and
will

be increasingly

reliable. Similarly, post-strike battle

give

commanders

more complete

a

its

environs, and

damage assessment

it

will

picture of when they need to restrike a target,

thereby avoiding unnecessary additional attacks that place the civilian population
at risk.

Improvements

in accuracy will steadily reduce the circular error probable

and allow the use of smaller charges

to achieve the desired level of damage.

Moreover, technological advances are making possible non-kinetic (or nonlethal) alternatives to destructive kinetic attacks.

ing

components of an

which they depend

power

electrical grid,

for power,

it is

For instance, rather than destroy-

which may be located near

now possible to

upon
drop carbon-fiber filaments on
civilians or

such as a

lines to interrupt electricity to a particular military objective,

command and control facility. Offering even greater possibilities is computer network attack. Using CNA, power to the target could simply be shut off. It might
even be possible to exert some control over enemy command and control (rather
by altering, adding, or deleting select information
within the system. Doing so might be more advantageous than simply turning off
than merely disrupting

power, for

it

it)

could create a

false picture

tually places itself at risk. Obviously,

attack with kinetically destructive

limiting collateral

damage and

of the battlespace such that the

enemy ac-

CNA and other technological alternatives to

weapons present the

possibility of dramatically

incidental injury, while attaining the

same or

greater military advantage.
Finally, as noted,

technology can compensate for numbers in warfare. During

World War II, the circular error probable (CEP) of a B- 17 dropping gravity bombs
was roughly 3,300 feet. This required 1,500 sorties dropping 9,000 bombs before
achieving a high probability of damage against a point target. 144 An F-117 armed
with laser-guided munitions, by contrast, can

CEP

now strike its target with an unclassi-

good enough for one-bomb, one-target tactics.
Obviously, the impact on civilians produced by hundreds of sorties dwarfs that

fied

of approximately 10

feet,
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caused by one. Moreover, because technology decreases the
essary to conduct

population, and

combat operations, there

less

is

less

number of troops nec-

intermingling with the civilian

opportunity for collateral damage and incidental injury.

Technology's ability to enable one to operate within the enemy's
also generating positive effects.

side can avoid

happened

By controlling the course of battle,

engagements that slow the pace of operations. This

in Iraq.

The

Coalition, operating within the Iraqi

to quickly speed north, bypassing

bogged

it

down and endangered

is

the advantaged
is

exactly

what

OODA loop, was able

urban areas where fighting would have both

the civilian population. 145 Since the best

minimize the impact of combat on
that

OODA loop

civilians

is

to limit

its

way

to

duration, the technology

makes speedy defeat possible enhances the protections of civilians and other

protected persons and objects. 146

The greatest impact of technology on the law of armed conflict lies in the area of
precautions in attack. Recall that those who plan or decide on an attack have to do
everything feasible to verify targets are military objectives, choose methods and
means of warfare with an eye towards minimizing collateral damage and incidental
injury, provide a warning if the circumstances permit, and select that target from

among

those yielding a similar military advantage that causes the least collateral

damage and incidental
nities for militaries

injury.

As discussed, technology is expanding the opportu-

equipped with

state

of the art equipment to avoid collateral

damage and incidental injury by complying with these requirements. They possess
more robust systems for reliably locating and tracking military objectives and distinguishing them from civilians and civilian objects, have a greater variety of weapons systems with which to strike the target, can choose from a larger set of possible
targets (in part because they have a greater ability to penetrate enemy defenses),
and will often have more opportunity to warn because, given their superiority, surprise is not as valuable a commodity to them as it is to their lower-tech adversaries.
But as the technological gap widens, the precautions in attack requirements operate

on the

belligerents in

an increasingly disparate manner. After

dards are subjective, not objective; a belligerent
feasible,

and

feasibility

tive relativism

its

belligerent

opponent.

It is,

is

the stan-

only required to do what

depends on the available technology. The

—the high tech

cautions in attack than

is

all,

result

is

is

norma-

held to higher standards vis-a-vis pre-

of course, normative relativism by choice

because States are under no legal obligation to acquire assets that will permit them
to better distinguish

between military objectives and the

civilian population.

The problem with normative relativism is that States comply with the law of
armed conflict in part due to reciprocity, i.e., they agree to be bound because their
opponents shoulder identical obligations. The obligations may not impose equivalent

burdens in practice, but

at least as a
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become

are planned for use, they

these cases, attacks will

military objectives

by definition

cases, incidental injury to civilians.

by virtue of "purpose." In

result in collateral

damage, and,

first place, collateral

damage and

complete knowledge about what
civilians will

incidental injury are typically caused by: in-

being attacked; a lack of understanding of how

no more than necessary is used; and restriking a target because one

unsure whether the desired

achieved.

fosters distinction. In

be affected; inaccuracy; an inability to precisely meter the force ap-

plied to ensure
is

is

many

143

Enhancing Distinction: At the same time, technology often
the

in

all

of destruction or neutralization has been

level

The advanced technologies described above,

as well as the general trends

noted, will counteract these causal factors to varying degrees. Transparency will

provide a greater quantity of information about the target and
will

be increasingly

reliable. Similarly, post-strike battle

give

commanders

more complete

a

its

environs, and

damage assessment

it

will

picture of when they need to restrike a target,

thereby avoiding unnecessary additional attacks that place the civilian population
at risk.

Improvements

in accuracy will steadily reduce the circular error probable

and allow the use of smaller charges

to achieve the desired level of damage.

Moreover, technological advances are making possible non-kinetic (or nonlethal) alternatives to destructive kinetic attacks.

For instance, rather than destroy-

components of an electrical grid, which may be located near civilians or upon
which they depend for power, it is now possible to drop carbon- fiber filaments on
ing

power

lines to interrupt electricity to a particular military objective,

such as a

command and control facility. Offering even greater possibilities is computer network attack. Using CNA, power to the target could simply be shut off. It might
even be possible to exert some control over enemy command and control (rather
than merely disrupting

it)

by

altering, adding, or deleting select

information

more advantageous than simply turning off
a false picture of the battlespace such that the enemy ac-

within the system. Doing so might be

power, for

it

could create

tually places itself at risk. Obviously,

attack with kinetically destructive
limiting collateral

damage and

CNA and other technological alternatives to

weapons present the

possibility of dramatically

incidental injury, while attaining the

same or

greater military advantage.
Finally, as noted,

technology can compensate for numbers in warfare. During

World War II, the circular error probable (CEP) of a B-17 dropping gravity bombs
was roughly 3,300 feet. This required 1,500 sorties dropping 9,000 bombs before
achieving a high probability of damage against a point target. 144 An F-117 armed
with laser-guided munitions, by contrast, can

CEP

now strike its target with an unclassi-

good enough for one-bomb, one-target tactics.
Obviously, the impact on civilians produced by hundreds of sorties dwarfs that
fied

of approximately 10

feet,
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caused by one. Moreover, because technology decreases the
essary to conduct

combat operations, there

is less

population, and less opportunity for collateral

number of troops nec-

intermingling with the civilian

damage and

incidental injury.

Technology's ability to enable one to operate within the enemy's

OODA loop

is

By controlling the course of battle, the advantaged
side can avoid engagements that slow the pace of operations. This is exactly what
happened in Iraq. The Coalition, operating within the Iraqi OODA loop, was able
to quickly speed north, bypassing urban areas where fighting would have both
bogged it down and endangered the civilian population. 145 Since the best way to
minimize the impact of combat on civilians is to limit its duration, the technology
that makes speedy defeat possible enhances the protections of civilians and other
also generating positive effects.

protected persons and objects. 146
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those yielding a similar military advantage that causes the least collateral

damage and

incidental injury.
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But as the technological gap widens, the precautions in attack requirements operate

on the

belligerents in

an increasingly disparate manner. After

dards are subjective, not objective; a belligerent
feasible,
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tive relativism

—

its

opponent.

It is,

is

the stan-

only required to do what

depends on the available technology. The

the high tech belligerent

cautions in attack than

is

all,

result

is

is

norma-

held to higher standards vis-a-vis pre-

of course, normative relativism by choice

because States are under no legal obligation to acquire assets that will permit them
to better distinguish

between military objectives and the

civilian population.

The problem with normative relativism is that States comply with the law of
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opponents shoulder identical obligations. The obligations may not impose equivalent

burdens in practice, but

at least as a
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footing.

With precautions

pletely neutral

in attack, however, the

manner, imposes dissimilar

law

itself,

com-

interpreted in a

duties. This reality creates resentment;

the greater the disparity, the greater the dissatisfaction of the belligerent bearing

the greater burden of the legal obligation.

Complicating matters are exaggerated expectations on the part of many as to the
ability

of high-tech forces to avoid either mistakes or collateral damage and inci-

dental injury.

Advanced

militaries bear part of the responsibility for creating such

expectations. Since at least Operation Desert Storm, they have

mounted aggressive

public affairs campaigns designed to convince the domestic and international public

that they are doing everything possible to avoid

harming

civilians

and

their

property. In the process, they have created the impression that high-tech militaries

have an endless supply of precision munitions, when in
limited.

fact the inventories

remain

147

Moreover, they also inadvertently caused an impression that weapons are flawless.

Yet, even

when working

commonly employed
laser guided.
II,

which has

not perfectly accurate. The most

precision munitions used in Iraq (and

a circular error probable of nine meters. 148
it is

far

At the same time,
eavesdropping on

from

tales

cell

Although such accuracy is

perfect.

of

satellite

photos of individuals taken from space and

phone conversations from

aircraft circling

to believe the battlespace transparency enjoyed

comprehensive and

fully accurate.

Although

it is

not absolute, a

fact

militaries

true that transparency
it is

is

is

at a level

equally true that

it

demonstrated by incidents ranging from the attack on the

Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, to two
ghanistan, to the attack
Critics of recent

overhead cause

by high-tech

unimaginable even a decade ago (and improving rapidly),
is

most accurate) were

Among these, the most frequently dropped was the GBU-12 Paveway

extraordinary,

many

perfectly, they are

on

a

strikes against

wedding party

campaigns,

an

ICRC warehouse

in Af-

in Iraq.

who tend to overrate the ability of high-tech forces,

often overlook the fog of war. Increasingly, they view collateral

damage and

inci-

dental injury (or mistaken attacks) as prima facie evidence of a failure to take pre-

cautions in attack. After
militaries, civilian loss

all,

given the high-tech systems at the disposal of advanced

"must" have been caused by either a

essary precautions or outright recklessness.

A

failure to take the nec-

rebuttable presumption of negli-

gence in serious collateral damage/incidental injury incidents seems to be

emerging vis-a-vis attacks conducted by high-tech attackers, who increasingly bear
the burden of persuasion as to having taken appropriate precautions. 149

Consider the reports written on the
Force and Iraqi Freedom.

150

air

campaigns during Operations Allied

While occasionally questioning attacks on the basis of

whether the target was a military objective (most notably media facilities), the bulk
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of the criticism alleged failure to take adequate precautions in attack. For instance,

with regard to Allied Force,

Human

Rights

Watch (HRW) expressed

uneasiness

over "whether every feasible precaution was taken to accurately distinguish
ians

tack

civil-

from combatants" and felt there were "questions regarding the decisions to at-

on the

of incomplete and/or seriously flawed information." 151

basis

Commenting on

the

Dubrava Prison

incident, in

which 20 prisoners died during

NATO attacks on nearby military facilities, HRW argued that "NATO did not apply adequate precautions in executing

its

on nearby

airstrikes

military objectives,

and therefore must be held accountable for the civilian deaths that occurred as a diof those attacks." But the organization failed to

rect result

beyond

the attackers should have taken,

about bombing from

The same

tact

a general

cite

comment

those precautions

earlier in the report

altitude.

was taken

vis-a-vis Iraqi

Freedom.

HRW opined that continuing

the decapitation campaign despite the lack of success "can be seen as a failure to
take

'all

feasible precautions' in choice

of means and methods of warfare in order to

minimize civilian losses as required by international humanitarian law." 152 Yet, the
organization offered no alternatives to those precautions taken, other than not
striking at

all.

This suggestion misstates the law, for the precautions in attack prin-

The central issue is whether
the attacker could have done something differently that would have lessened harm
ciple only applies to

an attack that

is

otherwise lawful.

to the civilian population without forfeiting military advantage.

Many have been

so captured

by the wizardry of modern weaponry and so

ex-

posed to the horror of civilian suffering through the media that entire campaigns

now become tainted by individual incidents. Indeed, scholarly, NGO, and journalistic

comment

often focuses

on

specific incidents,

such as the Grdelica Gorge

Bridge attack in Yugoslavia or the wedding party incident in Iraq, forgetting in the
process that overall high-tech warfare
153

is

yielding campaigns that are ever-more dis-

number of weapons dropped during Operation Iraqi
Freedom exceeded 10,000 and Allied Force involved the employment of more than
20,000. Yet, Human Rights Watch labeled its report on the former Off Target and

criminate.

Recall, that the

the latter Civilian Deaths in the

NATO Air Campaign.

Thus, technology not only actually heightens the legal standards to which hightech forces

must conform, but it creates expectations which,

legal valence, create

albeit initially without

de facto standards which States operating under the media mi-

croscope can ill-afford to ignore. Very subtly, these de facto standards will influence application and interpretation of de jure standards as to what

is

and

is

not

damage and incidental injury, the nature of the duty of care required of those planning and executing attacks, and the reasonableness of mistakes

lawful collateral

of war.
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Conclusions

What

is

striking

about the relationship between the technology, warfare, and the

law of armed conflict

is

that

all

the news

not good.

is

to increasingly limit the impact of warfare

on the

One would expect technology

civilian population. It certainly

does so to an extent, and a number of the technologies described will further

dis-

tance war from civilians.
Yet, the technology has a negative face as well.

Although almost never a purpose

of technology, the weapons of war are increasingly placing the principles under-

pinning the law of armed conflict

at risk. In great part, this is the result

of an ever-

widening divide between the technological "haves" and "have-nots." Faced with
near certain defeat, "have-nots" are understandably (albeit inexcusably) rejecting
the law of

armed

When

side operates in repeated violation of the law, adherence

one

conflict as they

compensate for

their asymmetrical weakness.

by the other

usually deteriorates in lock-step.

Even the technology
tion

itself

weakens the

and other protected individuals and

because

more

it

ability to safeguard the civilian

entities

during armed

conflict.

popula-

Whether

has broken the traditional spatial limitations of conflict or simply placed

civilians

on the

battlefield,

technology has proven

it is

no panacea.

And sadly, technology has confused many observers of warfare, causing them to
adopt unrealistic expectations that seem to be morphing into normative boundaries. Inevitably, militaries will react negatively to this trend, for

tions

on

their activities that

military necessity

military or those

who

places limita-

were not the product of the careful balancing between

and humanitarian concerns that

mation of the law of armed

it

conflict.

seek to limit

typically characterize the for-

This division does not bode well for either the

its

use.
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inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead

by

him to believe

resort to perfidy. Acts

that he

is

entitled to, or

obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in
conflict,
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(a)

with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following
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9, art. 23(f).

is

Study, supra note 22, ch. 18; International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and

Sentences (1946), 41
reference

to the

is

Condition of the

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The

Geneva Convention of 1864. Convention for the Amelioration of the
in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, reprinted in THE LAWS OF

Wounded

Armed Conflict, supra note
26.

172, 218 (1947).

Consider the 2003 war in

365.

Iraq.

Neither the United States nor Iraq was party to Additional

imposed no legal obligations on British forces because
and non-party State only when the latter "accepts
and applies the provisions thereof (art. 96). Iraq had not done so. Since Iraq was not a party to
the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), that agreement was inoperative by virtue of its general
participation clause (art. 2). Only the 1925 Gas Protocol, 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention bound all three major belligerents. The 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention also constrained the United States and the United Kingdom, even though
Iraq was not a party, because it prohibits using chemical weapons "under any circumstances"
Protocol

I.

The UK's party

5, at

Additional Protocol

I

status

applies between a party

(art. 1.1).

A provision along these lines appears in numerous law of armed conflict conventions.
Hague II Regulations, supra note 9; Hague IV Regulations, supra note 9, Preamble; Gas Protocol,
supra note 7, Preamble; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
27.

Sick in

Armed Forces in the

Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in THE LAWS
459 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for

Field, art. 63,

OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note

5, at

and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,
supra note 5, at 485 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, art. 142, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 507 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 158, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 575 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV];
Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 7, para. 5. In its Nuclear Weapons advisory
opinion, the International Court of Justice stated that the "continuing existence and
applicability" of the Martens Clause "is not to be doubted." Nuclear Weapons, supra note 4, at
the Amelioration of the Condition of the

Forces at Sea,

art.

Wounded,

Sick,

62, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, reprinted in

260.

29.

Customary Law Study, supra note
Id., Rules 70 and 71.

30.

Id.,

28.

Rules 72, 73-80, 86.

It

22.

further cites landmines

and incendiaries

as requiring particular

care. Id., Rules 81-85.

31.

Id.,

Rules 1-2,

32.

Id.,

Rules 7-8 (adopting the Additional Protocol

33.

Id.,

Rule 65.

34.

Id.,

Rules 11-13.

35.

Id.,

Rule

36.

Id.,

Rules 15-21.

37.

Id.,

Rules 25-30.

38.

Chairman

6.
I,

art. 52.2,

definition thereof).

14.

Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, as

amended through May

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.

170
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2005, available at
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The US defense budget for 2003 (most recent comparative figures available) was 404.9
billion dollars. Compare this figure with: Germany, 35.1b$; the United Kingdom, 42b$; France
45.7b$; China, 55.9b$; and Russia, 65.2b$. International Institute of Strategic Studies,
STRATEGIC BALANCE 2004-2005. The United States spent 26.2% of this amount on investment
(research, development, acquisition). Available comparable figures for Germany and the United
Kingdom are 18.5% and 24.4%, respectively. NATO Press Release 146 (2003).
40. Initially set up in response to the 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik, DARPA's current mission is
twofold: "to prevent technological surprise to the US" and "to create technological surprise" for
US adversaries. Defense Advanced Research Agency, Bridging the Gap, Feb. 2005, para 1
[hereinafter DARPA Mission] The agency was instrumental in conception and development of
such systems as the F-117 stealth fighter and the Global Hawk and Predator unmanned aerial
vehicles. Most notably, DARPA created the ARPANet and its network protocol architecture, the
precursor to today's Internet. The following discussion of strategic thrusts is drawn primarily
from this document. On the organization, see http://www.darpa.mil/.
41. DARPA Mission, supra note 40, at ch. 3. On the agency's programs, see also Statement by
Tony Tether, Director DARPA, to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats
and Capabilities, House Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, Mar. 10, 2005,
39.

.

www.darpa.mil/body/news/2005/darpa_hasc_3_10_05_final.pdf;

at

available

Defense Analyses, Transformation and Transition:

DARPA's Role

in Fostering

for

Institute

an Emerging

Revolution in Military Affairs (Paper P-3698), April 2003.
42.

For a discussion of these strikes and their law of armed conflict implications, see Michael N.

Schmitt, The Conduct of Hostilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom: An International
Humanitarian Law Assessment, 6 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 73
(2003).
43.

DARPA Mission, supra note 40, fig.

6.

The RQ-1 Predator is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that provides surveillance,
reconnaissance, and target acquisition services over long periods of time. Its detection
capabilities include a TV camera, an infrared camera, and synthetic aperture radar for looking

44.

through smoke, clouds or haze.
45.

See

which

is

—An Australian

Raydon Gates, Towards 2015: Challenges for a Medium Navy
Chapter XIII in

this

volume,

at

Perspective,

262-263.

46.

DARPA Mission, supra note 40, para.

47.

Id.,

48.

Intelligence

3.1.

para. 3.2.

evaluation,

is "the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis,
and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas."

Surveillance

is

the "systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places,

persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means." Reconnaissance

is

by visual observation or other detection methods, information
and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning

"a mission undertaken to obtain,

about the

activities

the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area."

DoD

Dictionary, supra note 38.
49.

Colonel

J.

Boyd, USAF, coined the term. Operating within an opponent's

OODA loop

is

a

decision-making concept in which one party, maintaining constant situational awareness,
assesses a situation

and

acts

on

it

more

rapidly than

opponent

its

opponent.

When

this

happens, the

is forced into a reactive mode, thereby allowing the first party to maintain the
As the process proceeds, the opponent eventually begins to react to actions that no
longer bear on the immediate situation. The resulting confusion causes paralysis. Boyd's ideas

initiative.
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were

out in a briefing

set

titled "Patterns

numerous venues.
50. The 2004 US National Military

of Conflict," which he delivered hundreds of times

Strategy specifically adopts this approach

at

by emphasizing

the criticality of decision superiority:

-

making decisions better and faster than an
is essential to executing a strategy based on speed and flexibility. Decision
superiority requires new ways of thinking about acquiring, integrating, using and
Decision superiority

the process of

adversary -

sharing information.

command,

It

necessitates

new

ideas

for

developing architectures for

communications and computers (C4) as well as the intelligence,
and reconnaissance assets that provide knowledge of adversaries. Decision
superiority requires precise information of enemy and friendly dispositions,
capabilities, and activities, as well as other data relevant to successful campaigns.
Battlespace awareness, combined with responsive command and control systems,
supports dynamic decision-making and turns information superiority into a
control,

surveillance

competitive advantage adversaries cannot match.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States 17 (2004).
51. Fire support consists of firing artillery or other weapons in support offerees engaging the
enemy.
52.

Robots are also being developed, some of which are already fielded in Iraq to deal with

roadside bombs. For a description of the robotics development program, see

Arsenal of the Future: Robots in Combat,

NEW YORK TIMES,

Tim Weiner,

Feb. 16, 2005, at Al.

53. CNN.com, Huge Underground Hideout Uncovered in Iraq, June 5, 2005, available at
www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/06/05/iraq.main/. The air-conditioned 503,000 square
foot bunker contained a large supply of weapons and ammunition, and contained living spaces

for Iraqi forces.
54.

55.

DARPA was instrumental in developing stealth materials for aircraft.
Peta as a prefix refers to 10 to the 15th power. In computing,

it is

one quadrillion (one

thousand million million) bytes.
56. An aimpoint is " [a] precise point associated with a target and assigned for a
impact to achieve the intended objective and
descriptively

(e.g.,

level

of destruction.

[It]

specific

weapon

may be

defined

vent in center of roof) by grid reference or geolocation." Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, Joint Publication 3-60, Jan. 17, 2002, at G-6.

50%

57.

CEP

58.

Probability of damage (PD) expresses the statistical probability (percentage or decimal) that

specified

is

the radius of a circle within which

strike.

damage criteria can be met assuming the probability of arrival. United States Air Force,

Intelligence Targeting Guide,

weapons, damage
(Catastrophic

AF Pamphlet

criteria include F-Kill

Kill),

14-210, at 59-60, Feb.

(Fire-power

FC-Kill (Fire Control

Kill),

(Interdiction Kill), SW-Kill (Seaworthiness Kill),
59.

of the weapons will

Kill),

1,

1998. For non-nuclear

M-Kill (Mobility

PTO-Kill (Prevent Takeoff

and Cut and Block.

Kill),
Kill),

I-Kill

Id. at 58.

For instance, a single cruise missile costs over $ 1 ,000,000. Federation of American

BGM-109 Tomahawk,

K-Kill

Scientists,

available at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/bgm-109.htm. Per

employ these systems is approximately $500,000.
60. The joint direct attack munition (JDAM) is a major first step. JDAMs consist of an existing
unguided bomb to which a guidance tail kit is attached. Using global positioning system
(satellite) and inertial navigation guidance, the resulting weapon has an unclassified CEP of
approximately 20 feet from as far away as 15 miles. Most aircraft can be easily modified to
employ the system. At a cost of roughly $20,000, JDAM brings accuracy within the reach of many
unit cost for forces already equipped to

nations.
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During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 5,086 JDAM GBU-31s (2,000 pound) were dropped
between March 19 and April 18, 2003. In addition, US forces dropped 768 JDAM GBU 32s
(1,000 pound) and 675 GBU 35s (1,000 pound penetrator). US Central Command Air Forces,
Assessment and Analysis Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom By the Numbers, Apr. 30, 2003,

—

at

11,

available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report

_30apr2003.pdf.
61.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,

Joint Publication 2-0,

Mar.

9,

2000,

fig.

II-2

The E-3 Sentry is an airborne warning and control system ( AWACS) providing surveillance,
command, weapons control, battle management, and communications services in the aerial
environment. Defensively, AWACS detects enemy aircraft or missiles and directs fighters to
intercept them. Offensively, it can monitor the battlespace, providing real-time location and
identification of enemy and friendly aircraft and naval vessels to users at the tactical, operational,
and strategic levels of warfare. The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) is an airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance aircraft that provides ground and air commanders with information that
supports attacks on enemy ground forces. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are aircraft
without a crew that can (depending on the system) perform surveillance, reconnaissance, and
target acquisition and attack functions.
63. Interview with senior US Army officer with recent combat experience. DARPA has also
demonstrated the capability for establishing Internet connectivity with tactical aircraft which
will allow ground station operators to access, as needed, data from sensors (e.g., electro -optical
and infrared video) on the aircraft. DARPA, DARPA Demonstrates Internet Connection for
62.

Tactical Aircraft,
64.

News

Networking

Release, Jun. 28, 2004.

significantly affects

authority and responsibility

command and

On

control.

the one hand,

it

pushes

the chain of command because the underlying premise of a

down

networked system is rapid response to information through enhanced horizontal cooperation
(e.g., by passing data directly from the sensor to the "shooter"). Yet, the technology that makes
transparency possible and improves communications speed and reliability also allows those up
the chain to become involved in even minor tactical engagements. Senior commanders can
literally watch soldiers enter buildings from thousands of miles away and talk to those soldiers as
they do so.
65. Over time, UAVs have become more robust. For instance, the Global Hawk can fly to an
area over 1 ,000 miles away and remain on station for 24 hours. Equipped with synthetic aperture
radar, a ground moving target indicator, and high-resolution electro-optical and infrared
sensors,
at

it

collects

information that

high altitude, the Global

66.

is

transmitted to users in near real-time. Because

it

Hawk is highly survivable and can monitor huge areas on

Anthony Dworkin, The Yemen

Strike,

Nov.

14,

operates

earth.

2002, available at www.crimesofwar/

onnews/news-yemen.html.
67.

Non-lethal weapons are

"

[

w] eapons that are

explicitly

as to incapacitate personnel or material, while

personnel, and undesired

damage

to property

designed and primarily employed so

minimizing

fatalities,

and the environment."

note 38. The United States has established the Joint Non-Lethal
warfighters a family of Non-Lethal
capabilities across the full

Weapon (NLW)

spectrum of threats and

permanent injury

DOD

to

Dictionary, supra

Weapons Program

to "provide

systems with a range of optional non-lethal

crisis."

See generally,

NLWP website, available

at www.jnlwd.usmc.mil/mission.asp.
68.

In then-year dollars. B-2

Accounting

Office,

Bomber: Status of Cost, Development, and Production, General

GAO/NSIAD-95-164, Aug.

1995.
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without the shooter actually seeing the target. Also labeled an "over the horizon" attack.

69.

I.e.,

70.

Through April

18, 2003.

By the Numbers, supra note

60.

Or

consider computerized

counter-battery radar systems that identify an incoming shell at the apex of

immediately calculate

its

source. Fire

is

its flight

and

enemy has an

returned quickly, presumably before the

opportunity to relocate.
71 Using advanced defensive and offensive technologies such as stealth aircraft (e.g., B-2 Spirit
and F-117 Nighthawk), anti-radar missiles (e.g., AGM-88 HARM high speed anti-radiation
missile), and jamming (e.g., with an EA6-B Prowler aircraft).
72. Steven Metz and Douglas Johnston have usefully described asymmetry as follows:

In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry

is

acting, organizing,

maximize one's own advantages,
exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of
action. It can be political-strategic, military strategic, or a combination of these. It can
entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or
some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by
default. It can be discrete or pursued in combination with symmetric approaches. It can
have both psychological and physical dimensions.

and thinking

differently than

opponents

in order to

Steven Metz & Douglas V. Johnson II, ASYMMETRY AND U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY: DEFINITION,
Background, and Strategic Concepts (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,

The instant article limits discussion to technological asymmetry. Other useful
on asymmetry includes Stephen J. Blank, RETHINKING ASYMMETRIC THREATS, (US

Jan. 2001).

material

Army War College,

Strategic Studies Institute, Sept. 2003); Ivan Arrequin-Toft,

Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric

How the Weak

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2001, at 19;
Steven J. Lambakis, Reconsidering Asymmetric Warfare, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, Dec. 2004, at
102; Montgomery C. Meigs, Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare, PARAMETERS,
Summer 2003, at 4; R.V. Gusentine, Asymmetric Warfare On Our Terms, PROCEEDINGS OF
the United States Naval Institute, Aug. 2002, at 58.
73. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War 166
Conflict,

—

(2004).
74.

International Institute for Strategic Studies,

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2002-2003,

at

97

(2003).

BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 401

75.

183,000.

76.

By the Numbers, supra note

helicopters. Id. Iraqi air

Southern Watch

(2004).

Apache and two Cobra
defenses had been degraded by Operations Northern Watch and
60, at 3, 7-8. Losses also included four

air strikes prior to

commencement of Operation

Iraqi

Freedom. These

operations monitored the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq.

November 2004. Estimates of casualties vary somewhat. See, e.g., Anthony Shadid, Baghdad
Day ofAttacks, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 21, 2004, at A30; US Casualties Surge in Iraq,
but Public Impact is Muffled, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 30, 2004; Iraq Coalition Casualty
77.

Suffers a

Count, icasualties.org/oif/Stats.aspx
78.

The United
Dual-use

States specifically

(filter

noted

by place and month).

this possibility in its

civilian technologies, especially

2004 National Military Strategy.

information technologies, high-resolution

imagery and global positioning systems are widely

available.

These

relatively

low

cost,

improve the disruptive and destructive
actors. Advances in automation and
information processing will allow some adversaries to locate and attack targets both
overseas and in the United States. Software tools for network-attack, intrusion and
commercially available technologies
capabilities of a

will

wide range of state and non-state

174

Michael N. Schmitt
disruption are globally available over the Internet, providing almost any interested

adversary a basic computer network exploitation or attack capability.

National Military Strategy, supra note 50,
79.

Jamming impedes

at 6.

the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Spoofing involves

creating signals that imitate those of the
80.

In this case, intercepting mobile

81.

See generally

enemy or

phone

others.

signals.

US Department of Defense,

Final Report to Congress:

Conduct of the Persian

Gulf War (1992).

Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq
78-79 (Dec. 2003), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usal203/. Since the denial of
combatant status to Taliban fighters and publication of photos of US Special Forces soldiers
attired in indigenous clothing during Operation Enduring Freedom, the "requirement" to wear
82.

uniforms has evoked

much

discussion. See,

e.g.,

Yourselves: Coalition Soldiers in Afghanistan are

Feb.

1,

Michelle Kelly

&

2002, at 19. For a comprehensive legal analysis of the subject,

Forces'

Morten Rostrup,

Identify

GUARDIAN (London),
see W. Hays Parks, Special

Endangering Air Workers,

Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 493

(2003).
83.

The
(

1

relevant provisions of Article 4 exclude the following

Members of

the

armed

militias or volunteer corps
(2)

from

civilian status:

forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as

forming part of such armed

members of

forces.

Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,

including those

of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating
in or outside their

own

territory,

even

militias or volunteer corps, including

if this territory is

occupied, provided that such

such organized resistance movements,

fulfill

the

following conditions:

commanded by a person

(a)

that of being

(b)

that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

(c)

that of carrying

responsible for his subordinates;

arms openly;

(d) that of conducting their operations in

accordance with the laws and customs of

war.

Geneva Convention

III,

Regulations, supra note

On the wear of "distinctive"
Geneva Convention I, supra note

supra note 27.
9, art. 1.2;

attire, see also

Hague IV
Geneva

27, art. 13(2)(b);

Convention II, supra note 27, art. 13(2)(b). Article 44.3 of Additional Protocol I relaxes the
uniform requirement in "situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of hostilities
an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself." In such circumstances, he or she must carry
arms openly during military engagements and while visible to the adversary during "a military
deployment preceding the launch of an attack." This provision is not customary law of armed
conflict, and therefore does not supercede the Geneva criteria for non-party States.
Michael Bothe

that, " [i]t

is generally assumed that these conditions were
deemed, by the 1874 Brussels Conference and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences,
to be inherent in the regular armed forces of States. Accordingly, it was considered unnecessary
and redundant to spell them out in the Conventions." MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 234 (1982). See also discussion in Customary Law Study,

84.

(et al.)

have noted

supra note 22, at 15. Case law

is

supportive. See,

e.g.,

Public Prosecutor

AC 430, 449; Ex parte Quirinetal., 317 U.S. 1 (1942). For a superb analysis of the
Kenneth Watkin, WARRIORS WITHOUT RIGHTS? COMBATANTS, UNPRIVILEGED

(1968), [1969]
subject, see

Mohammed Ali et al. v.
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and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, Program on Humanitarian

Belligerents,

Policy

and

forces of a party to a conflict (other than medical personnel

and

2, Winter 2005.
Customary Law Study, supra note

Conflict Occasional Paper No.
85.

This point

86.

"Members of the armed

is

reflected in

22,

Rule 106.

chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that

is

have the right to participate directly in hostilities." Additional Protocol I, supra note
87.

The

classic article

on the

subject

is

to say, they
13, art. 43.2.

Richard R. Baxter, So-called "Unprivileged Belligerency":

and Saboteurs, 1952 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 323, reprinted
MILITARY LAW REVIEW (Bicentennial Issue) 487 (1975). For a contemporary treatment of the
issue of direct participation, see Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation
in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 511 (2005); Michael N. Schmitt, "Direct Participation in Hostilities" and
21st Century Armed Conflict, in CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION:
Festschrift fur Dieter Fleck 505 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2004).
Spies, Guerrillas

in

88.

Off Target, swpra note

The prohibition

82, at 70.

from the 1863 Lieber Code, and appears in the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Regulations; 1906, 1929, and 1949 Geneva Conventions; and Additional Protocol I. General
Order No. 100, US Department of Army, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field (Lieber Code), art. 117, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,
supra note 5, at 3; Hague II Regulations, supra note 9, art. 23(f); Hague IV Regulations, supra
note 9, art. 23(f); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies
in the Field, arts. 27-28, July 6, 1906, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5,
at 385; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field, arts. 24 & 28, July 27, 1929, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at
409; Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, arts. 39, 44, 53, 54; Geneva Convention II, supra note
27, arts. 41, 44, 45; Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 38.1. See also the military manuals of
many nations. E.g., Commander's Handbook, supra note 22, para. 11.9.6; UK Ministry of
Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, para. 5.10(a) (2004). Permitted purposes
are set forth in Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, arts. 24-27, 38-44; Geneva Convention II,
supra note 27, arts. 22, 24-25, 27, 36-39, 41-44; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, arts. 1822; Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. 8, 18, 22-23. The prohibition is self- evidently
customary in nature today. See, e.g., Customary Law Study, supra note 22, Rule 59. When the
purpose of the misuse goes beyond merely "hiding" from the enemy to the use of the emblem to
treacherously attack, the separate violation of perfidy occurs. See, e.g., Commander's Handbook,
supra note 22, para. 12.2.; Federal Ministry of Defence (Germany), Humanitarian Law in Armed
Conflicts Manual, sec. 640 (1992).
90. Counter-targeting is "preventing or degrading detection, characterization, destruction, and
post-strike assessment." Defense Intelligence Agency, Saddam's Use of Human Shields and
Deceptive Sanctuaries: Special Briefing for the Pentagon Press Corps, Feb. 26, 2003, available at
89.

dates

www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/g030226-D-9085M.html.
91.

Todd

S.

Purdum, Night Time Ambush

in Iraqi City,

NEW YORK TIMES, Apr.

5,

2003, at

1;

Dexter Filkins, In the Field Choosing Targets: Iraqi Fighters Or Civilians? Hard Decision for
Copters,
92.

NEW YORK TIMES, Mar.

31, 2003, at 5.

This prescription tracks that found in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 28: "The

presence of a protected person

may not be used to

render certain points or areas

immune from

... in the
The prohibition only applies vis-a-vis those who
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Party of which they are not nationals." It would not
apply to Iraqi forces using Iraqis as shields. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 4.

"find themselves

military operations."
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Customary Law Study, supra note 22, Rule 97. See also Commander's Handbook, supra note
22, para. 11.2; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), art.
8.2(b) (xxiii), July 17, 1998, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 1309.
The customary nature is further evidenced by the widespread condemnation that results
whenever shields are used. The UN General Assembly labeled Iraq's use of human shields during
the first Gulf War as a "most grave and blatant violation of Iraq's obligations under international
93.

law"

GA

Res. 46/134 (Dec. 17, 1991). In

Protection Force

(UNPROFOR)

May

1995, Bosnian Serbs seized United Nations

human

peacekeepers and used them as

shields against

NATO

UN condemned the action,

demanded release, and authorized the
creation of a rapid reaction force to handle such situations. SC Res. 998 (June 16, 1995).
94. A principle enshrined in Article 51.8 of Additional Protocol I: "Any violation of these
air strikes. In response, the

on shielding] shall not release the Parties to the conflict
from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians. ..."
95 Those taking the opposite stance on involuntary shields reasonably and accurately point out
that it creates an incentive for the use of shields because an opponent can effectively render a
military objective immune from attack simply by placing enough civilians at risk (by virtue of
prohibitions [includes the prohibition

operation of the proportionality principle). A.P.V. Rogers has argued that:
[A]

considering

tribunal

whether

grave

a

breach

has

disproportionate attack] would be able to take into account

been

when

committed

[a

considering the rule

of proportionality the extent to which the defenders had flouted their obligation to
separate military objectives
civilian

population

.

.

from

civilian objects

which would otherwise be

to redress the balance

and

to take precautions to protect the

the proportionality approach taken

.

favour of the unscrupulous.

tilted in

A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 129 (2d ed.
and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1, 163

by the tribunals should help

2004). See also
(

W. Hays Parks, Air War

1992).

As noted in Article 51.3 of Additional Protocol I, "[civilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. " The Rome
Statute adopts this standard by making it a war crime to intentionally attack civilians unless they
are "taking direct part in hostilities." Supra note 93, art. 8.2(b)(i). The United States correctly
takes the position that as direct participants, they become targetable (although there will seldom
be any reason to directly attack them) and, more important, are excluded in the estimation of
96.

incidental injury

when

assessing proportionality.

And then, the other target category that is a challenge for us is where the human shields
that we've talked of before might be used. And you really have two types of human
shields. You have people who volunteer to go and stand on a bridge or a power plant or
a water

works

own free will.

facility,

and you have people

In the case of some of the previous use of human shields in Iraq,

placed hostages,

if

you

will,

shields, but, in fact, they

deal with that,

and

it

on

sensitive sites in order to

were not there of their own
requires that

community to determine what

US Department

that are placed in those areas not of their

free will.

we work very

that situation

carefully with the intelligence

might be

at a particular location.

War

in

Human

Iraq,

Feb.

Rights Watch, International
20,

2002,

available

at

Human

5,

2003, available at

Watch takes
Humanitarian Law Issues in a

www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/t03052003_t305targ.html.
Potential

that these were

of Defense, Background Briefing on Targeting, Mar.

the opposite position.

Saddam

human
Two separate problems to

show

Rights

www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/

iraq0202003.htm#l. Children legally lack the mental capacity to form the intent to voluntarily shield
military objectives. Israeli forces

do not use

live

ammunition
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against children. Justus R. Weiner,

War, Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict
Co-existence Without Conflict: The Implementation of Legal Structures for Israeli-Palestinian

Cooperation

Pursuant

to

Interim

the

International Law 591 n.407

Peace Agreements,

26

BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF

(2000).

97. International volunteer shields traveled to Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. All
departed once they realized the seriousness of their actions and the Iraqi Government's desire to

use

them

as shields for military objectives.

CNN

participation forget that, in the

Those who suggest that shielding is not direct
may be a more effective defense against

age, shielding

attack than weaponry.

Off Target, supra note 82, at 72-73.
99. Marine Expeditionary Force 8c Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Telling the Fallujah Story to the
World, Briefing Slides, Nov. 20, 2004 (on file with author).
98.

100. See also

Customary Law Study, supra note

101. Additional Protocol

I,

102. Id., art. 53(b). See also

supra note 13,

Hague IV

22, ch. 6.

art. 12.4.

Regulations, supra note

9, art. 27.

On misuse of religious locations, see also Regime Shows
Disregard for Historical, Religious Sites in Holy City, US Central Command News Release No. 0304-28, Apr. 2, 2003; Regime Use of Baghdad Mosques And Hospitals, US Central Command News
103.

Off Target, supra note 82,

72-73.

at

Release No. 03-04-65, Apr.

6,

104. Additional Protocol

supra note 13,

I,

2003.
art. 52.2.

According to the ICRC Commentary on the
is concerned with the intended future

definition of military objective, " [t]he criterion of purpose

concerned with its present function." COMMENTARY ON THE
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
at para. 2022 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987). For instance,
an apartment building's use as a unit headquarters transforms it into an attackable military
facility. Any collateral damage or incidental injury that might be caused during an attack thereon
would be governed by the principle of proportionality.
use of an object, while that of use

105. See also

Rome

is

Statute, supra note 93, art. 8.2(b) (ix).

Glenn Collins, Allied Advances, Tougher Iraqi Resistance, and a Hunt in the Tigris,
NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, at 1; Brian Knowlton, Bush Tells ofVood Progress' But Says
War has Just Begun, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 24, 2003, at 6. The prohibition is
106. See,

e.g.,

set forth in Article 37.1(a),

Additional Protocol

I.

See also Lieber Code, supra, note 89,

art. 71;

The Laws of War on Land (1880

Laws and Customs of War (1874
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 21;
Oxford Manual), at 9(b), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED

CONFLICT, supra note

5, at

Hague

Regulations, supra note

9, art.

Project of an International Declaration Concerning the
Brussels Declaration), art. 13, reprinted in

is

29;

II

Regulations, supra note

23(c); Additional Protocol

a grave breach pursuant to Additional Protocol

I,

I,

9, art. 23(c);

supra note 13,

Article 85.3(e).

art.

Hague IV

41.2(b). Violation

A flag is not the sole means of

any technique that so informs the enemy suffices.
Surrendering forces are hors de combat and entitled to immunity from attack.
107. On the increasing use of suicide bombings in Iraq, see Robert A. Pape, Blowing Up an
Assumption, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, May 19, 2005, at 8. See also ROBERT A. PAPE,
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005). Pape looked at 315
suicide bombings, concluding that suicide bombers are seldom religious fanatics. On the
contrary, the majority of bombings are conducted as part of a political or military campaign,
often intended to motivate democracies to leave territory that the bombers consider their
homeland. See also Dan Eggen 8c Scott Wilson, Suicide Bombs Potent Tools of Terrorist,

communicating intent

Washington Post,
108.

As

illustrated

to surrender;

July 17, 2005, at Ai.

by the kamikaze

in the

Second World War. See Yoram Dinstein, Jus in Bello
34 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 4-5
in the context of the war in Iraq.

Issues Arising in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003,

(2004), for a discussion of the legal issues
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109. See Schmitt,

Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation, supra note

87, at 520-21.

110. Centers of gravity consist of" [t]hose characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power

which

a military force derives

its

freedom of action, physical strength, or

will to fight."

from

DoD

Dictionary, supra note 38.
111.

To draw

States

such as

Israel into the conflict,

thereby disrupting the Coalition, which included Arab

Syria.

CNA consists of " [operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
CNA relies
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.
112.

.

on the data stream

to execute the attack. ..."

An example is

.

.

"sending a code or instruction to a

computer to short out the power supply." DoD
Dictionary, supra note 38. On computer network attack, see COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian O'Donnell eds., 2002) (Vol. 76, US
Naval War College International Law Studies); Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer
Network Attack and International Law, 84 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 365
(2002); Michael N. Schmitt, Heather A. Harrison-Dinniss & Thomas C. Winfield, Computers
and War: The Legal Battlespace, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research, International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative Briefing Paper (June 2004),
available atwww.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/schmittetal.pdf; Michael N. Schmitt, CNA and the Jus
in Bello: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER NETWORK
Attack and the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law: Proceedings 10
(Karin Brystrom ed., 2005).
central processing unit that causes the

113. Recall that Article 57.2(a)(ii) of Additional Protocol

upon an

attack to "take

all

I

requires those

feasible precautions in the choice of

who

plan or decide

means and methods of attack

with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian

life,

injury to

and damage to civilian objects."
computer contagions are designed to spread randomly in a way that may cause injury
to civilians or damage to civilian objects, they constitute prohibited indiscriminate weapon.
115. Dual-use objects are those used for both military and civilian purposes.
116. See, e.g., Knut Dormann, Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Network
Attack, in INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS CONFERENCE, supra note 112, at 139, 145.
civilians

114. If the

117. For instance, "the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the

object of attack" (51.2); "civilian objects shall not be the object of attack" (52.1); "indiscriminate
attacks are forbidden" (5 1 .4); "attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives" (52.2); etc.
118. This position
51,

is

consistent with other aspects of Additional Protocol

which provides that the

"civilian

I.

For instance, Article

population and individual civilians shall enjoy general

protection against dangers arising from military operations," and which prohibits "acts or
threats of violence the

primary purpose of which

population," as well as the

commentary

is

to Article 48,

to spread terror

among

the civilian

which notes that "the word 'operation'

should be understood in the context of the whole of the Section;
during which violence is used." Additional Protocol I, supra note

it

refers to military operations

13, art. 51.1-2;

COMMENTARY,

supra note 104, para. 1875.
119. A point supported by the prohibition on attacks intended to terrorize the civilian
population in Additional Protocol I, art. 51.2.
120. See,

e.g.,

James Brooke, North Koreans Claim

YORK TIMES, May

12, 2005, at

to Extract

Weapons Grade Fuel for Bombs, NEW

1.

Customary Law Study, supra note 22.
For a threat analysis of biological weapons, see Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons and
"Bioterrorism" in the First Years of the 21st Century, 21:2 POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES 3
121. This

is

the position taken by the

122.

(2002).
123. Nuclear

Weapons, supra note

4, para.

105E.
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War, Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict
124. See generally, Michael N. Schmitt, The International Court of Justice and the Use of Nuclear
Weapons, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Spring 1998, at 91, reprinted in 7 JOURNAL OF LEGAL
STUDIES 57 (1997).

125. For instance, use of nuclear

mines

remote areas of the high seas against enemy ballistic
weapons employed against armor forces in

in

missile submarines or low-yield battlefield nuclear

remote parts of the desert when there is no wind. The situations are rare, but not unimaginable.
126. Additional States include Israel, Pakistan, India,
127. See
128.

Customary Law Study, supra note

The term extends

COMMENTARY,
129.
"it is

members of

to

and North Korea.

22, ch. 22.

armed

the

forces.

It

not limited to objects.

is

supra note 104, at para. 2017.

The official ICRC COMMENTARY, discussing the term "definite military advantage," states
not legitimate to launch an attack which offers only potential or indeterminate advantages."

COMMENTARY,

supra note 104, para. 2024.

Commander's Handbook, supra note 22, para. 8.1.1. This assertion is labeled a "statement
of customary international law." The Handbook cites General Counsel, Department of Defense,
Letter of September 22, 1972, reprinted in 67 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123
130.

(1973), as the basis for this characterization.

US

joint doctrine reinforces this

providing that "[civilian objects consist of all civilian property and

activities

approach by

other than those

used to support or sustain the adversary's warfighting capability." Joint Publication 3-60, supra
note 56, at A-2. The term "war sustaining" also appears in the Instructions for the US Military
Commission at Guantanamo. Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2,

Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission, Apr. 30, 2003, para. 5D.
131. NATO's demands were set forth in a Statement of the Extraordinary Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council on April 12, 1999, and reaffirmed by the Heads of State and Government at
Washington on April 23. They included a cessation of military action, as well as ending violence
and repression of the Kosovar Albanians; withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and
paramilitary forces; an international military presence in Kosovo; safe return of refugees and
displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and the
establishment of a political framework agreement on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords. Press
Release

M-NAC-1(99)51, Apr.

12,

1999,

at

available

www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-

051e.htm; Press Release S- 1(99)62, Apr. 23, 1999, available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99062e.htm.
132. Christopher Marquis, In Wartime,

Really

Command,

133. See,

e.g.,

Some Argue, Commanders

NEW YORK TIMES, Feb.

Charles

J.

Dunlap,

Jr.,

10,

2004,

in

Chief Do Best

When They

at 18.

The End ofInnocence: Rethinking Noncombatancy in the Post-

Kosovo Era, Strategic Review 14 (Summer 2000).
134. Effects based operations are "[a]ctions taken against

enemy systems designed

to achieve

outcomes." US Air Force,
specific effects that contribute directly to desired military and
Air Force Glossary (AF Doctrine Document 1-2) 26 (Aug. 24, 2004). Consider electrical power.
Command and control usually relies to some degree on the civilian electrical grid. Therefore, in
political

the past, neutralizing

However, the

C2

often led to strikes against

power substations and generating

sought was not destruction of the

plants.

but merely interference
with command and control. An effects -based analysis would deconstruct the electrical grid to
identify that discrete component thereof depriving C2, and little more, of electricity. Only that
component would be attacked. A focus on effects has now been included in the National Military
effect

electrical grid,

Strategy: "Force application focuses more on generating the right effects to achieve objectives
than on generating overwhelming numbers of forces." National Military Strategy, supra note 50,
at 15.

135.

On

CHANGE

effects-based operations, see

IN

THE NATURE OF

WAR

DAVID

(2001);

A. DEPTULA, EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS:
Department of Defense, Effects-based Operations
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Briefing,

Mar.

On EBO

and

Conflict,

paper presented

19, 2003, available

afwww.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/g030318-D-9085.html.

law, see Michael N. Schmitt, Aerial Effects-Based Operations
at a

conference to

mark

the launch of the

UK

and the Law of Armed
Manual of the Law of

Oxford University, July 2004. The articles presented at the conference will
appear in a compilation to be edited by Steven Haines.
136. See generally Peter W.W. Wijninga & Richard Szafranski, Beyond Utility Targeting: Towards
Axiological Operations, AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL, Winter 2000, at 45.
137. Proponents of axiological operations cite Colonel John Warden's model, in which the

Armed

Conflict,

enemy is attacked as

a system consisting of five concentric circles (leadership, organic or system

essentials, infrastructure, population,

and

fielded forces), as

targeting. In Warden's approach, the intent

paralysis sets in.

FOR COMBAT

is

an example of sophisticated

utility

to cause the system to malfunction such that

On Warden's theory, see JOHN A. WARDEN III, THE AIR CAMPAIGN: PLANNING

(Brassey's rev. ed., 1998).

NATO

commander, Lieutenant General Michael Short,
felt that on the first night the
power should have gone off, and major bridges around Belgrade should have gone into the
Danube, and the water should be cut off so the next morning the leading citizens of Belgrade
would have got up and asked 'Why are we doing this?' and asked Milosevic the same question."
Short realized that Milosevic most feared losing the support of the population, and thereby
political power; in axiological operations terms, popular support for the regime was the value to
be attacked to most effectively create the effects sought incentivizing compliance with NATO
demands. C.R. Whitney, The Commander; Air Wars Wont Stay Risk-Free, General Says, NEW
138. Recall the

comments by

air

regarding Operation Allied Force air attacks against Belgrade: "I

—

YORK TIMES,

June

18, 1999, at

139. Additional Protocol

I,

Al.

supra note 13,

art. 57.2.

Human Rights Watch specifically discussed the Djakovica Road incident in its
on Operation Allied Freedom, concluding that because "higher altitude seems to have
impeded a pilot from adequately identifying a target"
"inadequate precautions were taken to
avoid civilian casualties." Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,
140. For example,

report

.

.

.

Feb. 2000, available at www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/index.htm#TopOfPag.
141.

As noted by Michael Bothe

et al., "[t]he

term military advantage involves a variety of
BOTHE ET AL., supra note 84, para.

considerations, including the security of the attacking force."
2.4.4. See also,

A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82

CROSS 165 (2000).
142. The term "battlespace" has been formally adopted
note 50,

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED

in the National Military Strategy, supra

at 16.

Some

argue (albeit contentiously) that even future potential use meets the purpose
criterion, although the better position is that there must be a reasonable belief that such use is
143.

highly likely before an object or location

may be

characterized as a military objective and

attacked.
144. Effects-based Operations Briefing, supra note 135. To take another example, during
Operation Cobra, the breakout from Normandy, US air forces dropped 14,600 500-pound

bombs on one German
the

division, destroying 66 tanks

and

1 1

heavy guns. During Desert Storm,

US dropped 9,800 precision guided munitions, destroying 2,500 tanks, heavy artillery pieces,

and armored personnel

—

carriers
a ratio of bombs to equipment destroyed 50 times that of
Operation Cobra. Robert A. Pape, Hit or Miss: What Precision Air Weapons do Precisely, FOREIGN

AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2004, at 160, 163.
145.

THE IRAQ WAR
and Military
Jr., The Iraq war: A Military

For general discussions of the conduct of the war in Iraq, see JOHN KEEGAN,
Anthony H. Cordesman, The War In Iraq: Strategy, Tactics,

(2004);

Lessons (2003); Williamson

History

Murray & Robert H.

(2003).
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was recognized in the Lieber Code, which noted "[t]he more
vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief." Lieber Code,
146. This temporal aspect

supra note 89,

art. 29.

For instance, during Desert Storm, a mere 8.8% of the munitions dropped were precision.
WILLIAM M. ARKIN ET AL., ON IMPACT: MODERN WARFARE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, A CASE
STUDY OF THE GULF WAR 78 (1991). By Operation Iraqi Freedom this figure had only grown to
68%. By the Numbers, supra note 60. For an excellent summary of the precision aspects of the
campaign in Kosovo, see US Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Kosovo/Operation
Allied Force After- Action Report, Jan. 31, 2000.
147.

munitions dropped. By the Numbers, supra note 60,
149. For a discussion of Operation Iraqi Freedom, see Schmitt, supra note 42.
148. 7,1 14 of the 19,948 guided

at

1 1.

150. Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final
Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, June 13, 2000, reprinted in 39
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1258 (2000); Amnesty International, "Collateral
Damage" or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied
Force, AI Index: EUR 70/18/00, June 2000, available flfwww.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/
docs/natorep_all.doc; Civilian Deaths, supra note 140; Off Target, supra note 82.
151. Civilian Deaths, supra note 140.

152.

Off Target, supra note 82,

153.

On

at 40.

the Grdelica attack, see Final Report, supra note 150; Civilian Deaths, supra note 140;

Collateral

Damage, supra note

Wong, Disputed Strike by

150.

On the wedding party incident, see Dexter Filkins & Edward
40 Iraqis Dead, NEW YORK TIMES, May 20, 2004, at 1.
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VIII
Modern Weaponry and Warfare:
The Application of Article 36 of Additional
Protocol

I

by Governments

Marie Jacobsson*
Introduction

The

basic rules directly addressing the use of weapons as reflected in Addi-

tional Protocol

I

to the 1949

Geneva Conventions are found

in Articles

35

and 36. Needless to say, there are other articles in the Protocol (primarily those re1

lating to targeting) and, of course, other conventions that also address matters relating to the use of weapons. Regulating

only a matter that

is

and

restricting the use of weapons

is

not

dealt with in the context of international humanitarian law,

disarmament law and human

rights

law are also relevant.

Neither the 1949 Geneva Conventions nor the 1977 Additional Protocols prohibit
a specific, easily identifiable weapon. This conclusion

is

by no means

controversial.

On the contrary, the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Commentary to the Additional Protocol

I

clearly

concluded that

" [t]he

Protocol does not im-

pose a specific prohibition on any specific weapon. The prohibitions are those of

customary law, or are contained in other international agreements." 2 The ICRC's

Customary International Humanitarian Law3 study draws the same conclusion.

* Principal Legal

Adviser on International

ideas presented in this paper

©

2006 by Marie Jaobbson.

do not

Law to

the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

necessarily reflect the views of the Swedish

The

Government.

Article

many

In

weapons.

4

36 of Additional Protocol I

States, soldiers are

A section

taught that

it is

on prohibited weapons

prohibited to use certain types of

any decent

also has a natural part in

presentation to the public of the contents of international humanitarian law. 5 As a
result of such education, as well as

tain

weapons

media coverage, many people are aware that cer-

dum-dum

are prohibited, such as gas,

bullets

and anti-personnel

land mines. In short, the general public has the perception (however vague
be) that the laws of warfare prohibit

would be

However, when a lawyer, or

and the

either possible to conclude that the

impressively long;

it all

manitarian law, the
ternational

list

list is

nothing but a

it

re-

6

any interested person, attempts to

described in two diametrical ways.

It is

depressingly short, or to conclude that it is

depends on the perspective.

When viewed from that of hu-

can be characterized as depressingly short; from that of in-

disarmament law, the

list

Humanitarian Law study somewhat
I

restrictions are

might

Or perhaps

dictates of the public conscience."

may be

Although the ICRC Commentary
Protocol

and

for that matter,

prohibited weapons, the result

use of weapons.

restrict the

better to say that the prohibitions

flection of "the laws of humanity

list

and

it

can be characterized as impressively long.
is

clear (and the

less clear)

7

when

it

Customary International
concludes that Additional

does not impose a specific prohibition on any specific weapon, the sec-

ond paragraph of Article 35 of the Protocol

declares that "It

is

prohibited to em-

ploy weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering." This
prohibition
rial),

on

certain types of

well

nothing short of a clear-cut

means of warfare (weapons,

as well as a clear-cut prohibition of certain

It is

is

known that the language of this

projectiles

and mate-

methods of warfare.

article catches the essence

of the long-

standing prohibition under international law that certain weapons are unaccept-

and moral terms) and hence such weapons

able (to phrase

it

in ethical

ited (to phrase

it

in normative

and

are prohib-

legal terms).

However, the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols do not

much

practical guidance as to

offer

which particular weapons are prohibited. These

weapons that fall under
the prohibition. Attempts by individual States and individual nongovernmental
organizations to propose an independent "international scrutinizing mechanism"
conventions leave

it

to the States themselves to identify the

have never met with support.

What was left from the Diplomatic Conference in the

1970s was the obligation imposed on States to determine whether the employment

of a particular weapon "would, in some or

all

circumstances, be prohibited by this

Protocol or by any other rule of international law." 8
In

fact,

resistance

even that provision must be regarded as a diplomatic success, given the

on

the part of some States to include such a provision in the Protocol.

Unfortunately, very few States undertake such an examination before employing
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new means and methods of warfare,
the initial stages,

i.e.,

lish evaluation

and "development" of a new weapon.

the "study"

The ICRC has attempted to

despite the fact that the obligation relates to

assist States

—and put pressure on

procedures to meet the obligation in Article 36. The

was made through the so-called SIrUS

project.

9

—

to estab-

first

attempt

States

That was not very successful.

More successful was the initiative taken at the 28th International Conference of
the

Red Cross and Red Crescent

in 2003.

The Conference

ICRC

review procedures in place to cooperate with the

invited States that have

with a view to

facilitating

10

on review procedures. The purpose of the
"exchange of experience" is to disseminate knowledge of, and information about,
how Article 36 is implemented, with the goal that more and more States would esthe voluntary exchange of experience

tablish Article 36 procedures.

Such processes of informal exchanges of experience

have already commenced, including several meetings and workshops. 11

The Swedish Delegation for International Law Monitoring of Arms Projects
The Swedish Delegation for International Law Monitoring of Arms Projects was
set up by the Government in 1974 to meet the requirements of international humanitarian law concerning the potential effects of conventional (mainly anti-personnel) weapons for unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate use.

United States were the

first

States to set

The reason the Delegation was

up such

inhumane weapons.

by growing international response.
requisition of

arms

mechanism.

up should be seen

set

Sweden, particularly during the early 1970s,
tain excessively

a

It

It

Sweden and the

against the efforts

as regards restrictions

was noted that the Swedish

made by

and use of cer-

efforts

were met

was therefore considered that future Swedish

for the military defense

needed to be judged and scrutinized

from the perspective of international law (hence, not only humanitarian law). It
was deemed that such examination was best undertaken in conjunction with the
then existing technical-economical examination.

It

was therefore decided that the

Delegation should consist of experts on international and national law, military

and technical experts, experts on arms technology and
today an independent "authority."

It is

scientists.

The Delegation is

not subordinated to the Swedish Defence

Forces or any other authority or ministry.

The Delegation monitors planned purchases or modifications of military weapons or applications of means and methods of warfare to assess whether they would
be dubious from the point of view of international law (primarily humanitarian
law),

human

rights

law and disarmament law.

makes either approval or non-approval deciThe Delegation may combine a negative decision with a request that

After monitoring, the Delegation
sion.
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weapon or ammunition be made, or that
the applicant consider an alternative weapon system or restrict the operational use
of the weapon in order to meet the requirements of international law. The decimodifications of the construction of the

sions can be appealed to the

Government.

The mandate of the Delegation developed over time. It has become more and
more precise but also wider. It was clear from the outset that the Delegation
should not only look at what was already forbidden under international law, but
also on international discussions that could lead to further prohibitions. Hence,

—

the mandate(s) has/have clearly reflected not only de lege lata requirements, but
also de legeferenda tendencies.

For example, the year
ing the Lucerne and

after the establishment

of the Delegation, in 1975, follow-

Lugano conferences that preceded the negotiations on the Ad-

ditional Protocols, the Ministry of Defence

amended

the instructions for the

Delegation with regard to projected means of warfare to direct that
ticularly

examine whether they could

criminate

result in

it

should par-

unnecessary suffering or have indis-

effects.

Some features of the mandate have been particularly noteworthy. Among those
is

the requirement that the Delegation, in examining weapons projects, should not

only take into account existing law, but also international treaties that had not yet
entered into force, but which Sweden had signed or

ratified.

Consideration should also be given to proposals that Sweden had put forward at
international conferences.

In addition, attention should also be given to the limited resources of Sweden as

The Delegation should make sure that the possibility
of Sweden to be part of the development in weapons technology was not impeded.
The Delegation had, particularly in the 1980s, contacts with the Swedish weapon
regards

weapons

acquisition.

industry.

The present mandate of the Delegation is formulated under a separate ordinance that stems from 1994. In that year, the Delegation became an independent
authority under the Ministry of Defence. According to the ordinance,
authorities
lice

(e.g.,

the Swedish

all

Swedish

Armed Forces, the Coast Guard and the Swedish Po-

Authority) that intend to purchase weapons must report their intended pur-

chases to the Delegation, which then monitors the project. As a result, the

Delegation has examined the acquisition of so-called pepper spray and certain am-

munition to be used by the Swedish

police, the

Swedish Coast Guard, and the

Swedish Prison and Probation Service.
Finally,

it

toring even

should be mentioned that the Delegation has a right to

if the

initiate

moni-

Swedish authorities have not reported planned purchases or use.
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What Kind of Comments Has

the Delegation

Made?

The Delegation often requests more information or requires more tests to be made
if it believes that the test results either do not meet scientific criteria or are difficult
to interpret. Moreover,

it

often sets out conditions for the use of a certain weapon,

for example, that a certain projectile

that

development of a weapon

that only a described

must be used only for anti-materiel purposes;

may continue only if certain conditions are met; or

combination of a weapon and ammunition

is

allowed,

and if

new application must be submitted.

changes are made, a

The analysis comprises both primary and secondary effects, possible indiscriminate effects, whether Sweden (or any other State) has put forward a proposal that
could lead to a prohibition, and implications of allowing civil authorities such as
the Swedish police or the Coast Guard, but not military personnel, to use a specific

weapon.

on anti-personnel weapons or weapons
the two notions of superfluous injury and un-

Since the Delegation primarily focuses
that can have anti-personnel effects,

The Delegation has not established
own, but evaluates the weapons much along the lines that are

necessary suffering are of particular interest.
specific criteria

of its

described in the Customary International Humanitarian

Law study. 12

The extended mandate of the Delegation has been both a challenging and meaningful exercise. It is challenging because the traditional ethical norms transformed
into international humanitarian law rules do not correspond with the norms expressed in human rights law. Tear gas and pepper spray are clearly prohibited under disarmament law and international humanitarian law as means and methods
of warfare, but perfectly acceptable in a police enforcement situation.

Although the mandate has been extended,

it

does not cover export control.

the Swedish Inspectorate of Strategic Products that

suring that the export of weapons
tions.

However,

it

does not

fall

is

is

entrusted with the task of en-

in conformity with

Swedish laws and regula-

under the competence of the Inspectorate to

examine whether or not a weapon would contravene humanitarian law
This has raised

It is

rules.

some concern. The Swedish Government, together with

Swedish Red Cross, and the other Nordic

States, therefore issued a

the

Pledge at the

28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 2003 to
undertake a review of national legislation and policies on arms transfer, in order to
explore the possibilities to take international humanitarian law into consideration as

one of the

criteria

on which arms

transfer decisions are

made and

to

examine

appropriate ways of assessing an arms recipient's likely respect for international

humanitarian law. 13
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States also pledged "to use the result of the review as a basis in order

model for the incorporation of internanational arms transfer decision-making." 14

to explore the possibilities to develop a

tional humanitarian law criteria in

Sweden has commenced working

to achieve the goals set out in the Pledge.

There are various references to "Swedish needs" in relation to the mandate of
the Delegation. This might be surprising to those who believe the illusion that Swe-

weapons contexts (disarmament, as
international humanitarian law) on the ground that Sweden did not have a

den has taken advocated strong positions in
well as

all

national security interest to protect. Such an assumption

On
time,

incorrect.

the contrary, Sweden, in the 1970s aiming at proclaimed neutrality in

enough to export its prod-

and survive. At the same time, Sweden had at long-standing ideological record

in the context of disarmament,

humanitarian law and human rights values. Instead

of disconnecting what on the surface appear to be contradictory policies,

Governments attempted to combine them

ish

new political

—and

still

To

Swed-

context (judged from the perspective of a history of nearly 200 years

and new political requirements, including its membership

Sweden has

all

do. Faced with a relatively

fall

of the Berlin Wall

in the

European Union,

of almost uninterrupted neutrality in wartime), namely, the

started to take a

limit the rights of

new and

fresh look at the

weapons

issues.

combatants to use certain new weapons

is

often inter-

preted as "telling the industry" not to develop certain types of weapons. That
cast

an obligation in the negative. Instead,

interpret the prohibition in a positive

the

war

had all the more reason to ensure that it could secure its own weapon produc-

tion and, as a consequence, that the industry was strong
ucts

is

framework of Article

36! This

it

gives the producers

manner,

i.e.,

is

to

an opportunity to

develop weapons that

fall

into

can be part of the producers' policy on corporate

responsibility.

But

it is

not enough that the Governments and the producers are collaborating.

Weapons technology is still developing at an impressive speed. The manufacturers
quickly respond to the demands of the market, irrespective of whether the market
consists of States, organizations or individuals. Indeed, this

where the market economy has proven to be
focus their discussions

on

existing

"successful."

yet another area

At the same time,

weapons and remnants of weapons

—

problems today. Of tomorrow's weapons we hear nothing
text

is

at least

of discussing their legality or legitimacy. The real challenge

is

States

that cause

not in the conto get States to

on "new weapons" and "methods of warfare."
All weapons need to be reviewed from a humanitarian perspective. The difficult challenge is whether or not the same norms should apply when considering a
weapon used by one combatant against another combatant, as when we consider
focus
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a

weapon or ammunition

to be used

by

a police

enforcement

official against a

civilian.

Previously,

it

seemed easy to argue

combatant-to-combatant situation
forcement situation. In the

that there

is

(a traditional

first situation,

a built-in distinction between a

armed

conflict)

the combatant

is

and a police en-

simply not allowed to

attack a civilian. In the second, the entire rationale for the police operation

and security

store civil order
force.

The

the

Today such

to re-

for individuals by, albeit as a last resort, the use of

objective of the military operation

his combatants.

is

a distinction

is

is

to

more

weaken the enemy by disabling

difficult to

uphold, for example,

UN operation maybe exclusively one of peacekeeping or one that contains ele-

ments of both peacekeeping and police enforcement or even an Operation Other

Than War (OOTW).
In this context,
the development

it is

interesting to note that, despite the almost daily reports

and employment of so-called non-lethal

on

(or less lethal) weapons,

no discussion on the political and legal implications of these weapons has
been held on a State-to-State basis, either at a civil or military level. It is worrying
virtually

that the legally shallow argument, "it

resurfacing in the discussion

There are a number of
tional level.

devices

on

is

always better to be

less lethal

wounded than

dead,"

is

weapons.

critical issues that

need to be addressed

at

an interna-

These include high-power microwaves, millimeter waves, thermobaric

and improvised explosive devices. Addressing them does not imply that the

weapons should be prohibited. But given the obligation imposed on
evaluate the legality of the

weapons used,

it is

all

States to

reasonable to discuss the matter in a

multilateral context.

Conclusion

I

would

like to

up

encourage States

Article 36

to:

mechanisms;

•

Set

•

Get medical, military, technical, industry experts, lawyers and

scientists

involved;
•

Establish a transparent view;

•

Be prepared to review the mandate;

•

Cooperate with other States

Finally,

but

—not only with

be a step ahead. Look not just

at the

nological

at existing

allies.

weapons and methods of warfare

new weapons and new warfighting methods that rapidly evolving techcapabilities are now and will continue to produce. International
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humanitarian law and the "dictates of public conscience" require that these weapons and methods of warfare be examined to ensure they are consistent with the law

and do not unnecessarily add

to the suffering inherent in war.
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Bullets:

Limited Law Enforcement Exceptions or

Unwarranted Handcuffs?

Kenneth Watkin*
Introduction

Modern armed

conflict has entered a particularly dangerous,

and

in

many

ways, chaotic phase. The post-September 11, 2001 period has witnessed
significant debate concerning the ability of existing
late

humanitarian norms to regu-

21st-century warfare, and in particular the "war on terror."

1

In an interna-

on the nation-State much of today's conflict is
of what Clausewitz might have viewed as war between

tional system of "order" based

taking place

on

the fringes

"civilized peoples." 2

Certainly as the 2003 Iraq campaign demonstrated, traditional conflict between
States

is still

a reality. Here, the "black

lished, if not perfect,

and white"

treaty law provides a well estab-

normative structure known as the law of armed conflict or

ternational humanitarian law.

3

Customary international law

in-

also sets out the

armed conflict. Determination of the exact
scope of this second body of law is more challenging as is evidenced in the continuobligations of States in international

ing dialogue over

* Brigadier General,

which of the provisions of Additional Protocol I are to be viewed

Canadian Forces. The opinions expressed

author and do not necessarily

reflect the

in this article are those

of the

views of the Government of Canada, the Canadian

Forces, or the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
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as

customary international law. 4 However, notwithstanding this dialogue, there is a

significant

commonality

in the

the conduct of hostilities.

understanding of the obligations on States during

5

However, much of contemporary

conflict

is

occurring in what can be termed a

"gray" zone. There are four situations where the military forces of the State are re-

quired to conduct operations at the interface between warfare and policing: occupation, non-international

international

armed

conflict,

peace support operations and the

campaign against terrorism. Consistent with the term "gray zone,"

the determination of the normative framework to be applied

While there

is

often a

is

not always

clear.

common theme of violence being applied between State and

non-State actors, the lack of clarity as to what rules should be followed occurs in

two ways.

First,

there

the question of the degree to which the law of armed con-

is

flict,

designed for inter-State conflict, can or should regulate violence between

State

and non-State

actors. Secondly, there

law of armed conflict and
ing

armed

is

the inevitable interface between the

human rights norms. In simpler terms: the rules govern-

conflict versus those applying to

law enforcement.

Resolving the question of which normative framework applies

is

extremely im-

portant. For the personnel involved, identification of the correct normative

framework governing the decision
death.

to use force can be literally a matter of life

and

Complying with that framework means military personnel are not only act-

ing "legally," but also in accordance with the value system
States of its "warriors."

6

The importance

demanded by modern

for soldiers, sailors

and airmen

to act ac-

cording to the standards of society, both broader society as well as military society,

cannot be overstated.
In dealing with this challenge of applying the law, military and civilian govern-

ment

legal advisors

their struggle to
States.

can take some solace from the

do the

right thing in the

complex

fact that

they are not alone in

security situations confronting

Non-governmental organizations and other humanitarian groups are

also

7

norms should be applied to 21st-century conflict. Just
as military forces are changing their understanding and approaches towards armed
conflict, human rights and humanitarian groups are being confronted with having
to apply long- cherished norms in an uncertain operational environment. One
scholar from the humanitarian law community has written "[i]t is debatable
whether the challenges of asymmetrical war can be met with the current law of war.
If war between States is on the way out, perhaps the norms of international law that
were devised for them are becoming obsolete as well." 8 This observation provides
wrestling with what law or

an indication that the
century warfare

is

ability

of existing codified law to meet the challenges of 21st-

being opened up to considerable debate.
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The purpose of this article is to look at two discrete areas of weapons usage
chemical agents and "expanding" bullets in order to identify some of the challenges presented in determining the law governing their use during complex security operations. Such operations often straddle the armed conflict and law

—

enforcement paradigms. In

this analysis, particular reference will

be made to the

2005 International Committee of the Red Cross Customary International Humanitarian

Law

study (hereinafter the Study). 9 This ambitious Study seeks to outline

customary international law rules for both international and non-international

armed

conflict, as well as

provide an important

compendium of State

practice. In

seeking to clarify the customary law of armed conflict rules that apply to non-inter-

armed

national

do something

conflict, the

Study represents the most fulsome attempt to date to

that the courts, academics

creasingly attempted to

and the

do over the past few decades.

offers a starting point for discussion rather
stitutes

militaries themselves
10

That being

have in-

said, the

Study

than the definitive word on what con-

customary international humanitarian law. The ultimate

test for

such

statements of customary international law, and particularly those dealing with the

law of armed

may be whether they can be practically
military forces who act on their behalf.

conflict,

ments and the

applied by govern-

This exploration of the law surrounding the use of chemical agents and "ex-

panding" bullets in contemporary conflict

is

divided into four parts.

The

first

part

armed conflict governing the use of these weapons. Particular
placed on identifying the restrictions on their use set out in treaty law.

outlines the law of

emphasis

However,

is

as will

be noted, those prohibitions are not absolute

as

both chemical

agents and "expanding" bullets are permitted in law enforcement situations.

second part

identifies

two approaches

to analyzing

contemporary armed

The

conflict.

more formal approach sets out distinct categories of conflicts such as international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict and domestic disturThe

first

bances that are often analyzed independently of one another. However, the second

approach notes armed conflict

is

increasingly being viewed in a less structured

manner, thereby recognizing greater potential for overlap between the law of

armed

conflict

and human

rights

normative regimes.

This then leads to the third area of analysis: the challenge of applying the law of

armed

conflict rules governing chemical agents

and "expanding"

temporary conflict. The final part outlines State practice

bullets in con-

in applying the "spirit

and

principle" of the law of armed conflict rather than the formal rules governing large-

more flexible application of the law
than a rule-based system of international armed conflict otherwise provides. In the
scale inter-State conflict. In effect, there

final analysis,

it is

is

a

suggested the complex 21st-century security environment
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require a re-analysis of rules governing the use of less lethal

weapons such

as riot

control agents and "expanding" bullets.

Broad Prohibitions?
In dealing with chemical weapons and "expanding" bullets across the broad spec-

trum of conflict, it will be helpful to first review the provisions of the law as they apply to international

armed

conflict.

Chemical Weapons
As

is

noted in the Study, there

weapons

in international

Court.

14

a broad treaty prohibition against the use of chemical

armed conflict,

cerning Asphyxiating Gases,

Weapons Convention

is

13

11

including: the 1899

Hague Declaration Con-

the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, 12 the 1993

Chemical

and the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal

For example, there are only 13 States that are not a "party to either the

Geneva Gas Protocol or the Chemical Weapons Convention." 15 Strong support for
suggesting that such a ban

is

customary

is

found

domestic

in

legislation, military

manuals and the statements of governments and national case law. 16
Similarly,

in

respect

of non-international armed conflict, the Chemical

Weapons Convention, Article I broad prohibition framed as "under any circumstances" reflects a more general trend "towards reducing the distinction between
international and non-international armed conflicts for the purposes of the rules
governing the conduct of

hostilities." 17

Many

of the contemporary abuses, per-

haps most infamously the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein against
the Kurds in 1988, 18 have occurred in non-international

armed

conflict. In

terms

of a normative prohibition there appears to be a broad consensus, including a
strong statement by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

Appeal Chamber in the Tadic decision against the use of such weapons in non-

international

armed

However, not

all

conflict. 19

military use of "chemicals"

is

prohibited.

"weapons" convention involving "toxic chemicals and
result, military

It is, after all,

their precursors."

20

As

a
a

purposes "not connected with the use of chemical weapons and

not dependent upon the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as method of warfare" are not prohibited. 21 This
cal agents"

is

is

not the end of the discussion. The use of "chemi-

not absolutely forbidden for

violence. There

is

all

purposes by States seeking to control

a significant exception regarding the use of such agents.

the purposes not prohibited under the Convention

ing domestic riot control purposes."

used as a method of warfare.

23

22

However,

is

Among

"[l]aw enforcement includ-

"riot control agents" will

not be

A rationale provided for the prohibition of what is
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otherwise an effective, less-lethal means of warfare, and one particularly suited to

enemy out of

certain activities such as forcing an
spaces,

other

is

"the fact that use of tear gas

more dangerous

chemicals'

by deadly chemicals and

.

.

.

.

.

.

bunkers and confined

caves,

'runs the danger of provoking the use of

since a party

'may think

resort to the use of chemical weapons.'"

Riot control agents have traditionally been associated with
well as vomiting agents.

it is

25

The

clarification over the use

being attacked

24

CS and

CN gases as

of chemical agents for law

enforcement found in the Chemical Weapons Convention ended long-standing
controversy over the scope of the 1925 Gas Protocol. The Study indicates the vast
majority of States were of the view the Protocol did apply to riot control agents;

however, there were notable exceptions. 26 The United States took the view that the

Gas Protocol did not apply to agents with temporary
during the Vietnam conflict.
to indicate

27

"CS and other such

Geneva Protocol."

The United Kingdom

effects

is

reflected,

1970

clarified its position in

gases accordingly as being outside the scope of the

28

The exception regarding the use of chemical agents
poses

and used such agents

for law enforcement pur-

perhaps too narrowly, in the Study in Rule 75 which

states "[t]he

method of warfare is prohibited." It should be noted
Chemical Weapons Convention "law enforcement" is a broader

use of riot-control agents as a
that

under the

concept than "riot control." 29 These provisions reflect State practice where certain
chemical agents are used against citizens for law enforcement purposes, primarily
as a less lethal alternative to using

and

In

addition

malodorants

32

to

for

such agents are used as

may be

control

riot

33

chemical incapacitants can include

agents,

The use of the

Moscow Theatre hostage

forces attempted to incapacitate

Chechen

latter led to tragic

rescue operation
terrorists

with

consequences

when Russian

gas.

in respect of the prohibition against using "bullets

in the

human body."

35

This prohibition

and Additional Protocol
ons, projectiles

I,

is

security

34

"Expanding" Bullets
The second area where the law of armed conflict and law enforcement can
is

used

subduing of violent suspects. 31

and calmatives.

during the 2002

all

chemical substances such as "pepper spray"

"riot control agents" as

for self-defense

deadly force. 30 Not

interface

which expand or flatten

easily

Hague Declaration 36
prohibited "to employ weap-

linked to the 1899

Article 35(2) in that

it is

and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superflu-

ous injury or unnecessary suffering." 37 The use of bullets "which expand or flatten
easily in the
tirely

human body,

cover the core or

is

such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not enpierced with incisions"
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1998

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute)

international

armed

conflicts.

in respect of

38

The question of whether "expanding" bullets may be used in non-international armed conflict is a more interesting one. In respect of the Study it is noted
that the prohibition against the use of "expanding" bullets "in any armed conflict
39
is set out in several military manuals"
and that "[n]o official contrary practice
was found with respect to either international armed conflict or non-international armed conflict." 40
Since Canada was one of the countries whose manual was identified as supporting this principle, it is important to note that the Canadian manual approaches the
application of the law of armed conflict to internal armed conflict situations in a
much more nuanced fashion than the Study suggests. The Canadian manual does
not make a broad statement suggesting that "expanding" bullets are prohibited as a
matter of law in non-international armed conflict situations. The
Conflict at the Operational

and

Tactical Level does state that

prohibited weapons under the law of armed conflict.
the law of

armed

conflict to non-international

cussed in terms of common Article 3

42

41

of Armed

expanding bullets are

However, the application of

armed

conflict

and Additional Protocol

dian manual indicates, "[t]oday a significant

Law

number of armed

is

specifically dis-

II.

43

As the Cana-

conflicts in

which

CF maybe involved are non-international in nature. As stated, the law applicable to such conflicts is limited. It is CF policy, however, that the CF will, as a minithe

mum, apply the spirit and principles of the LOAC during all operations other than
domestic operations." 44
This

is

not to suggest that "expanding" bullets are permitted as a means of war-

armed conflict. However, the rules of the law of armed
more nuanced application in complex security situations

fare in non-international

conflict

may have

where a

significant part of the duties of military forces

a far

may

also involve

law en-

must be noted that the
Appeals Chamber in the Tadic decision warned that two limitations would apply to
the application of humanitarian law rules to non-international armed conflict.
forcement and other public security duties. In this regard,

Those limitations were

"(i)

only a

it

number of rules and principles governing inter-

armed conflicts have gradually been extended to apply to internal conand (ii) this extension has not taken place in the form of a full and

national
flicts;

mechanical transplant of those rules to internal

conflicts; rather, the general es-

sence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they
applicable to internal conflicts."

There

is

may contain, has become

45

also a further indication that the

conflict to non-international conflict

found

contemporary consensus of States. In this

broad extension of the law of armed
in the

Study

may not

fully reflect the

respect, unlike the provision
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use of "expanding" bullets a war crime during international armed conflict, there

is

no similar provision in the ICC statute in respect of "conflicts not of an international
character." 46 As with the use of chemical agents, it is also notable that there is a "law
enforcement" exception regarding the use of "expanding"
tion

is

not written in any treaty,

nately, in the

Study

bullets.

While this excep-

specifically referred to in the Study. 47

it is

Unfortu-

phrased in terms of "several" States having decided to use

it is

such ammunition for domestic law enforcement purposes. There seems to be a
nificantly broader practice than this

sig-

wording suggests, extending even to the devel-

opment of "fragible" ammunition. "Expanding" ammunition appears to be used
by security forces in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom primarily
for reasons related to the ammunition being "less susceptible to ricochet and the
concomitant creation of unintended

collateral casualties." 48

Law Enforcement Operations
It is

these exceptions to the prohibitions of chemical agents

lets that raise

armed

some of the most

significant challenges to the

Both chemical agents and "expanding"

conflict.

and "expanding" bulcontemporary law of

bullets options are

em-

ployed in law enforcement operations with humanitarian goals in mind. For
chemical agents,

it is

the opportunity to apply less lethal means. Regarding the use

of "expanding" ammunition, sometimes, but far too inclusively, referred to as

"hollow point"
their use.

bullets,

When

these

and law enforcement
less

"humane" option

it is

concerns over collateral damage and injury that favor

means

are not allowed, particularly

where armed

responsibilities interface, a situation can
is

imposed on combatants. As a

result,

conflicts

be created where a

uninvolved

civilians

maybe exposed to greater risk of death or injury because of the application of rules
that are approximately a century old in their genesis
cifically for State

and

ronment of contemporary
at

The circumstances under which these moral
particularly evident is the complex operational envi-

versus State conflict.

legal challenges arise are

looking

and which were designed spe-

how modern

conflict. In that respect, the analysis will

conflict

gimes governing the use of these

is

now

turn to

impacting on the application of normative

less lethal

re-

weapons.

"Paper Worlds" and the Categorization of Conflict

The application of the law of war

is

dependent upon the categorization of conflict.

While Michael Walzer has noted "lawyers have created a paper world which
crucial points to correspond to the

of law and order

is

world the

ultimately dependent

rest

of us

live in,"

49

fails at

the establishment

upon the drawing of jurisdictional

199

lines.
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However, the determination of when and how the law of war applies is impacted by

two often divergent

One more

perspectives.

traditional

approach sees conflict divided into three formal catego-

armed

ries of: international

conflict, non-international

tions of internal disturbances

and tensions."

50

armed

conflict

International

armed

and

"situa-

conflict

is

governed by the extensive treaty and customary law regime of the law of war, while
the last category

is

controlled by a law enforcement/human rights regime.

boundaries of each of these two categories are

The

fairly well prescribed. International

armed conflict is largely defined by inter-State conflict, while non-international
armed conflict is usually separated from normal law enforcement by the requirement for the conflict to be between "organized armed groups" controlling territory
and exercising a semblance of governance. It should also be noted Additional Protocol I provides recognition that international armed conflict can occur between
States and non-State actors. 51 However, there is a generally recognized view that
most non-State groups will not be able to avail themselves of its provisions. 52
Under a traditional interpretation of the law, the law of armed conflict operates
during international armed conflict as a lex specialis to the exclusion of human
rights norms. 53 Even though there is a growing body of case law and opinion that
places the law of war in a more tightly woven relationship with human rights
norms, even during international armed conflict, 54 in many instances this idea of
overlap continues to be rejected particularly where
rights treaties

have extra-territorial application.

Finally, in respect

of non-international armed conflict,

common Article 3 to the

1949 Geneva Conventions

which are applied. The scope of internal armed

from

civil

war to

56

it is

the provisions of

and Additional Protocol

conflict can

II

57

be quite broad ranging

A par-

territorial control;

organized armed forces with a

command; or "sustained and concerted military operations" criteria of

Additional Protocol

II.

59

provides as extensive a
conflict,

human

been identifying the limits to the application of common Arti-

which does not have the

responsible

suggested that

conflict just outside the scope of purely criminal activity. 58

ticular challenge has
cle 3

it is

55

While neither of these law of armed

list

conflict codifications

of legal provisions as the law applicable to inter- State

they inject basic standards of humanity into conflicts where States

view their non-State opponents as "criminals."

still

60

The second perspective on the application of the law of war appears to be neither as definitive nor exclusionary as the first, more formal, model. Here, as is reflected in the more general wording of common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the dividing lines between the categories of armed conflict are less
well defined. Particularly, among humanitarian and human rights groups there is a
reluctance to clearly identify when common Article 3 applies either by associating
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it

with Additional Protocol

II,

how

or definitively outlining

lower standard of "internal disturbances and tensions."

61

interfaces with the

it

It is

these groups

which

have also pressed to have international human rights standards apply concurrently
with the law of armed

conflict. In addition, the existence

of an armed conflict can

be viewed as having a quite limited temporal existence. For example, in Juan Carlos
Abella
to

v.

Argentina, the Inter- American

view the "armed

Human

Commission on

conflict," the retaking

Rights appeared

of a military barracks from rebels, as be-

ing limited in time to the actual operation. 62

armed conflict has been significantly influenced in the post Cold War construct of armed conflict. The breakup of
Yugoslavia forced the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) to address the interface between international and non-international
armed conflict resulting in a ruling in the Tadic case that the law of armed conflict
applied to non-international conflicts. 63 The impetus for this change was a shift
from a sovereignty based approach to one placing emphasis on "human beings." 64
The reality is that some aspects of contemporary armed conflict have changed.
The events of 9/ 1 1 have highlighted the often complex interface between armed
conflict and normal policing. The categorization of the post-9/1 1 events included
This second,

less well defined,

delineation of

assessments that the conflict was international, non-international or internationalized non-international

armed

armed

conflict. 65

Another category known

as "transna-

would appear, to avoid
admitting international armed conflict can occur between States and non-State ac-

tional

conflict" has

been suggested primarily,

it

tors. 66

Some scholars have seen the attacks as only being amenable to a law enforcement response. 67 However, it is possible to conclude that "[i]n many respects,
global terrorism seems to straddle the law enforcement

and armed

conflict para-

digms. Engagement in criminal activity by terrorist groups, warlords, and other

non-State actors to finance their operations adds significantly to the perception of

an overlap between law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities." 68

The current emphasis on extending the laws of armed conflict to non-international

armed

conflict,

sets the

while seeking to expand the application of

human

norms,

scene for a conflict of normative regimes. This could have significant and

quite unintended results in the effort to expand humanitarian
protection.
gal

rights

and human

rights

The extension of the law of armed conflict not only brings with it a le-

regime designed to protect uninvolved civilians,

it

also

expands on the level of

violence that can be used by the State to counter an insurgency threat. At the

same time, the
tial

interface with the

human

rights-based regime extends the poten-

for the application of chemical agents

of law enforcement.
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and "expanding"
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Perhaps the most graphic example of
conflict

and human

this potential blurring

norms can be found

rights

in the

of law of armed

United Nations Secretary-

General's Bulletin Observance by United Nations Forces of International
tarian Law.

69

The

Bulletin states that the "fundamental principles

and

Humani-

rules of in-

ternational humanitarian law" are applicable in situations of armed conflict,

which

are stated to include "enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations

when

the use of force

is

permitted in self-defence."

70

It

appears that the use of force dur-

ing a United Nations operation, even in self-defense,
ever,

is

not clear that would always be the case, nor

it is

equated to "combat."
is it

violence confronted during a peace support operation
that of an

armed

evident that the level of

would

necessarily rise to

conflict.

While the use of "weapons or methods of combat of a nature
sary suffering"

How-

is

to cause unneces-

prohibited under the Secretary- General's Bulletin,

it is

evident that the use of riot-control agents for law enforcement purposes

templated during United Nations operations.

Weapons (CBW) Conventions

A

equally
is

con-

2002 Chemical and Biological

"Law Enforcement" and the CWQ 71 recChemical Weapons Convention 72 would in-

Bulletin,

ognizes law enforcement under the

clude United Nations operations. These law enforcement operations are defined

scope of a nation's jurisdiction to enforce

as actions within the

and

as authorized

by the United Nations. In respect of actions

its

national laws

that are "taken in

the context of law enforcement or riot control functions under the authority of

must be

the United Nation, they
act

is

one of 'law enforcement'

warfare'.

specifically authorized

if it

by that organization.

otherwise would be prohibited as a 'method of

." 73
.

.

Similarly, another analysis has

by the receiving

state,

concluded "peacekeeping operations authorized

including peacekeeping operations pursuant to Chapter VI

UN Charter; and peacekeeping operations where force
the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
of the

falling

No

.

.

.

within the context of "law enforcement."

74

is

authorized by

" are

operations

This very broad concept of law

enforcement increases the likelihood of an awkward interface between the two
normative regimes governing the use of chemical agents.

Operating in the "Gray Zone"

Having established the increasing overlap and sometimes unclear
tween normative regimes, the question remains

as to

interface be-

how the different norms gov-

erning the use of riot control agents and "expanding" bullets are applied in
practice.

The answer

in part

tional "gray zone" has long

can be found in the

reality that operating in

been a part of military operations.
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However,

it

should be noted that the problem of viewing armed conflict as being

limited to inter-State conflict

is

not unique to the legal community. Military forces

themselves often look at "war" primarily through the lens of conventional combat

between the armed forces of nation
flict

States. Preference for "traditional"

armed con-

impacts on doctrine, equipment acquisition, training, and, ultimately, the ca-

pabilities

conflict"

ment

of the armed forces. Generally,

less

time

is

spent on "low intensity

and the range of operations which require consideration of law enforce-

activities.

However, "warfare" has always included a range of
broader than battles between the armed forces of a

conflict significantly

Such

State.

conflict has

been

termed, somewhat inaccurately, as "small wars" since they are not necessarily
"small" in scope. 75 As
diers usually call

Max Boot has

them

stated "[t]hese days social scientists

—

either 'low intensity conflicts' or

'military operations other than war.'"
fied as

is

sol-

a related category

In 19th-century terms, they were identi-

"campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and

parts of the world
will

76

and

guerrilla warfare in all

where organized armies are struggling against opponents who

not meet them in the open

field."

77

In those campaigns, beating a hostile

not necessarily the main object. They

may involve

the subjugation of insurrec-

tion, the repression of lawlessness, or the pacification of territory.

"involve [d] struggles against guerrillas and banditti."

was not necessarily

sensitive to issues of "law,"

enforcement" type

activities

it is

army

78

These operations

While 19th-century warfare

clear that

governance and "law

have been an integral part of operations

at this

end of

the conflict spectrum.

Military involvement in law enforcement includes operations in times of occupation, non-international
ther, a

broad range of peace support operations can be added to

operations
as a

armed conflict and the campaign against terrorism. Fur-

may not be dependent upon

list.

Such

traditional sources of authorization such

United Nations Security Council resolution, but could also involve a request

from the governing authority of the
arise in a

and

this

territory involved. Military

number of ways. The absence of police and

failing States, or the responsibility to

the military performing a law enforcement role.
exist,

operations

other security forces in failed

govern occupied
79

involvement can

territory,

Even where

can result in

local security forces

maybe conducted in support of those forces in order to mentor or

augment their capability. Such operations are evident in Afghanistan and Iraq. 80 In
addition, law enforcement and military forces may conduct joint operations when
the threat is one like global terrorism which contains elements of both criminal activity and armed conflict. 81
The new complex operational environment is perhaps best articulated in the
United States Marine Corps doctrine of the "three block war." 82 This doctrine has
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been integrated into Canada's 2005 International Policy Statement and has been
" [o]

described as
in

one

ur military could be engaged in combat against well-armed militia

city block, stabilization operations in the

next block, and humanitarian re-

83

The doctrine recognizes the significant
potential for military forces to be engaged in combat with armed groups while at
the same time potentially being confronted with interfacing and controlling civilian populations. The latter responsibility can quickly take on the attributes of a polief

and reconstruction two blocks over."

licing function. Finally, military

to international operations.
tic

involvement in law enforcement

is

not restricted

Many nations regularly use military forces in a domes-

law enforcement role including participation in hostage rescue. 84

The

interface with law

enforcement means that military forces

may themselves

may be conducting operations with
This could mean participation in joint

be conducting law enforcement operations, or
security forces performing that function.

patrols with local security forces in a policing role

military

and police

forces both

become involved

under circumstances where the

in

an engagement with organized

85

The question immediately arises as to whether those security forces
should be barred from carrying riot control or other chemical agents because of the
potential to be engaged in armed conflict with insurgents. In this regard, it has been
suggested the use of such agents would be permissible as part of law enforcement
operations of an occupying power or in "non-traditional military operations such
insurgents.

as

peacekeeping operations, recognized as legitimate under international law." 86

has also been acknowledged that "non-traditional military operations"

apply to non-combatant evacuation and rescue missions.

The question of whether

riot control agents or

be applied in military operations

may

It

also

87

"expanding" bullets should

not limited to operations normally associ-

is

ated with law enforcement. For example, cramped, confined spaces on mer-

chant vessels and the crewing of those vessels by diverse multi-national crews
provide ample practical reasons to seek out
self-defense while conducting visit
tions.

88

The

latter

less-lethal

means

and search or maritime

to detain or act in

interdiction opera-

operations are normally authorized pursuant to a Security

Council resolution. However, a strong argument can also be made that

less-lethal

law enforcement tools should be equally applicable to law of armed conflict-based
visit

and search operations when

tion with

not anticipated there would be a confronta-

enemy forces.

Similarly,

units in

it is

"expanding" bullets are the ammunition of choice for hostage rescue

many

based, appears

States.

At the same time, kidnapping, both criminal and insurgent

common in many failed or re-building States. 89 It raises interesting

moral issues to suggest the civilians of a State such
exposed to greater

risk of injury in a

as Afghanistan or Iraq

should be

law enforcement operation because there also
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happens to be an armed
forces. All

conflict occurring in parts of the nation with insurgent

of this points to a broader use of riot control agents and potentially "ex-

panding" bullets than the concept of law enforcement might ordinarily imply.
State Practice

While many States and their legal advisors acknowledge the delineation of conflict
into the various traditional categories, there

is at

some point

a requirement to set

out the legal framework to be used for operations in the "gray zone." The solution
to this challenge

is

reflected in the approaches already referred to in the

Canadian

manual and the United Nations Secretary-General's Bulletin. The law of armed
conflict is applied as a matter of policy in situations where it technically may not
apply as a matter of law. The United States approach

is

articulated as

all

heads of

Department of Defense Components who are required to "[e]nsure that the
bers of their
flicts,

mem-

DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed con-

however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of

the law of war during

all

other operations." 90

In practical terms, States approach the use of law enforcement tools such as

chemical agents and "expanding" bullets in different ways. The United States
permits the use of riot control agents in a variety of circumstances, both during

armed

conflict

and lower

intensity peace support operations. That policy

is

set

out in Executive Order 11850 which "allows their use in defensive military

modes

to save lives. Since riot control agents in this capacity are not being

against combatants, they are not being used as a 'method of warfare.'"

91

used

Autho-

rized use includes the following situations: controlling riots in areas

under

United States military control; the rioting of prisoners of war; escaping prisoners

to

of war in remotely controlled areas; dispersing civilians

mask an

rear areas. 92

attack; rescue missions for

The United

downed

States military has

pilots;

and

when they are used
for police actions in

used both rubber bullets and tear gas

in dealing with violent detainee disturbances in Iraq. 93

The US Navy's Annotated

The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations notes
that the United States prohibits the use of riot control agents as a form of warfare
Supplement

in

to

both international and internal armed

"that

it

conflicts;

however,

it

goes on to state

does not apply in normal peacekeeping operations, law enforcement op-

erations,

humanitarian and disaster

tage rescue operations,

of such conflicts."

relief operations, counter-terrorist

and hos-

and non-combatant rescue operations conducted outside

94

Australian Air Force doctrine outlines a non-exhaustive

list

where

riot control

agents can be used. These situations include: rioting prisoners of war; rescue
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missions involving

downed

aircrew or escaped prisoners of war; the protection of

supply depots, military convoys and rear echelon areas from
terrorist activities; civil disturbance

when

civil

disturbances and

acting in aid to the civil power;

and dur-

ing humanitarian evacuations involving Australian or foreign nations. 95

Under

Canadian doctrine, "the use of CS gas or pepper spray is lawful and may be used for

crowd control purposes, but their use as a means of warfare is illegal." 96 The United

Kingdom, at least in respect of operations in Iraq, appears to have placed a total ban
on the use of riot control agents
ported to have stated that

in

armed

conflict.

riot control agents

Defence Minister

Hoon was re-

"would not be used by the United

Kingdom in any military operations or on any battlefield." 97 However, riot control
agents appear to be permitted for riot control. 98

The use of riot control agents

in situations involving civilians used to

screen attacks; for rescue missions of
prisoners of war has been criticized.

edgment

that an

99

downed

and

aircrew;

However, there has

"argument can be made that use of a

prisoner of war in an isolated area might be legitimate.

would not be extended
seeking to capture a

this

.

been an acknowl-

against an escaping

." 10 °

This concession

enemy combatants
"more resembles a method of

to the use of chemical agents against

downed

such use

pilot because

warfare than a law enforcement purpose."

However,

.

to capture escaping

also

RCA

mask or

101

viewpoint appears to assume such use would only be directed

towards "enemy combatants." Regarding the rescue of downed aircrew

it

does

not take into account the use of riot control agents to ensure local civilians do

not attempt to attack the aircrew.
that aircrew those civilians
tilities

and therefore be
act.

were to attempt to capture and

might be considered to be taking a

liable to attack.

causing the death or injury of
criminal

If civilians

downed

102

kill

direct part in hos-

In any event, civilians capturing and

aircrew would be the commission of a

103

Denying the

ability to use riot control agents in

such circumstances could be

seen as an overly formalistic approach to a difficult moral situation.

It

would indeed

be incongruous to end up with a "humanitarian" interpretation that those threatening to attack

downed aircrew would have to be

tary personnel

would

subjected to deadly force

prefer to use riot control agents to spare the civilians.

Similarly, contemplating the use of riot control agents in situations

ians are being used as
ficult

moral and

when mili-

where

civil-

human shields places military personnel in an extremely dif-

legal situation.

Such chemical agents are not to be used

as a

"method of warfare," but they may offer the only viable alternative to killing innocent women and children. Interestingly, it has been suggested that riot control
agents might be appropriate in some crowd situations during ongoing armed conflict. During an incident in Fallujah, Iraq on April 30, 2003, US military personnel
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fired

on

a

crowd of demonstrators from which they believed insurgents were en-

gaging them. This incident attracted the criticism of Human Rights Watch. 104 That

non-governmental organization noted that the troops "had no teargas or other
forms of non-lethal crowd control" 105 and among the recommendations was that
"U.S. troops in Iraq be equipped with adequate
sort to lethal force."

A
ians

ing

recommendation
is

crowd control devices to avoid a re-

106

that law enforcement

means be used

against rioting civil-

an appropriate one in most circumstances. However, the challenge

is

apply-

during an armed conflict with an ongoing insurgency when armed members

it

maybe in the crowd. In that circumstance "the separalaw enforcement role and operations in armed conflict may not

of armed opposition groups
tion between a

lend

itself to

being neatly drawn as the occupying power struggles to bring order

out of chaos." 107 However, to the extent the use of riot control means provides a viable alternative in situations like those presented in Fallujah,

argue they should also not be applied to limit casualties to

it

becomes difficult to

human shields being set

up by similar armed groups.
Similar challenges arise in respect of military operations in failed or failing
States

where

it

may not be possible to

easily separate the civilians

ing forces, or those forces from ordinary criminals. Here
sider the reason

is

may be helpful to

con-

why the ban on the use of riot control agents as a means of warfare

was imposed, namely,
conflict

it

from the oppos-

to avoid a misunderstanding as to

being attacked by chemical weapons.

108

If,

whether a Party to the

however, that rationale does

not apply to the operational situation and the use of riot control agents involving
civilians

more

closely approximates situations of domestic

law enforcement,

it

would be much more difficult to suggest that the use of riot control agents does not
provide an appropriate response. Further, the opportunity for misunderstanding

could be reduced by the use of an information operations campaign explaining the
circumstances under which such chemical agents are going to be used for riot control or other
fact

forms of law enforcement. Of course,

dependant. However, the challenge

formally at the expense of employing

Regarding the use of "expanding"

is

many of these situations will be

to ensure rules are not applied overly

more humane
bullets, there

options.

appears to have been

less

overt

reference to State practice. Identifying a consistent interpretation of the test for

what constitutes "unnecessary suffering" and "superfluous injury"
lematic.

One approach

has been to see the terms as synonymous,

have viewed the expression to cover "both measurable
cal) injury

Yoram

and subjective

—psychological

suffering

—

is itself

109

prob-

while others

objective (mostly physi-

and pain." 110 In addition,

as

Dinstein has noted "[s]ome scholars speak about proportionality between

injury or suffering

and the military advantage anticipated" although he
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agreement with that approach. 111 This lack of consensus nearly 140 years

development of the 1868

St.

Petersburg Declaration

112

after the

highlights the challenges in

applying this area of law.

The Study does indicate that the prohibition on the use of "expanding" bullets is
set forth in numerous military manuals and states that "no State has asserted that it
would be lawful to use such ammunition." 113 However, it also indicates the United
States has taken

munition

an "ambiguous" position regarding the use of "expanding" am-

if there is

"a clear showing of military necessity for

reaches a similar conclusion regarding non-international
ever, the

use." 114

armed

The Study

conflict. 115

How-

Study deals only tentatively with the question of the use of "expanding"

bullets for

forcement.
is

its

law enforcement and
It is

likely more

relies heavily

on

references to domestic law en-

here that the issue of State practice needs to be further explored.

It

than the "several states" alluded to in the Study permit the use of "ex-

panding" bullets for law enforcement purposes.

It is

a

common practice in North

America.

The Study describes the two most common reasons

ammunition
in a domestic law enforcement context: avoiding over-penetration and the stopping power of such ammunition. Then, in a somewhat ambiguous fashion of its
own, the Study notes "expanding bullets commonly used by police in situations
other than armed conflict are fired from a pistol and therefore deposit much less
energy than a normal rifle bullet, or a rifle bullet which expands or flattens easily."

116

It

could be argued that

this

statement

complete ban on hollow point ammunition.

panding" bullets
let,

fired

is

for using such

problematic for those supporting a

If the effect

of hollow point or "ex-

by a pistol has a less damaging effect than a normal

rifle

bul-

an argument might be made that the ammunition causes neither unnecessary

suffering nor superfluous injury. If that

why it

is

the case, then

it

would be

should not be permitted in armed conflict situations as

not apparent

A more

this

fundamental question

human

is

why ammunition

that

more complex when

of limiting collateral damage to uninvolved
State,

it is

is

is

viewed as causing

viewed

as lawful

un-

rights-based law enforcement regime governing domestic law en-

forcement. This issue becomes even

posing

However,

was the intention of the authors of the Study.

unacceptable injury and suffering under international law
der a

well.

difficult to see

civilians,

the humanitarian factor

including those of the op-

through the use of "hollow point" ammunition

is

considered. For

example, in the same way that "law enforcement" has been interpreted to permit
the use of riot control agents during

many international

operations, a convincing

argument can be made that "expanding" ammunition would
under that exception.

117
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also

be permitted

Kenneth Watkin

Conclusion

and "expanding" bullets, the increasing
norms are having on both military operations and

In respect of the use of chemical agents

influence that

human

rights

the law of armed conflict
liefs

may very well

require a re-assessment of long held be-

regarding the use of law enforcement means during

respects, the spotlight

conflict. In

many

turned on the "law enforcement" role performed by States in

complex security environments
that has long

armed

is

already having that effect, although

it is

a role

been performed by military forces on international operations.

On a practical level, many military lawyers advising commanders are placed in
an awkward situation of explaining why riot control agents or "expanding" bullets
can be used domestically
in a

law enforcement

sion that

(i.e.,

role,

against your

own

citizens)

and even internationally

but cannot be used against an enemy. This

becomes even more challenging

is

a discus-

as military forces are forced to confront

the reality of conducting operations in "three block wars" or performing law en-

forcement duties in
It is

failed or failing States.

not suggested that the long held and important prohibitions under the law

of armed conflict with respect to the use of riot control agents as a "method of warfare," or

using "expanding" bullets, be removed. However, there

is

considerable

merit to the argument that the underlying rationale for these prohibitions, created

more than a century ago, be critically analyzed. The interpretation of how the customary law of armed conflict rules apply to complex security situations requires
careful consideration of the more flexible application of law traditionally applied
by many States. The law of armed conflict has not been rigidly or formally applied
to those situations, but rather the "spirit

and principles" of those laws have been

followed. Given the continuing complexity of 21st-century conflict, the need to be
flexible

and

to search out

humane approaches

to applying force, remains

an im-

portant goal.

The extension of law of armed conflict norms to internal conflicts highlights this
need for a flexible approach. As Lindsay Moir has noted, many States that would be
"happy to see an increase in the level of humanitarian protection and regulation for
internal conflicts are unlikely to agree to the wholesale adoption in such cases of the

armed conflicts." There remains
throughout the international community that internal and
rules for international

conflicts are

fundamentally different in character."

118

a

broad acceptance

international

armed

A similar challenge arises in

attempting to apply law of armed conflict rules to other complex security situations such as occupation

and the war on

terror.
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In the words of Thomas Franck:

There has always been a large measure of agreement that terrorism poses a new
challenge to the rule of law. Now that it seems clear that the rule of law in both its
domestic and

its

more responsive

—

international configurations

—

still

new circumstances

to the onerous

This ultimately will require

all

the parties

applies, the next task

in

which

it

must

who have an

is

to

make

it

operate. 119

interest in the

law of

armed conflict, or international humanitarian law, however it is termed, to rethink some long held views on the conduct of operations, particularly when military forces are required to also

perform law enforcement functions. Included

among the areas for analysis should be the use of less-lethal means such as chemical
agents and "expanding" bullets in order to ensure the protection for uninvolved
vilians

and other non-combatants

is

ci-

not unduly handcuffed by rules designed for

large scale inter-State conflict.
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Legal Issues in Coalition Warfare:

A US Perspective

Charles Dunlap *

With

increasing frequency, a growing

engaged in operations with
tive

on how

US

number of nations

forces.

I

hope

to give

the United States views the legal obligations

find themselves

you some perspec-

and challenges of opera-

tions within coalitions.

A nation's participation as a member of a coalition is more than just a synchronization of military plans
Interpreting

and objectives;

and applying the law are

it is

also a synchronization of legal issues.

rarely easy tasks with coalitions

comprised of

nations with widely differing political, cultural, and historical influences
legal systems.
tally

The

precise legal context

—and hardly

important

It

up and

make

say,

battle. ...

.

.

.

Brigadier General,

technical, yet vi-

and the

differing ap-

Jones observes:

In a perfect world, a general

[Now] you have

become very legalistic and very complex.

*

L.

"Follow me, men," and everybody would

not the world anymore.

their

the legal aspects of conflict a strategic

must be addressed. As General James

used to be a simple thing to fight a

that's

becoming increasingly

intuitive. Indeed, legal issues

proaches amongst coalition partners
issue that

is

on

say, "Aye, sir"

would

and run

off.

to have a lawyer or a dozen.

get

But
It's

1

US Air Force. The views and opinions expressed by the author are his alone
reflect those of the US Government or any of its components.

and do not necessarily

Legal Issues in Coalition Warfare: A

US Perspective

Of course, even when lawyers are there to advise, a variety of legal challenges will
still

affect coalition operations.

are the big issues: interpreting

Each one will be discussed

in

more detail, but here

and applying international law

in coalition warfare;

domestic law and policy limitations on the different coalition partners (including

how coalition partners provide legal support within the op-

the United States); and
erational area.

I

will close

cratic nation: the

With

all

with a challenge that faces military forces of every demo-

enemy's abuse of law as a tool of asymmetrical warfare.

of these

issues, often the biggest

one hand, national commanders in the

field

question

and

is

On
"How

"which law governs?"

leaders back at

home

ask,

my nation's interpretation and application of law affect my ability to conduct
operations with coalition partners?" On the other hand, the coalition commander
does

must overcome

these

same

legal issues to effectively

employ national

forces in co-

alition operations.

International Law: The Challenge of Applying the
in Coalition

Law of Armed Conflict

Warfare

may appear, at first glance, to be a matter
of interpreting and applying established rules to the coalition as a whole. Much of
International law in coalition operations

international law related to coalition operations
the sea

and diplomatic

ticular international

relations law.

law

is

However,

is

fairly settled, for

example, law of

difficulties arise as to

whether a par-

recognized by each nation participating in the coalition

and as to widely different interpretations of seemingly fundamental rules. In the end,
a nation's domestic law

and policy will shape

The law of armed conflict (LOAC)
ers coalition warfare.

laws

differ,

erns?
ples

2

sometimes

is

its

international law that everyone agrees cov-

Yet, the interpretation
significantly,

application of international law.

and application of armed

conflict

between coalition partners. Which law gov-

To illustrate this thorny question from a US point of view, we'll look at exam-

from customary international law and international agreements.

Some LOAC

is

based in customary international law. These are rules that na-

tions have historically followed because of a sense of legal obligation to

do

so.

How-

how each nation views them can vary widely. For example, depleted uranium
(DU) is a common element used in making armor piercing rounds for a variety of

ever,

ammunition, including the A- 10's 30
a legal

mm cannon.

3

The United States views DU as

weapon that can be used. However, some other nations consider it unlawful

because of the potential dangers of exposure from the resulting debris. 4

more robust international
law than customary law because nations agree to be bound by the terms of treaties
to which they are parties. The bulk of LOAC has been established and defined by
International agreements, or treaties, are arguably
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widely accepted international agreements. 5 Treaties that most individuals associate

with

LOAC are the Geneva Conventions and its Protocols. 6 However, not all coalisame treaties. For instance, the United States has not
follows the principles as part of customary law. 7 An-

tion partners are parties to the
ratified

Protocol

other example
States

is

Even

is

I,

yet

it still

the Ottawa Convention

on anti-personnel mines. 8 The United

not a party to this while most coalition partners
if

coalition partners are

implementation laws

affect

all

parties to the

how and when

same

are.

treaties,

various domestic

each nation follows the

treaties.

This

can be seen in the different interpretation and application of the Geneva Conven-

war on

by long-time allies and coalition partners.
One area that created a legal debate and a flurry of press coverage is the Interna-

tions in the

tional Criminal

terror

Court (ICC). 9 Although the United States was an original signer of

the treaty that created the ICC,

it

was never ratified by the Senate. Thus, the United

Among other things, the US government has concerns about politicized prosecutions by individuals or entities who seek to use the
process not to redress legitimately made allegations, but merely to disrupt US opStates

is

not a party to the treaty.

erations. In fact, the

United States routinely asks other nations to sign "Article 98"

agreements 10 which would operate to protect
to the

US service members from being sent

ICC for trial. This has not stopped other individuals from filing suit in other

nations' courts alleging that

US

leaders were

committing war crimes. 11 In any

event, as a matter of policy the United States prefers to handle allegations of mis-

conduct in American courts, and seeks to avoid subjecting its military personnel to
the jurisdiction of foreign courts.

Even when nations agree on the law, the application to individual cases can vary
widely. For example, radio
potential military targets.
in a
this

and

television stations are seen

by the United

During the Kosovo operations, US

States as

aircraft participating

NATO operation bombed a Serb radio and television facility. Many considered
an unlawful attack on a

waves.

(OIF)

12

civilian target, despite the military use

of the

air-

This also very nearly became an issue during Operation Iraqi Freedom

when the United States,

Iraqi television

that these

and radio

as part

of coalition operations, considered attacking

stations. In this case, the Iraqis themselves

were valid military

targets

traditionally thought of as a civilian

made

it

clear

under LOAC. Even though the television

medium,

the Iraqis used

it

to rally troops

is

and

provide military direction. The news reports were even read by individuals wearing

uniforms of the Iraqi army. Nevertheless,
versy in future conflicts. Coalition

this

is

an area where there will be contro-

commanders will have to address this on a case-

by-case basis.
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Policy,

US Perspective

and Regulation: Limits on National Commanders

As we have seen, international law affecting coalition warfare is viewed through the
lenses of nations taking part in a coalition.
limits, nations' ability to

their forces

work

must comply with

Domestic law further shapes, and often

as coalition partners. National

their

domestic laws,

policies,

commanders and

and

regulations, fur-

ther complicating the legal aspects of coalition operations.

US domestic law, policies, and regulations have the potential to significantly impact US forces' conduct in coalitions. For US forces, domestic law is another aspect
of LOAC. Our policy is to apply LOAC principles to any conflict, no matter how
characterized. 13 Going even further, US forces normally operate within rules of engagement (ROE)

for a particular operation.

Using

LOAC as a foundation, civilian

ROE based on domestic law and policy considerations, in addition to LOAC. Common ROE for coalition forces is highly desirable.
However, even ROE for coalition forces can be different as a result of each partner's
and military leadership develops

own domestic laws and policy. The United States works with
develop and abide by common

ways retain the

ROE in coalition operations; however, US forces al-

right to "use necessary

ual self-defense."

and proportional force

for unit

and individ-

14

As with other aspects of law,
tions.

coalition partners to

ROE

are not

immune from

differing interpreta-

US ROE typically permit units and individuals to use force in self-defense in

situations

where someone or some group displays

hostile intent

and

capability.

US forces" or the use of the
threat of force to "impede the mission and/or duties of US forces." 15 Each coalition
partner defines hostile intent differently and may even limit the ability of their

This

is

the "threat of imminent use of force against ...

forces to engage in self-defense in these types of situations. This

becomes an even

more interesting determination when dealing with air operations. What represents
"hostile intent" to

an

aircraft?

Domestic law can create challenges

LOAC. Commanders must
United States

is

a party,

for

US commanders

abide by those international agreements to which the

which may limit their authority. Furthermore, under US law

American commanders usually cannot provide
ners without

in areas other than

logistic

support to coalition part-

some type of government-to-government agreement covering the ex-

change of goods and services

—and

often having a reimbursement requirement. 16

Command and control issues are also very important. The US Constitution and
domestic law place limits on the

mand.
there

ability

of US forces to serve under foreign com-

Typically, operational control or tactical control

is

ultimately a

US commander who

is

exercises actual
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Discipline

is

at the core

of every successful military operation, including coali-

tion operations. Historically, each coalition partner
its

is

responsible for disciplining

troops in accordance with domestic military and criminal law. This authority

does not

rest

with the coalition commander, but with the national commanders of

the coalition partners. However, every coalition
in unit welfare

and

discipline,

and should make sure

to avoid adverse operational effects.

Ghraib abuse scandal, a
battlefield.

commander has

failure

a strong interest

that discipline

is

carried out

As General Sanchez learned during the Abu

of discipline can be just as bad as a defeat on the

17

Applying domestic law to disciplinary matters creates challenges for all coalition

commanders,
tions. Since

especially with respect to situations that arise during specific opera-

Operation Desert Shield in 1990,

operation generally operate with
all

some form of "General Order #1"

components of the American contingent.

the beginning of an operation

US forces deployed for a contingency

and may

18

Such orders are

applicable to

typically issued at

limit the actions of troops for policy rea-

They limit, for example, the ability of troops to consume alcohol in certain locations. While US troops often are prohibited from drinking alcohol, other troops
may be free to do so. A US soldier is likely to be punished for drinking, while her
British friend might not. It is just another area where coalition partners may differ
and may present complications for US commanders.
The US illustrations, above, highlight some of the international and domestic
law challenges faced by coalition commanders and their legal teams when tackling
sons.

the question of "which law governs?"
sist

commanders

We now move to the individuals who can as-

to effectively accomplish the coalition mission within the

com-

pass of the law.

Legal Support to Commanders: The Role of Lawyers in the Coalition

The types of legal support commanders receive vary greatly between the coalition
members. Although General Jones would not go to war without a dozen or so lawyers,

many coalition partners do

them on

not have judge advocates (JAG) 19 or do not train

the various aspects of operational law. In

many cases,

their legal advisors

are not even deployed forward with the troops they service. For operations law,

many

coalition partners have to rely

on

civilian attorneys

back in their nation's

on complex and ever-changing operational issues. However,
JAGs do deploy together, great things can happen.

capital for advice

when

coalition

Bright Star 99/00

—

a biannual exercise held in Egypt 20

—was

a perfect

example

of coalition JAGs working together. The 1999/2000 exercise brought together military lawyers

from the United States and

Britain into a coalition warfare setting.
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JAGs bring their knowledge of their nations' domestic law and policy to
the table and help educate other JAGs on why they cannot engage in certain operacoalition

tions or use certain weapons. This

JAG

is

a reason

we

like to see robust, international

participation in coalition operations.

more
weapon

In the United States, and for coalition partners as well, JAGs must have

JAGs need to know the
systems that are being used, how they are being used, and the overall strategy for a
particular operation. They also need to understand the complex and intricate command and control environment in which they operate.
and more knowledge about

areas beside the law.

How do US JAGs cope with the issues they face in operations, especially serving
in Coalition Air Operations Centers (CAOC)? All JAGs that deploy to CAOC positions are required to attend a six- week-long training

CAOC.

tems and methodologies used to run a

This

not a JAG-specific course,

is

who serve in the CAOC.

but one attended by all specialties

how things are done and what attributes
In contrast to the increased training
coalition partners

program on the computer sys-

do not have the

each career

and resources

field

It

enables

them to

learn

brings to the fight.

available for

access to high-tech systems

US JAGs, many

found

in the

CAOC

Nor do all coalition
lawyers receive training in the complex and fast-paced conduct of modern warfare.
them

to enable

to provide effective oversight to operations.

Unfortunately, this

may be leading to a tech and training gap between US JAGs and

our coalition partners that

will

need to be addressed.

What about friendly fire cases? As the United States saw with the Tarnak Farms
"friendly fire" case, this can cause both political

and operational problems. Tarnak

Farms was an incident in Afghanistan where US

aircraft

dian ground forces. Canadian and
vestigating

tions that

US military lawyers were deeply involved in in-

and advising commanders

ranged from

after this

unfortunate incident. Legal issues

LOAC to discipline to release of information. These are difficult ques-

still

need more thoughtful study.

Another challenge facing the United

LOAC

mistakenly bombed Cana-

States

is

how to respond

to allegations of

violations. Unfortunately, in conflicts innocent civilians will

The United

States

must maintain

in the media-intense world.

a transparent approach to

its

be harmed.

targeting especially

US targeting philosophies and the lengths we go to

in

order to avoid unnecessary casualties need to be highlighted and available to the

media.

When incidents occur, reports should be made available for the media and

the general public so nothing
targeting process,

roles to

hidden. In addition to being an integral part of the

JAGs must be prepared

spokespersons on alleged

What

is

to advise

commanders and

military

LOAC violations.

JAGs play

in

modern

Weekly suggests that JAGs are the ones

conflict?

Michael Sirak in Janes Defence

who determine what weapons are built, the
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bombs, and

their targets. 21

The

reality for

US

forces

is

that

JAGs

—

are advisors

commanders make the decisions about weapons and targets. 22 Effective legal support to coalition forces is critical in this age of complex legal challenges, but lawyers should not

and cannot displace commanders

as decision-makers.

Lawfare: An Asymmetrical Threat to Coalitions
Besides being a foundation for

how we operate,

the law

is

being used as a weapon

by our adversaries. As Rivken and Casey said in 2001, "international law may become one of the most potent weapons ever deployed against the United States." 23
Our enemies, as William Eckhardt said, are now attacking our military plans as
being

illegal

gravity."

This

and immoral. Our laws have become a new Clausewitzean "center of

24

is

a

new form of asymmetrical warfare I call "lawfare." 25 As more and more

adversaries learn they cannot go

they have
tives.

moved

up

against our coalition forces

on the

battlefield,

to attack us through the law to achieve their operational objec-

However, not all lawfare is "bad" and the United States applies

sary, like controlling the

cameras on commercial

satellites

it

when neces-

with coverage areas over

Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom bases. Such control

is

achieved through the use of law, not the use of force. Lawfare, as

is

I

use this term,

an operational methodology that can be used for "good" or "bad" purposes.

Our adversaries often employ an abusive form of lawfare aimed at undermining
the kind of public support democracies need to conduct military operations.

very

It

much has a Clausewitzean basis. When we talk about Clausewitz, we are talk-

ing about the "remarkable trinity" that coalesces to create warfighting potential:
the government, the people,
flict is

to focus

its

and the

military. America's typical

approach to con-

energy and effort against the military capability of the enemy.

Using lawfare, adversaries are not trying to defeat the United States

militarily;

they

seek to separate the people from the trinity and erode their will for the conflict.

How do they erode the will of the people?
One way is to use actual or perceived LOAC violations. By repeatedly characterizing military actions as illegal and immoral, for example declaring LOAC violations, the

enemy's objective

to question the military

and forums are

is

to cause the people to

grow weary of war and begin

and government's conduct.

facilitating these

Increasingly, organizations

messages so the enemy has a variety of ways to

spread the word. As technology continues to develop in the 21st century, so too do

new means of spreading
the Internet

information.

Our

adversaries have been quick to utilize

and the power of the globalized media

227

to spread their message.
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Another strategy that we have seen is actually goading coalition forces into committing

LOAC incidents that would have strategic impact on our operations.

example, bin Laden has attempted to exploit the

were victims of collateral damage in an

effort to

larger East-West conflict, further inflaming
States

mies

and other

know

fact that

women and

children

ensnare the United States into a

Muslim opinion

against the United

friendly nations, including those in the Persian Gulf. 26

that the secret to

For

any democratic society

is

to get their

Our

ene-

message to the

people and the people will respond.

We
tack.

27

have also seen Iraqi forces that feigned surrender and then turned to

These incidents occurred frequently, causing coalition and

at-

civilian casual-

The enemy's perfidy created an environment in which US troops have been
known to shoot first and ask questions later when they encounter surrendering individuals. However, the television -viewing public sees only the US conduct. The
more we see incidents like this, the more people believe the war is being wrongly
fought. Professors W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou explain:
ties.

In

modern popular democracies, even

a limited

armed

conflict requires a substantial

base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse

how worthy the political objective,

if people believe

an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.

However,

this

does not

mean

that the

itself rapidly,

war

is

no matter

being conducted in

28

that democracies are at a disadvantage in future

wars. In fact, history proves that those nations that

comply with the accepted

norms of behavior in warfare are more successful than those nations that wage war
against civilians.

must develop

Coalitions

strategies to

counter lawfare; just as they must be pre-

pared to fight any asymmetrical attack. Foremost, every coalition partner must be

committed

monize

to

their interpretation

cal challenges

tackle. Yet,

among

complying with the law. Participating nations should
of doing

so.

and application of LOAC, despite the

Many

commanders, with

coalition forces

strive to har-

legal

and

politi-

of these issues are for the civilian leadership to

their lawyers, can

and be ready

emphasize

common ground

to respond to lawfare through transparency

and prompt public response.
Coalition Warfare:

A Synchronization of Legal Issues

Nations with a stunningly broad range of operational capabilities and legal sys-

tems have joined the United States in a number of military operations. Integrating
these diverse forces into an effective coalition requires
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more than coordination of
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military plans, objectives,

interpretation
I

and

coalitions. Far

US perspective on some of the legal challenges faced by

from being secondary, domestic law and policy are

heart of different legal perspectives,

nation to

its

orchestration of each nation's

and application of law.

have tried to present a

modern

logistics. It requires

from

commanders. The United

lenges through this lens,

at the

LOAC to the legal services provided by a

States views

its

legal obligations

and

chal-

which neither discounts nor minimizes the importance of

international law. In addition to confronting legal issues between coalition partners, the coalition

must be prepared

to counter the enemy's lawfare. In the highly

complex environment of coalition warfare, synchronization of legal

issues

is criti-

cal to operational success.
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"England Does Not Love Coalitions"

Does Anything Change?

Charles Garraway*

My

title

comes from a quote from Benjamin Disraeli, speaking in the House

of Commons on December

1
16, 1852. In 1852, Victoria

was on the throne

of England and Abbott Lawrence was the United States Ambassador to the Court

of St. James. Lawrence was born

at

Groton, Massachusetts, not too

far

from the

Naval War College, and is the founder of Lawrence, Massachusetts and of the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard. The British Empire was at

on

it

the sun never

set.

hinterland. This was

its

height in 1852 and

Livingstone was setting out on his journeys into the African

two years before the

of the Crimean War; British forces

start

were fighting in Burma; the Punjab had just been annexed and gold had been

dis-

covered in a remote prison colony called Australia. Disraeli was not yet Prime
Minister

—

that

Secretary in

US

was yet to come. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer

—Treasury

terms.

But what did Disraeli mean by "coalition"?

I

have not been able to find an 1852

my definition from my old copy of the Concise Oxford Dictionary (which still bears my school particulars in the front cover!).
English dictionary and

I

therefore take

This reads: "Coalition, n. Union, fusion; (Pol.) temporary combination for special

ends between parties that retain distinctive principles." 2

* Visiting Professor at King's College,

London and an

Associate Fellow of Chatham House.

"England Does Not Love Coalitions" - Does Anything Change?

Why, therefore, did England not love coalitions? I would suggest that the problem
is

similar to that facing the United States today. Britain at that time did not

alitions

world,

—

it

except, as

it

soon found out in the Crimea,

was supreme and could

act as

it

liked.

A

need co-

in Europe. In the rest of the

coalition,

by

my definition,

is

a

"temporary combination for special ends between parties that retain distinctive principles."

The problem

is

not so

much

in the

"temporary combination"

as in the "dis-

For a coalition to work, those "distinctive principles" must be

tinctive principles."

least similar. If there is

no "coalescing"

there, there

at

can be no "coalition." In Europe,

again.

came and went as principles coalesced in certain fields and then parted
The Crimean War itself was a classic example where British and French inter-

ests in

stopping Russian expansion led to a temporary coalition between countries

coalitions

that less than half a century before

Modern

history

—not

bloody

in

conflict.

of talk of coalitions. The most relevant here

is

that of the

modern entity, but the group of countries that came to1940s to stand up to tyranny and fascism. That metamorphosed into the

"United Nations"
gether in the

is full

had been locked

the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Communist bear

in

alliance

where the need

to hold the

check outweighed the "distinctive principles" of the different

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has
led to the balance shifting and more emphasis now being on the "distinctive principles" rather than the common purpose. It is the new World Superpower that now
states that it has no love for coalitions. Joseph Fitchett of the International Herald
Tribune writing in 2002 in European Affairs, talks of "[t]he dismissive attitudes that
have recently seemed to prevail in Washington toward NATO, ranging from benign
neglect during the Afghan campaign to forthright dislike for coalition warfare in the
comments of some Pentagon officials." 3
Yet, as the British found less than two years after Disraeli's dismissive comment,
coalitions are a necessary evil when the interests of the differing parties combine sufcountries involved.

ficiently to

outweigh the differences in the principles. But does that mean that the

dif-

removed or set aside? No. The distinctiveness of each coalition partner
remains and ways are found of working around the differences without prejudicing
the position of any of the partners. That is difficult and requires compromise on all
ferences are

sides. It is that

—whether Great
century—

need for compromise that superpowers

mid- 19th century or the United

States in the 21st

Britain in the

find so difficult.

What I would like to examine is the way that we have reached the current state of
affairs

and then look

at

two

specific areas

United States and some of its major

Allies.

of apparent disagreement between the
I

will also try to see

tinctive principles" are in fact distinctive and, if so,

whether these

whether they can be worked

around. Those two specific areas are the impact of Additional Protocol
rights law.
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and of human
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Ambassador James
tative to the

on

Justice

B.

Cunningham, United

States

Deputy Permanent Represen-

United Nations, speaking in the Security Council on September 24, 2003

and the Rule of Law

in International Affairs, stated:

The United States of America is a nation founded, not upon ethnicity or cultural custom
or territory, but upon law enshrined in our Constitution. As a consequence, establishing
and maintaining the rule of law has been an enduring theme of American foreign policy
for over
shall

two

centuries. Notably, the U.S. Constitution specifically provides that treaties

We

be the supreme law of the land.

because

we

cannot be

therefore

do not enter into

treaties lightly

believe the importance of the rule of law to a successful system of peace
overstated.

Democracy,

economic prosperity, human rights,
depend on the rule of law. The rule of law is

justice,

combating terrorism, and

lasting peace

essential to fulfill the ideas

behind the

all

UN Charter we are all pledged to support. 5

make this point right at the start because it is often overlooked. The United States
is a country founded on and believing in the rule of law. The very fact that debate toI

day

on that phrase is an illustration of how fundaAmerican psyche. The United States does not only recognize the

in political circles often centers

mental

it is

to the

validity of the rule of law in the

domestic sphere but also in the international sphere

Ambassador Cunningham makes plain. It is therefore of vital importance to those
who work with and alongside the United States to understand where, in the opinion
of the United States, that law exists and what it is. However, what is good for the
as

goose

is

also

good

for the gander

and

it is

just as vital that the

stands the laws that govern the activities of their Allies.

It

United States under-

would not be appropriate

for the

United States to demand that their Allies act outside the law that binds them,

even

that law

if

is

not binding on the United

mockery of the rule of law as a concept.
This was recognized by the United States

States.

Such a demand would make a

in the early 1990s,

Operation Desert Storm. Although Additional Protocol
treaty law because Iraq

was not a party (nor

United Kingdom or France),

it

at the

I

and

in particular in

did not apply as a matter of

time were the United

was recognized by the United

provisions of that Protocol were seen as binding law by

States that

some of the

States, the

many of the

Coalition forces.

1992,

on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War of April
in Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, discusses Additional Protocol I at

some

length, confirming that parts are "generally regarded as a codification of the

Indeed, the Final Report to Congress

customary practice of nations, and therefore binding on
also confirms the

US view that parts

all."

6

However, the Report

of the Protocol are not such a codification and

seeks to identify specific "deficiencies" therein. 7

There are frequent approving references to
col

I

throughout Annex

O

specific articles of Additional Proto-

and, under "Observations," the remark
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is

made

that
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"Adherence to the law of war impeded neither Coalition planning nor execution;
Iraqi violations of the

law provided Iraq no advantage." 8

This very practical approach mirrored that taken by President Reagan in his Letter

of Transmittal of Additional Protocol
Senate on January 29, 1987,
vice

9

II

oncilably flawed."

Armed Conflict)

when he announced that he would not

and consent to Additional Protocol
10

(Non-International

I,

describing

as

it

sound elements" and

to "the positive provisions of Protocol

humanitarian benefit

if

flicts."

We

He went on

by

irrec-

as containing "certain
I

that could be of real

parties to international

armed con-

to state:

are therefore in the process of consulting with our allies to develop appropriate

methods

for incorporating these positive provisions into the rules that govern

military operations,
results

In

generally observed

seek Senate ad-

"fundamentally and

However, he referred to the Protocol

to the

of this

and

as

initiative as

NATO

as

it is

possible to

do

so.

will advise the Senate

I

of the

11

had been under way since the adoption of the Protocols,

fact, that initiative

with a

customary international law.

soon

our

working group looking

agreed reservations which would

at possible

enable the Alliance to adopt a united front. Unfortunately, that process seemed to go

on

for too long for

some European

while negotiations were

still

States,

who broke

continuing, adopting

working group reservations. For example, and
ular State, Belgium,

who

some

on

Article 44

concern identified by the United

States.

and

I

—but not —of the NATO
all

am not seeking to isolate any partic-

ratified in 1986, prior to the

terpretative declarations"

NATO

I

ranks and ratified Protocol

Reagan transmittal, made

"in-

Article 1(4), the

two areas of particular

While the former was

in accordance with the

formula, that on Article 1(4) was in

less stringent

made by the United Kingdom on its ratification

in 1998

terms. 12

The statements

probably bear the closest

re-

NATO position.
Unfortunately, the failure of the NATO initiative seemed to bring an end to nego13

semblance to the almost-agreed

tiation

on

a formal level

though there was continuous contact among military law-

yers, particularly those tasked
series

with the drafting of military manuals. There were a

of meetings in various countries at which such issues were discussed and

at-

made to strike a common balance. In addition, Michael Matheson, then
Deputy Legal Adviser at the US Department of State, in a presentation made in

tempts were
the

Washington College of Law, 14 provided a comparatively detailed analysis
of Protocol I indicating those areas which the United States found acceptable and
1987

at the

those that

it

did not.

Although, as

we have

seen, Additional Protocol

I

was considered and

tested dur-

ing Desert Storm, the tide in the United States was already beginning to turn against
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had always been

the treaty. There

posed any compromise,
hand, the military,

a strong element within the

illustrated

who

by Douglas

had

actually

to

work

United States that op-

Feith's writing in 1985. 15

in the field,

On the other

were seeking to adopt the

Reagan approach and to develop "appropriate methods for incorporating these positive provisions into the rules that

govern our military operations." The problem that

the military faced was in identifying those "positive provisions" in the absence of any
clear

The military inevitably turned to the only guidance that
namely the Matheson article, and this found its way into military

government

they could find,

position.

manuals of all the
tocol

I,

Services.

There are frequent references to parts of Additional Pro-

such as in the Annotated Supplement

Law of Naval

(NWP

Operations

to

The Commander's Handbook on the

1-14M), 16 usually citing Matheson as the authority.

For example, in referring to Article 54( 1 ) of Additional Protocol I creating a new pro-

on the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare,

hibition

this is a prohibition that "the

NWP 1-14M states that

United States believes should be observed and in due

Law

course recognized as customary law," citing Matheson. 17 The Operational

Handbook of the Army Judge Advocate General's Corps
detail a

list

of the

articles

which "the U.S. views

... as

18

went further, publishing in

either legally binding as

custom-

ary international law or acceptable practice though not legally binding." 19 This type

of detail appeared in the Handbook from 2000 to 2003 but was omitted in 2004.

appeared in 2005,

20

It re-

only to be overtaken by an Errata note stating that the entry

should be "disregarded." This note went on to state that "Information was taken

from an Article written by Michael Matheson in 1986.
the U.S. position

and

as a result

It

takes an overly broad view of

may cause some confusion as to U.S.

Policy." 21 This

followed an article by Hays Parks in 2003 in which in a footnote he had stated that

Michael Matheson had expressed "his personal opinion that 'certain provisions of
Protocol

I

reflect

which should.
Matheson's

.

.

customary international law or are positive new developments

become

part of that law'." 22 In fact, the

full text

of that paragraph of

article reads:

well aware of the need to make decisions and to take action on
from our conversations with our allies that there is a shared
perception, particularly among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries,
of a strong military need for common rules to govern allied operations and a political
need for common principles to demonstrate our mutual commitment to humanitarian

The

executive branch

these issues.

values.

is

We know

We recognize that certain provisions of Protocol

I

reflect

customary international

law or are positive new developments which should in time become part of that law. 23

This should be read together with his opening statement that:

"I

appreciate the

opportunity to offer this distinguished group a presentation on the United States position

concerning the relationship of customary international law to the 1977
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Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions." 24

The Royal "we" went out

flecting a personal statement.

time of George

It is

in

hard to see

American English

ered "authoritative."

appears that the Matheson analysis

It

interesting in reading the so-called

It is

no longer consid"Torture Memos," 25 to
is

find the almost complete lack of reference to Additional Protocol

been wiped out of the

memory bank.

"We

said:

article 75.

I.

It is

as if

it

has

no longer even clear whether the United
Article 75 on Fundamental Guarantees, of

It is

such key provisions as

which Matheson had
contained in

at the

III!

So where are we now?

States accepts

this as re-

support in particular the fundamental guarantees

." 26
.

.

This lack of legal clarity causes acute problems for Allies seeking to work alongside
the United States. Quite apart
is

the

US

definition of a military objective?

dling. If the

United States

of Article 75,

United

from the issues arising from targeting decisions

it is

States.

is

serious issues arise over detainee han-

not prepared even to accept the fundamental guarantees

is

hard to see

This

—

—what

how allies can hand over detainees to the custody of the

before one takes into account the presidential decision that

Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions does not apply outside non-international

armed

conflict. 27

While

generally accepted that, in the

no doubt

this

may be

correct as a matter of treaty law,

Article 3] also constitute a

now

words of the International Court of Justice, "there

event of international armed conflicts, these rules

that, in the

it is

minimum yardstick.

is

[Common

." 28
.

.

My point here is not to criticize the United States decision not to ratify Additional
Protocol

I.

That

an acceptable position. However, the existence of the Protocol

is

cannot be ignored, nor the

fact that the

majority of the United States' traditional

al-

29

You will
note that I have omitted other parts of "Old Europe" such as France and Germany30
though in fact almost all the NATO States are indeed parties. 31 We need to know
are parties to

lies

what the United
is

it,

including the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia.

States position

vital for coalition operations.

—and even

law

ment.

32

its

However,

authoritative

form

is
I

very existence
it

should

trust that

appreciate that the role of customary international

—

is

sometimes questioned within the

US

be possible for the Administration to publish in an

stance

law of war manual under preparation in the Office of General Counsel of the

partment of Defense

would urge

its

early

govern-

on the provisions of Additional Protocol I which at least
from which others can work. It is to be hoped that the planned

its

will allow a baseline

still

and uncertainty simply undermines the

US De-

do exactly that and for that reason, if for no other, I
completion. As Michael Matheson noted, "The United States

will in fact

some alternative clear indication of which rules they consider binding or
otherwise propose to observe." 33 Indeed he went on to put it even more clearly: "It is
[must] give

important for both the United States government and the United States scholarly
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community to devote attention to determining which elements in Protocol I deserve
recognition as customary international law, either
true in 1987
it

and remains true today.

If Matheson

now or in the future." 34 That was

saw his effort as "work in progress,"

needs to be completed.

My second point is the increasing role of human rights law. Again there is a growing divide between the United States and, in particular, Europe

—and not

Europe." The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

mechanism of any human

ably the most effective enforcement
the world.

The European Court of Human Rights

approach or not,

it is

just

"Old

has prob-

rights organization in

passes binding judgments

presents a progressive interpretation of human rights law.
that

35

Whether one

and

agrees with

a fact.

The Convention requires parties to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms" contained in the Convention. 36 Jurisdiction has been interpreted widely and it has been ruled that although the application of the Convention is
primarily territorial, extraterritorial jurisdiction is not ruled out, inter alia, "when the
respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants

abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent,

invita-

Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the
public powers normally to be exercised by that Government." 37 The United Kingtion or acquiescence of the

dom
some

courts have interpreted that as allowing the application of the Convention to
activities in Iraq. 38

There is a difference here from the wording of the International Covenant on Civil

and

Political Rights

territory
test
is

which requires

and subject

which

is

to

its

States to grant rights to "all individuals within

jurisdiction." 39 This clearly

its

seems to lay down a two-part

lacking in the text of the European Convention where jurisdiction alone

the standard. However, this has been interpreted as "those within

those otherwise subject to

its

Human

jurisdiction."

40

its

territory

and

This interpretation was confirmed by

Committee in General Comment 31, adopted
March 29, 2004, when it stated, "A State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid
down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State
the United Nations

Rights

Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party." 41

The United States position, however, appears to be to adopt the literal reading of
the text and to limit the application of the Covenant to United States territory. This
position is confirmed by the Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in
the Global War on Terrorism which stated, "The United States has maintained consistently that the Covenant does not apply outside the United States or its special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and that it does not apply to operations of the
military during an international armed conflict." 42
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It is

interesting to note that the

but not

ratified

sure rights "to

by the United

all

American Convention on

Human

Rights, signed

States, in Article 1, also refers to the obligation to en-

persons subject to their jurisdiction," thus equating to the language

of the European Convention. 43

Thus the
rights law.

first

divergence of opinion

The United

persons within

its

and many others

to the territorial applicability of

is

States considers that

jurisdiction if they do not

—consider

it is

human

not bound in law to grant rights to

meet the territoriality test. The Europeans

that, while territoriality is a

key

factor,

it is

not the sole

governing factor and that they are therefore obliged as a matter of law to extend cer-

own territory.

tain rights outside their

But the quote from the Working Party also reveals another divergence. The
United States view appears to be that in time of international armed
rights

conflict,

human

law is inapplicable and is replaced by the law of armed conflict. This was indeed

an accepted view among

many in the past and seemed to reflect the classic divide be-

tween the law of peace and the law of war. But
tween peace and war

in the

same way that the boundary be-

has become blurred, so an analysis of the treaties

itself

themselves no longer supports the purist view. Article 4 of the International Cove-

nant deals with derogations and provides for such "in time of public emergency

which threatens the

life

of the nation and the existence of which

is

officially

pro-

claimed." Even then, there are certain rights that are non-derogable.

The European Convention is even more specific referring in Article 1 5 to "in time
of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation." In Article 15(2),
it specifically states: "No derogation from Article 2 [the right to life] except in respect
of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war
shall be made under this provision." It
is clearly not open to the European States to argue that the Convention does not apply in time of war as it specifically caters for that eventuality. It is therefore necessary
for them to examine how the two bodies of law mesh together in time of conflict.
For purposes of completeness, the American Convention refers, in its derogation
,

.

clause, to "war, public danger, or other

or security of a State Party."

.

.

emergency that threatens the independence

44

The International Court of Justice has addressed this issue in a number of cases including the Nuclear Weapons case 45 and, most recently, the "Barrier" case involving
the so-called "Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory." 46

In the Nuclear Weapons case, the Court observed:
[Tjhat the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not
cease in times of war, except

provisions
to

life is

by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain

may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.

Respect for the right

not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be
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deprived of one's life applies also in

of life, however, then
applicable in

falls

to be

hostilities.

The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation

determined by the applicable

armed conflict which is designed to

whether a particular

loss

namely, the law

lex specialise

regulate the conduct of hostilities.

of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare,

is

Thus
to be

considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant can only

be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the
terms of the Covenant

itself.

47

from the Nuclear Weapons case and

In the ''Barrier' case, the Court quoted

continued:

More

Court considers that the protection offered by

generally, the

human

rights

conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions
for derogation of the kind to

and Political
and human

Rights.

be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil

As regards the

relationship between international humanitarian law

rights law, there are thus three possible situations:

exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others

of human rights law; yet others

may be

some

rights

may

be

may be exclusively matters

matters of both these branches of international

law. In order to answer the question put to

it,

the Court will have to take into

consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as
lex specialise international

humanitarian law. 48

Lawyers operating with Allied countries have no choice but to wrestle with

complex interaction and find

it

difficult to

understand the United States objections,

particularly if they lead to presidential statements such as,

Nation, values that
tainees

we

share with

this

many nations

humanely, including those who are not

"Of course, our values as a

in the world, call for us to treat delegally entitled to such treatment." 49

(Emphasis added.)
Is

the president seriously suggesting that there are people

who are not legally enti-

"humane treatment"? Indeed, this sits oddly with the words of the same president on his second inauguration when he said: "From the day of our Founding, we
have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and
tled to

matchless value." 50
cause this
nents.

is

I

agree with these words

and the president

is

right,

not

least

be-

indeed the exact opposite of the doctrine preached by our terrorist oppo-

The United States has stood as a bastion for human rights since its founding.

was the United

States that led the

human

Universal Declaration of Human Rights
force. It

was the United

States

rights

51

itself had

world has them only

in the early days

Eleanor Roosevelt as

its

and the
guiding

who during the Cold War stood as a beacon of light of-

fering a different vision to oppressed people.

being given to the world

movement

It

now

at the will

is

that only

It is

therefore unfortunate that the view

Americans have

of the United States! That
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rights

—the

rest

of the

not the message of the
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Founding Fathers, nor
uncertain sound,

who

way as

In the same

the message of the president but "[i]f the trumpet give an

is it

there

the United States, so there
military operations.
States

what

part

is

is

—

prepare himself to the battle?" 52

shall

confusion about the status of Additional Protocol

is
is

I

in

confusion on the applicability of human rights law to

Whether we like it or not, the world is moving on and the United

a big part

going on in the

—of

rest

that world.

However,

it is

of the world. Those of us

not so big that

who

it

can ignore

are wrestling with these

knotty legal problems need the help and expertise that the United States can bring.

Furthermore,

by

if the

United States wants to shape the legal landscape,

a position of active involvement.

There are

many who

it

can only do so

are concerned with the

manner in which human rights law is being used to reinterpret accepted principles of
the law of armed conflict. The law of armed conflict reflects the realities of war in a
way that human rights law does not and was never designed to do.
I come back to my definition of coalition: "temporary combination for special

—

ends between parties that retain distinctive principles."

The United
coalition

is

States has distinctive principles

to work,

all

—and

that they exist

parties

but so do

need to retain those

are distinctive

—cannot be

all its

friends

and

allies. If

distinctive principles.

The

a

fact

ignored. If the United States wishes

own distinctive principles on others, that is not a "coalition." Nor can
or should we
as allies, impose our own principles on the United States. How-

to

impose

we

—

its

—

,

we do have

ever, in recognizing that

ways of channeling those

Our purpose

is

we need to work together to find
so that we move forward together.

differences,

distinctive principles

the same.
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Coalition Warfare:

Challenges and Opportunities

Dale G. Stephens -k

When

planning for coalition warfare, the military lawyer is concerned with

achieving effective interoperability under applicable international and

domestic law. In the modern context of "coalitions of the willing,"

means achieving
tion,

a

this essentially

harmonization of rules of engagement (ROE) with the lead na-

having regard to the specific taskings and missions the coalition partners have

assumed. Usually (but not always) the lead nation in conducting serious global operations in the

contemporary environment

is

the United States has asserted formally that

the United States. As

it is

is

well

not prepared to sign and

known,
ratify a

number of treaties applicable in the context of armed conflict and has been consistently critical of the "progressive" nature of a number of assertive statements of
1

customary law heralded by some. 2 Therein

lays the obvious,

but "ostensible" chal-

lenge, for coalition military partners in trying to ensure operational effectiveness

when operating under potentially divergent legal regimes. The word "ostensible" is
emphasized, because

*

at the

working officer level of coalition warfare, there

is

much

Commander, Royal Australian Navy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author

alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government, the Australian

Defence Force, or the Royal Australian Navy. This article was first published in volume 36 of the
Yearbook on Human Rights (2006) and is reprinted with permission. © 2006 by Dale G.

Israel

Stephens.
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and Opportunities

more commonality of approach than what one might expect notwithstanding the
stridency of statements sometimes made as to national divergence under the law.
due

theme of this

a

It is

to the pragmatic

This

article that coalition

approach taken to interpreting the law by coalition partners.

not to suggest any subversion of the law, but rather

is

coalition partners to intelligently

them

accommodate

differing legal

opposed

generally cast in terms of "standards" as

is

and thus

more

is

made by
approaches among

reflects choices

common good. This success is also due to the nature of the law itself,

for the

which

operations are frequently successful

upon

usually predicated

tary decision-maker.

to "bright line" rules

the invocation of "values"

are,

of course, a

interoperability

compare

many outside of

may think.
Modes of Analysis

There

mili-

Within this interdependent world, such values are more con-

vergent and synonymous with those of society at large than what
the military

by the

number of ways

in

—Formalism
which

to assess the issue of coalition

under the law. At the immediate or formalist level, one can merely

treaties ratified

by

coalition partners

made by such partners to determine who

is

and statements of customary law

able to

paign and to orchestrate missions accordingly.

do what

in the course of a

cam-

Of course, this assumes the absence

of a single consensus standard to which all will comply, which in terms of coalitions
of the willing,

From

is

a relatively safe assumption. 3

this formalist position,

we

some obvious direct inconsisThe Ottawa Land Mines Convention 4 is the

are faced with

tency issues under international law.

example of such inconsistency, especially Article

classic

1(c)

which provides

"Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances: to

assist,

that

encourage

or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party

under

New

this

Convention." 5

US

allies

such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan,

Zealand and the United Kingdom 6 have

Having regard

by such

to the literal

all

signed and ratified this treaty.

wording of the obligations imposed, mission taskings

signatories could not, for example, contemplate the tactical level carriage

of US forces or refueling of US assets where such forces or assets are carrying and/
or contemplate the use of anti-personnel landmines. 7 Additionally, a

US

allies

Statute

8

number of

have assumed obligations under the International Criminal Court

and under the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and

its five

9

Pro-

The United States is not a party to the International Criminal Court treaty
nor to two of the five Conventional Weapons Convention Protocols. 10 Again, these

tocols.

disparities

have their

own dynamics

regarding tactical level mission taskings.
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Such dissonance

is

also

found in

differing interpretations of customary interna-

The potential dichotomy between the definitions "war sustaining" under the US Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 11 and
"effective contribution to direct military action" under the San Remo Manual on
tional law.

Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea 12 is one such obvious area.
those who have ratified Additional Protocol I 13 are bound by a num-

International
Similarly,

ber of provisions that the United States
bition

on

is

not. For example, Article 56 with

and nuclear

attacking dams, dikes

its

prohi-

electrical generating stations is

one

where the United States has stressed its opposition as a ground for non-ratification. 14
Similarly divisive

tocol

I

is

the issue of belligerent reprisal. Article 51(6) of Additional Pro-

expressly prohibits attacks

on civilians. Such a constraint does not, however,

US forces under US formulations as to the residual scope of this right pur-

apply to

suant to customary international law. 15 Such differences in obligation are real and
are necessarily reflected in default statements of national
rectives to coalition

commanders.

Under the formalist paradigm,

ROE and "red card"

di-

16

all

of this would seem to render the chance of ef-

fective interoperability very difficult, if

not impossible. But of course this has not

been the

case. In recent years, coalition forces

States in

numerous operations without any

have participated with the United

serious

compromise

to mission effec-

during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,

tiveness. Coalition operations

during operations in Somalia, in East Timor, in Afghanistan and during Operation
Iraqi

Freedom

are, in fact, a

testament to coalition effectiveness under the law.

Why is this so? The answer to this question lies not in a formalist paradigm of the
law, but rather resides in a realist critique of formalism.

Realist Critique

The theme of this
very

common,

essay

is

that effective legal interoperability

is

possible, indeed

despite the impression of grave differences of view. This

is

not a

US Army (Ret.) has previously
addressed this theme and has put forward a number of explanations for why this
may be so. Firstly, he offered the proposition that while US allies had ratified these
unique observation. Colonel David Graham, JAGC,
17

treaties,

they had submitted a

that effectively achieved a

onel

Graham

reservations or declarations

common understanding of application. 18 Secondly, Col-

highlighted the extensive consultation and sharing of military law

manuals that has happened
socialization of concepts.
tilateral

number of agreed-upon

19

in

more

Finally,

recent times, which have

a greater

he stressed the operational significance of mul-

ROE development on operations occurring since

convergence of legal principle.

prompted

20
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The

insightful observations of Colonel

cle. It is

Graham

the third ground in particular which,

forging successful legal compatibility.

it is

rations

no doubt

by many nations when

identical.

useful to

it is

ground proffered by Colonel Graham, namely the
is

submitted, has been decisive in

The investigation of this phenomenon is the

principal focus of this article. Firstly, however,

declarations. There

are fully supported in this arti-

examine the

initial

issue of collective reservations/

that the language used in such reservations/decla-

ratifying Additional Protocol

I is

very similar,

if not

A cursory review of the tenor of declarations made to operative provisions

of the Protocol does evidence a certain symmetry of language and intent with respect
to issues like the definition of military advantage concerning attacks to be assessed as

a "whole," 21 to the incorporation of the lives of one's

own

military

members

in the

proportionality equation, 22 and to the definition of "deployment" for ascertaining

combatant

status.

23

This necessarily allows for a

common understanding and confi-

dence when applying potentially ambiguous operative provisions in the specific contexts

contemplated in the course of combined/coalition operations.

The second ground put forward

relates to the increasing declassification

and

sharing of military manuals, such publication having had the effect of engendering
a convergence of thinking. There
tions

which

upon

international thinking.

distill

val Operations

1990s,
als

25

and

24

is

ample normative evidence that official publica-

national interpretations of the law do have significant impact

and public

The US Commanders Handbook on The Law of Na-

ROE

release of Standing

have had a tremendous proselytizing

effect

for

US

Forces in the mid-

on the development of manu-

ROE doctrine in other countries. Partly because of the simple availability of

such resources, and partly because of the accomplished line of reasoning employed, the tenor and substance of the positions reached in these sources has consciously

and subconsciously influenced the operational

Indeed, the very phrases of the

legal thinking

of others.

US ROE are repeated in numerous iterations of co-

ROE that have been relied upon and have even found their way into the UN
Model ROE for Peacekeeping Forces. 26
alition

Finally,

of

ROE

it is

in the last category of Colonel

Graham's three grounds, the question

development through multilateral operations, where the most

tool for convergence of legal principle

is

effective

found.

The Psychology of Mission Accomplishment

The psychology of coalition
something that

is little

development in

explored in the literature.

evident that this process
facilitation.

ROE

is

27

one that engenders an

The methodology of

coalition
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active,

As

a

combined operations

normative experience,

irresistible quality

ROE

is

it is

of intellectual

harmonization appeals to the
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The process of

pragmatic, mission accomplishment goals of the military psyche.

intense consultation between military partners generates a compulsive mindset

and fosters cooperative and creative legal engagement to achieve nationally agreed-

upon

strategic

outcomes. Obvious

legal prohibitions,

such as those contained in the

Ottawa Convention concerning anti-personnel land mines for example, plainly constitute

"show stoppers," but the law is not commonly that

armed

conflict

is

imposing bright

line rules.

The
school

which

and

Thus, the perennial issues of deciding upon questions of

in turn allows for realistic acuity

issue of "law choice" theory

is

anticipate a calibrated

between coalition force ROE.

not new. Answering international relations

of international law's alleged "legalistic-moralistic" inertia in the

critics

early 1950s, the well

the

The modern law of

attaining specific standards, than

and quantifying "proportionality" 29

"military advantage" 28
discretion,

more concerned with

generally

stark.

known

international lawyer,

Myres McDougal, emphasized

dynamic nature of international law and spoke of a choice between
ineffective" law.

30

He

observed

The process of decision-making
redefinition of doctrine in

its

is

"effective

that:

indeed, as every lawyer knows, one of continual

application to ever-changing facts

and

claims.

A

conception of law which focuses upon doctrine to the exclusion of the pattern of
practices

by which

it is

given meaning and

made

effective, is therefore,

not the most

conducive to understanding. 31

McDougal concluded

that

"A

realistic

conception of law, must, accordingly,

conjoin formal authority and effective control and include not only doctrine but
also the pattern of practices of both formal
thesis of "effective law" shares

to innovative

and pragmatic

a defined societal value

and

effective decision

makers." 32 This

much with the subsequent Hammerskjold approach

legal resolution 33

and

is

anchored very heavily within

set.

This thinking also draws on the concept of the law of armed conflict as "soft

power," a process articulated masterfully by Professor Schmitt. 34 Professor Schmitt

examined the decision-making calculus resident within US
treaty ratification

and offered

a

attitudes concerning

number of hypotheses concerning law

as a policy

choice. Professor Schmitt sought to identify the causative impact of American decision making, both with respect to those treaties that are ratified,
triguingly, those that are not.

Law can even shape war

Hence, he made the significant point

attacks

opposition to

that:

for those not party to a particular normative standard. For

I, which the United States has not ratified, prohibits
and nuclear electrical generating stations. Despite U.S.
this particular provision, there have been no U.S. attacks on any of these

instance, Additional Protocol

most

and more

on dams,

dikes,
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Vietnam War; should it conduct such an attack it would be
Apprehension over condemnation certainly influences the policy
condemned.
choice of whether to engage in such strikes
[I]t would be hard to imagine
U.S.
forces in a coalition intentionally conducting an operation that would violate Protocol
I ... if any significant coalition partners were parties to the treaty. The realities of
coalition-building and maintenance would simply not allow it. 35
target sets since the
.

.

.

.

.

.

The point artfully made by Professor Schmitt discloses two underlying precepts.
The first is that US views on the scope of action legally available as a consequence of
not ratifying Additional Protocol

ronment

manner

in a

that

United States retains the

I is

often contextualized in an operational envi-

accommodates

full legal

coalition

Just because the

capacity to attack the types of objects prohibited

by the Protocol to others does not mean that

it

tacks. Policy imperatives regarding coalition

concerning attack

harmony.

will necessarily

undertake such

at-

cohesion plainly inform decisions

profiles.

Secondly, the assessment

made by

Professor Schmitt acknowledges the role of

when assessing the relative cost exchange for attacking particular targets
or deciding upon requisite levels of collateral damage or incidental injury. The law
of armed conflict requires that a military commander exercise his/her judgment as
"values"

to

whether the significance of attacking a particular military objective

is

worth the

commander under the law provided that such judgments are "reasonable and made in good faith."
In the modern context of volunteer military and naval forces, it is likely that military commanders will reflect the very values of the population at large when assess"cost."

ing

There

actually a

is

amorphous

anticipated."

wide

standards

level

like

of discretion available to the

"concrete

and

direct

military

advantage

One is often struck with how civilian audiences will go through a target

evaluation process and arrive at strikingly similar legal solutions concerning the
proportionality equation as would a seasoned military audience. Indeed, the political ramifications

of such methodologies tend to be

more

decision-making evolutions than that found within
It is

prescient within military

civilian thinking.

also evident that within professional military audiences of different na-

tions there tends to be a

broad consensus

tary significance of certain targets

incidental civilian injury

and

as to the values placed

and the

collateral

costs

damage

deemed

upon

the mili-

acceptable in terms of

to property

when

attacking (or

not) those targets. This has been a product of the increasing frequency of multilateral coalition

increase of
Similarly,

operations over recent years, in conjunction with the dramatic

UN peace operations that have operated under common sets of ROE.

it is

also the

product of the increasing socialization process brought

about by international professional military education. Venues such as the

Naval

War

US

College have been hosting officers from around the world for almost
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50 years and have been inculcating the teaching program with the promotion of
democratic
cisions

liberal values.

These values find precise expression in the targeting de-

made by senior commanders who

achievement under extant
atives

of modern

are driven

by both the goals of mission

ROE and the increasingly homogenous cultural imper-

societies.

Challenges to Coalition Warfare

While there is much greater commonality to ROE development than what one may
imagine, that isn't to deny the very real challenges that pervade this process. At the
tactical level,

stances

it is

self- evidently difficult to

where government policy

frame appropriate

as to the existing

law

has been subject to several reversals. While governments
ibility

is

ROE

in circum-

either unarticulated or

may prefer the policy flex-

of leaving their options open as to what they perceive to be customary inter-

national law, this has an obviously deleterious consequence for planning for both

the subject nation and coalition partners.

in

The other challenge to coalition interoperability is overt political intervention
the ROE process by governments. Although to be fair, unlike the Vietnam era,

the contemporary practice of governments has been to allow the military full reign
for the execution of the

ment once

interject political involve-

calculations concerning compliance with the law have been under-

taken. Hence, approval

proportionality
tervention"

campaign under the law and to

is

test,

may

be required for an attack even though

the

but nonetheless anticipates a significant loss of life. Such "in-

plainly appropriate

sion of undertaking

it fulfills

and

modern armed

reflects the realities

of the political dimen-

conflict. 36

Ironically, the greatest potential challenge to coalition operations

from the application of domestic law to the

may come

ROE process. It is somewhat of a para-

dox that military lawyers of different countries can speak easily about applicable legal
concepts and yet

when

those same lawyers speak to national legal colleagues of

other government departments

who may have

a stake in

ROE development,

such

conversations are at cross-purposes.

The Rome

Statute of the International Criminal

Court 37 has

also

brought into

focus the challenge of aligning criminal law standards reflected in that treaty with

more

traditional standards contained within domestic law. Issues such as "intent"

and "recklessness" and

their translation into

an operational context are obvious

points of potential difficulty. Similarly, the use of lethal force to protect mission essential

property and the application of domestic law self-defense criteria to opera-

tions against deadly enemies in the jungles
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and deserts of the world where military
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zone between war and peace are two other areas

forces operate in the twilight

where there

potential for

is

and Opportunities

dichotomous answers.

The issue of dealing with domestic legal conundrums when striving for coalition
interoperability
tional law" that

is

not unique.

was

originally

It

may be

time to

revisit the

concept of "transna-

championed by those such as Professor Jessup

in the

more reliable way to advance international law's reforming promise. 38 It
is a theme that, in a modified way, has been picked up more recently by Anne-Marie
Slaughter and her liberalist, international relations critique of the modern legal
method and may well be a profitable avenue of focus for those of us keen to recon1920s as a

cile

public international law rights and responsibilities with domestic law. 39 Profes-

sor Slaughter advocates a recasting of international law to assimilate public
private law, across

and between

territorial

boundaries of liberal

of a more effective body of resulting law that

but rather in terms of purpose and

effect."

is

States, to

and

conceive

defined not by "subject or source

40

Conclusion
Professor Louis Henkin famously observed that "Almost
all

principles of international law

the time."

41

It

remains a

differences of opinion

some very real
of ensuring

trite

and almost

all

of their obligations almost

aspects of the law of

challenges under both domestic

legal interoperability for

upon professional

nations observe almost
all

of

but powerfully correct statement. Despite some clear

on some

between coalition partners

all

is

ROE

armed

conflict,

and international

and despite

law, the process

development and mission fulfillment

not as grave as one might imagine.

It is

incumbent

military lawyers to continue to use their best creative endeavors

to seek solutions to otherwise intractable legal problems. This
to ensure the success of the mission,

which

is

is

essential not only

always the paramount obligation, but

to also instill greater strength into the intricate mosaic that

is

international law.
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PART VI
FUTURE NAVIES

XIII
Toward 2015, Challenges for a Medium Navy:

An Australian Perspective

Raydon Gates*

The

purpose of this

challenges for a

article is to

medium

sized

provide an operator's assessment of future

Navy from an

Australian perspective.

I

am

going to range quite widely across warfighting and organizational issues and suggest a

few areas where I might be able to generate some work for our judge advocate

colleagues.

about the

work

I

will

conclude with a short scenario that I hope will

legal issues associated

set

people thinking

with future combat operations, enabled by net-

centric warfare in a coalition setting.

me begin by addressing what I see as the most important future warfighting
trends. I am sure that they will not be a surprise to most of you. The Royal AustraLet

lian

Navy's (RAN) job

ests

and Australian

is

to protect the sovereignty of Australia, Australia's inter-

citizens. Australia's interests are global,

strategy is maritime in nature

our national security

and our government's approach to global security is-

sues reflects these facts. Therefore, the

first

enduring trend

is

a requirement for our

Navy to be able to project maritime power at home and offshore, wherever Australia's interests may lie. This trend is accompanied by a requirement to deliver combat power across the spectrum of conflict, whether that be in support of coalition
* Rear Admiral, Royal Australian Navy.
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war on terror, providing a secure environment in

combat operations

in the

State or delivering

humanitarian support to regional neighbors. That being

the Australian Defence Force
erations

and adapts those

a failed
said,

(ADF) acquires capabilities in support of combat op-

capabilities,

along with our

techniques and pro-

tactics,

Government across the remainder of the mission

cedures, to deliver options to the

We do not, as a general rule, acquire major capabilities that only have applications in operations other than combat. We simply can't afford
Earlier, perhaps over-emphasized that the RAN is in the business of looking afspace.

it.

I

ter Australia's national interest to

make

a point. Often in the coalition context

hear about the notion of common national interests.
is

I

would argue that this notion

generally a fallacy. In coalitions, compatible national interests are

must be

we

present, but compatible interests are not necessarily

and

common

certainly
interests.

Even in the tightest of alliances or coalitions we will see divergences in the handling
of certain

issues.

The fact that

coalition partners are signatories, or not signatories,

to a range of international treaties

Noting the observations of Clausewitz
discourse by other
ately

means

—

it

a direct reflection of political divergence.

is

—

that

war

is

a continuance of the political

follows that within the coalition force

we immedi-

have the potential for a number of different military objectives, reflecting

fering national political objectives.
structures; in

A

tension

is

dif-

thus created within coalition

my view that tension is an enduring feature of coalitions and there-

fore of the future

war

fighting landscape.

up

It is

to military

count for and manage national divergences so that unity of

commanders

effort

is

to ac-

maintained,

within national constraints and in accordance with national priorities.
Military lawyers play a large part in harmonizing, where practicable, national
rules of

engagement (ROE) and establishing procedures within

count for political divergences.

I

would

offer that these issues

coalitions to ac-

need to be addressed

very early in the planning process as they have the potential to affect the very essence of an operation; from targeting to operating areas, from rules of engagement
to task

group disposition. Before

I

leave this subject

I

would not want

to leave

you

with the impression that political divergence always offers problems, in fact it often
offers opportunities. It

may be possible for a coalition commander to use the forces

of another nation to undertake a task with more freedom of maneuver than would

be available to their

own

forces.

1992/93 where Australian
areas,

For example,

experienced this in the Red Sea in

ROE gave our units greater freedom of action, in certain

when conducting maritime interception

This was an advantage to the

when

operations with coalition partners.

US commander, who

units closest to the Straits of Tiran at the

"inspection runners"

I

subsequently employed

mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba

required.
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A trend in all Western armed services is that warfighting is being undertaken via
the application of joint effects. In Australia,

and enjoy

a close relationship

between the

we

are a relatively small defense force

Services. Yet

we have

still

learned

les-

sons about operating as a joint force in recent times. The joint application of com-

power

bat

will

be an enduring feature of the future warfighting landscape. Even

simple issues such as terminology can
ent Services

mean different things to people from differ-

from the same nation. Maritime

forces are also increasingly being

required to provide support to the joint force ashore.

I

have more to say on

will

this issue a little later on.

In the Australian context,
creasingly being approached
tary

we

are also seeing responses to security issues in-

from a whole-of-government perspective. The

must work with other government, and importantly non-government,

agencies to achieve the mission at hand. In

could be argued that the
the

mili-

activities

some circumstances, perhaps most,

it

of other, non-military government agencies are

war winners. In these circumstances, the

viding a secure environment so they can get

military's role

becomes one of pro-

on with their job;

this

is

probably now

the case in Iraq.
Australia's recent lead role in the Regional Assistance Mission to the

Islands

is

Solomon

another example. This was a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade led

mission in close partnership with the Australian Federal Police, the

ADF and others.

The ADF contributed its weight and presence to the equation, creating a secure environment so police and other government agencies could assist the Solomon Island
authorities to regain control of their community and system of government. As a
result of this whole-of-government trend, we are seeing increased numbers of nonmilitary personnel legitimately in combat zones. This has advantages and challenges. Obviously, some adversaries often fail to make any distinction between a
combatant and a noncombatant in this regard; they simply fight by a different set
of rules or lack thereof. This poses interesting force protection and ROE quandaries for the modern day and future commander.
The future maritime warfighting environment is characterized by lethality no
matter what mission you are conducting, whether it is peace operations, assisting
with law enforcement in territorial waters or delivering humanitarian aid. The
asymmetric threat of non-State players, including disaffected people and elements
of transnational crime, enabled by the proliferation of weapon technologies and
unrestrained by an obligation to comply with the law of armed conflict, has diminished warning time for a potential engagement and has further blurred the
distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Lethal effects can be delivered by individuals or small groups on an increasingly devastating scale. A humanitarian aid mission in an area frequented by terrorist groups can be as lethal as
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combat operations in a State-on-State scenario. It is only the duration, magnitude
and potential warning time of the lethal engagement that varies, not whether
lethality

As a

is

present or not.

result

of the global trend of urbanization, particularly in coastal regions,

and the importance of the sea for global trade, I think it is fair to say that the majority

of the world's future security issues will have an element either on, or within in-

fluence of, the sea. Accordingly,
will

be dominated by the

we conclude that future maritime force operations

littoral;

a parallel development to the increasing impor-

tance of urban terrain to the land force. Littoral environments
the density of noncombatants, complications

from

terrain

mean an increase in

and the environment,

and the increased presence of sea mine and land-based threats. Combine
asymmetric

tactics,

the blurring of combatants

warning times and increased lethality and we have
cation, threat response time

and

this

with

and non-combatants, reduced

ROE,

significant

target identifi-

force protection challenges.

Another trend from recent conflicts that we see continuing is the problem of access,

basing and overflight rights. In Australia's region, this

is

particularly relevant.

From my observations, it is not the culture of Asian nations to get involved in what
they consider each other's internal business

—

a fair

enough

Southeast Asian regional non-aggression pact proposal
this position.

Combine

this

trend with the

littoral

is

stance.

The

recent

probably a reflection of

emphasis of future operations

The RAN's Future Maritime
Operating Concept also looks to leverage the freedoms and maneuver space of the
sea. Those freedoms are embedded in the United Nations Convention on Law of
the Sea (1982 LOS Convention). Australia has signed and ratified this treaty.
Archipelagic sea lanes, international straits and complex maritime boundary interpretations abound in Australia's potential mission space. Our lines of communication lay across and through all of these maritime areas. The 1982 LOS Convention
and the response

is

to develop sea basing concepts.

1

remains a key convention in a globalized world where seaborne trade accounts for

commerce and is crucial to energy flows. Freedom of the
sea is obviously key to the freedom of maneuver of coalition navies.
On the technology side of warfare, we are seeing the increased use of unmanned
vehicles for surveillance and for offensive and defensive purposes. With the future
the vast majority of global

development and confluence of miniaturization, propulsion technologies and
cells,

nanotechnology, communications and computing technologies

the capabilities

and presence of unmanned platforms increase

domains. Potential

legal issues

abound

we

will see

in all warfighting

here.

Missile technologies are proliferating at an accelerated rate; their speed
particular their ranges are rapidly increasing. These missiles are

but

I

am

sure

we

fuel

will see increasing levels

262

and

in
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example, on arrival

may reassign itself if the target appears

moved or seems absent. How does this sit with ROE and identification cri-

to have

There

teria?

at a target area a missile

also the potential for land forces to reassign the missile in flight

is

should a target be destroyed while the missile

is

inbound. Again, take the situation

of forces from one nation reassigning a missile from another with the firing unit

having

little

say in the process. Vexing legal problems arise that

must be overcome

so that warfighters can leverage advances in technology. Sea mines are in the inventories of many maritime nations

and it would be reasonable to expect that non-

much trouble, should
submarines are entering service with many nations, par-

State actors could acquire these technologies without too

they so desire.

Of course,

of interest. They are a great weapon

ticularly in Australia's area

leverage an asymmetric advantage or are simply

if

you

are trying to

outgunned on or above the

sur-

face of the ocean.

To top

it all

the future maritime battlespace will be

off,

wrapped

in a network,

linking sensors to shooters and, in theory, facilitating a pervasive situational

awareness that will synchronize forces and provide subordinate commanders with
the information they need to act independently to implement the senior

mander's

intent. Decision cycles will

deal with elusive

and mobile

targets.

be compressed and

fires

com-

delivered faster to

Network enabled operations

will

be a feature

of the future.

As you are well aware, the United
in

most

and

areas

cost of technology
full

in particular in

States leads the

implementing a network centric approach. The

generally very high

is

and

for some, possibly

implementation of network centric warfare

able. Australia uses

world in military technology
our

own Navy, the

(NCW) may simply be

unafford-

technology to generate a fighting edge. Importantly, this also

includes the smarter application of technology as proliferation of modern weapons

and sensors narrows the gap between others and ourselves. Let me say at this junc-

mind of Australia's military leaders when we examine where we might need to be technologically; we use interoperability with the
United States as a benchmark. However, we must strike a balance that ensures we

ture, there

is

no quandary

in the

remain interoperable with both technically advanced allies and those not as technically

advanced, but no

successfully led the

less

UN

command and control

important, regional and coalition partners. Australia

effort in East

Timor because

it

had the

systems, technology, tactics, techniques

ability to flex its

and procedures

in

both directions to accommodate coalition partners across a range of technological
capabilities.

We must continue to achieve this balance within a tight budget. This

will challenge

Let

our ingenuity and,

me move on

I

suspect at times, our patience!

to organizational challenges. Recently,

leased his strategic guidance for the Future
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document examined the future Navy we need to be and the challenges that will face
us. I would like to touch on but a few of those issues.
I think it is fair to say that our two largest concerns will be people and budgets.
Western populations are aging and stagnating, yet our economies continue to
grow. This places an enormous strain on our all volunteer Navy's traditional recruiting base. Competition with industry for the right people will sharpen

edly over the

coming decades. Engineering and technical skills will be in particular

demand. In our view, the
time, yet

it

mark-

must

RAN will

deliver the

same

probably become incrementally smaller with

—

if

not a greater

—warfighting punch. Careful

management and preservation of our most precious resource, people, will be required to manage workloads, ensure the Service is an attractive career option and,
once people are part of our Service, ensure we retain them. As you are all well
aware, uniformed people are a rare and very expensive asset in which the armed
services make a substantial investment. Regardless of technological prowess, war is
a clash of wills,

it is

a

tiveness of militaries

An

human endeavor and, at the end of the day, the fighting effecis all

about the quality of their people.

aging population and infrastructure reinvestment requirements will gener-

ate increasing fiscal

sonal tax base.
able to fund

demand

By our Government's own

its

I

analysis,

post-2017 Australia will not be

governance without incurring budget

tural changes to taxation

challenge.

within the budgetary structure of a decreasing per-

and spending patterns

think the impact on a

will

medium navy is

articulate;

Obviously, struc-

be required to address

this

obvious; an expectation of real

funding increases in the longer term, while possible,
discontinuity in the world's security situation. So

deficits.

is

it is

not

likely,

barring a major

a pretty simple problem to

do our business better with fewer people and fewer resources.

These two

critical factors,

will generate a

along with the warfighting trends addressed above,

range of other future issues.

I

will

touch on but a few. Within our

we will see increasing automation to decrease the requirement for people and
help manage the workload of smaller ships' companies. There will be an increasing
number of human-machine interfaces and eventually machine-machine interships

may be required to implement decisions programmed into them without a human in the loop. Ships will have to stay at sea
longer in order to maximize greater reliability and availability, but somehow we
faces.

Decision support systems

must balance workloads and retain our people. In the future, our ships will continue to have to comply with international treaties to which our governments may
be party. Environmental law and occupational health and safety

will play

an

in-

and operation. As some will be aware, the
RAN has recently purchased the double hulled merchant tanker Delos, soon to be
commissioned as HMAS Sirius, so that we comply with the International Maritime
creasing role in ship design, maintenance
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Organization's

(IMO) pollution from

2

fuels at sea, just as

The

ships requirements for the transportation of

an example.

eternal drive for fiscal efficiency will see the greater use of contracted sup-

port both on and off board our ships. Contractors will have to be integrated into

way we do our business rather than being seen as simply delivering services. We
may find that the armed services and defense industry effectively share people as
the workforce skill base decreases in proportion to demand. The legal aspect of
contracted support to deployed operations is an area we could talk about for hours.
Are contractors in providing direct support to the force combatants or noncombatants, and from whose perspective? In this case are they under military command
the

or are they not? Are they subject to the Defence Force Discipline Act (or the Uni-

form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for the United States)? What if a contractor
refuses to deliver services into a combat zone despite the usual fiscal enticements
and contractual requirements? Can we compel a contractor

to put civilians in

harm's way and subject to the constant presence of lethal force? The status of contractors vis-a-vis host nations

who provide logistic support also raises issues as, for

example, in the application of local health, safety and insurance laws and regulations.

With regard

to the protection of host nation contractors,

designated persons under our rules of engagement or not?
forces agreements or arrangements or

ever the flavor of the

memorandums

do they become

Not to mention status of

of understanding, or what-

month happens to be. These are issues that we have had to ad-

dress during recent operations

and must continue

to address in the future.

There are numerous other issues to consider, such as the competition for maritime practice areas with commercial interests and environmental concerns. The

is-

sue of whales and sonar has recently been of contention both in the United States

and

in Australia. Increasing

ships in ports

commercial traffic and access to

and the application of security zones around warships are but a few

of the contentious issues with which
Let

me

ports, security of war-

we must wrestle.

conclude with a very brief scenario that encapsulates some interesting

contemporary and future warfighting and international law

issues.

The year is 2015 and His Majesty's Australian Ship Adelaide lays 20 miles offshore on the boundary of the new territorial sea limit. It would be better if she were
in at 12 miles like the old days. The combat system is up, the decision support software filters information, delivering only, as the system has been programmed, assessments that a person can consume.
missile

is

on the

rails.

The ship

where; whether friend or foe
or fishermen?

checked out.

is

it is

A hypersonic, autonomous, fire-and-forget

waiting for the

hard to

tell.

call for fire.

There are boats every-

Are they hostile intelligence collectors

They are all traveling fast and can't all be stopped, boarded and
They seem to be avoiding the 500-meter warship exclusion zone
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though. (Legal or not, the zone seems to be having

desired effect

its

and

that's all

that counts.)

Ashore Purpleland

have identified the

special forces

through the ether to the Orangeland

streaks

commanded

target.

The E-message

coalition headquarters.

no time to mess around. The E-message
is permitted to auto-progress from the sensor network to the shooter grid for fires
allocation. Onboard Adelaide the missile launcher bell sounds and almost immedi-

This

is

a time sensitive target. Just

sound of a

ately the familiar

one

shot,

missile streaking

landward breaks the

silence.

The

Combat Information Center (CIC) duty officer watches on his heads up, virtual 3D
display.

He sees the target position and terrain, observes the correct protocols and
more of it. There

thinks nothing

war on

these

terror operations.

and saw the bird

Upon

are plenty of time sensitive targets that arise in

No need to tell the Captain, she was on the bridge

go. Adelaide sets off for a port visit, a job well done.

arrival, a

defense contractor climbs the mast to replace an aerial; he

from the contractor support unit based

Forward Operating

in the Fleet

base.

is

A

Captain's worst nightmare unfolds; a sniper has just shot the contractor, and one

of her sailors has shot a local

who he

time to think, he had to make a decision.
the ship
sion.

was

The sailor had no
One moment the assailant was bunkering

believes

was the

from the wharf, the next minute he was a

The

really

assailant.

sniper.

No

time to ask permis-

ROE talked about this situation, but he never fully understood what he
meant

to do.

The Captain's day

not going to get any better. She has been advised that the

is

missile Adelaide fired struck

a local politician.

She has also been advised that the target was

its target.

He was visiting a community center;

50 people have been

killed.

How could this happen? That politician wasn't a combatant within the Australian
ROE. His targeting was not consistent with our international obligations! A community center

is

noncombatants

not an approved target for Australian units and the death of 50

is

outside national collateral damage/incidental injury limits.

The

NCW system was meant to be programmed, there were meant to be safeguards in
place.

What could she have done from sea with the system in automatic? There was

no time

to confirm the target in

any event.

It

was time

sensitive.

Purpleland and Orangeland commanders seem to be notably absent;

know

is

that the

round

that killed the apparent sniper

ship, as did the missile that hit the

community center.

plied the lethal force. These are Australian problems.

decides to have a drink;

all

the locals

came from an Australian

In both cases Australia ap-

The Captain

you can do that on Australian ships.

sits

down and

Common versus com-

patible national interests, divergent international legal obligations, status of forces

agreements,

it's all

networked,

it's all

warrior. She decides to call a lawyer

.

automated and
.

.

it's all

after she finishes
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1.

21

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.

International Legal Materials

10, 1982,

1833U.N.T.S.

3,

reprinted in

1261, available at www.un.org/Depts/los/convention

_agreements/texts/unclos/closindex.htm.
2.

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution

from Ships, Nov.

2,

1973, reprinted

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (with Protocol of Feb. 17, 1978) [hereinafter
MARPOL 73/78]. Regulation 13f to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 requires that all new tanker
in 12

vessels built after a designated date

be equipped with double

equivalent.
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XIV
The Current State of The Law of Naval Warfare:

A Fresh Look at the San Remo Manual

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg*
Introduction

The

1994 San Remo Manual has met widespread approval as a contemporary
1

restatement of the principles and rules of international law applicable to

armed conflicts at sea. In view of the fact that many of its provisions are but a compromise between the differing views within the group of international lawyers and

who

some of its provisions may be far from perfection.
Still, this has not prevented a considerable number of States from adopting most of

naval experts

the San

armed

Remo

drafted

rules in their respective

2

forces. Against that

increasing

it,

number of both

manuals or instructions

for their naval

somewhat surprising that there

are an

operators and lawyers criticizing parts of the San

Remo

background

it is

Manual as outdated and as an unreasonable

obstacle to the success of their oper-

on measures
especially on block-

ational or strategic goals. They, inter alia, refer to the provisions

short of attack and

on methods and means of naval warfare,
ade and operational zones. In their view, those provisions meet neither the necessities of modern operations, e.g., maritime interception operations (MIO) nor
non-military enforcement measures decided upon by the UN Security Council,
nor do they offer operable solutions to the naval commander. 3

* Professor of International
article

was

first

Law

at

Europe-University in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. This

published in volume 36 of the Israel Yearbook on

reprinted with permission.
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and

is

A Fresh Look at the San Remo Manual
Of course,
cessity.

Remo Manual does not prioritize military or operational neimposes legal restrictions on naval commanders that may prove

the San

Rather

it

inconvenient in view of the means available and in view of the task of the respective

The

beyond such general complaints about
legal rules. It is based upon the belief that whenever it comes to other States' shipping, interference would be permissible only if it is in accordance with the law of
mission.

said criticism, however, goes

naval warfare,
difficult,

Remo Manual. If so, it would be
missions, e.g., MIO, conducted within

with the provisions of the San

i.e.,

indeed, to maintain that certain

the framework of the Global

War on Terror are legal. It would be similarly difficult

to explain the legality of measures enforcing

an embargo

if they

had to be judged in

the light of the law of blockade alone.

However, the said criticism

is

based upon an erroneous understanding of the

law of naval warfare, of its scope of applicability and, thus, of the San

Maritime interception operations aimed

at

Remo Manual.

combating transnational terrorism 4 or

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 5 and related components do have
a legal basis that

is

independent from the law of naval warfare. The same holds true

with regard to enforcing an embargo
the

UN Security Council.

Remo Manual

as its

6

—

either with or without the authorization of

Therefore, neither the law of naval warfare nor the San

most recent restatement pose an insurmountable obstacle

such operations. The San

Remo Manual's provisions apply exclusively to situations

of international armed conflicts. 7

MIO

based upon that body of law only

if

between two or more

to

and other maritime operations have

to be

they occur in the course of an armed conflict

States.

However, the said criticism does not seem to be absolutely unjustified insofar as

Remo Manual may indeed no longer properly reflect contemporary State
practice or meet the realities of modern maritime and naval operations. Moreover,
some of its provisions seem to be quite ambiguous and, thus, may be misinterthe San

preted. This lack of legal clarity could ultimately render obsolete the great progress

achieved by the San
Therefore,

it is

Remo Manual.

time to take a fresh look

author has been entrusted with

is

at the

San Remo Manual. The task

to identify those provisions that

8

this

ought to be

considered or modified and to evaluate the persuasiveness of some of the

re-

critical

arguments that have been put forward.
Definitions

At

first

glance, the

list

comprehensive and

of definitions in paragraph 13 of the

reflective

of customary law. The
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to be

latter is certainly true in
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principle. 9
reflect

this

Still,

contemporary

Civilian Mariners

There

does not necessarily

is

a

mean

that

all

the definitions continue to

State practice.

and Private Contractors on Board Warships

tendency in contemporary State practice to crew warships with

make

or at least to

use of civilian contractors

who work on board

civilians

warships. 10 In

many cases, the contribution of civilian contractors is essential for the operation of
the ship or of its

weapons systems. Hence, the question arises whether the presence

of civilian mariners or civilian contractors affects the legal status of the ship concerned.

The

ability to exercise belligerent rights

remains reserved for warships. 11

Warships are authorized to engage in offensive military

and

search, blockade, interdiction

are expressly prohibited

activities,

including

visit

and convoy escort operations. Auxiliary vessels

from exercising belligerent

rights. 12

There are convincing

on board warships should perform neither
crew functions nor other functions related to the operation of the ship and its
weapons or electronic systems. Such activities should indeed remain reserved for
the armed forces personnel who have traditionally performed them.
arguments according to which

It

and

civilians

should be noted, however, that the definition of warships in paragraph 13

in

(g)

customary international law does not necessarily rule out the use of civilian

mariners and of civilian contractors. According to that definition the warships

must be manned by "a crew that
trast,

the 1907

is

under regular armed forces

Hague Convention VII

Ships into Warships,

13

discipline." In con-

Relating to the Conversion of Merchant

in Article 4, provides that "the crew" of a converted

mer-

chant ship "must be subject to military discipline." While the use of the definite
article in

Hague Convention VII rules out the

(further) use of civilian mariners, the

indefinite article in the definition of warships justifies the conclusion that not necessarily all

crew members must be under regular armed forces

discipline.

Leaving

aside the ensuing question of the permissible proportion of civilian mariners (or

private contractors) in
clear that the

comparison to

sailors

manning of warships with

and officers proper,

civilian

status of the ship as long as the other criteria are

tion of the crew remains under regular

armed

it,

met and

as

long as a certain por-

forces discipline.

good

becomes

mariners does not affect the legal

Of course,

findings are without prejudice to the legal status of civilian mariners
contractors. If captured they could, with

thus,

these

and of civilian

reasons, be considered unlawful

combatants and prosecuted for direct participation in

hostilities.

The

latter

prob-

lem could be solved by conferring a special legal status on civilian mariners and pri-

would certainly contribute to legal clarity if paragraph 13
(g) were supplemented by an explanatory statement with regard to the presence of
civilians on board warships.

vate contractors.

Still, it
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Unmanned Vehicles
Paragraph 13 lacks a definition of unmanned
This issue

is

—

aerial or

—

underwater

vehicles. 14

may well be of importance with
of neutral States. An unmanned vehicle is either an

raised here because their legal status

regard to the rights and duties
integral part of a warship's

weapons systems or otherwise controlled from

tary platform. If that military platform

is

a mili-

a warship or a military aircraft, the un-

manned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV), or
unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), according to the position taken here, necessarily shares the legal status of that platform and it, thus, enjoys sovereign immunity as long as

it

operated in high seas areas or in international airspace.

is

Accordingly, neutral States would under no circumstances be allowed to interfere

with them.

Regions of Operations

The provisions of the San Remo Manual on the Regions of Operations are evidently
influenced by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 15 The adaptation of
the rules on the regions of operations to the contemporary law of the sea is by all
means a realistic, and the only operable, approach to reconcile the interests of belligerent and neutral States. Of course, this delicate compromise is continuously challenged by excessive maritime claims. 16 Creeping jurisdiction may unsettle that
compromise and may, ultimately, render obsolete that part of the San Remo Manual.
Therefore, States should take

all

necessary measures to preserve the achievements of

both the Law of the Sea Convention and of the San
sions of the San

Remo Manual on

Those provisions

reflect the

Remo Manual. 17 Still, the provi-

the regions of operations are far from perfect.

approach underlying the Law of the Sea Conven-

tion not only with regard to the determination of neutral waters," 18 but also with

regard to the obligations of belligerents at sea to pay due regard to the legitimate
rights of coastal States,

when

when

operating within their EEZ, and of third States,

operating in high seas areas. 19

process of the San

decision.

is

aware that during the drafting

Remo Manual there was a controversy about the exact meaning

of the due regard principle and that
20

The author

its

inclusion in the

Nevertheless, there should be a

little

even worse,

it

will

a

compromise

further guidance as to

meaning. Unless specified, the due regard principle
or,

manual was

will

only be paid

its

exact

lip service

be abused by coastal States in order to camouflage

acts of

unneutral service.

The same holds true with regard to paragraph 15 of the Man ual which states that
hostile actions by belligerent forces are forbid"within and over neutral waters
den." Paragraph 16 contains a non-exhaustive list of activities that are covered by
.

.

.
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the term "hostile actions." This enumeration predominantly refers to traditional

naval operations during

one of the

well as

enough

armed

conflict.

activities listed

—"use

to also cover other activities,

Of course,

as a base

e.g.,

the term "hostile action," as

of operations"

the use of means for electronic warfare

(EW),

target acquisition, or reconnaissance purposes.

would,

it is

tional law.

—would be broad

Such an interpretation

maintained here, certainly be in accordance with customary interna-

However, the examples following that term could

whether such

activities

would

also

cast

doubt on

be covered by the prohibition of using neutral

waters and neutral airspace as a base of operations.

One way of avoiding such cases

of doubt would be the deletion of all examples. In order to contribute to legal
ity,

however,

it

clar-

seems preferable to add to the examples listed a formulation similar

to that of Article 47 of the 1923

Hague Rules 21 which

provides:

A neutral state is bound to take such steps as the means at its disposal permit to prevent
within

one

its

jurisdiction aerial observations of the

belligerent,

movements, operations or defenses of

with the intention of informing the other belligerent.

This provision applies equally to a belligerent military aircraft on board a vessel of war.

Such a

clarification also

tions in neutral territory.

seems appropriate with regard to combat rescue opera-

Such rescue operations are not

specially protected

under

the law of armed conflict. Rather, they are to be considered military operations that

would

also

fall

into the category of "hostile action."

The Aerial Element

Modern

naval operations are

— Underestimated

no longer conducted

in a purely

maritime environ-

ment. Naval battles proper, as traditionally envisioned, belong more or

less to the

Today naval forces operate jointly with other forces, especially with air
forces. 22 As an integral part of these joint operations, naval forces can no longer be
considered bound by only one set of rules specifically and exclusively designed for

past.

them. Moreover, even

if

naval operations were confined to the maritime environ-

ment, they would always imply the use of aircraft and of missiles because these

as-

among the most effective weapons against enemy naval forces.
Of course, the San Remo Manual does not follow the limited approach of the

sets are

treaties

of 1907 23 or of 1936. 24

Its

provisions are not limited to naval platforms, but

also relate to military aircraft, civil aircraft,

broadened

—or

at least clarified

—

and to

missiles. 25

Thus, the Manual has

the scope of the term "law of naval warfare" to

cover not only ship-to-ship, but also ship-to-air and air-to-ship operations,
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including the use of missiles; as well as "prize measures," and the protection of vesobjects

sels, aircraft,

and persons

at sea,

on

land,

and

While the San Remo Manual addresses many of the
action of naval

naval warfare

and

still

air warfare, its

in the air.
issues arising

from the

inter-

provisions sometimes give reason to assume that

has been regarded in isolation. At least one cannot entirely escape

the impression that the aerial element of maritime operations, as well as the possible impact of aircraft

on naval

operations, has been dealt with only marginally.

With paragraph 45 stating that "surface ships, submarines and aircraft are
bound by the same principles and rules," the San Remo Manual starts from the
premise that when it comes to methods and means of naval warfare there is no
need to distinguish between the vehicles or platforms employed. Since the basic
principles of the law of armed conflict apply to

and cogent.

all

methods and means of warfare,

this

approach seems to be

this

approach will lead to operable and viable provisions for the conduct of modern

logical

Still,

the question remains whether

maritime operations. For example, the Manual's rules on mine warfare and on
blockade do not seem to meet that
rules dealing with

enemy and

test.

The same holds

true with regard to those

neutral aircraft.

Aerial Threats
Aircraft have always posed,

and continue

to pose, a considerable threat

—

a threat

not limited only to naval platforms. Accordingly, particularly the conditions that
render
craft

civil aircraft

legitimate military objectives need to be reconsidered.

approaching naval surface forces can

inflict

damage to

a warship

comparatively inexpensive and non-sophisticated means. Moreover,

and transmit information

that

is

vital to the success

An air-

by the use of
it

may

gain

of the military operation in

26

The drafters of the 1923 Hague Rules understood this and, accordingly,
agreed upon Articles 33, 34, and 35 27 that would have enabled belligerents to deal
question.

with those threats adequately.
Spaight,

who is hesitant to accept the

1923 Hague Rules relating to the treatment

of civil aircraft as suitable for adoption, 28 doubts whether Article 34 would prove
operable in practice for the following reasons: 29
Item

( 1 )

of the Article contemplates a contingency which

is

improbable;

enemy non-

military aircraft are hardly likely to venture into the jaws of the enemy's jurisdiction.

same Article is unduly restricted. If a
saw an enemy private aircraft suddenly approaching at high
speed, surely it would be entitled to repel the aircraft by gunfire even if no operations
were in progress in the locality? The reference to the 'immediate vicinity' of a

The term

'operations' in item (3) of the

belligerent warship

'jurisdiction'

—

interpretation;

a

it

new
will

test

in

international

law

—may

lead

to

difficulties

in

not be an easy test for the officers concerned to apply in practice.
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The framing of both Articles in a positive, instead of the usual prohibitory, sense leads
to lack of precision. The quite unchallengeable right of a belligerent to fire upon a nonmilitary aircraft which disobeys his signal or order to stand offor change

not seem

to be safeguarded, at

any

rate in the

open

when

sea

its

course does

'operations' are not in

progress.

Spaight therefore suggests replacing Articles 30, 33, and 34 with the following for-

mulation: 30

A non-military aircraft may not be fired upon in flight, unless
( 1

It

disobeys a belligerent's signals or orders; or

an area notified by him as one of military activity in which
their peril and are liable to be fired upon without warning.

(2) It enters

circulate at

Spaight's criticism

probable that

enemy.

is

not necessarily valid today.

civil aircraft

continue to

fly

aircraft

On the one hand, it is not im-

within the jurisdiction of the respective

On the other hand, the term "immediate vicinity of operations" has obvi-

ously gained

some support and, moreover, has

to be distinguished

defense situations obviously (also) envisaged by Spaight. While
these concepts,

it

we

from

self-

will return to

needs to be emphasized here that Spaight, despite his criticism,

agrees that aircraft

—enemy or neutral—pose

belligerents are entitled to counter that risk if necessary

Unlike Spaight and the 1923 Hague Rules,
underestimates that threat and imposes

31

upon

and

a considerable risk

that the

by the use of armed force.

the San

Remo Manual

obviously

belligerents obligations of absten-

tion that will hardly meet the test of reality. Accordingly, therefore paragraph 63
is

too restricted. Pursuant to that provision, an

military objective

if

it,

inter alia,

is

"armed with

enemy civil

aircraft

is

a legitimate

air-to-air or air-to-surface

ons." This excludes, as emphasized in the explanations, "light individual
for defence of the crew,

of an attack."
as

32

But

it

coming within the

(f)

weap-

weapons

and equipment that deflects an attacking weapon or warns

remains an open question of what weapons can be qualified
categories of paragraph 63

(f).

Moreover,

this

formulation

leaves out of consideration the possibility that the aircraft itself is used as a weapon.

The way modern warships are constructed would not enable them to sustain a hit
by an aircraft. In this context, one should not think of "Kamikaze" aircraft used as a
pattern of an unsuccessful military tactic or strategy.
are scenarios similar to that of the

USS Cole
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Mine Warfare
One consequence of equating warships and

aircraft

is

that the latter

obliged to "record the locations where they have laid mines."

advanced military equipment
e.g.,

34

would

also

be

States possessing

may be in a position to comply with that obligation,

by equipping air delivered mines with a system that would transmit their loca-

enemy

The majority of
States will, however, hardly be in a position to acquire such systems. As the practice
of World War II demonstrated, the recording of minefields laid by aircraft is a most
difficult undertaking 35 and an obligation to do so does not seem to reflect customary international law. 36 Closely related is the problem
at least for a considerable
number of States of how to provide "safe alternative routes for shipping of neutral States" 37 in case the mining is executed by military aircraft. The minelaying belligerent will, in many cases, only be in a position to identify the mine area as such
but not routes through the minefield that would be sufficiently safe. No considertion without the

belligerent profiting

from the

signals.

—

—

down in paragraph 85 of the
San Remo Manual?* For example, the United States, when mining Haiphong harbor, made it possible for merchant vessels lying there to leave the harbor by dayable difficulties arise with regard to the obligation laid

light.

The mines

delivery.

delivered

by

aircraft

were activated three days

after their

39

Blockade
It is

true that in the past blockades were a

ever,

today a blockade

will regularly

method of economic warfare at sea; how-

be an integral part of a genuinely military op-

eration. Therefore, the lack of a definition of the concept of blockade in the

Remo Manual could

some unnecessary misunderstandings. Such a
"Blockade is a method of naval warfare by which a

give rise to

definition could read as follows:

belligerent prevents vessels and/or aircraft of

all

nations from entering or exiting

specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or

control of an

San

40

under the

enemy nation."

The purpose of establishing a blockade is to deny the enemy the use of enemy
and neutral vessels or aircraft to transport personnel and goods to or from enemy
territory. It should be emphasized that a blockade is the only method of naval warfare by which belligerents may interfere with enemy exports.
But even if exclusively directed against the enemy's economy, there will always
be a strategic element because the enemy's capabilities of resistance
ily

Regardless of the distinction between economic and strategic

is

today general agreement that a blockade need not be enforced

be weakened.

blockades there

exclusively against seagoing vessels but that
craft.

42

will necessar-

41

it

may

also

Moreover, and in view of the importance of
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blockade

may be maintained and enforced "by a combination of legitimate meth-

ods and means of warfare," 43 including military

aircraft. 44

The San Remo ManuaTs provisions on blockade, however,
erence to

In most cases, these aircraft will operate from a warship that serves as their

aircraft.

base.

Of course, an interpretation of paragraphs 96 45 and 97 46 justifies
that a blockade may also be enforced and maintained by military

aircraft.

the conclusion

47

lack any express ref-

It is

also possible, however, that the aircraft entrusted with the

of a blockade are deployed on

on land.

airfields

Still,

enforcement

while there seems to be general

agreement on the lawfulness of the enforcement of a blockade by military aircraft,

two questions remain unanswered.

(

1 ) Is

the presence of a warship or

its

opera-

tional control of the military aircraft necessary for a blockade to be lawful or

blockade be enforced by aircraft (and mines) alone? (2)

met

in order for the blockade to be effective if

it is

What

criteria

may a

have to be

maintained and enforced by

aircraft?

In

most

cases, the aircraft entrusted

not be dependent upon a warship,
tional control of a warship.
tle

complicated

if one

fore,

it

will

they are not necessarily under the opera-

However, the answer to the first question becomes a lit-

may be damaged or in another distress situation. There-

have to access the blockaded coast or port but the blockade

tained by mines and aircraft only.

How

will the

comply with its obligation to allow ships in
line if

ment

A merchant

takes into consideration the following scenario:

warship

vessel or a neutral

i.e.,

with the enforcement of a blockade need

no warship

distress entry into the

against the legality of a blockade that

is

main-

blockading power be able to

in the near vicinity? 48 Accordingly, there

is

is

is

blockaded coastat least

one argu-

enforced and maintained without a

surface warship present in, or in the vicinity of, the blockaded area.

As regards the second question, one may be inclined to point to the well-established
rule according to

of fact."

49

While

which the "question whether a blockade

it is

clear that "effectiveness"

is

effective

is

a question

can no longer be judged in the

of the state of technology of the 19th century 50 and, while the view

is

light

widely held

that effectiveness continues to be a constitutive element of a legal blockade, 51

must be recognized

that there are

no

criteria that

determination of the effectiveness of

all

would make

possible an abstract

blockades. In this context, Castren

postulates:

Aircraft in the blockaded area

may leave the area when there are other aircraft on patrol

duty so that the blockade remains in force the whole time. The

connexion with a naval blockade are
dominate the air. 52
in

effective
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It is

maintained here that

tor the

this position

is

enforcement of a blockade only

correct. In

A further aspect regarding blockade,
whether this method of naval warfare
it

may

also

Manual are

be enforced vis-a-vis

on

silent

this issue.

aircraft will

be used

the respective belligerent has gained air

if

superiority. Otherwise, the use of aircraft

any event,

would be too dangerous.

as dealt

with in the San

Remo Manual,

is

necessarily restricted to vessels or whether

is

Again, the provisions of the San

aircraft.

The "explanations"

reveal that the legal

Remo

and naval

experts, in the context of the effectiveness of a blockade, considered that question

only indirectly. 53 While
considered to have lost

it

its

may be correct that a

to land within the blockaded area, this

is

but one

as-

Although traditionally blockades have been viewed as a method of naval war-

fare proper, there
aircraft.

54

In this

no reason why it may not be extended (or even restricted) to
context, the argument that "transport by air only constitutes a
is

very small percentage of bulk traffic" 55

is

not absolutely convincing. The blockaded

belligerent State, either alone or together with

its allies,

the cargoes only served humanitarian purposes
traffic

may have a considerable air

As the example of the "blockade of Berlin" shows

fleet at its disposal.

bulk

may not be

effectiveness for the sole reason that a considerable small

number of aircraft continue
pect.

(purely) naval blockade

can be transported by

air

—

—although

a considerable percentage of

over a considerable period of time.

Methods and Means of Naval Warfare
Despite the lack of a definition and despite the disregard of the aerial elements, the
provisions of the San

Remo Manual on blockade

certainly reflect

customary inter-

56

Whether this also holds true with regard to the provisions on
zones is far from settled. Of course, it seems that, in principle, zones have become
and it is quite probable that the Manual
a recognized method of naval warfare 58

national law.
57

—

has contributed to that development.

Remo Manual's

provisions

Still,

as already stated elsewhere, 59 the

on zones remain

gard to the purpose such zones

may serve.

San

rather obscure, particularly with re-

This, however,

is

not the only criticism

of the Manual's provisions on methods and means of naval warfare.

Precautions in Attack

The Manual's rules on precautions in attack are directly taken from the 1977 Additional Protocol

I.

60

In principle, this does not necessarily pose problems

—even

from being recognized by all States of the world.
reopen the famous dispute between Meyrowitz 61 and Rauch 62

though Additional Protocol I

is

far

would be futile to
on whether and to what extent the provisions of Additional Protocol I apply to naIt

val warfare at

all.

It is

maintained here

that,
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body of rules applies to ship-to-ship, ship-to-air, and to air-toship attacks as long as such attacks do not affect civilians or civilian objects on land.
That is also clear from a reading of Article 49 (4 ). 63 Accordingly, Articles 58 and 59
of Additional Protocol I are inapplicable to naval warfare as treaty law. Whether
and to what extent they are customary in character is not quite settled. 64 Moreover,
it is far from clear whether paragraph 46 of the San Remo Manual offers operable
solutions for the conduct of hostilities at sea. The use of the concept of "feasibility"
certainly mitigates some of the difficulties. Still, if naval operations are conducted
in sea areas with dense maritime traffic, like in the Persian Gulf, it could become
nearly impossible to determine "whether or not objects which are not military objectives are present in an area of attack." 65 The USS Vincennes incident may be inProtocol

I,

a special

dicative of the difficulties involved. 66 Legal rules that are merely paid lip service will

certainly not pass the test of practice.

Naval Bombardment
Attacks against targets
in the

I.

col.

It

(naval

bombardment)

are not dealt with explicitly

San Remo Manual. This is partly due to the fact that the participants regarded

this subject as already
67

on land

covered by the respective provisions of Additional Protocol

should be kept in mind, however, that not

Then

tion IX

68

Even

bound by the Proto1907 Hague Conven-

States are

the question arises whether the provisions of the

constitute customary international law.

if

that question

to deal with aircraft

to Article

all

is

answered in the affirmative, 69

it

remains unsettled

how

launched from warships attacking targets on land. According

XLI of the 1923 Hague Rules

aircraft-carriers, shall be

"aircraft

on board vessels of war, including

regarded as part of such vessels." This could imply that the

rules applicable to warships

engaged in naval bombardment also apply to

aircraft

launched from them. Then, however, such aircraft would be allowed to attack military objectives in non-defended localities. 70
59,
i.e.,

paragraph

1

,

While Additional Protocol

Article

on such localities "by any means whatsoever,"
such attacks would not be prohibited under Articles 1 and 2

prohibits attacks

including aircraft,

of Hague Convention IX. Castren takes the position that

Hague Convention IX

"must probably be understood to concern warships only, and not

when collaborating with them."
is

I,

71

If,

aircraft

even

however, Article XLI of the 1923 Hague Rules

a correct statement of customary law, warships

and military

aircraft

launched

from warships would be bound by the same rules.
Apart from the wording of these provisions, a further argument in favor of the
view that land attacks by aircraft operating from warships should be governed by
Additional Protocol

I is

the ability of modern aircraft to discriminate

duct surgical strikes by means of high-precision ammunition.
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must be remembered

Still, it

that for a locality to be entitled to protection

against attacks, Article 59(2) of Additional Protocol

I,

and the probably corre-

sponding rule of customary law, provides that four conditions must be met:
combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military

(a) all

equipment must have been evacuated;
(b)

no

use

hostile

shall

be made of fixed military installations or

establishments;

(c)

no

acts of hostility shall

be committed by the authorities or by the

population; and

(d)

no

activities in

Accordingly, even

support of military operations shall be undertaken.

if fixed

military installations or establishments remain in the re-

spective port or

town this would not justify an

no

made of them. Then,

hostile use

Protocol

is

an attack would probably be contrary to the law of armed

I,

as

it

and

its

may, a

neutralization

clarification

the use of aircraft

and

if

regardless of the binding force of Additional

cause the object in question would not
action

attack "by any means whatsoever"

would not

make an

conflict be-

effective contribution to military

offer a definite military advantage.

Be that

of the rules applicable to naval bombardment, including
missiles launched

from warships, should be taken into

consideration.

Deception (and Surrender)

The San Remo Manual's rules on deception are too vague and, thus, do not provide
the necessary guidance for naval commanders. On the one hand, it is rather difficult to distinguish "active simulation" 72 from "passive simulation." The capabilities of modern technologies could open a vast grey area and, consequently, could
render the provision obsolete.

On the

other hand, there should be a definition of

amended by a non- exhaustive list of permitted ruses that should
be drafted with a view to modern technologies. The traditional examples given for
permissible ruses of naval
especially Count Luckner and the Cruiser Emden
have a romantic charm but they certainly are too remote from the realities of modlegitimate ruses

—

—

ern naval operations. 73
In a highly electronic environment and with over-the-horizon or beyondvisual-range capabilities, the hoisting of the true flag prior to an attack

seems to make

much

sense.

no longer

However, ruses remain an important pattern of mod-

ern naval warfare. Therefore, there

is

a growing need for specific rules enabling
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naval

commanders to distinguish between permissible ruses and prohibited acts of
While perfidy has been

perfidy.

equately addressed.
sufficient to

It

clarified in the

San Remo Manual, ruses are not ad-

needs to be emphasized in this context that

ever,

1

is

not always

draw the necessary conclusions from the prohibition of perfidy. For

example, actively feigning the status of a protected vessel

graph

it is

10 of the

is

prohibited by para-

the corresponding customary law. 74 This rule,

Manual and

how-

without prejudice to a decision to feign neutral status by the use of civilian

radars or other electronic equipment. According to the position taken here, the use

of civilian navigational radars (thus taking advantage of the respective emissions)
is

to be considered a permissible ruse of naval warfare

immediately prior to the launching of an attack.
position
trative

is

not shared by all.

the radar

may well be,

is

switched off

however, that

this

should be recalled that, in 1983, the World Adminis-

Conference for the Mobile Services adopted Resolution No. 18 75 on the

identification of vessels

armed

It

It

if

conflict,

and

aircraft

recommending

of States not participating in an international

the use of adequate transponders

and

that:

The frequencies specified in No. 3021 of the Radio Regulations may be used by ships
and aircraft of States not parties to an armed conflict for self- identification and
establishing communications. The transmission will consist of the urgency or safety
signals, as appropriate, described in Article 40 followed by the addition of the single
group 'NNN' in radiotelegraphy and by the addition of the single word 'NEUTRAL'
pronounced as in French 'neutral' in radiotelephony. As soon as practicable,
communications

It

shall

be transferred to an appropriate working frequency.

would, of course, be a considerable progress

were enhanced. However, that proposal

is

if the

.

.

protection of neutral vessels

not suited for achieving that aim. As

Fenrick has rightly pointed out, the resolution:
appears to have been issued by a forum unfamiliar with law of armed conflict issues

and without consultation with national officials responsible for such matters. Ships
and aircraft using such procedures may assume they are entitled to protection when in
fact they are not. The fact that a ship or aircraft is registered in a state not party to the
conflict does not, in and of itself, mean that it is not a legitimate military objective. 76

Therefore,

it

would

certainly

permissible ruses were

add

to legal clarity

and

legal certainty if the rules

amended by a non-exhaustive

list

on

of examples.

A problem closely related, but not limited, to ruses and perfidy is the surrender
of warships and military

aircraft.

The provision of the San Remo Manual referring

to the surrender of warships 77 certainly reflects
in a

modern

than the

battlefield

customary international law. 78

environment, visual identification

rule. Therefore,

an

effort

is

Still,

rather the exception

should be undertaken to specify the different
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of how warships and military aircraft can surrender

The more so
since the San Remo Manual lacks a provision on enemy aircraft exempt from attack
possibilities

which have surrendered.
aircraft has surrendered.

tack

on

it

It

79

may, indeed, be

If,

difficult to verify

at

all.

whether a military

however, surrender has been offered bonafide an

would be contrary to

y

at-

one of the most disputed aspects of public

inter-

basic rules of the law of armed conflict.

Maritime Neutrality
Probably, the law of neutrality

is

The diversity of views on the subject makes it almost impossible to establish the continuing validity of that body of law, its scope of applicability, and its
content. The drafters of the San Remo Manual have been heavily criticized for havnational law.

ing adopted a rather traditional approach to the law of maritime neutrality. 80

maintained here, however, that

this criticism

is

It is

unfounded.

Obsolete by Desuetude or Irrelevant under the Jus ad Bellum 7
.

Although the said uncertainties
need to protect

persist, there

States not taking part in

general agreement that there

an international armed

their nationals, the vessels flying their flags
81

is

and the

aircraft

is

a

conflict, as well as

bearing their mark-

on the need for there to be obligations
on neutral States, their nationals and their merchant shipping and civil aviation
with a view to effectively prevent the escalation of an ongoing international armed
conflict. 82 However, there is no consensus on how these objectives ought to be
ings.

Moreover, there

is

similar agreement

pursued.

According to a widely held view, the traditional law of neutrality is incompatible
with the jus ad bellum. 83 The proponents of that view claim that the traditional
rules have

been extensively modified by the

States not parties to

an ongoing international armed

position of "benevolent" neutrality

ad bellum.

84

conflict are entitled to take a

one party to the

if

conflict has violated the jus

Indeed, under the right of collective self-defense, States are entitled to

participate in an international
sion. If they

UN Charter. Therefore, they maintain,

armed

conflict

on the

side of the victim of aggres-

may assist the victim militarily then, a fortiori, they must be entitled to

discriminate against the aggressor and to assist the victim State by any

of war. In theory, this
trality is

operable only

aggressor. This
ual.

85

If,

is

is

certainly correct.
if

means short

However, the concept of benevolent neu-

the Security Council has authoritatively determined the

and 8 of the San Remo Manunable or unwilling to act under Chapter

expressly recognized in paragraphs 7

however, the Security Council

VII, the benevolent neutral's right will
ligerent to take appropriate counter

is

compete with the

right of the aggrieved bel-

measures in order to induce the neutral State
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The better view is, therefore, to apply the laws
of neutrality to such situations because only by so doing can the object and purpose
agreed upon protection of neutrals and prevention of an escalation of the armed

to

comply with the traditional

conflict

—be

rules.

—

achieved.

Moreover, the concept of benevolent neutrality has no foundation in State prac-

The proponents of that view ignore the fact that, since

tice.

1945, third States assist-

ing one belligerent to the disadvantage of the other never referred to the right of
collective self-defense. 86 Rather, they either

advanced contractual obligations, or

they claimed that their assistance did not cover military ("lethal") items, 87 or they

simply acted clandestinely. 88 Hence, State practice since 1945
ing that a

new legal

status of non-belligerency has

emerged

not apt "for prov-

is

as a

concept of law.

It

would be all too easy to avoid duties of neutrality by just declaring a different status." 89 The fact that in many instances "non-belligerents" endeavored to conceal
their assistance indicates, if not proves, that they had not based their conduct on a
corresponding opinio juris.

Hence, State practice,

as well as military

manuals 90 and the International Law

Association's Helsinki Principles, 91 support the view that the traditional rules of

the law of maritime neutrality as codified in the 1907

Hague Convention

XIII 92

have neither become obsolete nor have they been extensively modified. Therefore,
the provisions of the San

Remo Manual continue

to reflect

customary interna-

tional law.

Continuing Value of the Laws of Maritime Neutrality

The main reason why most States continue to pledge allegiance to the laws of maritime neutrality is the intrinsic value of its principles and rules. On the one hand,
this body of law serves the interests of neutral States by protecting them, their nationals, their merchant shipping and their aviation against the harmful effects of
ongoing

hostilities.

interests are

93

On

the other hand,

not jeopardized by neutral

it

guarantees that legitimate belligerent

States, their nationals, their

merchant ship-

ping and aviation unduly interfering in the warfighting and war- sustaining
It

effort.

should be remembered, however, that the applicability of that law in

tirety

is

its

not triggered automatically as soon as an international armed conflict

existence. This only holds true with regard to those rules of the

neutrality that are essential for safeguarding
neutralitatis)

.

There

is

its

object

94

enis

in

law of maritime

and purpose

(essentialia

widespread agreement that the following rules of the law of

maritime neutrality become applicable to every armed conflict

at sea, irrespective

of a declaration of war or of a declaration of neutrality: protection of neutral waters,

tus,

95

96

the obligation of neutral States to terminate violations of their neutral

and the prohibition of unneutral

service.
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It

needs to be emphasized that, despite allegations to the contrary, 98 the 24-hour

rule" also belongs to those essentialia neutralitatis.

non-discriminatory basis, prohibit access to

If a neutral State

its territorial

sea

and

does not, on a

its

internal

wa-

ters by belligerent warships, 100 a passage or sojourn exceeding 24 hours (unless un-

avoidable on account of damage or stress of weather) would

amount to

the use of

neutral waters as a sanctuary. If the neutral State does not terminate that violation

of

its

neutral status, the aggrieved belligerent will be entitled to take appropriate

countermeasures. 101 The ensuing potentialities for escalation are obvious. The
that the international

waters in question

is

armed

While the aggrieved belligerent may not be

sition to enforce the neutral State's obligations

ships or military aircraft,

it

would

by directly interfering with

at

all,

this

does

in a poits

war-

certainly be entitled to take other measures in

response to that violation of international law. Even

does not react

remote from the neutral

conflict takes place in areas

irrelevant.

fact

mean

that there has not

if

the aggrieved belligerent

been a violation unless the

aggrieved belligerent's conduct amounts to acquiescence.

Of course,
ships

and

the 24-hour rule implies

some inconveniences

auxiliaries, especially if their visit in a neutral port

is

for belligerent war-

unrelated to the on-

going international armed conflict. However, the object and purpose of the 24-

hour

rule

is

not limited to the protection of the belligerents,

it

also contributes to

the protection of neutral States. If neutral States wish to remain under the protection of the law of maritime neutrality they are under an obligation to apply

enforce the 24-hour rule.

It

should not be forgotten that the rule

and

may prove a most

valuable tool in pursuing belligerent goals as the case of the GrafSpee clearly
onstrates.

to

dem-

102

Measures Short of War

A final criticism of the San Remo Manual relates to its section on "measures short
The United Kingdom in particular has long taken the view
that this part of the law of naval warfare and neutrality at sea has been considerably
modified by the jus ad helium. This approach must be rejected. The provisions of
the San Remo Manual on prize measures certainly reflect customary international
law. There are, however, two aspects that should be reconsidered.
of attack,"

i.e.,

prize law.

—

Law Modified by the Jus ad Bellum?
The San Remo Manual as well as the military manuals
Prize

—

from the premise

that the jus

international law.

103

in hello,

104

the San

ad bellum and the

of some navies

ius in hello are

two

—

starts

distinct parts of

In view of the basic principle of the equal application of the ius

Remo Manual does

not distinguish between the aggressor and
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the victim of aggression, unless the

UN Security Council has acted under Chapter

VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 105 Accordingly,
international

it

allows

all

parties to

an

armed conflict at sea to make use of the full spectrum of methods and

means of naval warfare, including measures short of attack. 106
According to the UK Manual, however, "the conduct of armed conflict at sea is
subject to the limitations imposed by the UN Charter on all use of force." Therefore, in "a conflict

of limited scope

... a belligerent state is

constrained, to a greater

extent than the rules set out in the present chapter might suggest, in the action that
it

may

lawfully take against the shipping or aircraft of states not involved in the

conflict." 107

This position
1980s

is

far

from new. The

—and has been heavily

it.

it

since the

According to the position taken here,
if

adopted by other

most unfortunate lack of legal clarity and it would enable some ma-

levolent States to arbitrarily

against the shipping

armed

criticized for

well-founded. The British position would,

this criticism is
States, lead to a

UK government has maintained

deny the

of measures taken by a belligerent

legality

and aviation of States not

parties to

an ongoing international

conflict.

This position

is

not shared by the UK's

allies

who are unwilling to limit the spec-

trum of methods and means provided by the law of naval warfare. 108 Obviously,
those allies maintain that it will be up to them to decide whether and to what extent
they will interfere with neutral shipping and aviation when engaged in an international armed conflict. And indeed the question arises as to who other than the belligerent State

competent to decide what

is

achievement of the goal for which force

"necessary and proportionate to the

is

may be used."

Of course, in case of an authoritative decision by the UN Security Council based
upon Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a belligerent may be prevented from making
use of the

full

spectrum provided by the law of naval warfare. However,

no such decision by the Security Council,

it is

if

there

is

generally recognized that the bellig-

erent States alone are entitled to decide whether they will interfere with neutral

shipping and aviation. The affected neutral States will be limited to a legal evaluation of the concrete measures taken,

the law of naval warfare
a legally binding
as visit

i.e.,

they may judge their legality in the light of

and the law of maritime neutrality. 109 The right to judge,

in

manner, the legality of the initial decision to resort to actions such

and search has been conferred upon the

UN Security Council. Therefore,

statements by neutral States on the legality of measures short of attack based
rules other than those of the ius in hello (including the

upon

law of maritime neutrality)

are to be considered merely political in character.

Another concern with the UK position

is

that

it

may lead to an arbitrary applica-

tion of the law of naval warfare. In this respect, the British conduct during the
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Falklands

example.

As
1982,

is

War

(1982) and during the Iran-Iraq

War

(1980-1988)

well

a Total Exclusion

that proclamation the

Zone (TEZ). 111 According

UK was prepared to

an

and of customary international law the

legality

would have been more than doubtful.

was intended to deter rather than

shipping.

It

may well be that it was,

to the

wording of

attack every ship encountered within

the limits of the TEZ. In the light of the jurisprudence of the

tion

as

known, during the Falklands War the British government, on April 28,

announced

therein,

may serve

110

Nuremberg Tribunal

of the TEZ, or of attacks performed

112

It

may well be that the proclama-

to serve as a legal basis for attacks

after

all,

nothing but a

on neutral

—permissible—

ruse of

war. Taken at face value, however, and in view of the fact that the British govern-

TEZ by referring to the right of self-defense, the British
conduct during the Falklands War could also justify the following conclusion: if
the British Government considers it necessary for its self-defense, it may decide to
ment

tried to justify the

go beyond what

is

provided for by the law of naval warfare by establishing and en-

forcing a "free-fire zone."

During the Iran-Iraq War, the
That time, however,

it

British

Government chose the same approach.

did not lead to a widening but rather to a restriction of the

spectrum of measures provided by the law of naval warfare. After Iranian forces

had stopped the

British

merchant vessel Barber Perseus^ the Foreign

Office,

on Jan-

uary 28, 1986, declared:
[U]nder Article 51 of the United Nations Charter a State such as Iran, actively engaged

an armed conflict, is entitled in exercise of its inherent right of self-defence, to stop
and search a foreign merchant ship on the high seas if there is reasonable ground for
." 113
suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side for use in the conflict.
in

.

.

Thus, the British Government claimed the right to judge the legality of belligerent

measures not in the
Article 51 of the

light

of the law of naval warfare alone, but also in the light of

UN Charter.

In other words,

if

party to an international

ment, by referring to

its

armed

conflict, the British

inherent right of self-defense, considers

Govern-

itself entitled to

and means under the law of naval warfare. If not
party to an international armed conflict, the British government denies that very
right to the belligerents but claims to be entitled to judge and declare what is necesenlarge the spectrum of methods

sary

and proportionate

for the belligerents' self-defense.

Hence, the British position

Of course,
However,

in theory
it

it is

will

not lead to operable and practicable solutions.

always possible to identify a breach of the jus ad bellum.

must be emphasized

that the prohibition of the use of force
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UN system of collective security. 114 If the Security Council

integral part of the

is

not

in a position to authoritatively determine the limits of the right of self-defense in a

given case,

it

remains with the parties to the conflict to determine and decide which

measures are necessary. The only operable

legal yardstick

providing practical solu-

tions will then be the jus in hello Moreover, the British position

with the principle of the equal application of the ius
ity

of that principle

is

The continuing valid1945 and by the Preamble

in hello.

confirmed by State practice since

to the 1977 Additional Protocol

I.

Accordingly, there

is

an overwhelming interna-

tional consensus that the jus in hello does not discriminate

gressor

and the

irreconcilable

is

.

between the alleged ag-

alleged victim of aggression. Moreover, that position

counterproductive for British interests in case the United

Kingdom

is

may prove
party to an

provided for

armed conflict at sea. The use of prize measures by the Royal Navy, as
in the UK Manual, 115 could be qualified as illegal by other States that

may refer to

this very statement.

international

Prize Measures

and the Necessity of Prize Courts

In view of the fact that, under customary international law, belligerents, by resorting to prize measures, are entitled to interfere with

shipping and aviation,
prize courts. There
tional

is

116

it is

neutral merchant

indispensable to provide for the establishment of

no evidence in State practice or in legal writings that the tradi-

maxim "Toute prise

doit etre jugee" has

Rather, pre- and post-World

proof that the

enemy and

War II

maxim remains

practice

in force.

become

by desuetude. 117

obsolete

and scholarly statements

give

ample

118

Aspects to Be Reconsidered
It

has been

shown

in the foregoing that the provisions of the

prize measures indeed restate the customary rules

matter.

Still,

and

San Remo Manual on

principles

on the

subject

the question remains whether those rules sufficiently take into ac-

count practical requirements.

On

the one hand, there seems to be an unjustified discrimination between

warships and military

As regards the

rules applicable to military aircraft

and search operations, the San Remo Manual unnecessarily demilitary aircraft the same rights as warships. While paragraphs 139 and 151

conducting
nies

aircraft.

allow, "as

chant

visit

an exceptional measure," the destruction of enemy and of neutral mer-

vessels, there is

no such exception

should be kept in mind
Rules,

119

tions are

that,

enemy

or neutral

civil aircraft. It

according to Articles 57 to 59 of the 1923 Hague

the destruction of such aircraft

met beforehand.

for

would be permissible

120
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Moreover, the San Remo Manual, in paragraph 128, obliges belligerents "to adhere to safe procedures for intercepting
ternational organization,"

i.e.,

issued by the competent in-

civil aircraft as

to the International Civil Aviation Organization's

(ICAO) Manual concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft. 121 While it is true that
"the ICAO manual contains detailed procedures for interception," 122 those provisions are designed for interception operations in times of peace.

from

settled

therefore, far

It is,

whether and to what extent the detailed procedures

laid

down

in the

ICAO manual are operable in times of armed conflict.

On
ered.

the other hand, a further alternative to visit

and search should be consid-

Modern armed forces possess multi-sensors enabling them to identify certain

cargoes, like chemicals or explosives. 123 Therefore, as an alternative to visit

search conducted in the traditional way, a belligerent

may

and

very well be satisfied

with verifying the innocent character of cargo on board neutral merchant vessels

and

civil aircraft

by merely "scanning" the

course, whether the use of sensors

is

vessels or aircraft with

practicable

and

such sensors.

sufficient will

Of

depend upon

the circumstances of each case.

Conclusion

The 1994 San Remo Manual has contributed in an invaluable manner to a clarification of the law applicable to naval warfare and maritime neutrality. The vast majority

of

its

provisions are a contemporary restatement of customary international

law. Since those provisions almost perfectly balance the interests of belligerents

and of neutrals

alike everything feasible

mendous achievement

in restating a

sively addressed since the

should be undertaken to safeguard

body of law

that

its tre-

had not been comprehen-

adoption of the Oxford Manual 124 in 1913.

We do, however, live in a time of rapid technological development that certainly
has a deep impact

upon

military doctrine

and on the conduct of hostilities. Disre-

way modern armed conflicts are fought would
San Remo Manual and could even make it obsolete. While thanks

garding that development and the
marginalize the
to

Yoram

Dinstein considerable efforts are being undertaken to

fill

the Manual's

gaps with regard to the aerial issues involved, the other issues addressed here

should be thoroughly scrutinized and ultimately solved. The best way of adapting
the San

Remo Manual to the

said developments

would be

to reconvene,

auspices of the International Institute of International Humanitarian

under the

Law and

of

Committee of the Red Cross, a group of experts with a view to
adopt an informal declaration that would not substitute for but merely amend or

the International

clarify parts

of the San

Remo Manual.
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guerre maritime, 89 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 245, 254 et seq. (1985):
61

"Cette difference, repetons-le, est fondamentale et absolue. Fondamentale, en ce qu'elle decoule
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de l'essence respective du droit de

guerre terrestre et

la

du

droit de la guerre maritime, cette

difference decoulant elle-meme de la difference entre les donnees de la guerre sur terre et celles

de

la

62.

guerre maritime. Absolue, parce qu'elle interdit de transposer

Rauch maintains

that the provisions of Part IV, Section

I,

les regies

de Tune a l'autre."

Additional Protocol

I

apply to

all

measures of naval warfare directed against merchant vessels. ELMAR RAUCH, THE PROTOCOL
additional to the geneva conventions for the protection of victims of
International Armed Conflicts and the United Nations Convention on the Law of
THE SEA: REPERCUSSIONS ON THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 57 et seq. (1984); see also Elmar
Rauch, Le droit contemporain de la guerre maritime, 89 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
International Public 958 (1985).
63. See, inter alia, Michael Bothe, Commentary on the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, in THE LAW OF
NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 23, at 761; Sally V. Mallison & W. Thomas Mallison, Naval
Targeting: Lawful Objects of Attack, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 259 et seq. (Horace B.
Robertson,
64.

1991) (Vol. 64,

Jr. ed.,

US Naval War

College International

Law Studies).

GN Manual, supra note 2, para. 321, and UK Manual, supra note 2, para.

the wording of paragraph 46 of the San

Remo Manual. However,

in

NWP

13.32,

both repeat

1-14M, supra note

2,

no express reference to precautions in attack.
65. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 1, para. 46 (a).
66. For the details, see David Evans, Vincennes - A Case Study, 119 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS 49 (Aug. 1993); Norman Friedman, The Vincennes Incident, 115 U.S. NAVAL
Institute Proceedings 74 (May 1989).
67. While this view is shared by most writers, O'Connell seems to take the position that naval
bombardment is governed by both Hague Convention IX and Additional Protocol I. See II
Daniel P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea 1130 et seq., 1139, (Ivan A.
there

is

Shearer

ed., 1984).

68.

Supra note 23.

69.

See, inter alia,

and Humanity]
70.

Obviously, this

criticism, see
71.

EBERHARD SPETZLER, LUFTKRIEG UND MENSCHLICHKEIT

[AIR

WARFARE

127 et seq. (1956).
is

the position taken by SPAIGHT, supra note 28, at 221 et seq. For an early

MORTON W.

CASTREN, supra note

ROYSE, AERIAL

BOMBARDMENT

162 et

seq. (1928).

42, at 402.

San Remo Manual, supra note 1, para. 1 10.
73. See Mary T. Hall, False Colors and Dummy Ships: The Use of Ruse in Naval Warfare, 40
Naval War College REVIEW 52 (1989). See also TUCKER, supra note 42, at 139, who, in 1957,
72.

still

74.

believed that flying a false flag was of most practical importance.

UK Manual, supra note 2, para.

supra note
75.

2, para.

406

13.83;

NWP

1-14M, supra note

2,

para. 12.1;

GN Manual,

et seq.

Reprinted in 238 INTERNATIONAL

REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 58

et seq. (Jan.-Feb. 1984).

Law of Naval Warfare, in
The Military Objective and the Principle of Distinction in Naval Warfare 40 (Wolff
76.

William

J.

Fenrick, Introductory Report: Military Objectives in the

Heintschel von Heinegg

ed., 1991).

77.

SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note

78.

UK Manual, supra note 2, para.

1,

para. 47

13.33;

(i).

GN Manual, supra note 2, para. 324 et seq.; NWP

1-

14M, supra note 2, para. 8.2.1.
In NWP 1-14M, supra note 2, para. 8.2.1, it is emphasized: "Disabled enemy aircraft in air
combat are frequently pursued to destruction because of the impossibility of verifying their true
status and inability to enforce surrender. Although disabled, the aircraft may or may not have
lost its means of combat. Moreover, it still may represent a valuable military asset. Accordingly,
79.
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combat is not generally offered. However, if surrender is offered in good faith so
that circumstances do not preclude enforcement, it must be respected."
80. E.g., by Steven Haines, supra note 3.
8 1 CASTREN, supra note 42, at 500 et seq.; TUCKER, supra note 42, at 206 et seq.; OPPENHEIM'S,
supra note 31, at 675 etseq.; Yoram Dinstein, Neutrality in Sea Warfare, in III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 558 etseq. (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997).
82. Supra note 81. See also STEFAN OETER, NEUTRALITAT UND WAFFENHANDEL 129 et seq.
(1992); Dietrich Schindler, Aspects contemporains de la neutrality 121 RECEUIL DE COURS 263
surrender in

air

(1967); Michael Bothe, Neutrality at Sea, in

Dekker

& Harry H.G.

1980-1988,

at

205

et seq (Ige F.

Schindler, supra note 82, at 261 et seq.; Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States.

83.

Collective Security:

Law of War and Neutrality,

(Max Sorensen

et seq.

ed.,

Intermediate Status Between

98

THE GULF WAR

Post eds., 1992).

et seq (1954);

in

MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 840

Law Recognize an
AMERICAN
48
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
and Duties Under International Law, 34 AMERICAN

1968); Philip C. Jessup, Should International

War and Peace?,

Quincy Wright, Rights

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 etseq. (1940); Frederick R. Coudert, Non-Belligerency in
International Law, 29 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 143 (1942); Andrea Gioia, Neutrality and NonBelligerency, in International Economic Law and Armed Conflict 51 et seq. (Harry H.G.
Post ed., 1994); Ove Bring, Comments, in THE GULF WAR 1980-1988, supra note 82, at 244.
84.

Supra note 83; see

85.

Paragraph

7:

also

OPPENHEIM'S, supra note

"Notwithstanding any rule in

31, at 651.

this

document or elsewhere on

the law of

where the Security Council, acting in accordance with its powers under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, has identified one or more parties to an armed conflict as
neutrality,

responsible for resorting to force in violation of international law, neutral States: (a) are

not to lend assistance other than humanitarian assistance to that
assistance to

by

State;

and

(b)

bound

may

lend

any State which has been the victim of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression
8: "Where, in the course of an international armed conflict, the

that State." Paragraph

Security Council has taken preventive or enforcement action involving the application of

economic measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, Member States of the United Nations
may not rely upon the law of neutrality to justify conduct which would be incompatible with
their obligations under the Charter or under decisions of the Security Council."
86. See OETER, supra note 82, at 136.
87. For example, the British Government, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), stated that it
would not deliver "lethal equipment" to Iraq, but added that it would nevertheless "attempt to
fulfill existing contracts and obligations." See 56 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
534(1985).

mention the Iran-Contras affair. See Alan T. Leonhard, Introduction,
Neutrality Changing Concepts and Practices 4 (Alan T. Leonhard ed., 1988).
88.

It

suffices here to

89.

Bothe, supra note 82, at 207.

90.

NWP

note

2,

1-14M, supra note

2,

chap.

7;

GN Manual, supra note 2, chap. 3; UK Manual, supra

para. 13.9 (note that para. 13.9 has

91.

Supra note 56.

92.

Supra note 23.

been supplemented by para. 13.9

93.

See the references, supra note 81 et seq.

94.

Id.

95.

Hague Convention XIII, supra note 23, arts.

etseq.;

NWP

1-14M, supra note

2,

in

1, 2,

paras. 7.3.2, 7.3.4;
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UK Manual, supra note 2, para.

13.8

GN Manual, supra note 2, para. 236, 243;
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SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note

1,

paras. 15-17; Helsinki Principles, supra note 56, paras. 1.4,

2.1.

96. Hague Convention XIII, supra note 23, art. 8; UK Manual, supra note 2, para. 13.9E; NWP
1-14M, supra note 2, paras. 7.3 and 7.3.4.1; GN Manual, swpra note 2, para. 232; SAN REMO

MANUAL,
97.

supra note

para. 22.

1,

The term "unneutral

service" refers to a

conduct of neutral merchant

vessels

which

in

is

enemy belligerent, e.g. the carriage of contraband. See Dinstein, supra note 81, at
564 et seq. With regard to the prohibition of unneutral service, see Declaration Concerning the
Laws of War arts. 45, 46, Feb. 26, 1909, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note
support of the

23, at

1

113;

NWP 1-14M, supra note 2, para.7.4; UK Manual, supra note 2, para. 13.84 etseq.; GN

Manual, supra note

para. 258 et seq.;

2,

SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note

1,

paras. 112 et seq.;

Helsinki Principles, supra note 56, paras. 5.2.1 etseq.
98. See

UK Manual, supra note 2, para.

13.4:

"[T]he United

Kingdom

takes the view that the

old rule which prohibited belligerent warships from remaining in neutral ports for

hours except in unusual circumstances,
99.

The 24-hour rule

is

is

supra note

1,

para. 21; Helsinki Principles, supra note 56, para. 2.2. See also Dinstein,

supra note 81, at 559 et
les

100.

Hague Convention

7.3.4;

seq.;

Paul Parfond, Le statut juridique des navires de guerre belligerants
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dans

ports neutres,

no longer applicable in view of modern state practice."
Hague Convention XIII, supra note 23, art. 12;
GN Manual, supra note 2, para. 236 etseq.; SAN REMO

expressly recognized in

NWP 1-14M, supra note 2, para. 7.3.2.1;
MANUAL,

more than 24

(1952).

NWP 1-14M, supra note 2, paras. 7.3.2 and
GN Manual, supra note 2, para. 245. See also Tucker,

XIII, supra note 23, art. 9;

UK Manual, supra note 2, para.

1

13.9B;

supra note 42, at 240; OPPENHEIM'S, supra note 31, at 727 etseq.; CASTREN, supra note 42, at 519
et seq.

101. See the references supra note 96.

an in-depth analysis of the Graf Spee incident, see DANIEL
INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 27 et seq. (1975).
102. For

103. See

SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note

para. 5.1;

1,

paras. 3 et seq. See also

P.

NWP

O'CONNELL, THE

1-14M, supra note

2,

GN Manual, supra note 2, para. 218.

104. For a detailed analysis of this principle, see HENRI MEYROWITZ, Le PRINCIPE DE L'EGALITE
DES BELLIGERANTS DEVANT LA DROIT DE LA GUERRE (1970). See also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE

Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict 4
105. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 1, paras. 6 etseq.
106.

The same approach underlies NWP

107.

UK Manual, supra note 2, para.

1-

(2004).

14M, supra note 2, and the GN Manual, supra note 2.

13.3.

108. Supra note 106.
109. Evidence can be

found

in the practice of States during the Iran-Iraq

neutral merchant vessels were

1984) and by the

member

condemned by

the

UN

War. The

attacks

Security Council (SC Res. 552, June

on
1,

European Community. See Bulletin of the European
Communities, Commission, No. 9, at 7 ( 1980); European Political Cooperation Documentation
Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 2, at 93 (1987) and Vol. 4, No. 1, at 173 etseq. (1988).
110. For a detailed analysis of that practice, see William J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in
the Law ofNaval Warfare, 24 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1986). See also
Ronald P. Barston & Patricia Birnie, The Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas Conflict- A Question of
Zones, 7 MARINE POLICY 14 (1983); A. Vaughan Lowe, Commentary, in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
(1980-1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 241 et seq. (Andrea de Guttry & Natalino
States of the

Ronzitti eds., 1993).
1 1

l."[T]he exclusion zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries but

also to
illegal

any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the
occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces. The zone will also apply to any
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which is operating in support of the Argentine occupation.
Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is found within the zone without
authority from the Ministry of Defence in London will be regarded as operating in support of the
illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked by
British forces." TIMES (London), Apr. 29, 1982, reprinted in 53 THE BRITISH YEARBOOK OF
aircraft,

whether military or

International

Law 542

civil,

(1982).

However, Fenrick, supra note 1 10, at 1 12 et seq., maintains that the British TEZ was legal in
view of the fact that in was established in a remote sea area and that neutral ships were not
112.

attacked.
113. Statement

by the Minister of

State,

Commonwealth Office, Jan. 28, 1986,
reprinted in 57 THE BRITISH YEARBOOK OF

Foreign and

House of Commons Debates, Vol. 90, col. 426,
International Law 583 (1986).
114. See YORAM DlNSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 80
115.UK Manual, supra note 2, para. 13.84 et seq.

116.NWP 1-14M,

supra note

2,

para. 7.4;

et seq.

GN Manual, supra note 2, para.

(3d ed. 2001).

258

et seq.;

Helsinki

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search,
Diversion and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part I, The Traditional Law, 29 CANADIAN YEARBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283 et seq. (1991); Part II, Developments since 1945, 30 Canadian
Yearbook of International Law 89 et seq. (1992).
117. Paul Reuter, ETUDE DE LA REGLE: 'TOUTE PRISE DOIT ETRE JUGEE' (1933).
Principles, supra note 56, paras. 5.2.1 et seq. See also

1

18.

See the references supra note

1

16. See also Dinstein,

119.

Supra note 21.

120.

As already mentioned, these conditions are similar

supra note 81, at 566.

to those laid

down

in the

San

Remo

Manual on the destruction of "prizes." Note that SPAIGHT, supra note 28, at 394 etseq. and 409 et
seq., doubts whether the 1923 Hague Rules would be operable.
121. See also Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 2, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1 180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295.

EXPLANATIONS, supra note 1, para. 128.1.
most recent description of the capabilities of such sensors, see JANE'S DEFENCE
WEEKLY, Apr. 14, 2004, at 23 etseq.
124. Institute of international Law, The Laws of Naval War Governing the
Relations between Belligerents (1913), reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflict, supra
122.

123. For a

note 23, at 1123.
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Future Navies

—Present Issues

Jane G. Dalton*

The US Navy

transforming to deal with a wider range of missions than the

is

major combat operations which

traditional blue- water,

it

has traditionally

been equipped to handle. That emerging transformation has resulted
1

in a

number

of new programs, technologies, and strategies that raise interesting, and sometimes

complex,

legal

issues.

Lawyers advising the Navy's leadership through

this

transformational process are analyzing these legal issues now, in the present, to ensure that the future

equipped. This
advisors

who

US Navy

article will

is

properly,

legally,

organized, trained and

address five topics of interest for naval planners and legal

are building the

Navy of tomorrow.

Civilian Mariners

The US Navy

and

and Sea Basing

currently maintains a force of approximately 550,000 full-time per-

35% of whom are civilians. At any given time, 130-plus of the Navy's
283 ships are underway. That constitutes about 45% of the total ship inventory. 2 In
2004, former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark directed the

sonnel, about

*
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Future Navies

Navy to maximize

capabilities,

nate unnecessary billets.
lets

that have

little

to

3

—Present

minimize

payroll,

One way to meet those

Issues

improve productivity and

goals

is

to

remove

do with warfighting, and replace them with

sailors

from bil-

civilians.

—

maintain the engineering plant, chip paint

sailors cut hair, serve meals,

that civilians are equally capable of performing,

and do perform,

at

elimi-

At

sea,

tasks

all

commands

on warships to perform those tasks is a logical extension of
the CNO's guidance and would free sailors to engage in combat-related activities.
ashore. Placing civilians

The Navy's answer to

the

CNO's

federal civil service mariners

challenge

is

an experimental program to place

onboard warships. These

tasks sailors have traditionally performed

civilian

onboard warships, but that civilian mari-

ners have performed onboard auxiliary vessels for decades
vessels for centuries

—

mariners perform

and onboard merchant

and deck seamanship. For example,

navigation, engineering,

USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC-20) deployed to the European theater as the new US Sixth Fleet and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
command ship one of the most sophisticated Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) ships ever commissioned. 4 Mount Whitney
is manned by a hybrid crew consisting of 157 US Navy sailors and 143 civilian marin early 2005,

—

iners

employed by the Military Sealift Command. These 300 personnel represent a

reduction of 276 people from the previous

menting the .crew with
ports, "the

all

active-duty

Navy crew. "By supple-

civilian mariners," the Sixth Fleet Public Affairs Office re-

Navy is operating

the

command ship

at a

reduced cost and employing

on forward combatant vessels." 5 Mount
Whitney will be engaged in NATO exercises and Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean maritime operations and will be available as a command and control ship for
captured uniformed personnel

future

combat operations

if

billets

required.

In addition to placing civilian mariners

duty

sailors

have performed in the past,

on warships performing functions activethe Navy is simultaneously pursuing the

concept of "sea basing" as a transformational initiative. Sea basing is the Navy's an-

swer to the concern that access to bases in foreign territory will be

and more ad hoc than

in the past. This

concern

is

less predictable

not an idle or speculative one, as

evidenced by Turkey's refusal during Operation Iraqi Freedom to permit the 4th
Infantry Division to cross Turkish territory into Northern Iraq.

—

The sea base is envisioned as a system of systems a flotilla of ships that serves as
a staging and sustainment area for ground forces to launch attacks ashore in a nonpermissive environment

Though no one knows

—sometimes

exactly

referred to as "forcible entry operations."

what the sea base

will

look

like in

probably consist of a "network of ships providing offshore
port, supplies

and

a secure

any

detail,

it

artillery fire, air

will

sup-

home for troops fighting on land." 6 The primary com-

ponents of the sea base could include the Maritime Prepositioning Force Future
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(DDX), the Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) and the Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA-R) in conjunction with existing guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, aircraft carriers, and submarines. 7
(MPF-F) cargo

ship, the next generation destroyer

Of particular

interest for this discussion

is

the role of the

MPF-F

cargo ship in

The MPF-F is designed as the replacement for today's
prepositioning force cargo ships and would serve as a floating logistics center. One
report notes that it would be "nearly as large as an aircraft carrier" and would "accommodate heavy-lift helicopters and perhaps cargo planes as large as the Air
Force's C-130. It would be able to move supplies and equipment to those aircraft
sea basing operations.

and other ships while

at sea." 8

volved in combat operations.

Another report, however, depicts
It

refers to the

deck Tarawa-class ships and describes

it

MPF-F

as a

a role directly in-

replacement for the big-

as a "fighting logistics ship

with a

flight

deck big enough to send hundreds of Marines ashore in rotorcraft and launch Joint
Strike Fighters." 9
If the

MPF-F

ship

will consist entirely

is

manned

similar to existing prepositioning ships, the crew

no legal prohibition against manammunition ships, supply ships, and

of civilian mariners. There

ning naval auxiliaries such as

oilers,

is

prepositioning ships with civilian mariners. In

fact,

these mariners have a recog-

nized status under the Geneva Conventions as "civilians accompanying the force"

and

are entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. 10 Issues arise, however, if the

MPF-F

is

indeed to become part of the "assault echelon"

actually launch

Mount

—

if

Marines or soldiers

from the ship into combat operations ashore. Similar issues

arise if

Whitney, with a hybrid crew of active-duty sailors and civilian mariners,

employed

as a

C4I ship in a future armed

is

conflict.

The issues that arise are twofold: First, under conventional and customary international law, a warship is manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline.
Second, civilians who assist in operating and maintaining a warship engaged in international armed conflict could be viewed as participating actively or directly in
hostilities, and thus as having lost their protected status as civilians accompanying
the force. These two issues will be addressed in turn.
Article 29 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 11 and
Article 8 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 12 identify warships by four characteristics: they belong to the armed forces of a State; they bear external marks distinguishing warships of their nationality; they are commanded by officers duly
commissioned by the government of the State and whose names appear in the appropriate service lists or equivalents; and they are manned by crews under regular
armed forces discipline. These characteristics originated in the 1856 Declaration of
Paris 13

which abolished privateering, and the 1907 Hague Convention VII 14 which

established the conditions for converting

merchant ships into warships. The
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served to distinguish bona fide warships from privateers, which operated from

motives of personal gain, by clearly establishing that the warships operated on be-

They also furthered the requirement in Hague VII that warships are
observe the laws and customs of war. These four characteristics are so univer-

half of a State.
to

sally identified

with warships throughout the world that they

may be

said to have

attained the status of customary international law.
Left undefined, however,

what the phrase "manned by

is

a crew" actually

means in practice. Many US Navy warships today have civilians onboard performing a variety of functions
tors.

Under customary

—

technical representatives, science advisors, contrac-

practice, warships

have carried

civilians

onboard. In the

War of 1812, for example, Commodore Stephen Decatur's ship, the frigate
embarked female contract nurses

States,

to care for the sick

mere presence of small numbers of civilians
its

status as a warship.

clearly

United

and wounded. 15 The

does not deprive a warship of

But the issue takes on greater meaning

if

one-third or one-

composed of civilians who, though subject to a
civilian disciplinary system, are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus16
tice.
Though there is no "bright line" rule that determines what percentage of a
half of a warship's

complement

is

warship's crew should be active-duty sailors,

fair to

it is

say that the greater the

percentage of civilians onboard performing functions traditionally accomplished

by sailors, the less likely the warship will be able to maintain swift and effective discipline over its entire manning complement. The inability to effectively discipline
a crew thus calls into question the ship's ability to "observe the laws

and customs

of war" as required by Hague VII.

The

first

issue concerning civilian mariners, as just discussed, implicates the

warship's ability to meet

toms of war and

to

its

international obligation to observe the laws

meet the

criteria established for

customary law. The second issue

is

an international armed

the basic principles of the law of armed conflict

that

is

as possible

from the exigencies of war.

noncombatants

unless

(civilians)

and until they take

17

conflict.

that of "distinction"

and noncombatants must be distinguished so

much

warships in conventional and

related to the civilian mariners themselves

to their status if they are captured during

ants

and cus-

as to spare

and

One

of

—combat-

noncombatants

as

A corollary of the basic principle is

enjoy protections under the law of armed conflict

a direct or active part in hostilities. 18 Civilians

accompa-

nying the force certainly assume the risk of becoming casualties of war due to their
proximity to military operations. For example, civilian mariners manning
replenishing warships at sea are aware that the platforms

serve are

The mariners themselves, however, retain their status
"persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members

legitimate military objectives.
as

on which they

oilers
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They carry identification cards reflecting their authority to accompany
the force, and are entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. 19
If the civilian mariners are employed onboard a warship engaged in combat opthereof."

erations, however,

fortunately, there
in hostilities.

20

it is

is

possible that questions could be raised as to their status.

Un-

no authoritative definition of "direct" or "active" participation

Purely collateral duties such as cutting hair, running the ship's store

and performing housekeeping functions may contribute
onboard the warship, but are not necessary

to

its

combat

to the quality of

life

On

the

effectiveness.

other end of the spectrum, firing weapons, maintaining the weapons systems or
serving as
pation.

members of belligerent boarding parties

are

more akin to

actual partici-

Running the engineering plant, navigating the ship and operating the small

boats and cranes could be considered collateral functions or could be considered
actual participation.

A sailor who needs a haircut can nevertheless man the weapons systems or serve
on a boarding party. A ship that is not within its assigned Tomahawk Land Attack
Missile

(T-LAM) launch basket or

is

not properly heading into the wind for the

combat function. Further, the warship
itself is a weapons system and the full crew complement is required for the weapons

launch of fighter aircraft cannot perform

system to be

effective. Civilian

its

engineers running the propulsion plant, navigators

movement, and technicians working on the missile system all contribute to the war fighting effectiveness of the ship. It is difficult to argue that any of
these personnel are not actively and directly contributing to the combat functions
plotting ship's

of the ship.

It is

conceivable that an opposing belligerent could perceive civilian

mariners serving onboard a warship engaged in international armed conflict, particularly those

engaged in engineering, navigation and deck seamanship,

taken an active and direct part in
also

be unlikely to grant the

and could prosecute them
ent's

hostilities.

civilian

for

as

having

That same enemy belligerent would

mariners combatant immunity for such acts

murder, arson and other violations of the

belliger-

domestic law.

The above discussion posits the most extreme examples. To

date, the only war-

manned with civilian mariners have been those warships designated as command and control platforms such as Mount Whitney. The MPF-F ships are still in
the planning stages and it is not determined exactly how they will be employed in
the sea basing construct. As the Navy continues its transformational efforts, howships

no doubt be continued pressure to contract out or seek civilian submore and more administrative and support functions in order to free

ever, there will

stitution for

active-duty sailors for actual

combat

duties.

To address both issues raised by the potential "civilianization" of warship crews,
the Navy has proposed legislation 21 that would create a 5-year pilot program to
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component.
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affiliate

with a special Navy Re-

mariners will remain civilian fed-

ordered into combat operations in international

which time the mariners

will

be ordered to active duty. In their

duty status, the mariners will be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus-

thus ensuring that the entire crew

ther, if captured, they will

is

subject to

armed

forces discipline. Fur-

be members of the active duty force entitled not only to

prisoner of war status, but also to combatant

immunity for any belligerent

acts in

which the warship engaged. Though there may be other ways to approach the
ternational law concerns raised
legislation
civilian

is

attractive in that

it

in-

by placing hybrid crews on warships, the proposed
resolves both issues satisfactorily

and provides the

mariners with the highest degree of protection under international law in

the event they are captured during belligerent operations.

Unmanned Aerial and Underwater Systems
In April 2005, General John

Jumper reported

aerial vehicles operating in Iraq.
its first

operational

23

At about the same time, the

unmanned undersea

Remote Minehunting System
Khwar Abd Allah channel at the

vehicle, a

(RMS), to identify and chart suspicious objects

Umm Qasr.

unmanned
US Navy deployed

that there were over 750

in

24

Most readers are surely familiar with the use of the Predator as a precision weapon in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. 25 There is even talk of a
future unmanned aerial system which would track and engage targets without a
"man in the loop." 26 The relatively low cost, ease of transport, technological sophistication, and lack of manned crew combine to make unmanned systems the
surveillance platform and armed weapon of choice for the foreseeable future, 27
even to the point of replacing F- 16 and KC- 135 aircraft in the current US Air Force
Iraqi port of

inventory. 28

The use of

these

unmanned

systems, however, raises a primary legal issue:

Should they be treated under international law
airplanes

like their

manned

counterparts

and submarines? For example, do the regimes of innocent passage,

transit passage

straits

and archipelagic sea lanes passage apply? Are they required to com-

ply with the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea

(COLREGs)? Do they enjoy sovereign immunity? What
attacking an

unmanned

most of these questions

the legal framework for

system? Unfortunately, developing a complete answer to
is

beyond the scope of this

topic of a scholarly legal treatise.
itive

is

article,

and each could be the

Some of the answers, however, are relatively intu-

and will be addressed below.
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Take, for example, a carrier strike group transiting the Strait of

employing an unmanned Scan Eagle
vehicle

29

for a "channel

intelligence, surveillance

sweep" mission. The

Strait

Hormuz and

and reconnaissance

of Hormuz, as an international

connecting the Arabian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea,

strait

subject to the regime of straits transit passage throughout the strait

proaches.

and

30

Under

that regime,

overflight solely for the

strait.

frain

31

all states

its

ap-

enjoy the right of unimpeded navigation

purpose of continuous and expeditious

While exercising the

and

is

right of transit passage, ships

and

transit

of the

aircraft "shall re-

from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of contin-

uous and expeditious

transit."

32

Accordingly, in analyzing whether a carrier strike group
naissance vehicle during straits transit passage, the question

may employ a
is

recon-

not whether the ve-

33

manned or unmanned, but whether it is consistent with the strike group's
"continuous and expeditious transit" in its "normal mode" of operation. The Commander's Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations provides that the normal mode
of operation for surface ships includes "transit in a manner consistent with sound
hicle

is

navigational practices and the security of the force, including formation steaming
aircraft." 34

and the launching and recovery of
straits transit

passage during

armed

conflict

The San Remo Manual addresses
and concludes that belligerents "are

permitted to take defensive measures consistent with their security, including

launching and recovery of
electronic surveillance."

The Scan

aircraft,

Eagle's "channel

force protection

screen formation steaming, and acoustic and

35

sweep" mission

and navigational

is

a surveillance mission designed for

—normal operational concerns

safety

for

all

Navy vessels wherever they are transiting and whether the transit is in peacetime, in
a period of heightened tensions, or during an armed conflict. The need for defensive, force protection measures is particularly acute when transiting in relatively
close proximity to land, in high traffic areas such as the straits,

where an asymmet-

36

enemy such as a terrorist could strike without warning. Accordingly, employment of the Scan Eagle in a force protection and safety of navigation surveillance

ric

and reconnaissance mode is completely consistent with the regime of straits transit

maybe launched from the aircraft carrier or other surface platform. If it
were an unmanned undersea vehicle, it could operate submerged, if that is consistent with its normal mode of operation. The same would apply if the strike group
passage.

It

were operating
It

in archipelagic sea lanes transit

must be noted, however,

through an archipelagic nation.

that the Scan Eagle

is

also

an intelligence-gathering

The rules concerning straits transit passage provide that passage must be
"solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait," 37 and
States are to "refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal

platform.
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distress."
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transit unless

States are also to refrain

rendered necessary by force

from "the

threat or use of force

against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States

bordering the
national law

is

or in any other

embodied

manner in violation of the principles of interUnited Nations." 39 Importantly, un-

in the Charter of the

governing innocent passage through

like the rules

gathering

strait,

not identified as inconsistent with

territorial seas, intelligence-

straits transit passage.

Indeed,

some

amount of photographic or electronic intelligence-gathering may inevitably occur
incidental to the "channel sweep" mission. Such intelligence-gathering would not
be inconsistent with the regime of transit passage since the "channel sweep" mission

is

related to safety of navigation

and

security of the force. 40

Compare the transit passage regime with that of innocent passage through territorial seas.

on the
any

When engaged in innocent passage, submarines are required to operate

surface, ships

act

aimed

may not launch or recover aircraft or any military device, and

at collecting

of the coastal State

is

information to the prejudice of the defense or security

considered inconsistent with the innocent passage regime. 41

Accordingly, a carrier strike group engaged in innocent passage could not launch

or recover the Scan Eagle or the

RMS underwater vehicle. Since there is no right of

innocent passage through a nation's

launched outside the

territorial sea

an unmanned

territorial airspace,

would not be

aircraft

entitled to innocent passage over

the territorial sea.

unmanned

Consider, though, whether an
entry into the territorial sea

submarines

is

under the

ment of the
equivalent,
43

State

Arguably, the

RMS

a

of an officer duly commissioned by the govern-

crew which

vehicle

ship

and the crew operating

.

marks distinguishing such ships of its

and whose name appears

and manned by

.

does define "warship" as "a ship belonging to the

it

command

commanding officer of the

RMS

surface as other
.

forces of a State bearing the external

nationality,

on the

enThe 1982 LOS Convention provides that "ships of all States
42
of innocent passage through the territorial sea." The Convention

does not define "ship," but

pline."

entitled to innocent passage

are.

joy the right

armed

undersea vehicle launched prior to

fits

is

list

or

under regular armed forces

this definition if

from which

it is

in the appropriate service

it is

launched

"manning" the

its

disci-

one considers that the
is

in

vehicle. In

"command" of the

any event, the

RMS

does not have to be a warship to be entitled to innocent passage, since the right applies to "ships"

of

all States.

Webster's dictionary distinguishes between ships,

rather large vessels adapted for deep-water navigation,

and

boats, rather small,

usually open, craft. 44 But Webster's also notes that for legal purposes, a ship
vessel intended for

propulsion."

45

marine transportation, without regard to form,

Arguably, then, an

unmanned undersea vehicle,
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ship,

could engage in continuous, expeditious innocent passage, provided

transited

on the

surface,

showed

its flag,

and did not engage

it

in intelligence collec-

tion to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state.

A related issue is whether unmanned systems like the RMS are "vessels" which
must comply with the Regulations
(COLREGs). The COLREGs apply to

for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea
"all vessels

on the high

vessel to include "every description of watercraft, including

seas,"

and define a

non-displacement

means of transportation on
water." The COLREGs definition is also found in US statutes 47 and is the generally accepted definition in admiralty law. The US Supreme Court has ruled on this
subject, and continues to expand the type of watercraft encompassed by the term
"vessel." 48 Though the RMS system is incapable of transporting people, it does
carry a payload of sensors, other instrumentation and equipment, has its own propulsion system of up to 16 knots, and is able to operate as far as 14 nautical miles
from the launch platform. 49 If the RMS and similar systems are "vessels," they must
meet a number of design and operational requirements, such as being equipped
with lookouts, sound, lighting, and dayshapes. 50
Regardless whether the RMS is required to comply with the COLREGs requirements, those in command of the launching platform and the unmanned system
have a duty to act with due regard for the safety of others on the high seas a duty
imposed by both the COLREGs 51 and the Law of the Sea. 52 The RMS system is currently equipped with a mast-mounted camera that allows the operator to safely
avoid surface objects; forward-looking sonar to alert the operator to submerged
objects; and a mast-mounted strobe light to advise nearby vessels of its presence. A
radar reflector may also be mounted on the mast. 53 Given the unsettled state of the
law on the status of unmanned undersea systems, 54 the prudent course of action for
the US Navy is to ensure these systems comply with all applicable COLREGs recraft

and seaplanes, used or capable of being used

as a

46

—

quirements or obtain appropriate exemptions.

Hospital Ships

Military hospital ships are granted extraordinary protection under the Second

Geneva Convention. Current technology and the
ever, are

threat of global terrorism,

how-

posing two vexing problems for navies of the future.

Military hospital ships are those ships built

and transport the wounded,

and equipped
55

solely to assist, treat

They may

no circumstances" be attacked or captured, but shall "at all times be respected and protected," provided that the parties to the conflict are notified of their names and
sick

and shipwrecked.

"in

descriptions ten days before the ships are employed. 56 Hospital ships are entitled to
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the aforementioned protections "unless they are used to
the enemy."

tended to

57

The presence on board

facilitate

commit

.

.

.

acts

harmful to

hospital ships of "apparatus exclusively in-

navigation or communication" does not deprive the ships of the

protections due them. 58

Somewhat

in contradiction, however,

it is

expressly for-

bidden for hospital ships to "possess or use a secret code for their wireless or other

means of communication." 59
ment in this day and age.

It is this

prohibition that proves difficult to imple-

Professor Richard Grunawalt has conducted an in-depth analysis of the origins

of this prohibition, 60 which derived from a desire to conclusively prevent any further instances of hospital ships being used to signal

and provide non-medical

vices to combatants, as occurred during the Russo-Japanese

and again during World War I.
negotiated,

it

62

Even

as the

War

ser-

of 1 904-1 905 61

Second Geneva Convention was being

was recognized that a prohibition on the use of secret codes by hospi-

would be difficult to implement in practice. So the Diplomatic Conference
recommended that the High Contracting Parties draw up an international code

tal

ships

providing regulations for the use of "modern means of communication" between
hospital ships

and warships and military aircraft. 63 Unfortunately,

that code never

came into being, and the High Contracting Parties are left with the prohibition as it
was drafted

in 1949.

Interestingly, the equally authentic

French text of the Convention contains a

prohibition only on the use of a secret code to transmit 64
addition, Article 28(2) of Additional Protocol
craft provides that

such

aircraft "shall

I

traffic,

not to receive

it.

of 1977, concerning medical

In

air-

not be used to collect or transmit intelligence

data and shall not carry any equipment intended for such purposes," but does not
prohibit the use of a secret code or encrypted communications to further the hu-

manitarian mission of the aircraft. 65 Additional Protocol I clearly takes a more
istic

real-

approach that recognizes the developments in communications technology

since 1949.

The French

text of the

1949 Geneva Convention also appears to recog-

nize the necessity for hospital ships to receive encrypted communications, at a

minimum.
Professor Grunawalt's article provides ample discussion of the problems in-

herent in the use of unencrypted communications by hospital ships, not the least

of which

is

that

US

federal privacy standards require that patient medical infor-

mation be transmitted over secure

do

so.

tion,

66

circuits if

it is

reasonable and appropriate to

There are also practical security issues with transmitting patient informa-

such as social security numbers, in the

growing concern,

it

would be unfortunate

were exposed to yet an additional
a hospital ship. Further,

it

risk as a

With identity theft an everwounded and injured personnel

clear.

if

consequence of being treated onboard

has been reported that
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deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in January 2003,

equipped with encrypted communications systems.
ticle to

67

is

anachronistic, unrealistic,

nology environment where

satellite

is

no need

on use of a

further belabor the point that the prohibition

hospital ships

There

and unworkable

in fact

it

was

in this ar-

"secret code"

by

in today's high tech-

communications are both routinely en-

crypted and routinely employed by military systems. Accordingly, this author
joins with Professor

Grunawalt 68 in recommending that the

US Navy

formally

abandon adherence to this requirement, while reaffirming adherence to the underlying mandate that hospital ships may not be used for military purposes harmful to

an adversary.

The second vexation facing hospital ships is the need to arm them for force protection against USS Cole-type attacks. Again, the Second Geneva Convention proand in this instance the basic rule is far more
vides the baseline legal requirement

—

realistic

than the one just discussed prohibiting the use of a secret code. Article

35(1) provides that arming the crews of hospital ships for the maintenance of order, or for their

own

defense or the defense of the sick and wounded, does not de-

prive the ships of their protected status. 69 In this author's opinion, that should
all

debate,

and the Navy should not hesitate

teams armed with crew-served weapons

to

end

man its hospital ships with security

—such

machine guns and grenade

as

launchers for close-in defense against attacks by terrorists or others

who do

comply with the law of armed conflict. Professor Grunawalt, however,

aptly points

not

out the very legitimate reasons one should be cautious about deploying hospital

And on this topic, the San Remo Manual
has taken a decidedly anachronistic viewpoint by opining that hospital ships may be
ships bristling with defensive armaments. 70

armed "only" with

"deflective"

means of defense (such

as chaff and flares)

and "not

with means that could be used in offensive fashion, such as anti-aircraft guns." 71

Not only are

chaff and flares ineffective against a determined suicide attack like

that launched against Cole, but the requirement as stated in the
is

nowhere found

in the

Geneva Conventions and

is

an unnecessary and untimely

restriction of the plain letter of the law. Accordingly, this

fessor

San Remo Manual

author concurs with Pro-

Grunawalt that in addition to crew-served weapons

like .50 caliber

guns, hospital ships should be equipped with the Phalanx Close-in

machine

Weapons

Sys-

tem or other state-of-the art defensive anti-air and anti-surface weapons systems. 72
While the Royal Navy concurs that encryption equipment may be fitted in hospital
on the
any armaments

ships "to assist with the humanitarian mission," they are not as supportive

arming

issue.

A Royal Navy official told Jane's Defence Weekly that

beyond small sidearms "would compromise the protected status of the vessels" under current international law. 73

due to budgetary rather than

The Royal Navy approach

legal considerations
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platforms that can accomplish other missions in addition to caring for the

wounded and

sick

—may be more

in line with the

As Dr. Arthur M. Smith pointed out in

US

Navy's plans for sea basing.

a recent edition of the

may be dramatically

Review, "plans for afloat casualty care and strategic evacuation
altered"

under the Navy's sea basing concept.

chartered cruise ships or Military Sealift

75

He

Command

Naval War College

suggests that commercially
logistics ships

might deliver

troops and equipment to the sea base, and then be converted to casualty care. Further, given the terrorist threat

more

practical

method

worldwide, aeromedical evacuation could provide a

to care for

and evacuate the wounded than evacuation by

hospital ships. Given that potential terrorists could view white ships with large red
crosses as attractive targets rather than as specially protected vessels, force protec-

tion considerations alone could dictate developing flexible, multi-mission plat-

forms
out,

as substitutes for traditional white-hulled hospital ships.

combatant commanders

As Dr. Smith points
and evacuation

will define their casualty care

quirements in the future, and those requirements might not include ships

USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy.

relike

76

The Law of the Sea Convention and the Future of Naval Warfare
As the Navy looks

some have questioned whether
Navy leadership's long-standing support for United States accession to the Law of
the Sea Convention continues to be in the best interests of the Navy and the United
States.

to sea basing

and the

future,

Some have asked whether the Convention helps or hinders the Navy's vision

of sea basing. Throughout his term as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark
never wavered from his strong position in favor of the Convention.
fore Senate committees

sea basing

on more than one occasion

that the

He testified be-

Convention supports

and "provides the stable and predictable legal regime with which to con-

duct our operations today and in the future. Joining the Convention will support

ongoing U.S. military operations, including continued prosecution of the Global

War on

Terrorism." 77 Likewise, the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral

Michael Mullen, follows a long line of distinguished predecessors in his support of

United States accession to the Convention. 78

It is this

author's opinion that the

Law

of the Sea Convention preserves our ability to fully leverage use of the world's
oceans by providing a body of widely accepted and recognized law that protects
navigational freedoms and our ability to operate
First,

on the high

seas.

the Convention does not impair or inhibit the inherent right of self-defense.

The Convention was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations and the
precepts of the Charter, Article 5 1 of which clearly recognizes and reflects the inherent right of self-defense. Second, the stipulation in the Convention that "The
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high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes" 79 must be read in light of Article
58,

which

specifically reserves

freedom of navigation and overflight and "other

ternationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms" to be enjoyed
States.

80

State practice over

zones

is

—confirms

now

all

territorial seas

—

in-

recognized as their contiguous and exclusive economic

that military uses of the seas that

United Nations Charter

81

are lawful

The Law of the Sea Convention
ties in

by

hundreds of years, by which the navies of the world

have operated and trained in waters seaward of other nations'
cluding what

in-

do not violate Article 2(4) of the

under customary international law.

reaffirms this position

by limiting military activi-

only a few narrow circumstances, such as Article 19 regarding innocent pas-

and Consent

sage through the territorial sea. Moreover, the Resolution of Advice
Ratification

vides that

approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

"The advice and consent of the Senate

derstandings: (1)

The United

... is

to

specifically pro-

subject to the following

States understands that nothing in the

.

.

.

un-

Convention,

including any provisions referring to 'peaceful uses' or 'peaceful purposes' impairs
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense or rights during
flict."

82

The

"peaceful purposes" provision of the

Law of the

armed con-

Sea Convention creates

no new rights or obligations and imposes no restraints on military operations or traditional uses of the seas

any more than does the equivalent provision in the Outer

Space Treaty, which provides that the
"exclusively for peaceful purposes."
States that "peaceful purposes"

83

moon and other celestial bodies shall be used
It

has long been the position of the United

means "nonaggressive" purposes. Consequently,

military activity not constituting the use of armed force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity

or political independence of another nation, and not otherwise in-

consistent with the United Nations Charter,

Third, a word about innocent passage.

is

permissible. 84

Some have argued that the Law of the Sea

Convention would negatively impact national security because the innocent passage regime "prohibits" or

makes

"illegal" intelligence

gathering or submerged

submarine operations within a coastal nation's 12 nautical mile

territorial sea.

What the critics do not recognize or acknowledge is that the United States has been
complying with the navigational provisions of the Convention since 1983. In

Ocean Policy Statement of March

Law of the Sea Convention

10, 1983, President

Reagan announced that the

"contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of

the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law

balance the interests of

all

States,"

and

and

that the United States

act" in accordance with those provisions. 85 Further, the

the 1958 Convention

his

practice

and

fairly

would "accept and

United States

is

a party to

on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which contains

innocent passage provisions similar to those in the
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including that submarines in innocent passage are "required to navigate on the

and

surface

to

show their

flag."

86

Law of the

Sea Convention requires

that submarines engaged in innocent passage navigate

on the surface and show
an improvement over the

Like the Territorial Sea Convention, the

their flag. 87

The Law of the Sea Convention, however,

Territorial Sea Convention, in that

may be
State

it

is

specifically delineates those activities that

considered prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal

—thus

shielding the United States

and other sea-going nations from efforts by

coastal States to regulate other types of

"any act aimed

at collecting

conduct in the

territorial sea. It

denotes

information to the prejudice of the defence or security

of the coastal State" as inconsistent with innocent passage and prejudicial to the
peace,

"illegal,"

89

Such

activities are

not deemed

nor are they forbidden. The coastal State may have national laws prohibit-

may

ing such activities,
cent,

security of the coastal State. 88

good order or

take necessary steps to prevent passage which

and may require a warship

regulations concerning passage through the territorial sea.

90

its

Thus,

the territorial sea in innocent passage,

nocent passage.

If it

innocent passage

does not do

it

if a

national laws and

These provisions

the carefully crafted balance the United States sought to protect
flag State.

not inno-

to leave the territorial sea "immediately" if the

warship disregards requests by the coastal State to comply with

both a coastal State and a

is

its

own

interests as

warship or submarine transits through

must comply with the requirements

so, the coastal State that

may require the warship

reflect

for in-

becomes aware of such non-

to depart the territorial sea immediately,

and may then address the matter through diplomatic channels.

Law of the Sea Convention would

Fourth, accession to the

in

no way negatively

The PSI
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and

a global ef-

affect the President's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

is

fort to stop trafficking

their delivery

systems to and from States of proliferation concern.
ganization.

It is

partner nations

a cooperative effort to apply

—

intelligence,

thorities, financial

and on

land.

port for PSI
tion.

—

not a treaty or a formal or-

the tools at the disposal of the PSI

diplomacy, law enforcement, military, customs au-

to prevent transfers of WMD-related items at sea, in the

More than 60

—most,

all

It is

if

While the goal

not
is

air,

countries around the world have indicated their sup-

all,

of which are parties to the

more dynamic,

"to create a

Law of the
creative,

Sea Conven-

and proactive

approach" to preventing proliferation, "actions taken in support of the PSI

will

be

and relevant international law and framestrengthen existing authorities where they are

consistent with national legal authorities

works." 91 Certainly the goal

weak or

inefficient,

is

to

but only within the bounds of national and international law,

which includes the Law of the Sea Convention. Numerous
have taken place, and the

initiative

multilateral exercises

had one publicly announced
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success, in the

fall

of
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when

2003,

four nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Ger-

many) cooperated to interdict and prevent a shipment of centrifuge parts to Libya. 92
Conflict Resolution in the Exclusive Economic Zone

no doubt that the Navy's plans for sea basing could give pause to allies and
potential competitors alike. After all, it is based on the notion that "America will
There

is

never seek a permission

slip to

defend the security of our country." 93 Lieutenant

General James Mattis, head of the Marine Corps

mand,

says the idea

allies to

is

to

Combat Development Com-

minimize the need for the United

States military to rely

on

supply territory from which United States forces can operate abroad. 94 One

hears phrases like "using the sea as

maneuver

space," exploiting the United States'

"control of the seas," and, from a large display in the Pentagon in June 2005, the

"command

of the commons." 95 Carried to

its

logical conclusion,

it

will inevitably

involve the staging of large, floating military bases off the coasts of other nations,

probably in their contiguous or exclusive economic zones, from which joint forces

and weapons could be projected ashore

in a future conflict. Sea basing also has a

Former Naval Sea System Commander Vice Admiral Phillip
Balisle pointed to the Navy's tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia as an example of
sea basing in action. Relief efforts were launched and directed from a collection of
ships stationed off-shore. "We have always had a sea base, or at least for many

more benign

years.

What

side.

we're talking about

now is

the shaping of that sea base for

[a]

21st-

century environment." 96
Will the sea base impact the sovereignly of other nations, threaten their security

or convert the oceans to "non-peaceful" purposes? The answer
will

is

no. Each sea base

be established consistent with principles of law applicable to the operation in

question
flict,

—whether

it

be humanitarian

relief operations, international

or United Nations sanctions enforcement.

Is it

armed con-

possible that other nations

may disagree with the United States over the applicable legal principles? Of course.
Conflicts and disagreements will arise in the future, as they have in the past. One
has only to recall the P-3 incident off Hainan Island in the People's Republic of

China and the difference of opinion between the United

States

and China over the

propriety of military activities conducted in a coastal State's exclusive economic zone
to realize that there will often be differing interpretations of the applicable law. 97

Because of these differing interpretations, particularly as between the United
States

and the People's Republic of China, one might ask whether

it

able for the United States to attempt to negotiate an agreement with

the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement

Agreement

99

98

would be

advis-

China similar to

or the 1989 Dangerous Military Activities

with the former Soviet Union. At the time of those agreements, both
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the United States and the former Soviet
Several dangerous incidents

Issues

Union had

substantial blue-water navies.

had occurred between units of the two nations and the

potential for unpredictable future confrontations existed

around the world.

With China, the potential for confrontation exists primarily within China's exclusive economic zone due to China's objections to US military activities there
such as surveillance and military surveys. An existing mechanism, the Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement, 100 is available and is probably sufficient, given
the limited area and scope of potential confrontations, to address these issues concerning military activities in areas where high seas freedoms apply. In fact, it was
presumably under the auspices of this agreement that Ambassador Prueher proposed a meeting to discuss the EP-3 incident, and suggested that the agenda include a "discussion of causes of the accident and possible recommendations
whereby such collisions could be avoided in the future." 101 However, this author
would not rule out the value of a more comprehensive agreement, embodying special signals like

those in the Incidents at Sea Agreement, for indicating one's inten-

and operations,

tions

if

the consultative

mechanism proves unsuccessful

in

preventing future dangerous encounters.
It is

our

certainly appropriate that the United States continue to

allies

ture.

and potential competitors

Concerning all

five

alike

communicate with

concerning plans for the Navy of the fu-

of the issues discussed in this

to inform other nations of United States intentions

article,

it

would be advisable

and engage

in a dialogue with

them concerning the legal bases for our actions. A cooperative, consultative approach would be useful in obtaining the support and understanding of potential
coalition partners, as well as alleviating the concerns of potential competitors. In a

recent speech to the

Mullen stressed
tions.

102

how

US

Naval

War

College, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral

important coalition partners

will

be to future naval opera-

And while President Bush has made it clear that the United States will not

jeopardize

its

national security by acquiescing to "the objections of the few," 103 the

modus operandi is to seek international support and international partnerships. The Proliferation Security Initiative, for example, is evidence that the
President wants to work with multi-national partners to the maximum extent possible. The issues discussed in this article provide ample opportunities for collabora-

preferred

tion

and cooperation on the international

level.
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